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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on post-conflict Bosnia, one of Europe’s most divided post­
conflict societies, and where the external leadership of the state building process has 
been pronounced. The specific goal is to delineate a framework of analysis that 
accounts for the elite dynamics involved in the state building process in Bosnia in the 
context of the EU accession process. The main research question is: how and under 
what circumstances can external actors shape domestic change in deeply divided 
societies? How may external actors affect the interests, goals, and strategies of 
domestic actors in post-conflict, divided societies? Can local actors resist external 
pressure?
In order to explore these issues empirically, this dissertation examines the 
process of constitutional reform in Bosnia in 2005-2006, and draws from 80 personal 
interviews with the key players and other actors involved. The thesis brings a large 
body of evidence into a process that was, heretofore, largely unknown and shrouded 
in secrecy.
The dissertation is framed within the paradigms of state building and 
international conditionality; which I argue do not adequately capture the nuances and 
complexities of post-conflict Bosnia. Drawing from the literature on conflict 
regulation and other plural society theories, I propose a unique three-tiered 
framework, and argue that this approach represents a more comprehensive construct 
for analyzing post-conflict Bosnia. More specifically, this approach dissects the 
process of constitutional reform from an inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and what I term 
‘supra-national’ level (the latter referring to the interactions between domestic and 
external actors). The study of these interactions is likely to help us define better 
policies in post-conflict state building processes.
I conclude that the international push in Bosnia, and the transformative power of 
the EU were blunted by an ethnic power game. While external actors did play a 
substantive role, the neglect of intra-ethnic dynamics rendered external actors’ efforts 
at shaping the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia ineffective.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“I don’t want to be the rider on a dead horse”1 
Miroslav Lajcak, High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007-2009)
1 February 20092
1.1. INTRODUCTION
The signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFPA) in Dayton in 
November of 1995, which represented the end of the armed conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH),3 set in motion an ambitious peace and state-building mission; 
including an extensive external involvement and supervision of the military, police 
and institutional aspects of the agreement. While the military and security 
components of the GFPA were quickly put into place, the High Representative (HR) 
-  the international envoy created in Dayton to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement -  struggled to build a functional state, in the face of stubborn local 
obstruction stemming from the three major ethnic groups;4 Bosniaks,5 Serbs and
1 The High Representative Miroslav Lajc£k -  the sixth international envoy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -  was not referring to Bosnia, but to the international bodies operating in this country, 
impotent in their mission to create a functional state. Lajcak made this comment two weeks after he 
announced his departure to take on a new job as Slovak Foreign Minister. This quote is reflective of 
the frustration felt within the international community, which has been common ever since the end of 
the war.
2 Miroslav Lajcak, cited in Srecko Latal, “Western Bodies in Bosnia “Dead Horse.”’ Balkan
Insight, 2 February 2009.
3 I use the terms ‘Bosnia’ and ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (BiH) interchangeably throughout
this disertation.
4 The persistence of the mono-ethnic, corruption-riveted structures that had been created
during the war and the continued influence of wartime leaders did also contribute to undermining the 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement (the post-war dynamics of local 
obstruction are further explored in chapter 3, section 3.2). Ongoing institutional obstructions by local 
politicians coupled with deep inter-ethnic divisions led EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn 
to state in 2007 “The current dysfunctionality of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
detrimental to progress. This is hard to understand. Your country benefits nothing from a return to the 
1990s mentality” (Rehn 2007).
5 I use this term to refer to the Bosnian Muslims. Muslims were first recognized as a distinct
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Croats.6 Although there were some important breakthroughs in the late 1990s with 
the launch of the ‘Bonn Powers,’7 which included the imposition of a common 
currency, the introduction of a common vehicle license plate, and the enactment of a 
common national passport;8 Annex Four of the GFAP (i.e. the constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) remained purely a theoretical framework during the 1990s.9
A more comprehensive strategy was conceived and launched in 2000, linking 
the process of state building in Bosnia with the process of EU accession. The goal 
was to use the EU as an incentive for parties to fully engage in the state building 
process, but most of the early reforms were imposed by the HR.10 Spurred by strong 
international pressure, some successes were achieved in 2004-05; including the 
creation of a state-level intelligence agency, the unification of the three armies, and 
the creation of an integrated tax system; but again the gains were short-lived and 
they reflected strong external arm-twisting rather than local engagement in the 
reform process; nationalist rhetoric did not abate and previously accepted reforms 
faced resistance in the implementation phase.
The complicated institutional structure entailing multiple ‘ethnic veto points’, 
coupled with the ongoing ethnic divisions around the form of the state, have been 
argued to impair the process of state building in Bosnia, and bring the entire system
ethnic group in former Yugoslavia in the 1961 census (Burg and Shoup 1999). Recognition of 
Muslims as a nation within Yugoslavia in equal status to the rest of the constituted nations would only 
come in 1963 with the adoption of new a constitution for the republic (Ibid).
6 There are no accurate estimates of the population distribution in Bosnia; it is generally 
accepted that Bosniaks represent more than 50 percent; Serbs around 28 or 30 percent; and Croats 
around 12 or 13 percent (see for example McGonagle, Noll and Price 2003,120-121). The last census 
was completed in 1991. According to this census, Bosniaks represent almost 44 percent of the total 
population; Serbs 31 percent; and Croats 17 percent (Bieber 2006a, 2).
7 The international community launched a revamped international strategy to confront 
domestic obstruction in late 1997, which included inter alia new executive powers vested in the 
international envoy to dismiss officials and impose legislation. These powers were created at the Peace 
implementation Council (PIC) meeting in Bonn in 1997 (Peace Implementation Council 1997b).
8 Cox 2001.
9 Indeed, political parties refused to fully participate in central, state-level institutions and 
would only do so reluctantly, following strong arm-twisting by the international community. As a 
result, state-level institutions remained highly dysfunctional and highly dependent upon the HR’s 
powers (see chapter 3, section 3.2).
10 Including inter alia the Law on the Council of Ministers; the Law on the Civil Service; the 
Decision on Restructuring the Public Broadcasting System; the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office; the 
Law on the High Judicial Council; and the Law on the State Court. Most of these reforms were later 
confirmed by the respective parliaments at both the state and entity levels. The HR’s powers have also 
been prominent in the creation of state level agencies such as the State Border Service in 2000 and in 
the appointment of key positions for newly created institutions. As a case in point, the HR intervened 
in October 2002 to appoint the Director and Deputy Directors of the State Investigation and Protection 
Agency (OHR 2002e). In September 2005 he appointed the Director and Deputy Director of the State 
Border Service (OHR 2005).
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into a chronic institutional impasse. As a case in point, the leading Bosniak and Serb 
parties, namely the SBiH and SNSD, have based their government agendas on 
mutually incompatible demands reminiscent of wartime politics. SNSD’s leader, 
Milorad Dodik, for example, has fervently defended both Dayton and the Serb 
dominated entity Republika Srpska (RS), and threatened to hold a referendum on 
independence, should the status of the latter be questioned. SBiH leader Haris 
Silajdzic, on the contrary, has demanded the dissolution of Dayton and the creation 
of a new state with no entities, divided into economic and geographic territorial units 
as opposed to ethnic ones. These developments have continued to create a deadlock 
over the reform process. Furthermore, the fact that most key reforms to date have 
been either directly imposed by the HR, or have been accepted by the parties only 
after intensive persuasion by the international community, has challenged the role 
external actors have played in shaping the state building process in this country. In 
the words of former High Representative (HR) Paddy Ashdown, “Divided, 
dysfunctional, a black hole,... a space that we cannot afford to leave because it’s too 
destabilizing if we do, but we cannot push forward toward full statehood, either ... 
That, I think, is the danger.”11
My dissertation focuses on the failing record of the state building process in 
post-conflict Bosnia; one of Europe’s most divided post-conflict societies. In 
particular, it sheds light on the dynamics of the post conflict state building in Bosnia 
under the EU leadership; with a particular focus on the interactions between 
domestic and external actors. Some of the key questions under consideration include: 
can external actors shape domestic change in post-conflict, deeply divided societies? 
Can external actors provide incentives to affect the interests, goals, and strategies of 
local actors in deeply divided societies? Can local actors resist external pressure?
My interest thus lies in the study of the external push in post conflict Bosnia and 
the extent to which external actors can succeed in shaping the process of institution 
and state building in this country. In order to explore these questions empirically, I 
examine the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia between 2005 and 2006, and 
draw from more than 80 personal interviews with internal and external actors that 
were involved in the process. I provide much new evidence on developments that
11 Paddy Ashdown, speech given in Washington D.C. before the US Helsinki Committee on 6
April 2009. Cited in Heather Maher. “Helsinki Commission Urged to Renew US Engagement in 
Western Balkans.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 April 2009.
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were, heretofore, largely shrouded in secrecy. The reform process was triggered by 
domestic and international calls to amend the complex structures created by Dayton 
and put in place a functional state capable of making progress towards EU 
accession.12 Notwithstanding the external pressures reflected in the EU’s ‘soft power’ 
approach, and direct ‘arm-twisting’ by the US, this process failed in April of 2006. 
My thesis attempts to explain why this failure occurred, and to reflect on the broader 
state building process unfolding in this country.
My dissertation is framed within the paradigms of state building and 
international conditionality; which I argue do not adequately capture the nuances and 
complexities of post-conflict, deeply divided societies such as Bosnia. I propose a 
three-tiered framework, which has not been used systematically before, and argue 
that this mehodology represents a more comprehensive construct for analyzing post­
conflict, deeply divided societies. More specifically, this approach dissects the 
process of constitutional reform from an inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and what I term 
‘supra-national’ level (the latter referring to the interactions between domestic and 
external actors).
My research reflects two key focal points: (1) a process-driven approach; 
investigating specific dynamics to reveal how external involvement and incentives 
factored into local politics; (2) an “actor-centric” approach; focusing on the role of 
political elites. As Simon Chesterman states in his comparative study of transitional 
administrations and state building, “two of the most important lessons [about post­
conflict state building] are that local politics matter and that the personalities of local 
and international staff can change the course of an operation.”13
12. BEYOND DAYTON?
The Dayton Constitution, a facet of the peace accord signed in November of 1995, 
established a political system that drew heavily on Lijphart’s consociational recipe 
for power sharing.14 This is a system based on the belief that ethnic differences
12 Chapter 4 provides a full account on the rationale for constitutional reform.
13 Chesterman 2004,6.
14 Lijphart 1969. Lijphart’s consociational model emerged in the late 1960s as a response to the
post-decolonization scholarship that questioned the link between democracy and divided societies. In 
fact, Lijphart’s model questioned the link between stability and social structure, drawing from the 
power-sharing model in place in the Netherlands.
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should not be abolished or weakened, but rather should be explicitly recognized.15 It 
provides critical guarantees and veto powers to the different ethnic groups16 so that 
their interests are not overridden, and is considered important for divided societies 
emerging from a violent conflict. Bosnia has built upon the key elements featuring 
Arend Lijphart’s consociations,17 some of which were accentuated to provide ethnic 
groups with further guarantees. The key elements of Lijphart’s consociations 
include:18
(1) The joint exercise of governmental power, which may take various 
institutional forms, the most common of which is the ‘grand coalition’. Bosnia’s 
government rests upon this broader notion, but the government is formed as a 
post-election inter-ethnic coalition (following the country’s division into three 
ethnic groups), including the parties gaining most electoral support within each
15 Lijphart 1977. Two major power-sharing models have been devised for divided societies, 
namely the consociational model (Lijphart 1969; see also McGarry and O’Leary 1993 and 2004; 
O’Leary 2005) and the centripetalist or integrative approach (Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2001), 
both of which rely on inter-ethnic cooperation and moderation. An alternative model has also emerged 
recently, known as the “power dividing arrangement” (Rothchild and Roader 2005). Though the two 
basic models aim to achieve similar ends; namely the accommodation of differing groups within a 
single polity, they differ on how such accommodation is translated into the political system. The 
consociational model recognizes and enhances the differences. The idea is “to turn the segments into 
constructive elements of stable democracy” (Lijphart 1977, 42) and provide them with institutional 
guarantees that prevents the state-level institutions from making any decision that is contrary to their 
interests. This model is premised on the idea that elites are prone to inter-ethnic cooperation, provided 
their rights are protected. The centripetalist approach, on the contrary, works under the assumption 
that elites are not always predisposed to inter-ethnic cooperation, and aims at undermining the salience 
of the ethnic factor; it advocates building bridges across group boundaries and providing politicians 
with incentives (mostly electoral) to encourage them to cooperate with members of groups other that 
their own. The chances to introduce integrative formulas by international mediators are however often 
constrained by the very nature of post-conflict contexts and the highly distrusted patterns of behavior 
(Hoddie and Hartzell 2005). Nationalist parties may indeed be more likely to accept a consociational 
arrangement, as it respects and enhances their power base -  namely the ethnic group.
16 This dissertation takes the notion of ethnic group as “the nominal members” or a type of 
“cultural collectivity” of ascriptive categories such as common descent, race, language, religion, etc 
(Smith 1991; Chandra 2007). The term “ethnic group” does not imply “active participation in a 
common group identity” (Ibid, 2-3). According to Chandra ‘nominal membership’ is inherited (for a 
definition on the categories ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic identity’ see footnote 103 in this introduction).
17 Though most of the clauses contained in the Dayton agreement fall into the consociational 
category, some integrative elements were also included. The Constitutional Court and the Central 
Bank are based on a parity representation, but decisions are taken on a simple majority basis (see 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1985. Art. 6 and 7). Other integrative elements have been 
added overtime, mostly as a result of the HR’s intervention; foremost among these is the imposition in 
2002 of an amendment to the entities’ constitutions whereby all the constituent peoples are to have 
equal status in both entities. This amendment, Caspersen argues, has limited group territorial 
autonomy (Caspersen 2004; for a more in-depth review of the consociational and integrative elements 
contained in Dayton, see Caspersen 2004; see also Bieber 2006b). Bosnia thus represents a typical 
case of complex power sharing, which combines different power sharing mechanisms to regulate 
conflict in a divided society, borrowing from both the consociational and integrative models (see p. 
65, footnote 213)
18 See Lijphart 1977; 1990.
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ethnic group.19
(2) Group autonomy, which can take the form of federalism, where “groups have 
a clear territorial concentration;” and a non-territorial arrangement, which may 
involve ample autonomy in areas such as culture and education. Group 
autonomy may also entail a mix of territorial and non-territorial forms, where 
groups are intermixed.20 Bosnia follows the mixed formula.21 On the one hand, 
the three major ethnic groups (constitutionally formed as the ‘Constituent 
Peoples’) enjoy special group rights and status. On the other, the state is highly 
decentralized, and is divided into two highly autonomous ethnic-based entities; 
the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).22
(3) Political and allocation proportionality, not only in the civil service and 
electoral system, but also in all decision making institutions, in which groups 
have a voice in relation to their relative strength.23 In the case of Bosnia, ethnic 
based parity formulas have taken prominence in most state-level institutions.
(4) The granting of a minority veto on vital questions, which represents the 
ultimate weapon for groups to protect their fundamental interests.24 Lijphart 
however warned, “The veto power clearly contains the danger that the entire 
power-sharing system can be undermined if one or more minorities overuse or 
abuse their veto power.”25 This note of caution is particularly significant in the 
context of Bosnia, where multiple vetoes were built into the Constitution at both 
the government and legislative levels and where inter-ethnic distrust is
19 A different ethnic arrangement was built into the entities. Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats had no 
‘constituent’ status in the entities where they represented a minority. Things changed in 2002 with the 
imposition of an amendment to the entities’ constitutions, whereby the three ethnic groups gained 
equal status throughout the territory of Bosnia.
20 Lijphart 1990,494-495.
21 The entity’s constitutional changes of 2002, however, have undermined group autonomy in 
each entity (Bieber 2004). These constitutional changes are further discussed in chapter 4.
22 The Federation is also divided into ten ethnic-based Cantons, which enjoy a great deal of
autonomy. Five cantons have a Bosniak majority: Una Sana, Tuzla, Zenica Doboj, Bosna Podrinje and 
Sarajevo. Three are Croat: Posavina, West Herzegovina and Herceg Bosna. Two are mixed: 
Herzegovina Neretva (Mostar) and Central Bosnia. Bieber has argued that Bosnia is an asymmetric 
federation, given that “the subunits are constituted very differently: one is a loose federation consisting 
of ten cantons and two predominant nations and the other is a (formally) centralized republic of one 
dominant nation” (Bieber 2002, 327). The District of Brcko, a multiethnic unit that is part of both 
entities, also provides for further asymmetry {ibid).
23 Lijphart 1977,38.
24 Ibid.
25 Lijphart 1990,494.
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pervasive.26 In fact, a double veto exists in the parliament: the ethnically-based 
veto on the vital national interest (VNI), which is enjoyed by all groups in the 
upper house (the House of peoples); and the entity based veto (the so-called 
entity veto), which is enjoyed in the lower house (the House of Representatives). 
The entity veto provides the Serb community with an advantage over the other 
two groups, who jointly share this veto power.27
Though no violent conflict has taken place since 1995, the complicated 
institutional structures and the unresolved ethnic questions remaining from the war,28 
have limited the effectiveness and functionality of the Bosnian state.29 As a matter of 
fact, the multiple ‘ethnic veto points’ have resulted often times in a near paralysis of 
the decision making process, to the point that it has only managed to function owing 
to heavy external ‘arm-twisting’, and the direct intervention of the HR. As a case in 
point, the HR imposed 67 laws from 1997 to 2004, amending inter alia the state’s 
and entities’ constitutions or imposing the Law on the Composition and Functioning 
of the Council of Ministers.30 Furthermore, the HR removed a total of 139 individuals 
from 1998 to 2004 (including judges, civil servants and elected officials both at 
entity or state level) for violations to the legal commitments made under the Dayton 
Peace Accords (DPA).
As previously noted, the international community engaged in a revamped 
strategy to strengthen the Bosnian state and diminish the room for ethnic blockage 
by: providing the HR with more extensive powers; and linking the state building
The members of the presidency, which is collectively formed by members of each 
constituent people, can effectively block any decision that is declared to be in violation of vital 
national interests. In addition to the formal vetoes contained in the constitution, Bosnian politicians 
have often resorted to informal boycotts of state level institutions (see chapter 4, p. 157).
27 The House of Representatives, which is comprised of 28 members from the Federation and 
14 from the RS, makes decisions on a majority basis; requiring one-third of the members of each 
entity to be in agreement (this is referred to as ‘entity voting’). This clause permits merely 10 
representatives from RS to block any decision at the state level (the constitution is unclear about the 
number of actual entity votes needed to pass legislation when the assembly is in quorum, namely 
acting with the majority of its members).
28 See for example Woodward 1997. Bosnians continue to be haunted by the constitutional 
debate that led to the violent conflict in 1992 (chapter 3 discusses these dynamics). Generally, 
Bosniaks remain in favor of a unitary state in which they are the majority group; the Serbs favor a 
highly decentralized federation in which RS is one federal unit; the Croats are divided between a 
decentralized state where the local level is enhanced and the creation of a third entity.
29 This dissertation is however not concerned with how the multiple veto points have affected 
the functionality of the Bosnian state. The focus is rather on how political elites interact with each 
other within this constraining institutional framework.
30 Council of Europe 2004c ,16-17.
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agenda to the process of EU accession in 2001 and 2002 (through the formal launch 
of the Stabilization and Association Process, namely the pre-accession framework for 
the Western Balkans). This new strategy benefited from the ambiguity of Article 3.5 
of the Bosnian constitution; whereby new competences could be assigned to the state 
in order “to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and 
international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”31 The fundamental goal was to 
strengthen the Bosnian state and to slowly and deliberately transform Dayton from 
within; a process that would go hand-in-hand with EU integration.
It was in a context of limited progress within this step-by-step transformation 
from within that voices in favor of the reform of Dayton rose amongst both locals 
and international officials in 2004 and 2005.32 These voices were inspired by the 
belief that a simpler institutional arrangement (within the power sharing model in 
place) would provide less room for ethnic blockage and speed the decision making 
process. The formal rationale for constitutional reform came with the Venice 
Commission’s opinion of the Bosnian constitution in 2005. This opinion revolved 
around the necessity to create a functional and efficient state with the institutional 
capacity to fulfill the EU accession criteria.33 The reform was also intended to redress 
certain specific violations of the European Convention on Human Rights contained in 
the Bosnia’s constitution.
Two key factors prompted the international community -  and particularly the EU 
-  to lend support to the reform of Dayton at this time. First, the near initiation of talks 
on a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) -  the end goal of the Stabilization 
and Association Process - ,  the implementation of which would require a more 
efficient state. Second, the decision of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) -  the 
international body created in the London Conference in December 1995 to review the 
peace implementation process in Bosnia -  to begin the last phase of the HR mandate. 
Despite some divergent opinions and concerns regarding timing (elections were to be 
held in October of 2006), a consensus was formed around the need for constitutional 
reform. It was believed that the closure of the OHR would need to come with the 
enactment of a new constitutional framework, endowed with local support and
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995.
32 Chapter 4 discusses the origins of the constitutional reform.
33 Venice Commission 2005. The Bosnian institutional set up is also highly costly and 
cumbersome as a result of the multiple layers of govemnnent in place.
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democratic legitimacy.34
The process of constitutional reform in Bosnia took place between 2005 and 
2006. Following the failure of various constitutional initiatives introduced in the 
House of Representatives, both the Bosniak and Croat leadership turned to 
international actors for assistance in breaking the deadlock. Initially, the international 
response was lukewarm, fearing that constitutional negotiations would unravel other 
reform processes already underway. The Principal Deputy High Representative 
(DPHR), US Ambassador Donald Hays took on the initiative, and launched the 
process as a representative of an NGO, with the financial assistance of some 
European countries such as Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.35 Donald Hays’ efforts 
were nominally supported by key European institutions such as the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP), along with the US 
government.36 These actors became increasingly involved as the negotiations 
evolved.37
Despite the fact that the process of constitutional reform has often been 
portrayed as an American initiative, the EU played an important role (especially at 
some critical points);38 and was supportive of the negotiations.39 This support 
included varying levels of participation by both European institutions and individual 
member states, along with the use of numerous instruments; ranging from public 
endorsements to direct lobbying40 The most significant European input however, 
came through the provision of a rationale for reform outlined in public statements 
and through the Venice Commission’s opinion of the constitutional situation in
34 The Dayton agreement is a regional peace agreement that was never discussed or approved 
in the BiH parliament. It was signed by Serbia, Croatia and a Bosnian delegation led by the Muslim 
leader Alija Izetbegovic.
35 Amb. Donald Hays was PDHR from July 2001 to March 2005. Much of the preparations for 
the constitutional negotiations were undertaken while he was an OHR official. Prior to his position as 
PDHR, he was the US Representative to the United Nations for UN Management and Reform (1999- 
2001). He also held positions as Director of the Office of Management Policy and Planning and 
Executive Director of the European Affairs Bureau at the US State Department.
36 See chapter 4 for a full description of the origins and initial steps of the process of 
constitutional reform.
37 Chapter 5 through 7 provides an in-depth discussion of the role of external actors in the 
process of constitutional reform.
38 Notwithstanding the high stakes involved, the overall role of the EU was rather ambivalent 
throughout the process; and lacked clarity of purpose (see chapter 5 through 8 for a detailed 
description of the role of the EU during the process of constitutional reform).
39 The EU had much to gain from this process. Head of the EC Delegation in BiH Michael
Humphreys stated that the process represented a good opportunity for the EU; “What [Donald Hays] 
was doing was good for the EU, to have a more functional state in BiH” (Author’s phone interview 
with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009).
40 Chapters 5 through 7 provide an in-depth analysis of the role of the EU during this process.
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Bosnia in March of 2005.41 Though the opinion was intended as an outline of the key 
shortcomings identified in the Bosnian constitution, it became the benchmark and 
framework for negotiations.
The process started as a rather low-key process. At the outset, it was facilitated 
by Donald Hays as part of an NGO, and involved preparatory, exploratory talks 
among party representatives without public knowledge in a working group format. 
Following this initial preparatory stage, negotiations took place in different formats 
and evolved in three separate phases. (1) The transition from low-level to high-level 
negotiations with the involvement of party leaders in November 2005. (2) The US 
takeover of the process in December 2005, which led to the signing of an initial 
agreement by party leaders in March 2006. During this time, direct external pressure 
amounted to a significant degree. (3) The transfer of the agreed package to the 
parliament for public discussion. It was in the last phase of negotiations, when 
political infighting became more pervasive. Notwithstanding the heavy international 
backing and arm-twisting by both the US and the EU, the package was finally 
rejected in April 2006, falling two votes short of the two-thirds majority needed for it 
to be passed.
13. THE CONTEXT: STATE BUILDING AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
This dissertation is framed within the debate on external intervention and 
international conditionality. It uses the case of Bosnia and the process of 
constitutional reform as a test to reflect on current issues in relation to post-conflict 
state building and the process of European conditionality.
The experience of state building with a pronounced external influence is a rather 
recent development. It is directly related to the transformation of the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty (based on the absolute authority of the state over the control of 
its territory), into a new understanding of sovereignty attenuated with the issue of 
legitimacy.42 Two interrelated developments triggered this transformation; the end of
See Venice Commission 2005.
42 Fukuyama 2004. The so-called Westphalian system was created in 1648, following the
Thirty Years’ War. European states agreed to abide by the principle of territorial integrity and to 
pursue their interests without destroying each other (Mastanduno and Lyons 1995). The system was 
originally centered on Europe. Each country was regarded as “ ‘juridically equal’ and their sovereignty 
was to be regarded as absolute” {ibid, 5).
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the Cold war, which lifted much of the pressure on the international community to 
respond to new and emerging crises; and the explosion of new internal conflicts43 
whose violent intensity called for new and rapid international interventions. 
“Sovereignty and therefore legitimacy could no longer be automatically conferred on 
the de facto power holder in a country ... Dictators and human rights abusers ... 
could no longer hide behind the principle of sovereignty to protect themselves.”44 As 
a result, numerous peace-building missions emerged in the 1990s on humanitarian 
grounds in places such as Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and Rwanda.
The massive destruction of state-like functions in territories ravaged by war 
brought to light new security threats in the international system.46 This, in turn, 
promoted new and more intrusive forms of external involvement such as the so- 
called ‘second generation’47 external interventions. These interventions take the form 
of state building similar to the Bosnian example48 and involve two major phases. 
Step one is comprised of post-conflict reconstruction or stabilization; where the goal 
is to achieve general stability and the provision of basic services. Step two entails 
state building per se; where the chief objective is to create self-sustaining institutions
43 Kaldor 1999.
44 Fukuyama 2004, 97. For a discussion on sovereignty and humanitarian intervention see for
example Damrosch 1993; Hoffman 1996; Mastanduno and Lyons 1995; Mayall 1996; Weiss and
Collins 1996.
46 Failing or weak states are too frail to enforce the rule of law within a given territory and
provide/deliver services to the population. Furthermore, failed states “commit human rights abuses, 
provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their neighbors” 
(Fukuyama 2004, 93). 9/11 represents the highest point of this new generation of security threats, 
namely thriving terrorist groups that operate transnationally in states that are either too weak to 
enforce the rule of law or too corrupt to avoid the intertwinement of unlawful activities with the state 
apparatus (both Afghanistan and Pakistan are clear examples).
47 Peace building scholars differentiate between first- and second-generation peace building
missions. During the first generation missions (1989-1997), “Initial mandates tended to be for very 
limited periods, focusing primarily on holding a successful post-conflict election ... Relatively little 
attention was paid to the longer-term tasks of constructing or strengthening the institutional structures 
necessary for democratic governance and market reforms” (Paris and Sisk 2009, 6). The second 
generation interventions (i.e. Bosnia from 1997 onwards, Kosovo and Timor Leste) were more 
expansive; they were based on “a recognition that such operations needed to focus less on exit 
deadlines, and more on achieving the conditions for basic stability in these societies” (ibid, 7).
48 Historically, State building has been broadly defined as the process whereby the state deals 
with the struggle over the monopoly of physical violence within a certain territory (Tilly 1975). But 
the recent experience of post-conflict state building with heavy international assistance has made 
Tilly’s definition obsolete. This study takes the notion of state building as the efforts undertaken by 
international and/or national actors “to reconstruct, or in some case to establish for the first time, 
effective and autonomous structures of governance in a state or territory where no such capacity exists 
or where it has been seriously eroded” (Caplan 2005a, 3). State building thus involves more than the 
creation of a state; it involves building an effective form of governance. It is also important to note 
here that post-conflict state building is not synonymous with post-conflict peace building, namely the 
efforts taken to create the conditions in which violence will not recur (Paris and Sisk 2009). State 
building constitutes a particular approach of peace building and other external interventions in which 
the emphasis is placed on the strengthening and legitimacy of institutions, as well as on its design.
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that can survive external withdrawal.49 These interventions have often been 
accompanied by the establishment of international administrations such as the HR in 
Bosnia. The new ‘trusteeships’50 are often endowed with rather intrusive 
competences and powers51 in the area of economic policy, security, the rule of law, 
and institution building52 Constitution making has also featured as one of the key 
activities of such state building missions, and has usually been undertaken with 
strong external leadership. One of the key issues that differentiate post-conflict peace 
building from international administration is that the latter is a ‘political enterprise’ 
and to succeed, it cannot be indifferent to ‘political outcomes.’53 This is, as Stefan 
Wolff has noted, a significant feature in Bosnian politics where the HR -  and the 
broader international community -  has not only been affected by political outcomes 
in this country but also become an integral part of them, “in order to establish 
conditions that are perceived as conducive to the overall success of the international 
mission in the country.”54
Although state building operations have increased in recent years in places such 
as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the question of how to export norms and 
institutions continue to challenge both scholars and practitioners alike. Under what 
conditions can external actors shape the state building process in post-conflict, 
divided societies? What are the conditions that make the external push more effective 
in these contexts? Under what circumstances do local actors resist external pressure
49 Fukuyama 2004. The process of state building may also involve the development of a 
positive identification of the citizen with the state, the very essence of nation building; “It is in this 
respect that the overlap [of state building] with nation-building often becomes relevant” (Kopecky and 
Mudde 2000, 529). These two processes may not be synonymous nor parallel developments (see the 
discussion on nation and state building in Linz 1993; Smith 1986). Most external interventions have 
focused on the former.
50 Caplan 2001. The creation of international administration has raised important legitimacy
issues, which are not the focus of this research. Some of these questions include: under what 
circumstances and on what grounds should international administrations be established? Are external 
administrations’ aims to change local societies legitimate? How much power should be granted to 
external actors and for how long? Should external administrators be accountable, and if so, to whom? 
(Caplan 2005a; for a discussion of these issues in Bosnia see Chandler 1999; Knaus and Martin 2003).
51 Including the authority to “enforce local laws, exercise total fiscal management of a territory, 
appoint and remove public officials, create a central bank, establish and maintain customs services, 
regulate the local media, adjudicate rival property claims, run schools, regulate local business, and 
reconstruct and operate all public utilities among many other functions” (Caplan 2005a, 2)
52 See Brinkerhoff 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009.
53 Caplan 2005a, 12. It is significant to distinguish between two aspects of state building,
namely state capacity and state design (Call 2008). While the former is related to building institutional 
capacity in a way that “[state] sustainability does not depend on any single individual but on a shared 
commitment to the principles, procedures, and goals of the institution” (Call 2008, 8); the latter is 
focused on particular institutional arrangements, which tends to be “profoundly political” {ibid, 10).
54 Wolff 2008,557.
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and why?
The Bosnian case is also framed within the context of external conditionality; a new 
form of external influence that emerged in the 1980s with the practice of provisional 
aid in developing countries.55 This mode of conditionality, in turn, became tied to the 
process of EU accession in the CEE in the 1990’s. The conditionality framework was 
based on the provision of financial assistance, unilateral trade preferences and the 
establishment of contractual relations with the EU; all of which were contingent upon 
the countries’ compliance with a set of prerequisites - the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria56 What set the EU accession framework apart from other forms of aid 
conditionality was thus the prospect of EU membership to assist these countries in 
their transition from communism to liberal democracy. The tools of persuasion 
ranged in scope from the use of ‘hard’ instruments, such as economic rewards and 
sanctions, to ‘soft power’, including diplomatic pressure and political persuasion.
The EU accession framework for the Western Balkans, the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP),57 was launched in 1999, marking a new phase in post­
conflict Bosnia under EU leadership. Two key developments prepared the 
groundwork for the new EU role in the region. Firstly, the EU had further 
strengthened the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam with the development of new crisis management capabilities through the 
ESDP and the creation of a EU HR; a kind of EU foreign policy minister.58 The 
Western Balkans, particularly Bosnia, represented the obvious testing ground for the 
readiness of these new instruments.59 Secondly, the relatively successful association 
toolbox, in use in CEE throughout the 1990s, offered a new framework in which
Economic conditionality evolved into the so-called political or second-generation 
conditionality where issues of human rights and good governance were attached to economic aid.
56 The Copenhagen criteria involve conditionality in three major fields: democracy and the rule 
of law (the political criterion), the existence of a functional market economy (the economic criterion) 
and the adoption of the acquis communitaire (the legal criterion) (Council of the EU 1993). A fourth 
pillar, the administrative one, has also become part of the conditionality package as of 1995, which 
relates to the adjustment of relevant administration structures (i.e. strengthening them with a view 
towards more effective adoption and application of EU legislation).
57 It is important to note the ‘stabilization’ component. This is a distinct element of EU
integration from previous enlargement rounds.
58 European Union 1997.
59 The failure of the EU crisis management in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s had, in
fact, convinced the EU of the need to strengthen the foreign and defense policy mechanisms created in 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.
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crisis management and stabilization could operate in synergy.60 The US support for a 
revamped EU presence in the region, which would free US resources to address 
emerging crises elsewhere, as well as the Kosovo crisis in 1999, were also critical in 
triggering a EU’s jointly stabilization and association strategy in the region.
The SAP was formally sealed at the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, when 
countries in the region agreed to abide by the EU’s conditionality (as set out by the 
1997 Council61) and to use the SAP as the instrument to progress towards EU 
membership.62 While the pre-accession process in the Western Balkans did not 
require candidate countries to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, they were 
encouraged to start adjusting to EU standards and norms. Three important changes 
were introduced from the previous EU policy in the region:63 linking the 
conditionality framework to eventual EU membership; the prospect of a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (similar to the European agreements in CEE); and the
See Gordon, Sasse and Sebastian 2008.
61 SAP conditionality draws from the 1997 Council, which include: compliance with the Peace 
Accords and other bilateral agreements, cooperation with the ICTY, willingness to re-establish 
economic cooperation with one another, good-neighborly relations, the respect for democratic 
principles and the rule of law, compliance with broadly recognized standards of human and minority 
rights, the privatization of state-owned property, a commitment to engage in economic reforms, and 
the respect for additional criteria defined by the Council (Council of the European Union 1997). The 
conditions for establishing contractual relations with the EU consisted of additional pre-requisites, 
containing both region-wide, and country-specific pre-requisites. The country-specific conditions for 
Bosnia included the following: (1) the set up of functional institutions in accordance with the 
constitution, and the definition of a policy on commerce and customs; (2) the free movement of 
people, goods and capital; (3) close cooperation with the HR; (4) the creation of a unified municipal 
Council in Mostar; (5) the dismantling of institutions that are in violation of the spirit and letter of the 
Dayton agreement; (6) cooperation with the ICTY (ibid).
62 The prospect of EU membership was offered explicitly for the first time at the Feira Council 
in June 2000 (Council of the EU 2000a).
63 The first European effort at designing a regional strategy towards the Balkans dates back to 
December 1995. The ‘Declaration for stability and good neighborliness for the South East Europe,’ 
better known as the ‘Royamount Process,’ was launched under the French Presidency with the 
objective of promoting the normalization of relations between the Western Balkan countries (Council 
of the EU 1998). Framed to assess the possibility of extending the 1995 European Stability Pact for 
Central and Eastern Europe to Southeastern Europe (Panebianco and Rossi 2004), the EU stressed the 
need for the Balkan countries to comply with Dayton as a precondition for the development of 
cooperation agreements with the EU (Council of the EU 1996). The conclusion of such agreements 
were also to be dependent “on the willingness of the countries concerned to work towards 
consolidating peace and to respect human rights, the rights of minorities and democratic principles” 
(Ibid). The next step in the EU’s policy towards the Balkans, the so-called EU Regional Approach, 
was officially launched in April 1997 (Council of the EU 1997). The new EU’s policy incorporated 
the issue of conditionality, with strong links to compliance with the Peace accords. Non-compliance 
with the criteria could result in either the freezing of the assistance or its granting through other 
means. This approach was an attempt by the EU to use the same conditionality approach used in the 
‘pre-accession process’ in CEE. Notwithstanding these initial efforts at designing a EU policy, the 
EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans remained subordinated to the broader efforts of the 
international community during the 1990s, which were primarily focused on security and 
reconstruction under the still heavy influence of the US.
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launch of a new Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and 
Stabilization (CARDS). CARDS represented an improved instrument of economic 
assistance that substituted both Phare (the pre-accession financial instrument used in 
the previous enlargement round) and the Obnova regulation for the Western 
Balkans.64 The SAP was enhanced in June 2003 with the Thessaloniki agenda,65 
which incorporated some of the instruments used in CEE, such as the European 
Partnerships, to define the short- and mid-term priorities for each country and the 
commitments that progress would be measured against.
The launch of the SAP in 2000 marked several important developments in the 
post-conflict stabilization of Bosnia. First, it represented a shift of approach in the 
region from reactive crisis management to long-term stabilization66 tied to the 
prospect of European integration.67 Second, it marked the transformation of the EU 
leadership in the region from a subordinate status, under the US leadership, to a 
position in which the EU was dictating both the pace and substance of the state 
building and reform process. Indeed, SAP was built around the “recognition that the 
main motivator for reform ... is a relationship with the EU that is based on a credible 
prospect of membership;” and the belief that a more flexible approach would “allow
/TQ
each country to move ahead at its own pace.” Finally it provided further purpose, 
legitimacy69 and impetus to the state building process in Bosnia; given that the EU’s 
reform agenda focused on the consolidation of a functional state capable of meeting 
the criteria for eventual EU accession.70
Though the prospect of EU membership was established early in the process, the
64 Council of the EU 2000b. Following a recommendation from the Commission in 2006, 
CARDS was replaced in 2007 with the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA); a new financial devise 
aimed at streamlining disbursements associated with the process of EU accession.
65 Council of the EU 2003.
66 The Stability Pact, which was launched by the EU in Cologne in June of 1999 following the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, was the first attempt of the broader international community at shifting 
the approach in the Western Balkans to stabilization and integration (Gordon, Sasse and Sebastian 
2008). Unlike the SAP, a fully European initiative, the Stability Pact became an international 
instrument designed to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern 
Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy’ (See 
http://www.stabilitvpact.org/about/default.asp [accessed on March 25,2006]).
67 Gordon, Sasse and Sebastian 2008.
68 European Commission 2006.
69 EU membership enjoys broad public support. An opinion poll conducted by the European 
Commission Delegation to BiH in February 2004 showed that 73.2 percent of Bosnian citizens 
favored EU accession (Quoted from Noutcheva 2006,186).
70 As a result, while the objective of European integration is generally to transfer state
functions to a supranational entity (which arguably weakens the scope and autonomy of the state) the
process of pre-accession in Bosnia has been intended to have the opposite effect, namely the 
strengthening and consolidation of Bosnia’s central institutions.
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allure of the EU has in turn been mitigated as a result of several developments. 
Firstly, the SAP has emerged as a multi-layered process in which new conditions and 
benchmarks can be gradually incorporated on an individual basis prior to the signing 
of a SAA. In fact, the signing of a SAA does not guarantee actual membership.71 
Application for official candidacy can only happen when the SAA has been fully 
implemented. Furthermore, the green light for candidacy status is based on a decision 
by the Council of the EU, which sets in motion a whole new process involving 
supplemental bargaining and the meeting of additional criteria that can last for 
several years, given the open-ended nature of membership negotiations.72 This 
development has provided the EU with important political leeway in order to add 
new conditions and to decide what constitutes compliance, undermining the overall 
basis of the alleged merit based approach.73 Secondly, the conditionality framework 
has been rather political in the context of Bosnia, and far more intrusive than in 
CEE.74 It has, in fact, “touched on the internal sovereignty configuration in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina through requesting a redistribution of policy competences between 
the central and entity layers of government in the country.”75 As a result, Gergana 
Noutcheva argues, “since the issue of the state structure of Bosnia is highly sensitive 
in nature, the fulfillment of EU conditions have proven very political.”76 Finally, the 
so-called enlargement fatigue (reflecting the EU’s reluctance to further expand), has 
served to create further uncertainty as to when and whether the Balkans will join the 
EU.77 The 2008 enlargement strategy, released in November, failed to provide a
Indeed, SAP countries fall into the category of ‘potential members’, a category that holds out 
the promise of eventual membership, but that lengthens the ill-defined time frames.
72 European Commission 2005.
73 As a case in point, accession negotiations with Croatia (which were frozen since March 2005
on ICTY cooperation grounds) were opened in October 2005 thanks to Austria’s acceptance of 
Turkey’s candidacy in exchange for the opening of accession talks with Croatia. Serbia’s EU 
aspirations however, continue to be held out on ICTY grounds; especially in reference to the hand 
over of Bosnian war crimes indectee Ratko Mladic.
74 The nature of the conditionality laid out for the Western Balkans thus contrasts with the 
rather fuzzily worded Copenhagen criteria applied in CEE. Gergana Noutcheva, for example, 
differentiates between the technical and political conditionality, the latter referred to sovereignty 
issues (Noutcheva 2006).
75 Noutcheva 2006,240.
76 Ibid, 60. As Gergana Noutcheva has argued, “sovereignty-linked demands do not enjoy the 
same degree of legitimacy as the normative appeal of the EU requirements for democracy, market 
economy and rule of law” (ibid, 8).
77 The Council meeting in Zalzburg in March 2006, for example, brought to light strong
disagreements within the Union over how soon Balkan countries should join the EU, or whether they 
should ever do so (see “UK Says EU Door Must Remain Open for Balkans.” Dtt.net.com. London, 21 
March 2006). Member states placed additional hurdles in the pathway of EU accession, as the 
organisation’s absorption capacity (a rather ambiguous term) would need to be tested before further
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clear timeframe for future accession.78
In summary, while the EU has successfully managed to provide a European 
rationale for reform in Bosnia, the uncertainties and politics involved in the process 
suggest that the allure of EU membership does not represent a clear form of external 
influence. Further exploration of the specific dynamics involved and the different 
interactions between local and European actors is needed in order to shed further 
light on the ways in which the EU pull, and European incentives, may impact the 
state building process in post conflict Bosnia. The key questions under consideration 
are: can the EU shape the interests, goals and strategies of locals in post-conflict 
Bosnia within the framework of EU accession? Under what conditions can local 
actors accept or resist the EU pull?
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research has two objectives. Firstly, it aims to provide an analytical framework 
in order to explain how the interactions between local and external actors impact the 
state building processes in post-conflict Bosnia. Can external actors shape the 
process of state building in Bosnia? Under what conditions can external actors 
promote conflict regulation and inter-ethnic cooperation in post-conflict, deeply 
divided societies? Why does their influence enjoy different forms and results? Can 
local actors resist external pressure? Secondly, it tests the impact of the external push 
and international conditionality in post-conflict Bosnia. In other words, what is the 
impact of external conditionality on the process of state building in post-conflict
enlargement could be considered. Growing doubts over the merits of enlargement were confirmed in 
the end-of-year summit in Brussels in December 2006, where some argued for making further 
enlargement dependent on the reform of EU institutions (see “EU hardens tone on enlargement.” BBC 
News. 15 December 2006). While the commitment to European enlargement has not been turned down 
(enlargement still features as an integral part of EU's rhetoric towards the region), the EU remains 
hesitant about how to proceed with the next enlargement round (indeed, there is no date yet on how 
soon Balkan countries will join the EU). EU divisions over Turkey’s accession have compounded 
Europe’s discomfort about further enlargement.
78 Gergana Noutcheva et al. have, for example, suggested that the long-term European
perspective in post-conflict environments may encourage domestic actors to postpone reform until the 
perspective of European integration and the benefits attached to it draw nearer; given that any 
compromise “is viewed by the parties are [as] taking a leap into the unknown” (Noutcheva et al. 2004, 
p 21). The effects of ‘gate keeping’, i.e. the power of the EU to decide when the criteria and the 
required stages have been met (Grabbe 2001), and the ‘moving target problem’, which refers to the 
consistently changing nature of the stages and conditions involved (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004), 
may compound this problem.
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Bosnia? How may European and international incentives affect the interests, goals, 
and strategies of domestic actors? Is getting the incentives ‘right’ the sufficient and 
necessary requirement for conditionality to be effective, or are there other domestic 
factors at play?79
An in-depth study of constitutional reform in Bosnia over the period of 2005- 
2006 is used to test the questions reflected above. In this context, the specific 
questions under consideration are: what are the key variables accounting for the 
failure of the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia? Did the EU and the US 
manage the process well? What is the impact of both domestic and external actors 
upon the final outcome? How did EU incentives and the external push play out in the 
process of constitutional reform in Bosnia? What can we learn about the differing 
roles of the EU and the US?
Other related and complimentary questions are also explored in this study; 
including the factors that determine inter-ethnic conflict regulation and cooperation 
in deeply divided societies. In this scenario, the important question under 
consideration is, “How do elites calculate the costs and benefits of accommodation 
and what, if any, factors may affect their willingness to cooperate with one 
another?”80 This dissertation also addresses the relative weight of the different levels 
analyzed in this study -  namely the intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic and supra-national 
levels (the latter referring to the interactions between domestic and external actors) -  
in the final policy outcome.
IS .  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study revolves around two separate debates: post-conflict state building, and 
international conditionality.
Studies on post conflict Bosnia (and the broader literature on state building) have 
generally focused on the study of external actors and their impact on the overall state 
building process. In particular, these studies have tended to center on two major 
topics. (1) The weaknesses and strengths of state building interventions, with a
79 This question is frequently addressed within the conditionality literature (see for example 
Checkel 2000)
80 Zahar 2002,6.
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predisposed focus on the supply/external side (neglecting the two-way dynamics this 
study aims to explore). This argument has taken two different directions. One blames 
the failure of state building in Bosnia on the lack of international resolve and 
strategy.81 The other argument blames the intrusive nature of the international 
intervention in Bosnia, which has created mechanisms of dependence that have 
undermined the state building process.82 (2) A second line of research has focused on 
the impact of externally devised institutions (such as the electoral system, or specific 
power sharing and constitutional arrangements) on the long-term stability of post­
conflict societies.83 Notwithstanding the well-informed accounts on the unfolding of 
state building processes, these works have generally been undertaken at the macro 
level, paying little systematic attention to the specific interactions that occur between 
local and external actors in the unfolding of these processes.84 Furthermore, these 
studies have failed to factor in the issue of international and European incentives.85
Conditionality studies have developed more sophisticated analyses of the 
entanglements and dynamics of both external and domestic actors than are contained 
in this work. This is especially true in reference to the two salient variables contained 
in this research: (1) the role of agency-driven factors and (2) the two-way dynamics 
that feature in externally led processes of state building. These conditionality studies 
however, rely on Putnam’s two-level bargaining model; examining the process of 
European integration as a bargaining process that develops distinctly in external and
81 See for example Belloni 2008; Caplan 2005a; Cousens and Cater 2001; Donais 2005; Paris 
2004.
82 See for example Chandler 1999,2006a and 2006b; Knaus and Martin 2003.
83 See for example Kumar 1998; Paris 2004; Sisk 2009; Samuels 2005 and 2009; Bieber 2006a. 
A third line of research has focused on particular themes within the state building agenda, such as 
inter alia the impact of the economics of war in state building (Cooper 2004; Donais 2005), and the 
role of civil society (Pouligny 2005).
84 Some studies have recently paid further attention to these interactions (see for example 
Barnett and Ziircher 2009; see also Ottaway 2003). Further systematic research on how these 
interactions affect the final policy outcome is however needed.
85 Studies on post-conflict constitution making have also failed to acknowledge these issues. 
They have generally focused on: the role that constitutions play in conflict management and conflict 
transformation; the impact of constitutions for post-conflict divided societies on the long-term 
democratization process; and the degree to which institutions can be engineered externally (See for 
example Horowitz 2002 and 2004b; Lijphart 2004; Reynolds 2002). There has not been a serious 
attempt at studying systematically the politics involved in the process of constitution making. Elster’s 
comparative study of post-communist constitution making (1993) focuses on these issues, but his 
study is concerned with the experience in Eastern Europe, which differs widely from the process in 
post-conflict Bosnia. Kirsti Samuels (2009) looks at postwar constitution building and the impact that 
the nature of the process (inclusive vs. exclusive) has in the final outcome. This study fails however to 
consider the different elements that this thesis aims to explore, namely the multiple level interactions 
between domestic and external actors, and the push of external conditionality in the final outcome.
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domestic playing arenas.86 I argue that this “game” framework is too simplistic an 
approach, as it does not capture the nuances and complexities of the multiple levels 
of interactions that occur in deeply divided societies. The conditionality literature 
also generally ignores the study of the patterns of conflict regulation in post-conflict, 
divided societies. Instead, they use both theoretical and rationality models that 
feature in fully functioning states and homogenous societies; where the form and 
nature of the state is not contested by different ethnic groups.87 These models fail to 
encapsulate scenarios in which the aforementioned conditions are absent, such as in 
Bosnia.88
I build on the conflict regulation and power sharing literature,89 which identifies 
the intra- and inter-ethnic levels of analysis in post-conflict societies, and I 
incorporate the “external push” as a third tier. I aggregate the three levels in this 
study of post-conflict Bosnia and offer a framework that has not been used 
systematically before. My research is thus based on a three-level game framework, 
where both the patterns of conflict regulation and the impact of external incentives 
are fully explored.
While conflict regulation and plural society studies have generally focused on 
the study of political stability in divided societies,90 this research uses the dimension 
of conflict regulation as a proxy of accommodation/adaptation in the context of 
adjustment to external norms and policies.91 Adaptation to external standards will 
occur when domestic elites engage in conflict regulation and inter-ethnic
See for example Grabbe 2006; Kelley 2004a; Noutcheva 2006.
87 Some studies have examined how the EU accession played out in ethnically diverse societies 
in CEE; such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (see for example Sasse 2005), but the 
minority situation in these countries is different than that in Bosnia. While the issue at stake in CEE 
was how to protect minorities, the challenge in Bosnia has been making the state functional in the face 
of deep inter-ethnic intransigence.
88 The conflict regulation literature emphasizes the study of conflict societies. It assumes that 
the patterns of political behavior in post-conflict, deeply divided societies are different than those 
expected in stable and relatively homogenous democracies where a strong sense of civic bond 
nourishes inter-group trust. This issue is likely to influence the outcome of the reform proces; as 
discussed in this dissertation.
89 For example Nordlinger 1972; Horowitz 1985.
90 See for example Nordlinger 1972; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972.
91 Conflict management or conflict regulation is usually defined to cover a wide range of 
situations, most commonly in relation to the containment, limitation and mitigation of violent conflict 
(See for example Miall, Rambsbotham and Woodhouse 1999). This dissertation, however, uses a more 
generic definition, as appropriate for cases where there is no immediate threat of a violent outbreak. 
Conflict regulation or conflict management is thus defined as the efforts taken by domestic actors to 
handle and channel conflict within the parameters provided by the institutional framework in place, 
without resorting to practices of mutual intransigence and/or procedures that result in institutional 
deadlock between the ethnic groups involved.
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cooperation. Entrenchment and intransigence, on the contrary, will result from 
domestic actors’ failure to engage in conciliatory behavior. The dependent variable 
here is the practice of conflict regulation at the inter-ethnic level. The independent 
variable is represented by the political interactions that take place at three different 
tiers: the intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic and supra-national.
1.6. HYPOTHESIS
This research is based on the hypothesis that the three-level framework contained 
herein offers a better and more comprehensive understanding of the process of state 
building in Bosnia. This framework is based on the idea that the state building 
process is determined by patterns of conflict regulation at the inter-ethnic, intra­
ethnic and supra-national levels. These dynamics, this research argues, are critical for 
understanding how external actors may affect the interests, goals, and strategies of 
local actors in post-conflict, deeply divided societies. The key dynamics involved are 
summarized as follows:
(1) Conflict regulation at the inter-ethnic level is determined by the 
psychological and social underpinnings of ethnic relations; including those related to 
the experience of war, and the status of the different groups vis-a-vis each other and 
the state.
(2) At the intra-ethnic level, conflict regulation is influenced by the internal 
competition within each ethnic group (i.e. politics of outbidding). There are two 
prominent dimensions at this level; namely the party level and the broader party 
system within each ethnic group.
(3) At the supra-national level, conflict regulation is influenced by the 
interactions between local and external actors.
This research argues that the intertwinements of these three levels are critical for 
understanding the policy outcome of constitutional reform in Bosnia.
In addition to the central hypothesis, this research tests the following 
propositions:
(1) The divisive nature of the Bosnian society is the key factor accounting for the
failing state building process. It is the power game played within each of the
ethnic communities, as opposed to inter-ethnic divisions, what represents the
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major obstacle to reform.
(2) Domestic considerations carry more weight than external factors in 
accounting for the success or failure of the state building process. In other words, 
the role of external actors in deeply divided societies is subsidiary, although 
external actors may serve as a reinforcing mechanism for conflict regulation 
when conditions at the inter- and intra-ethnic levels are ripe.
(3) The post-conflict, deeply divided nature of Bosnian society distorts pure 
rationality-based models that are used in conditionality studies.
1.7. WHY BOSNIA? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM?
Why Bosnia?
Bosnia represents an extraordinary test case for analyzing how external models of 
political reform play out in post-conflict, divided societies. Three key features come 
together in the case of Bosnia that are critical to this research. Firstly, Bosnia 
represents one of the most pervasive forms of external intervention since the end of 
the Cold War. As noted above, the DPA set in motion an extremely ambitious peace 
and state-building program in Bosnia. Indeed, for the past 15 years, the international 
community, through the establishment of a myriad of different external institutions 
such as the PIC, the Contact Group, and the OHR, has remained at the center stage of 
the decision making process in Bosnia. The HR, for example, has enjoyed the 
authority to remove and vet key public officials who fail to cooperate in the 
implementation of Dayton, to freeze individual bank accounts, and to impose 
legislation in key areas at both the entity and state levels (including amendments to 
the constitution). The Council of Europe (CoE) has, in fact, labeled Bosnia, “an 
international de facto semi-protectorate.”92
Secondly, the external leadership in Bosnia has evolved and is now framed 
within the process of EU accession; especially following 2002, when Lord Paddy 
Ashdown took office as both the new HR and the EU Special Representative 
(HR/EUSR). This transformation has triggered a new form of state building in
Council of Europe 2004c ,13.
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Bosnia, whereupon European incentives and domestic ownership have taken 
prevalence. In other words, the new phase of European incentives has progressively 
transformed the state building process in Bosnia from one in which direct external 
control prevailed, to one based upon increasing domestic ownership within a 
framework of external incentives (which include economic rewards and sanctions, 
the EU pull, diplomatic pressure and political persuasion).93 As Ashdown stated in 
2005, “the High Representative cannot impose the way to Europe. You can reach 
Europe only through the actions of [Bosnian] politicians.”94
Finally, Bosnia is one of Europe’s most divided societies,95 and represents a 
prototype for post-conflict society. The distinction between a divided society (such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands) and a deeply divided society is relevant in the context 
of this research.96 Two important criteria are prevalent in deeply divided societies, in 
contrast with divided societies. The first of these is the prominence of deep-rooted 
psychological perceptions and emotions based upon subjective experiences and often 
rooted in violence. A deeply divided society exists “when a large number of conflict 
group members ... hold antagonistic beliefs and emotions toward the opposing 
segment.”97 Such antagonist views are clearly salient in the realm of politics.98 The 
recent experience of violence adds further fuel to these perceptions. John Paul 
Lederach, for example, suggests that contemporary conflicts, fought by opposing 
groups “are characterized by deep-rooted and long-standing animosities that are 
reinforced by high levels of violence and direct experiences of atrocities. As a result, 
psychological and even cultural features often drive and sustain the conflict more
93 The process of state building in Bosnia is now less a model of control than of external 
incentives (see Chapter 2 for a discussion on the different forms of external influence).
94 Paddy Ashdown. Cited in Sead Numanovic. “Interview: Paddy Ashdown: ‘There Will Be No
New Political Negotiations.”’ Dnevni Avaz, 15 September 2005. Available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr- 
dept/presso/pressi/default.asp‘?content id=35463 [accessed on May 7, 2009]. As Noutcheva notes, the 
HR intervened on numerous occasions during the fulfillment of the roadmap (2000-2002), but the 
“HR’s direct interventions have declined, especially on EU-demanded reforms. In the meantime, his 
role of political mediator pushing for local compromise has strengthened” (Noutcheva 2006,179).
95 Divisions are primarily related to religion, but also to different historical narratives (which
may be real or perceived). All groups speak the same language (with slight variations that have been 
accentuated in the last few years); and share similar traditions and cultural habits (Bieber 2006a). 
Inter-group differences became aggravated during the war and remain entrenched.
96 Nordlinger defines a deeply divided society as one in which “communal divisions obviate 
social homogeneity, the conflict issues often leave a narrow margin for consensus, emotion-charged 
beliefs entail a high level of partisanship, crosscutting divisions are rare, and deeply ingrained hostile 
and invidious attitudes toward members of opposing segments rule out feelings of social trust” 
(Nordlinger 1972,2). Definitions of divided vs. deeply divided societies however do not abound in the 
conflict regulation literature.
97 Nordlinger 1972,9.
98 See Horowitz 2004a.
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than substantive issues.”99
The second factor is the degree to which the system has evolved into the 
“ethnification” of politics; when ethnicity becomes the dominant division, taking 
precedence over other schisms. The status and relevance of crosscutting, or 
accumulative cleavages, defines the distance between groups and the moderation of 
the subgroups. The distance between groups is greater when cleavages do not overlap 
and are of a cumulative nature (territory, ethnicity, religious, language, etc). On the 
contrary, moderation is likely to be found in divided societies where ethnicity 
represents only one among many existing cleavages. Val Lorwin, for example 
suggested that “The availability of individual alternatives distinguishes the politics of 
segmented pluralism from those based on the cleavages of caste, communalism, race, 
or even language;”100 he notes that “the ‘spiritual families’ into which these European 
polities are divided are not as airtight as ascriptive groups are.”101 Similarly, Donald 
Rothchild argues that, “To the extent that individuals are aware of multiple identities 
and diffuse obligations, ethnic boundaries can remain relatively soft and amenable to 
political exchange. In contrast, when political entrepreneurs adopt winner-take-all 
perceptions and operate out of fear for their group’s future security and cultural 
survival, boundaries can become fixed, which makes bargaining and commitment to 
an agreement extremely difficult.”102
This study accepts that Bosnia is deeply divided along ethnic lines,103 without
99 Lederach 1997, 18. He also states, “Where there is deep, long-term fear and direct
experiences of violence that sustain an image of the enemy, people are extremely vulnerable and
easily manipulated. The fears in subgroup identities are often created, reinforced, and used by leaders 
to solidify their position and the internal cohesion of the group behind them. Deep polarization and 
sharp divisions are, in fact, functional for increasing cohesion, reducing ambiguity, and decreasing 
internal criticisms of leaders” (ibid).
100 Lorwin 1977,143.
101 Quoted from Horowitz 1985,572.
102 Rothchild 1997,4.
103 Ethnicity is broadly referred to a set of tangible factors that distinguish one group from
another, including attributes such as inter alia language, race and religion. What makes the category of 
ethnicity relevant at the political level is the link between the tangible and intengible aspects of ethnic 
identity, i.e. “what people believe, or are made to believe” (Wolff 2007a, 36). This link contributes to 
the emergence of the notion of a group’s self identity and uniqueness (Connor 1994,104); any threat, 
real or perceived, to the group’s tangible attributes will thus be “considered as a threat, or opportunity 
for, self-identity and uniqueness” (Wolff 2003, 3). Ethnicity or ethnic identity is thus “something that 
has roots in a group’s culture, and historical experiences and traditions, but that is also dependent upon 
contemporary opportunities that can be a useful instrument for mobilizing people for social, political, 
or economic purposes that may or may not be related directly to their ehtnic origins” (Wolff 2007a, 
36-37; Esman 2004b). The notion of ethnicity is not a permanent condition, but rather a dynamic one, 
and in a state of constant flux. For a discussion on the transformation of ethnic groups into active 
political actors see for example Horowitz 1985; Connor 1994; Wolff 2007a.
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questioning how such divisions have become the primary point of distinction.104 As 
the European Parliament signaled in 2005, “ten years after the signing of the Dayton 
agreement, crucial political problems remain unresolved, the country is deeply 
divided and political stability is vulnerable.”105
Indeed, the political system in Bosnia has evolved towards one that is ethnically 
based and highly fragmented, featuring an inordinately low level of trust among 
ethnic groups, foremost at the political level.106 Major parties in Bosnia can be 
defined along three main divides:107 first, the ethnic social base, i.e. Serb (SNSD, 
SDS and PDP), Bosniak (SDA, SBiH and SDP108) and Croat (HDZ BH and HDZ 
1990); second, the nationalist divide.109 which places parties along a continuum 
between moderate (SBiH in the post-war period110; SNSD before 2006; PDP; and 
some segments within HDZ and SDA) and radical ethnic-nationalism (foremost the 
Serb Radical Party of RS or SRS, and some factions within the SDS, SDA and 
HDZ);111 and finally ideology, which is of either center-right-wing (SDA, SDS, HDZ,
104 This study is not concerned with the transformation of ethnic or social attributes into the
politicization of ethnic identity (for a discussion on this issue see Horowitz 1985; Connor 1994; Wolff 
2007a). This dissertation is rather concerned with the dynamics involved in inter-group relations when 
such transformation has already occurred, “for ethnic consciousness arises only in the presence of 
other groups, and the state is frequently perceived as being under the domination of one or associated 
ethnic groups” (Ghai 2000,6). 
i°5 European Parliament 2005.
106 UNDP’s Early Warning Reports -  a quarterly publication that surveys Bosnian citizens’
attitudes towards various issues including ethnic relations, political stability and trust in public
institutions -  has reported increasing levels of inter-ethnic stability since 2000 (see UNDP Early 
Warning System Resports at www.undp.ba ). Levels of social trust in Bosnia are, however, very low 
in comparison to other countries. Only 7 percent of the population in Bosnia agrees that others can be 
trusted. In Germany is 43 percent, whereas in Croatia and Serbia the levels are 20 percent and 18 
percent respectively (see United Nations Development Programme 2007a).
107 See Sebastian 2007.
108 The SDP claims to be multi-ethnic but its social base is primarily Bosniak.
109 Florian Bieber (2006a) defines four categories in the nationalist divide in Bosnia: (1) 
extreme nationalists (the SRS), who advocate the elimination of the status quo (i.e secession); (2) 
nationalists (SDS, SDA, HDZ), who operate within the parameters of the status quo, even if they favor 
the elimination of Dayton; (3) moderates (SBiH and SNSD before 2006), who favor “a stronger 
commitment to cross-national cooperation” and “a not exclusively identity-based political agenda,” 
even if their political platform is generally commited to only one ethnic group {ibid, 104); and (4) non­
nationalists (SDP), whose political agenda is not centered around a specifc ethnic group.
110 Placing SBiH in the nationalist continuum is rather challenging. In the post-war period, 
SBiH’s nationalist position was more moderate than SDA’s. However, more recently this party has 
adopted a more radical nationalist profile (more radical than the SDA’s leader Sulejman Tihic). The 
party has increasingly questioned the Dayton system and has strongly advocated for its elimination; 
which has been perceived by the Serb parties as the advancement of a radical-nationalist platform 
aimed at eliminating RS.
111 The moderate-radical nationalist divide cannot be clearly defined as a result of two
phenomena: (1) parties’ ideological evolution since the end of the war (i.e. SBiH and SNSD; and (2) 
the high degree of intra-party fragmentation, with a clear divide between hard liners and moderate 
forces, mostly within SDS, SDA and HDZ.
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and PDP) or center-left-wing orientation (SNSD and SDP).113 In practice, however, 
ideology has been superseded by the prominence of the ethno-nationalist divide, 
turning ethnicity into the key political division within the country.114 In fact, the 
political situation in Bosnia has evolved in such a way that center-left-wing parties 
(such as SNSD) have developed a more radical nationalist agenda than center-right- 
wing parties.115
The Bosnian state also enjoys questionable legitimacy at both the societal and 
elite levels,116 given that relations between the three nationalist communities have 
continued to be based on “mutual security fears”117 (foremost at the political level), as 
opposed to mutual cooperation at the state level. None of the communities in Bosnia 
agree on what the state or the central government’s competences should look like,118 
and at least two groups (Croats and Serbs), do not fully accept its existence.119 This 
situation has precluded the consolidation of an effective state at the national level. “In
113 SBiH is more difficult to place in the ideological continuum; given the lack of a clear left- or 
right-wing orientation.
114 See Michael Keating. “The Creature from the Dayton Lagoon: Institutional Design in BiH.” 
Puls Demokratije. 4 June 2007. All major parties in Bosnia, except for the SDP, could be defined as 
ethnic or national parties following Sumantra Bose’s conceptualization of cross-national parties. 
According to Bose, a party is cross-national (in orientation) when it not only has a non-sectarian base 
of support (cross-national base) but also ‘seeks to represent citizens rather than members of one 
national group’ (Bose 2002, 209). Conversely, a nationalist or ethnic party can be referred to as one 
that seeks to represents citizens not as individuals but rather as members of a particular national or 
ethnic group. Chandra (2007): “An ethnic party is a party that overtly represents itself as a champion 
of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and that 
makes such as representation central to its strategy of mobilizing voters” (Chandra 2007,3).
115 Sebastian 2007,3.
116 A survey conducted by UNDP in 2007 revealed that 76 percent of the population in Bosnia 
say they do not trust the state government in Sarajevo (United Nations Development Programme 
2007a). Only half the people who do not trust the state government wished to have political power 
based in Sarajevo (ibid).
117 Bose 2002. A poll conducted by Prism Research in RS in 2005 showed that 66 percent of the 
population in this entity thinks that the sustainability of RS is the only guarantee for the sustainability 
of Serbs in Bosnia. Only 26 percent thought that Bosnia integration into the EU is a guarantee for 
sustainability and prosperity of Serbs in Bosnia (see Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa 2006,71).
118 Both Serb and Croat parties are strongly opposed to moving Bosnia closer to a unitary state, 
which is the most favored option by the Bosniak parties. The Serbs are particularly sensitive about any 
movement towards the strengthening of state level institutions to the detriment of the competences of 
the Serb-dominated RS.
119 A survey conducted by Prism Research for UNDP in 2003 showed that the three groups hold 
antagonistic opinions about the state. A majority of Bosniaks was in favor of creating a civic state, 
whereas the majority of Serbs expressed a preference for independence or for having RS merged with 
Serbia. As for the Croats, a near majority favored the creation of a third entity (United Nations 
Development Programme 2003). Some authors have referred to Linz and Stepan’s notion of 
‘stateness’ to describe the situation in Bosnia (see Donais 2005; Belloni 2008). The stateness problem 
refers to a situation in which “there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the 
political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state 
... [or] about what should actually constitute the polity (or political community) and which demos or 
demoi (population or populations) should be members of that political community” (Linz and Stepan 
1996,17).
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important ways, therefore, Bosnia remains a state without a nation, as almost no 
progress has been made towards fostering a sense of Bosnian ‘nation-ness’ among 
the country’s divided ethnic communities.”120
Why Constitutional Reform?
The process of constitutional reform offers ample room for exploring the dynamics 
involved in the externally led state building process in Bosnia. It represents one of 
the key activities of recent state building processes in which external actors have 
been heavily involved. In fact, the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia 
coincided with other US’ constitutional initiatives in divided societies such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq; it is part of a wider phenomenon.
The process of constitutional reform also offers ample room for exploring the 
dynamics involved in the process of EU integration. Although constitutional reform 
did not feature as an expressed condition for EU accession, the European 
Commission supported the process publicly.121 In fact, constitutional reform was 
turned into a framework of indirect, diffuse conditionality.122 The EU made it clear 
through public statements and official documents that constitutional changes would 
be required for the process of EU accession. They stopped short, however, of 
providing any specific criteria, except for the need to create an effective and 
functional state capable of complying with EU accession criteria.123 This relative 
ambiguity in terms of external directive provides an opportunity to examine a process 
in which international actors were heavily involved, and to explore the degree to 
which they succeeded in shaping the local outcome.
Pickel and Donais 2003,19.
121 Although the key priority for the EU at the time was police reform, the European 
Commission was in favor of constitutional negotiations. Passage of constitutional changes was 
however never linked to the process of EU integration (see chapter 5, p. 207 for a discussion on this 
issue). Following the failure of the constitutional negotiations in 2006, the EU included constitutional 
reform as one of the key priorities to be accomplished in the “next few years” as part of the 2007 
European partnership for BIH (Council of the EU 2007a). The inclusion of constitutional reform as a 
key priority for EU accession was based on the belief that the Bosnian constitution “prevents swift 
decision-making and therefore hinders reform and the capacity to make progress towards the EU” 
(European Commission 2007, 7). The EU has been unclear, however, in defining the legal 
implications associated with setting constitutional reform as a priority in the process of EU integration.
122 See chapter 2 for a definition of formal and informal conditionality.
123 In October 2005, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn declared that Bosnia would 
not be able to join the Union with its current structure (see OHR, BiH media round-up, 20 October 
2005).
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Finally, in contrast with other overlapping EU-led reform process in Bosnia, 
such as the restructuring of police forces,124 constitutional reform involved a process 
of elite bargaining restricted by a specific period of time (from April 2005 to April 
2006). Though other initiatives were launched after the failure of the process, they 
never managed to gamer enough domestic support and resulted in failure. Choosing a 
reform process within the constraints of a timeline is essential to avoiding the 
‘moving target’ problem in post-conflict Bosnia; a process that has been in constant 
flux.
1.8. METHODOLOGY
My research is qualitative in nature and is based on the analysis of primary and 
secondary documentation and on 80 open-ended interviews with some of the key 
players involved in the process of constitutional reform.
A Single-case Study
While this research is based upon a single case study of post-conflict Bosnia, it uses a 
three level framework, which has not previously been used for analysis. The decision 
to use Bosnia as a case study stems from several important factors. Bosnia represents 
an important example of a post-conflict, deeply divided society in which the external 
leadership is prominent. Important lessons can be drawn from an in-depth study of 
post-conflict Bosnia, which can, in turn, be applied outwardly. Such an example 
would be Iraq, where the external leadership has been pronounced, and the division 
of society along three major ethnic groups holds many similarities with Bosnia. This 
study represents an attempt to build some theoretical propositions in an area of study 
where no major theory exists.125
The case of Bosnia also stands out for its uniqueness and complexity. This 
complexity, in part, justifies the undertaking of a single-case study in order to be able
124 Police reform was set up as a condition for European accession in 2003. A final agreement 
on police restructuring was only possible at the end of 2007 and early 2008. This dissertation explores 
the dynamics of police reform as they intertwine with constitutional negotiations in chapter 5 ,6  and 7.
125 My study falls into what Lijphart calls “hypothesis-generating case studies.” The ultimate 
goal is to build propositions that may be tested in subsequent comparative studies (see Lijphart 1971).
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to fully explore all of the intricacies. Bosnia’s uniqueness is related to a confluence 
of different factors. These include: the intensity of the conflict,126 the singularity of 
the system created in Dayton (with a heavy external leadership), the simultaneity of 
different transitions,127 and the overlap of state building with the process of European 
accession. Notwithstanding the uniqueness of the Bosnian case, this research is 
comparative in nature; reflecting on existing, established theory, as opposed to 
providing a mere descriptive account of facts and events as they developed.
This study is process driven, and aims to bring a large body of new and empirical 
evidence to a heretofore largely undisclosed process. It thus seems sensible to adopt a 
case-based approach in order to be better informed about the different set of 
dynamics and factors involved in this process. As Arend Lijphart states, “The great 
advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be 
intensively examined.”128 Furthermore, this research utilizes the aforementioned 
three-level framework. Small-N comparative studies (or single case studies) are 
generally better received and more informative when the analytics deployed involve 
multiple variables. An inductive, process-oriented approach seems most appropriate 
to explore the specific interactions between internal and external variables in the 
process of constitutional reform in Bosnia.
The Actor-Centered Approach
My dissertation takes an actor-centered approach. The choices available to political 
actors are somewhat constrained and structured by the institutional framework in 
which they operate.129 Having said this, my research is based on the notion that much 
depends on how elites interact with each other, given such constraining institutions, 
and the ample room for maneuvering nonetheless enjoyed by these elites. This study
126 Bosnia is believed to have paid the heaviest toll in the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. 
This represents an important issue as it relates to the question of trust in the aftermath of the war. 
Estimates show that around 97,200 people were killed in the war out of a population of roughly 4 
million people (see the Research and Documentation Center at http://www.idc.org.ba/aboutus.htmn. 
30,000 went missing and a total of 2.2 million were displaced. Bosnia also suffered from “some of the 
worst massacres committed in Europe since the Second World War” (Council of Europe 2004c, 5) as a 
result of the genocidal experience. While it is believed that the number of people displaced and 
missing are roughly accurate, as well as the magnitude of the material destruction (more than a third of 
the housing was completely destroyed), the number of people killed remains in dispute.
127 These include an economic and political transition (from socialism and communism to 
democracy and capitalism) as well as a process of state and nation building.
128 Lijphart 1971,691.
129 March and Olsen 1984; Peters 1999.
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is thus not concerned with the impact of power sharing on the pace of reform; but 
rather with the patterns of behavior of the political elites within the existing 
constraining institutions in which they operate.
The literature on conflict regulation and power sharing has underscored the 
critical role of political elites in making these institutional arrangements work. 
Lijphart, for example, argues that elites play a central role in making consociational 
democracies effective and stable over time.130 In fact, according to Lijphart, 
consociational democracies can only work when the political leaders realize that 
mutual inter-segmental intransigence can lead to self-destruction and war (the so- 
called self-negating prediction). This realization, in turn, encourages conciliatory and 
accommodating behavior.131 Other power sharing studies, more critical of Lijphart’s 
self-negating prediction in post-conflict societies, have also underscored the 
prominence of political elites in the success (or failure) of consociational 
experiments in deeply divided societies.132 Nordlinger’s cross-country study of 
conflict regulation in deeply divided societies, for example, brings to light the 
critical role of conflict groups leaders. In the words of Nordlinger, “it was the 
conflict group leaders who took the initiative in working out the various conflict- 
regulating practices, who put them into operation, and who did so at least partly with 
the goal in mind of arriving at a conflict-regulating outcome.”133
In addition to the critical role of political elites in power sharing arrangements, 
the process of constitutional reform was an elite driven process. There are three 
broadly defined types of constitution making, which vary in the level of 
inclusiveness:134 first, elite roundtables, which involve a small number of political 
elites;135 second, national conferences, which allows broader participation of political
Lijphart 1969.
131 “The critical role of the leaders is especially clear in those cases, like South Africa, where 
the background conditions and the degree of pluralism are not very favorable for consociationalism” 
(Lijphart 1985, 120). Lijphart also refers to flexibility and pragmatism as key attributes of political 
elites for the successful functioning of consociational arrangements.
132 Schneckener’s comparative study on the favorable conditions for power sharing 
(Schneckener 2002), for example, shows that actor-centered approaches are more relevant than the 
ones that are institutionally based in accounting for success in power sharing agreements. The 
institutional approaches seem to become more relevant as the operation of the agreement is maintained 
over time.
133 Nordlinger 1972,40.
134 See Samuels 2009.
135 Kirsti Samuels argues that most elite-driven constitution making processes have been largely
negative, except for the case of Spain (Samuels 2009).
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elites and civic activists;136 finally, the participatory constitution-making process, 
which develops largely without international involvement in deeply divided 
societies; these processes usually involve education programs as well as extensive 
consultations.137 In the case of Bosnia, there was an early attempt to include the 
broader civil society in the negotiations, and bring some of the elements of a 
participatory process of constitutional reform, but as we shall see in the chapters to 
follow, the US ultimately turned the process into a highly exclusive process of elite 
bargaining. Political elites were thus the ultimate decision makers in the process.
Political Elites
This dissertation uses the definition of political elites from John Higley and Richard 
Gunther. These authors refer to elites as persons,
“Who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful 
organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and 
substantially.138 Elites are the principal decision makers in the largest or 
most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, 
professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements 
in a society. This means that they are made up of people who may hold 
widely varying attitudes towards the existing social, economic, and 
political order, including the holders of key positions in powerful 
dissident organizations and movements.”139
My study focuses on political elites,140 rather than economic or social elites, for 
two reasons. First, party leaders represent the key actors in the process of
These model has been generally used in transitions from authoritarian rule in Francophone 
Africa (ibid). While the initial experience was positive, the conventions were later on unable to 
“institute regime change against the wishes of those in power” (ibid, 177).
137 Ibid, 177; see also Samuels 2005. These processes tend to prolong for extensive periods of 
time, especially in comparison to the other two models. Samuels argues that the participatory model 
was particularly successful in Uganda and South Africa (Samuels 2009).
138 Elites affect political outcomes substantially “in the sense that without their support or 
opposition, an outcome salient to their interests and locations would be noticeably different” (Higley 
and Gunther 1992,9).
139 Higley and Gunther 1992,8. See also Burton and Higley 1987; Moyser and Waystaffe 1987; 
Putnam 1976.
140 Drawing from the definition of Higley and Gunther (1992), this study refers to political elites 
as the principal decision makers and the holders of strategic positions in the “most-resource rich” 
political and governmental organizations in the society.
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constitutional reform. Second, this research is based on the assumption that the 
ultimate decision making power in Bosnia resides in the political leadership. In fact, 
international actors have operated under this assumption for the past few years. Since 
the HR Ashdown took office in 2002, the international strategy has been directed 
towards working with party leaders as the critical interlocutors of the reform process. 
The process of constitutional reform perfectly fits this pattern.
While other economic and religious elites have held important pockets of 
influence over the broader reform process in Bosnia, this study only refers to them in 
so far as their actions are likely to affect the patterns of conflict regulation during the 
process of constitutional reform. The role of non-core elites is thus only considered 
when appropriate.
The role of non-elites is marginally discussed in this study, given the secondary 
role that civil society played in the process of constitutional reform. Though it would 
be reasonable to assume that the support of non-elites may have factored into the 
calculations of political elites as to whether or not to engage in conflict regulation in 
the area of constitutional reform, this dissertation is based on the assumption that this 
was secondary to other considerations. Three factors have informed this assumption. 
The first one is related to the specific condition of Bosnia as a semi protectorate 
where the international community holds important pockets of power and influence. 
The institutionalized presence of the international community in Bosnia has given 
way to an ‘upward’ accountability chain in the political system, in which domestic 
politicians are answerable to the international community rather than to society.141 In 
other words, party leaders have become accountable to external actors rather than to 
civil society (supra-national variable). The second one relates to the fact that deeply 
divided societies are highly vulnerable to the politics of outbidding, where part of the 
strategy of the political elite focuses on issues of authenticity and group 
representativeness. In the case of Bosnia, the struggle is over what defines a real 
Serb, a real Bosniak, etc, and over who has the right to speak for the ethnic group, 
and who counts with the support of the group.142 Under these circumstances, the 
political struggle evolves into a struggle over political positioning based on the issue 
of ethnic representativeness; where the main audience may be other intra-group 
members of the elite as opposed to the general public (intra-ethnic variable). The
141 Chandler 2006; Knaus and Martin, 2003.
142 Gagnon 1995; Caspersen 2004.
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support of the non-elite may be one among many considerations in the calculations 
of the elite, but certainly not the most important one.143
Key Domestic Players
The key political actors144 involved in the process of constitutional reform include the 
following:
• The Bosniak Group (comprised of SDA, SBiH and SDP). This group was the most 
fragmented and divided group during the negotiations, despite of the fact that the two 
leading parties (the SDA and the SBiH) were coalition partners at the state and entity 
levels.
- The Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the leading Bosniak party until 2006, 
was created in May 1990, on a religious-based platform under the leadership 
of Alija Izetbegovic (The party was formed by members of an Islamist 
movement associated with the pan-Islamist organization ‘The Young 
Muslims’145). The SDA has been the traditionally nationalist party within the 
Bosniak group; although it has evolved into more moderate positions under 
Sulejman Tihic, who has led the party since 2001. This party has historically 
governed as part of a coalition with other traditionally nationalist parties; 
namely SDS and HDZ. The party’s leadership has been divided between a 
radical faction (members of the Islamist movement146), under the leadership 
of Muslim cleric Hasan Cegnic, and a moderate faction led by Tihic. Radical 
forces have favored the outright elimination of the status quo (as reflected in
In short, political elites may be compelled to engage in conflict regulation depending upon 
the position of other members of the political elite, and the ability to use conflict regulation practices 
to appeal to the population on issues of authenticity.
144 I generally use the term actor to refer to political parties, not individuals, although 
sometimes the line separating the two is blurred. In this dissertation, I will be explicit when I refer to 
the party versus the party leader and/or the high-ranking officials of the party. It is significant to note 
here that the analysis of local elites is undertaken in relation to two different tiers: (1) at the intra­
ethnic level, where the units of analysis are the political elites and parties; (2) at the inter-ethnic level, 
where the units of analysis are the ethnic groups.
145 Bougarel 2007. The organization ‘Young Muslisms’ was created at the end of the 1930s and 
was dissolved in 1947 (Izetbegovic himself was part of it). Its members became active again in the 
1960s through formal religious institutions, namely the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica), and 
with new recruiters from the madrassah in Sarajevo (ibid).
146 Ibid.
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Dayton);147 whereas Tihic’s position has become more pragmatic over time 
(seeking to reform Dayton as part of a consensus platform with the other 
ethnic groups). These divisions were most prominent during constitutional 
negotiations between 2005 and 2006, as we shall see in the following 
chapters.
- The Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), led by Haris Silajdzic, was 
formed in 1996 as an offshoot of the SDA; favoring more moderate 
nationalist positions. Though a smaller party since inception, the last 
presidential elections in October 2006 placed this party at the center of the 
political stage and awarded its leader the position of Bosniak member of the 
presidency. This party has also adopted a more radical nationalist position 
recently. In the past, SBiH has formed coalitions with the SDA (1996-2000; 
2002-2006), and with the SDP as a member of the short-lived moderate 
‘Alliance for Changes’ (2001-2002).
- The Social Democratic Party (SDP), under the leadership of Zlatko 
Lagumdzija, represents the successor to the League of Communists of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The SDP has remained the only moderate and non­
nationalist political organization.148 The weak structure of the party (which 
revolves almost exclusively around its leader Zlatko Lagumdzija)150 and its 
disappointing performance in government with the “Alliance for Changes” in 
2001-2002, have prevented this party from playing a bigger role in Bosnia’s 
politics. The party’s Croat candidate for the 2006 presidential elections, 
Zeljko Komsic, was elected as Croat member of the presidency.
• The three key Serb parties include the SDS, the SNSD, and the SDP.
- The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), led by Dragan Cavic at the time of the 
constitutional negotiations, was founded by war crimes indictee Radovan 
Karadzic in July of 1990. This party has been mired with internal divisions
147 Especially, the elimination of RS and the entity-based structure.
148 Its popular base and support is however mostly Bosniak and Croats and Serbs living in
Central Bosnia (Bieber 2006a); Florian Bieber notes that the party’s support for the strengthening of 
the state has made it less appealing to Croats living in Herzegovina and Serbs living in RS (ibid).
150 It is important to note, however, that the party is strong institutionally. The party has a 
branch organization in almost every municipality.
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between radical and moderate nationalists. One of the most prominents rifts 
resulted in former radical nationalist, and at the time RS president, Bjljana 
Plavsic, defecting from the party in early 1997 and setting up a non-SDS 
minority government under Dodik's leadership in early 1998. Divisions 
between a radical nationalist wing (associated with the party officialdom in 
Eastern RS), and a more moderate Banja Luka-based nationalist faction led 
by Cavic have continued;151 and were most prominent during the process of 
constitutional reform. The SDS was the strongest, nationalist party in RS at 
the time of the negotiations. It has however, lost much of its clout to Dodik’s 
SNSD, which has emerged as the leading Serb party at the entity and state 
levels since the 2006 elections. Mladen Bosic replaced Dragan Cavic as the 
head of the party in November 2006, following the resignation of the latter 
after the 2006 elections.
- The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), which came into 
existence in 1996 as a moderate social-democratic force under the leadership 
of Milorad Dodik, has become the primary nationalist force. Dodik held the 
position of prime minister from 1998 to 2001. He was reappointed prime 
minister on 28 February 2006 and continues to hold this position. 
Traditionally, SNSD’s power bases have been in the urban centers of Western 
RS, but it has progressively extended its influence in Eastern RS (especially 
after the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections).152 SNSD’s nationalist agenda 
has been mostly moderate (defending the autonomy of RS153); but it has 
evolved into a more radical stance since 2006.154
- The Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), created in 1999 under the 
leadership of Mladen Ivanic, maintains a moderate platform of economic 
reform and political pragmatism, and remains a smaller party. While the PDP 
made significant progress in the 2000 local elections, it lost ground in 2004 in 
a coalition with the SDS (its partner in the government for four years prior to
151 SDS radicals have traditionally favored RS’s secession and have advocated for no Serb
participation at the state level institutions. They have also opposed fiercely the transfer of powers from 
RS to the state. SDS’s moderates are in favor of preserving RS autonomy, but accept the status quo 
and are willing to make concessions on the basis of the process of European integration.
152 SNSD is the only Serb party that has attempted to extend its activities (and represent Serb
minorities) in the Federation.
153 Bieber 2006a.
154 The progressive ‘radicalization’ of SNSD is explored in chapter 7.
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the contest). PDP’s leader Ivanic was appointed RS prime minister in 2001 
and foreign affairs minister of BiH after the 2002 elections.
• Within the Croat community, the major actors are:
- The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) was 
founded in August 1990 as a branch of the HDZ in Croatia. HDZ has also 
been mired with divisions since inception between radical nationalists (who 
favor the creation of a third entity) and moderate nationalists, mostly in favor 
of providing Croats with further local autonomy. HDZ’s current leader, 
moderate nationalist Dragan Co vie, was indicted on corruption charges in 
March of 2005. Though he was forced to step down from the position as 
Croat member of the presidency in light of the scandal, he never resigned 
from his position within the party. He was elected president of HDZ in May
2005. Ongoing divisions flared up during the process of constitutional reform, 
resulting in the creation of an offshoot party, HDZ 1990.
- The Croatian People's Community (HNZ) is a smaller party with no 
representation at the state level. The party is led by Miljenko Brkic, a former 
president of HDZ BiH. It took part in the process of constitutional reform so 
that the Croats could have two representatives at the negotiation table. This 
study deals only marginally with the HNZ.
- HDZ BiH 1990 emerged as an offshoot of the HDZ at the end of the process 
of constitutional reform, in April of 2006, under the leadership of Bozo 
Ljubic. Although the party was formed by moderate figures of HDZ BiH, it 
adopted a more conservative nationalist platform to differentiate itself from 
HDZ BiH.
The International Community: Key External Players
The terms “international community: and “external actors” are often used in 
reference to either the broader community of states, or a specific set of actors, 
contingent upon both the matter and issue at stake. In either respect, the term 
international community tends to homogenize the features and main characteristics of 
the different units involved. This study is, however, based on the assumption that
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these actors do not espouse similar goals, interests and/or strategies. This note of 
caution is particularly significant in the context of Bosnia, where the international 
community is comprised of a myriad of actors. These range from the institutions that 
were created during and after the war (such as the Contact Group, the OHR and the 
PIC155) to other more conventional actors such as the EU, the US and other states of 
the broader international community that operate in Bosnia. Various international and 
regional organizations also enjoy a significant presence in Bosnia, including inter 
alia NATO, the UN, the OSCE, the IMF, the CoE, and the European Court of 
Human Rights.
This dissertation uses the term external players to refer to two key international 
actors directly involved in the process of constitutional reform; namely the US and 
the EU.156 The EU will be analyzed in two capacities: (1) as a supranational entity. In 
this function, the EU’s role is assessed through the actions and statements of both EU 
officials and EU institutions157; (2) as a collective body comprised of member states, 
which hold differing interests, goals and strategies. In this capacity, the EU’s role is 
assessed through the actions and statements of European diplomats in Bosnia, acting 
in their national interest. Other organizations will also be taken into consideration, 
including the CoE, the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG)158 and the 
NGO Dayton Project, the latter created in early 2005 to facilitate the negotiations 
during the first phase of the negotiations.
Two additional notes of caution are in order. First, though European and US 
elites are believed to hold some degree of autonomy on the ground, this study 
presupposes that they are the executors of the policies heralded by the countries or 
organizations they represent. Second, the analysis of the role of external actors is
155 An organization established in the London Conference in December 1995 to help assist with 
the implementation of the peace plan. The PIC is comprised of 55 countries and agencies that support 
the peace process. The Steering Board was also created in the London Conference to assist the OHR 
and provide political guidance (Peace Implementation Council 1996). The members of the Steering 
board include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the 
Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), which is represented by Turkey.
156 Other non-EU member countries such as Norway and Switzerland provided financial support 
in the initial stages of the constitutional negotiations. The role of these countries was secondary and 
ended once the US became formally involved.
157 Such as the Council of the EU, the EU Special Representative in BiH, the European 
Delegation in BiH, and the European Parliament.
158 PILPG is a non-profit group with a long history of engagement with Bosnia. It served as a 
legal advisor to the Bosnian delegation during the negotiations of the Dayton Peace Accords. PDLPG 
Director Prof. Paul Williams was in fact a member and representative of the Bosnian delegation 
during the Dayton negotiations. PILPG supported Donald Hays during constitutional negotiations.
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somewhat compromised by their overlapping activities on the ground. This problem 
is significant in the case of constitutional reform, given the complimentary, yet 
sometimes overlapping role of both the EU and the US. This research has overcome 
this methodological problem by treating and analyzing the role of both actors 
separately, whenever possible, and indicating when separation is not possible.
This dissertation also takes into consideration the role of kin states (namely 
Croatia and Serbia), but only in so far as they affect the course of the process. Kin 
state involvement is thus considered as a secondary variable.
Sources and Data Collection
Two main methods of data collection are employed in this thesis. Firstly, I conducted 
80 interviews with key players involved in the process of constitutional reform and/or 
engaged in the process of state building in Bosnia. I chose personal interviews as the 
key method because of the rather secretive nature of the process, and the absence of 
available empirical material. Secondly, I analyzed existing official documents from 
the EU, the US and Bosnia; including policy papers, party documents, and material 
provided by the Dayton Project (the NGO in charge of constitutional negotiations 
prior to the US takeover). Other secondary material such as news articles, policy 
papers and academic articles were used, along with quantitative sources, although 
they did not comprise the empirical backbone of this study.
In-depth interviews as the primary empirical source
A total of 80 in-depth interviews were conducted over an extended period of 
fieldwork in Bosnia in 2007159 and two study visits in Brussels and Washington DC 
in the summer of 2006 (a second trip to Washington DC was also taken in 2007). The 
interviews were conducted with the following actors160:
* Key local players, including: some of the party leaders that participated in the 
negotiations, deputies at the state and entity-level legislatures, and party
159 Fieldwork in Bosnia included visits to Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka from May to July 
2007. A preliminary one-week fieldwork trip to Sarajevo was conducted in December 2006.
160 See appendix 1 for a full list of interviews.
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officials. Domestic elites were selected according to a representation formula 
across ethnic lines.
* Key international players, including the UK and Austrian Ambassadors to BiH, 
US diplomats, the HR Schwarz Schilling, and other Western diplomats.
* European officials from the European Commission, the European Delegation 
in Bosnia, the Council of the EU, the office of the EUSR in Bosnia; and the 
European Parliament.
* Other informal actors that participated in the process as assistants to the key 
players.
* Local and international informants, such as high and low-ranking party 
officials, academics, analysts, journalists, members of civil society and other 
Western diplomats who participated indirectly in the process of constitutional 
reform.
Given the lack of publicly available primary sources of information about the process 
of constitutional in Bosnia, gathering primary data through in-depth personal 
interviews with the key participants was deemed critical. The aim was twofold: to 
gather information about the positions, motives, perceptions, interests and strategies 
of the elites involved in the process; and to gain further knowledge of the key 
developments in the process. In light of the fact that political elites are often reluctant 
to readily disclose their true motives and the political games and strategies in which 
they engage (which represents a significant methodological problem161), I sought to 
overcome this limitation by using a three-pronged strategy: (1) I compared and 
contrasted the interviews; (2) I did an extensive critical review of the information 
generated by the local media during the process of the negotiations; (3) I conducted 
interviews with key informants who had privileged information about the process, 
either through their position as close aides, or through direct observation of the 
process. The aim of this three-pronged strategy was to validate, confirm and cross­
check the information garnered, and to correct and dismiss potential gaps and/or 
contradictions.
This problem is aggravated when the object study is a moving target. Though the process of 
constitutional reform failed in 2006, there were ongoing informal talks on constitutional reform when 
the author was doing fieldwork in Bosnia.
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Additional data
This study relies on the following additional sources of data.
1. Qualitative sources:
- Primary documentary sources:162
• Constitutional documents and other political texts (position papers, statements 
by leading politicians, speeches, party programs, etc) generated during the 
negotiations.
• EU official documents (available via the Europa website), including reports, 
policy papers, speeches, statements, action memorandums, etc, from the 
Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the EC Delegation in 
Bosnia and the EU Special Representative. These sources were referenced 
against the information gathered through the interviews with respect to the 
viewpoints and strategies of the EU in Bosnia, and more specifically in 
relation to the process of constitutional reform.
• Official texts (policy papers, speeches, position papers, statements, etc) from 
other international organizations such as the OHR and the CoE.
• Additional official documentation, including records of constitutional talks as 
provided for in the summaries produced by the Dayton Project (the non-profit 
organization involved in the preliminary round of negotiations). These 
sources were helpful in mapping out the different meetings that took place at 
the time, and for identifying the major issues at stake, along with the key 
positions of the actors involved.
- Secondary material:
• The OHR’s media monitoring service, an online service that provided 
summaries of the major local media outlets (including newspaper, Radio and 
TV) translated into English.
• International and local media, as well as specialized online resources such as
162 Most of these sources were provided to the author by the interviewers, especially Donald
Hays and members of the Dayton Project. Other primary information was available online, as
indicated in the references.
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Bosnia Daily, Transitions Online, and Balkan insight.
• Policy analyses and reports from international research organizations, 
including the Stability Pact Initiative and the International Crisis Group, and 
local think tanks such as the Center for Security Studies and the Center for 
Research and Development.
• Academic resources, including journals, books, dissertations and conference 
papers.
2. Quantitative Sources:
- Public opinion Polls on domestic political attitudes and identities, conducted by 
local and international poll institutes, as well as electoral results. This data provided 
information about the population’s values and attitudes towards the political elites 
and the overall reform process; demonstrating whether these were in concert with the 
views and interests of political elites.
- Additional Quantitative data, such as aid expenditures, economic and social 
indicators, and government statistics, were gathered via the web and locally during 
fieldwork.
1.9. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation is divided into four sections. Part one (chapter 2) is concerned with 
the conceptual theoretical framework. It analyzes the research schools this study 
addresses (namely the conditionality and state building literatures), and outlines a 
framework for a better understanding of post-conflict state building in deeply divided 
societies. Drawing from the literature on conflict regulation and other plural society 
theories, this framework divides the analysis into three tiers; namely the inter-ethnic, 
intra-ethnic and supra-national levels.
The second section of this thesis (chapter 3) seeks to analyze the constitutional 
debate in Bosnia following the break up of former Yugoslavia. It examines the key 
issues involved in the design and implementation of the DPA signed in 1995. The 
goal of this chapter is to provide a thorough understanding of the Bosnian
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constitutional backbone, and to lay the groundwork for understanding the context in 
which the process of constitutional reform took place in the period between 2005 and
2006.
Section three of this dissertation (chapter 4 through 7), is concerned with the 
process of constitutional reform in Bosnia over the period of 2005 and 2006. Chapter 
4 is devoted to outlining the rationale, the origins and the initial steps in the process; 
including the dynamics and rules of engagement. The subsequent three chapters 
(Chapter 5, 6 and 7) are devoted to the analysis of the process of constitutional 
reform; examining three critical stages in the development of the negotiations.
Chapter 5 explores the first critical phase (November through December of 
2005). This phase featured the transition from a preparatory stage, in which party 
representatives operated in a low-key manner, to a stage in which party leaders 
became more actively engaged. The involvement of party leaders yielded an infusion 
of zero-sum claims and a notable increase in the use of nationalist rhetoric. These 
dynamics exposed a high level of inter-ethnic distrust, which, in turn, had a 
significant impact upon how the parties perceived their own interests, the interest of 
other groups, and how they formulated a political strategy within the bargaining 
framework. Politics at the intra-ethnic level were also disruptive during this phase; 
with key leaders facing serious challenges within their respective parties. These 
dynamics collectively served to enhance the level of radicalization, and negotiations 
verged on collapse in early December of 2005.
Chapter 6 is devoted to the second stage of the negotiations (from December, 
2005 through March of 2006), and following the US appropriation of the process in 
December of 2005. During this phase, the US provided a framework in which an 
agreement at the inter-ethnic level was made possible. Developments at the intra­
party levels also contributed to a successful outcome, given that party leaders 
managed to sideline major internal divisions. The role of external actors was critical 
during this stage, however the exclusion of specific political forces became a 
challenge in the subsequent phase of the process.
Chapter 7 examines the final phase of the negotiations, from March through 
April of 2006, when the agreement was transferred to the parliament for public 
discussion and debate. While pressure from external actors increased dramatically at 
this point, including direct lobbying activities by the US and European countries,
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politics at the intra-ethnic level acquired a new dimension. This development 
ultimately led to the failure of the constitutional package on April 26th.
Part four (chapter 8) of this dissertation offers concluding remarks drawn from 
the empirical discussion. I conclude that the international influence in Bosnia, and the 
transformative power of the EU were blunted by an ethnic power struggle. While 
external actors did play a substantive role, the neglect of intra-ethnic dynamics 
ultimately rendered external actors’ efforts at shaping the process of constitutional 
reform in Bosnia ineffective.
This dissertation uses an inductive, process-oriented approach in analyzing this 
post-conflict deeply divided society. Such an approach is required to be agency- 
driven, and explore the political interactions that take place in three different 
dimensions, namely the inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic and supra-national levels. This 
approach, I argue, is best suited to understanding the specific interactions between 
internal and external forces, and the significance of these interactions on the overall 
policy outcome in the state building process in Bosnia.
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PARTI
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Part one o f the dissertation (chapter 2) aims to develop a theoretical framework to 
account for the political dynamics involved in state building processes, where the 
external leadership is pronounced and where society is deeply divided along ethnic 
lines.
Chapter 2 is divided into four sections. The first section briefly addresses 
different forms of external influence. The second section is devoted to the review of 
the key theoretical approaches that this research speaks to, namely the recent 
literature on state building and conditionality studies. This review focuses on two 
overarching themes, namely (1) the analysis of the intertwinements between domestic 
and external factors, and (2) the role of political elites. This section concludes with a 
brief account of the key shortcomings associated with these studies when leveled 
against post-conflict Bosnia.
The third section of the chapter lays out an alternative three level framework to 
study the dynamics involved in the process of state building in post-conflict Bosnia, 
drawing from the literature of conflict regulation and other plural society theories. 
The goal is to create a comprehensive, yet concise, analytical backbone to inform the 
empirical discussion that follows in the subsequent chapters. Under what conditions 
can we expect external actors to have an impact on domestic politics in post-conflict, 
divided societies? What role does the ethnic and post-conflict factor play in such 
scenarios? How do external and internal actors interact with each other in divided 
societies?
The final part of the chapter levels this framework against post-conflict Bosnia, 
accounting for the different set of interactions that take place between domestic and 
external actors in the reform process under consideration.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. FORMS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
Basic Models of External Influence
Lawrence Whitehead’s The International Dimensions o f Democratization163 was the 
first major study to analyze the interconnectedness of international influences on 
processes of political reform164 and democratization.165 In his study, he identified 
three models of external influence whereby one can analyze the role of external 
forces.166 The first one, contagion, refers to systemic processes of influence. 
Particularly, it refers to “the diffusion of experience [and ideas] through neutral, i.e. 
non-coercive and often unintentional, channels from one country to another.”167 
According to Whitehead this level of analysis is the simplest one given that it 
requires no consideration of actors or their motivations, and there is “no attribution of 
primacy to either internal or external sources of democratization.” The problem, 
Whitehead notes, is that the contagion model “cannot tell us how a sequence begins,
Whitehead 1996; see also Whitehead 1986; Pridham 1994 and 1991.
164 Studies on tied aid also came out in the 1990s, but there was a lack of engagement between 
scholars of the developing world and democratization studies. A lack of engagement was also patent 
within the democratization studies in the early 1990s, between the Latin America specialists and 
scholars of the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
165 The early studies on democratic transitions and consolidation failed to include the
international dimension. Dankwart Rustow’s Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model 
(1970), for example, stressed that while international influences are almost always present in 
democratic transitions through either war, military occupation or the spread of ideas, “the dynamic 
process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive [internal] political 
struggle” (Rustow 1970, 382). Following the steps of Rustow’s initial study on the subject, Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Philip Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead’s seminal work on Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule stressed that “external factors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role, 
with the obvious exception of those instances in which a foreign occupying power was present” 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986,5).
166 Whitehead uses these models in order to illuminate recent democratization experiences
where the role of external forces was pronounced; he includes the analysis of actors, processes and 
motivations. Whitehead adds a note of caution for there is a significant overlap between the three 
models (Whitehead 1996,4).
167 Schmitter 1996,29.
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why it ends, what it excludes, or even the order in which it is likely to advance.”168
The second one is the model of consent, which involves “a complex set of 
interactions between international processes and domestic groups that generates new 
democratic norms and expectations from below.”169 The focus is the local drive to 
pursue democracy from examples or standards defined externally. Indeed, there is an 
intentional or unintentional drive on the part of the domestic actors (be it at the 
political, economic or societal level) to adopt democratic procedures or specific 
norms from external actors or processes. Within this rubric, one can include 
transnational influences such as those promoted by transnational social organizations, 
effects of globalization, emulation, or domestic or regional drives to merge with other 
countries or regional organizations in order to protect or promote democracy.170 
Under the latter, Whitehead includes the broader process of European integration, 
especially in reference to the decision taken by domestic actors to converge with 
European standards and norms.171
The third model is the control model, which may refer to two phenomena: (1) 
experiences of outright imposition from above of specific democratic structures, 
norms and/or processes, or (2) the promotion of democracy through explicit policies. 
The key characteristic of this form of influence is the expressed intention by outside 
actors to affect domestic processes through either outright imposition or the 
implementation of programs and policies that are designed to promote democratic 
institutions and/or good governance. This form of external influence involves 
experiences such as the imposition of democratic structures in Germany and Japan 
after WWII or democratic promotion programs by external agencies as part of a 
defined strategy that does not include coercive methods.172 The recent experiences of 
external state building and international administration may also be included within 
this rubric.
168 Whitehead 1996,5.
169 Schmitter 1996,29.
170 Schmitter 1996. German unification is a clear case in point.
171 It is important to note here that the logic involved in the process of European integration 
(which refers to the process of adjustment of EU member states) is different from the process of EU 
accession, where conditionality comes into play. Though there is a factor of consent in both processes, 
the conditionality framework puts in place a set of sanctions and rewards that do not feature in the 
process of EU integration.
172 The surge in USAID democracy promotion in the early 1990s is closely linked to the fall of
communism.
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Conditionality has been identified as the fourth model of external influence.173 
Early studies defined conditionality as “a mutual arrangement by which a 
government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which all 
international institutions will provide specified amounts of assistance—usually 
financial or technical.”174 This definition is, however, restricted to intematioanl 
organizations and fails to account for state’s national and ideological interests. 
Conditionality is best defined as a process where both formal and informal rules 
apply. James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, for example, define 
conditionality as the process characterized by “the interaction between multi-level 
actors, perceptions, interests, different rewards and sanctions, temporal factors, 
institutional and policy compliance.”175 In sum, conditionality involves a stated 
strategy set up by an external actor with a desired outcome attached and acted upon a 
third country. Rather than a uniform variable, conditionality generally involves an 
instrument that enjoys different meanings and effects depending on the time frame, 
the context, the domestic actors and sectors involved, the credibility of the 
conditionality package and how it is applied.176 In contrast to models of outright 
control, conditionality involves some room for domestic forces to adapt, accept or 
reject the conditions lay out externally;177 it “allows the recipient to maintain 
independence, while accepting the pre-negotiated consequences of failing to act in 
the way the donor expects.”178 As a result, both the study of the supply side (the 
‘downloader’) and the recipient country (the ‘uplodader’) are deemed critical for 
understanding how external factors may impact the way in which domestic structures 
and actors readily accept, reject or adopt external conditions.179
Processes of institutional change through conditionality are to a certain degree 
more amenable to empirical research than other forms of external influence such as 
contagion. First, there is a stated goal (representing the source of influence) by an
173 Schmitter 1996.
174 Checkel 2000,1.
175 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004,3.
176 See for example Lippert, Umbach and Wessels 2001; Grabbe, 2002a; Kelley, 2004a;
Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004.
177 In the case of outright control, there is no such an option, which does not mean that the 
implementation of democracy structures and processes will be successful. On the contrary, as the case 
of the Bonn powers shows, imposition does not mean internalization or successful implementation.
178 Dawisha and T umer 1997,407.
179 Conditionality thus allows for analyzing the strategies of external actors; the strategies and
calculations of local actors; and the direction and methods of transmission whereby external push is 
exerted.
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external government or an international organization, which many times can be 
quantified and measured.180 As a result, both the policy under consideration and the 
agents involved can be easily identified. Second, there are a number of mechanisms, 
devices and standardized processes that can be observed and measured. Finally, there 
is an expected/desired outcome,181 so that compliance is relatively simple to 
identify.182 With respect to the instruments, conditionality may involve the use of 
negative or positive sanctions. Positive conditionality implies that aid increases when 
the government improves its ‘behavior’. Negative conditionality, on the contrary, 
implies aid reduction if the democratic structures and norms are not observed.183 
Conditionality may also use other methods of external influence. Joan Nelson and 
Stephanie Eglinton identified three:184 (1) persuasion, or policy dialogue, which 
consists of an effort to convince the target government (or antireform elements within 
the government) that altered policies are in its own best long-term interests. Channels 
for persuasion range from formal international conferences through meetings 
between foreign technical experts and ministry officials to private conversations 
between foreign ambassadors and political leaders; (2) support through training, 
technical assistance, and financial aid, in order to help cover the costs of reforms (i.e. 
strengthening an election commission or demobilizing troops). Diplomatic support or 
concessions may also apply in certain circumstances; and (3) pressure, which may 
involve varied forms and be exercised through multiple channels, such as diplomatic 
relations and trade measures.185 Nelson and Eglington conclude that in practice, “a 
vigorous effort to influence a particular government is likely to employ all three 
approaches, and sometimes the distinctions between them is blur.”186
Conditionality can be classified according to different criteria.187 Within the
180 Often times, these goals are vaguely stated in order to give donors great latitude in 
interpreting when compliance is achieved.
181 “Conditionality can be said to have been effectively exercised only if a recipient country 
undertakes a policy change it would not have undertaken by itself, that is, without the pressure made 
to bear upon it by the donor” (Uvin 1993,68).
182 This applies to the case of constitutional reform in Bosnia. First, the policy under 
consideration and the agents involved can be easily identified, namely the different external actors and 
political parties involved in the process. Although the scope and contents of the reform under 
consideration were not clearly spelled out (except for a vague notion of making the state efficient), 
external actors provided important benchmarks and criteria (see chapter 4). Compliance -  namely a 
constitutional agreement -  was also easily identifiable.
183 Waller 1995.
184 Nelson and Eglinton 1992.
185 Ibid, 8.
186 Ibid, 8-9.
187 It is pertinent to note at this juncture that conditionality should not be confused with the
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context of European enlargement,188 the most common classification is the one made 
between formal (explicit/direct) and informal (implicit/indirect) conditionality. 
Hughes, Sasse and Gordon argue that formal conditionality “embodies the publicly 
stated preconditions as set out in the broad principles of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ 
and the legal framework of the acquis'” informal conditionality, on the contrary, 
includes “the operational pressures and recommendations applied by actors within 
the Commission to achieve particular outcomes during their interactions with CEEC 
[Central and Eastern European Countries] counterparts in the course of 
enlargement.”189 According to the authors, these two types of conditionality do not 
operate separately but rather in tandem.190 Milada Vachudova also differentiates 
between active leverage, which builds on accession membership and refers to the 
actual, deliberate conditionality used by the EU in the accession process, and passive
leverage, which mainly refers to the lure of EU membership and the European
* 101 perspective.
Conditionality can also be classified in reference to the scope of the demands.192 
Olav Stokke identifies the following:193 (1) systemic conditionality (the highest 
degree of political intervention), which involves the system of government and
concept of Europeanization as the former represents just one mechanism, among many others, through 
which the process of Europeanization operates in candidate countries. Europeanization is thus related 
to the of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of “formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms,” which are first defined 
and consolidated at the European level and then “incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, 
identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2000). Vink (2003) offers a more 
minimalist understanding of the process of Europeanization that considers the effects at both European 
and national levels and two-way causality mechanisms. According to the author, “Europeanization is 
always (to a certain extent) a process of domestic political change caused (somehow) by processes of 
European integration.”
188 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier define enlargement as the “process of gradual 
and formal horizontal institutionalization [the adoption of] of organizational rules and norms” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 503). For the authors, the institutionalization of EU rules 
includes “the transposition of EU legislation into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic 
institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic political practices according to EU 
standards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004,662).
189 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004,26.
190 Ibid.
191 Vachudova 2005. The lure of EU membership builds upon an asymmetric interdependence
between the EU and the candidate country in which non-compliances is too costly (Ibid).
192 Conditionality can also be ex-post or ex-ante. Ex-ante conditionality involves compliance 
with a set of criteria prior to entering into an aid relationship (Stokke 1995). Ex-post conditionality is 
found when “expectations of the recipient’s progress towards meeting [the criteria] may be expressed 
beforehand and followed up afterwards” (ibid, 12). In words of Stokke, “Ex-post conditionality 
implies an explicitly understanding by both parties that continued aid ... at some future point in time 
will be dependent on the recipient government’s performance vis a vis certain standards in the 
meantime, as assessed by the donor government” (ibid, 12 ft 7).
193 Stokke 1995.
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governmental institutions;194 (2) changes in national policies and priorities within, for 
example, the realm of human rights, democracy and good governance; (3) specific 
policies within a specific sector; (4) conditionality aimed at the programme/project 
level; (5) financial conditionality; and (6) administrative conditionality, which 
involves “procedures for the transfer of resources, accounting, reporting, 
evaluating.”195
Forms o f External Influence in Post-conflict Bosnia
The Form of external influence that has featured most prominently in Bosnia is one 
of control; given the ample use of the executive powers by the HR. The external 
leadership has, however, evolved since 2000 into one framed within the process of 
EU accession. This transition triggered a new form of state building in which 
European incentives and domestic ownership take primacy over the practice of 
control. In other words, the new phase of European incentives has transformed the 
external influence in Bosnia from one of external control to increasing domestic 
ownership supported by external incentives. These incentives include: economic 
rewards and sanctions, the lure of EU membership, diplomatic pressure and political 
persuasion.
The conditionality framework used in the process of constitutional reform was of 
an informal nature; although some direct, formal links were established between the 
need for constitutional changes and European accession. Indeed, while constitutional 
reform did not feature as an expressed pre-requisite for the signing of the SAA (the 
key EU-related reward in sight at the time of constitutional negotiations), European 
officials presented constitutional reform as a key requirement for the broader 
accession process.196 In the words of the Venice Commission, “with respect to the EU 
it is unthinkable that Bosnia can make real progress with the present constitutional 
arrangements. The EU will not countenance the kind of delay, indecision and 
uncertainty that a multiplicity of government entails.”197 Similarly, EC President Jose
194 This may include demands such as “the pressure for democratic reform and the introduction
of a multi-party system and free and fair elections, as well as for improved human rights. They also 
include the good governance agenda in general” (ibid, 14-15).
195 ibid.
196 The signing of the SAA is the end goal of the pre-accession process. Once the agreement is
implemented and the country is accepted as a candidate, the accession process per se starts.
197 Venice Commission 2005, pa. 26.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 60 10/30/09
Manuel Barroso stated during the negotiations, “Constitutional reform is not direct 
condition for signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement. However, these two 
processes are linked. As I said earlier, the EC and the EU have to be convinced that 
Bosnia will be capable of respecting its promises and of implementing the agreement 
that we are negotiating now.”198
The process of constitutional reform in Bosnia involved a wide range of different 
instruments including: financial and technical assistance, persuasion and direct 
pressure. During the first phase, financial and technical assistance was provided by 
countries such as Sweden, Switzerland and Norway. The EU also assisted in the 
process through the sponsoring of a meeting in Brussels; the first one where party 
leaders were involved. From December onwards however, the US took over the 
process, and became the major provider of technical assistance during the 
negotiations. Persuasion was also used throughout the process through public 
statements in support of the constitutional changes and bilateral meetings with party 
leaders. Finally, direct pressure was heavily used; especially towards the end of the 
process, including direct pressure exerted multilaterally and bilaterally with domestic 
actors.199
It is also important to note that constitutional reform featured as a form of 
political and systemic conditionality, involving highly sensitive statehood issues. As 
noted in the introduction, the EU accession process in Bosnia has generally involved 
both technical and political conditionality. The latter has rendered the accession 
process more controversial than in previous enlargement rounds; for the costs 
associated with the EU accession have turned out to be closely related to the power 
balance between the different ethnic groups. This issue is particularly significant in a 
context mired in deep inter-ethnic distrust.
22. LITERATURE REVIEW: STATE BUILDING AND CONDITIONALITY
This literature review critically engages with the growing body of work that focuses 
on the interdependency of domestic and external factors in processes of political
198 Jose Manuel Barroso. Edited quote from OHR, BiH Media Monitoring, 18 February 2006.
199 Chapter 4 through 7 provides a full analysis of these different forms of influence exerted 
during the negotiations.
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reform. This area of study has tended to be neglected until quite recent times.200 After 
the collapse of communism, which revealed how international factors could prepare 
the groundwork for the rise of vigorous democratic forces in specific contexts, 
further attention was paid to exploring whether and how international dynamics 
could contribute to promoting political change. Furthermore, as a result of various 
developments such as the massive, multi-stranded EU enlargement process in CEE, 
academic interest in exploring the interactions between domestic and international 
actors in processes of institutional change grew rapidly. In particular, scholars 
focused on the issue of ‘conditionality’ and external leverage (if not direct 
intervention) on securing domestic change. This area of research was further 
stimulated by the various state-building interventions that have taken place in recent 
times; including Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Notwithstanding the sudden increase 
of studies devoted to this area of research, many questions remain unanswered. 
Under what conditions can we expect external actors to have an impact on domestic 
politics? How do external and internal actors interact with each other? Can local 
actors resist external influence?
Various strands of literature have grappled with the study of the external push in 
the processes of domestic change in recent times; including the literature on post­
conflict state building and conditionality201 This section briefly reviews these;
The interest in the interconnections between domestic and external variables was developed 
earlier within the area of international relations. Indeed, Peter Gourevitch’s The Second Image 
Reverse: The International Sources of Domestic Politics (1978) looked into how domestic politics, as 
a dependent variable, could be affected by the international system or by incidents taking place at the 
international level (including trade, investment and war). By establishing two-way causal relationships 
between both spheres -  looking for example at how the international economic system impacted the 
regime type and the formation of domestic coalitions -  Gourevitch described what some authors 
consider one of the most “rigorously formulated ad well-researched treatment of the international- 
national relationship” (Almond 1989, 241), providing key theoretical propositions to account for the 
impact of external policies in the distribution of interests at the domestic level, and giving domestic 
politics an important role in accounting for the final outcome of external pressure. As he asserted, 
“Some leeway of response to pressure is always possible,” adding, “the choice of response therefore 
requires explanation. ... [which] entails an examination of politics: the struggle among competing 
responses” (Gourevitch 1978,911). Notwithstanding the prominent role given to domestic politics, he 
left the study of these dynamics for future investigation, and rather focused on the impact of 
international dynamics such as war and trade.
201 Democratization studies have also focused on the external dimension since the early 1990s; 
these studies have tended to focus on the study of global, systemic influences (including the use of 
force, the spread of ideas, contagion dynamics and the effects of globalization), none of which relate 
to the discussion at hand. Though some studies have showed an interest in exploring agency-driven 
factors -  foremost among these is Samuel Huntington’s Third Wave (1991) - ,  these have been 
intertwined with other systemic influences. The increasing number of democracy building 
interventions in the late 1990s and early 2000s (through both direct external interventions and 
democracy promotion programmes) added a new impetus to the research agenda on the study of the 
interconnections between domestic and external factors in the area of democratization. Some of these
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focusing on two overarching themes, namely the analysis of the intertwinements 
between domestic and external factors and the role of political elites.
2.2.1. Post-conflict State Building
The nascent literature on post conflict state building has provided new opportunities 
to learn about the interconnections between domestic and external actors. Both the 
failed record of peace building missions in the late 1980s and early 1990s (including 
Bosnia over the period of 1995 to 1997), and the emergence of complex, ‘second 
generation’ external interventions in post-conflict contexts (such as in Bosnia from 
1997 onwards, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq), have given rise in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s to a new research agenda within the peace building literature202 that
focuses on the experiences of externally-led state building processes in post-conflict
• *societies.
These studies have tended to focus on three major areas of research. Firstly, the 
weaknesses and strengths of external interventions; with a predisposed focus on the 
supply/external side and neglecting the two-way dynamics this study aims to 
explore.204 Some of these studies have presented rather pessimistic accounts on the
studies looked at the impact of specific program-driven democratic interventions based on incentives 
rather than conditionality. These works, however, encountered enormous methodological problems 
that precluded them from reaching conclusive evidence about the way in which external influences 
may be effective in promoting democratic reforms in third countries. As Ethier (2003) and Carothers 
(1999) suggested, assessing the impact of these programs became very difficult given the lack of 
large-scale evaluations undertaken by the donors involved. Furthermore, these studies seemed to be 
driven by an interest to look into the specific record of program implementation and program 
effectiveness rather than to the exploration of process related dynamics, failing to provide a 
framework for the understanding of the dynamics involved in processes of domestic change where 
both external and domestic actors interact (see Knack 2004).
202 This dissertation is not concerned with the literature on peace building, which has generally 
focused on both the implementation of peace agreements in the aftermath of conflict and the dilemmas 
involved in these operations (see for example Del Soto and Del Castillo 1994; Hampson 1996; Kumar 
1997; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Cousens, Kumar and Wermester 2001; Stedman, Rothchild and 
Cousens 2002; Call and Cousens 2008; see also more recent accounts such as Jarstad and Sisk 2008; 
see also cross-case comparisons such as Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and 2006; Fortna 2004); nor the 
literature on state failure (see for example Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2004; Chesterman, Ignatieff and 
Chandra 2005). My research is instead focused on the unfolding of post-conflict state building, the so- 
called second-generation operations.
203 Some of the key studies on post-conflict state building include: Caplan 2005a; Chesterman 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004. Some recent edited volumes 
include: Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009.
204 See for example Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Caplan 2005a; Chesterman 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2004; Krasner 2004; Cousens and Cater 2001. Some studies have considered the role of local 
elites (see for example Ottaway 2003; Barnett and Zurcher 2009). Marina Ottaway argues that the 
success of state buidling is dependent upon the constellation of local forces on the ground, especially
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ability of external actors to create or influence the basis of modern states in post­
conflict deeply divided societies;205 some studies underscore the lack of international 
resolve and assertiveness,206 the lack of sufficient resources to undertake such 
endeavors207 and problems of multi-targeting and rushed deadlines 208 As Chesterman 
states in a comparative study of transitional administrations, the most common 
mistakes of what he calls “benevolent autocracies” is that “the means are inconsistent 
with the ends, they are frequently inadequate for those ends, and in many situations 
the means are irrelevant to the ends.”209 Other studies have pointed to the creation of 
mechanisms of dependency between international and domestic actors that have 
turned inimical to building self-sustaining states210
A second line of research has revolved around the long-term impact of 
institutions upon the conditions for sustainable peace (including studies on 
constitutional engineering). Particularly, these studies explore the impact of 
externally engineered institutions (such as the electoral system and constitutional 
arrangements) on the outcome of the state building process, and how states become 
consolidated after intra-state conflict.211 A new research agenda has recently emerged 
within the conflict regulation and power sharing literature that converges with the 
state building focus on institutions in post-conflict, deeply divided societies.212
when international engagement is limited. As Ottaway observes, “International attempts to rebuild 
institutions of collapsed states without a strong international presence is not only futile, but can also 
lead to dangerous outcomes, unless the donors undersand how power is distributed in the country and 
act accordingly” (Ottaway 2002, 1019). A systematic analysis of how local politics may impact the 
unfolding of externally driven state building processes is however still lacking.
205 See for example Hayden 1999.
206 Caplan 2005a; Chesterman 2004; Cousens and Cater 2001; Donais 2005; Belloni 2008.
207 See for example Chesterman 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004. Some authors have criticized 
international actors for engaging in overly ambitious democratic reconstruction operations, especially 
given the limited resources available (Ottaway 2002 and 2003; Paris 2004).
208 See Belloni 2008.
209 Chesterman 2004,239.
210 See Chesterman 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Ignatieff 2002; Chandler 2006. An alternative 
explanation is that “peacebuiders have adopted strategies that have reinforced previously existing 
state-society relations—weak states characterized by patrimonial politics and skewed development” 
(bamett and Zurcher 2009,24).
2,1 See for example Kumar 1998; Paris 2004; Sisk 2009; Samuels 2006 and 2009. Kirsti 
Samuels, in particular, looks at postwar constitution building and the impact of the nature of the 
process (inclusive vs. exclusive) on the final outcome. The power sharing literature has also explored 
the impact of institutions on the long-term stability of post-conflict, divided societies (see for example 
Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2002 and 2008; Lake and Rothchild 2005; Weller and Wolff 2005; Wolff 
2005b and 2009). Studies on constitutional engineering in divided societies, for example, focus on the 
role of institutions and state design, and on the impact of specific constitutional arrangements on the 
long-term democratization of divided societies (See for example Horowitz 2002 and 2004b; Lijphart 
2004; Reynolds 2002; Hart 2001; Ghai and Galli 2006).
212 Some recent edited volumes include Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Noel 2005; O’Flynn and
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Confronted with the pressing challenges of post-conflict societies, this recent 
literature has looked at the failing record of post-conflict power sharing 
arrangements. These studies attempt to provide an initial assessment of the sources of 
political and institutional instability of the so-called ‘complex power-sharing 
arrangements’.213 There are two different schools: critics of the consotiational model, 
who contend that complex power sharing institutions, based on the promotion of 
ethnic differences, have tended to perpetuate the sources of communal conflict and, 
in turn, undermined the basis of inter-ethnic cooperation;214 and advocates of the 
consotiational model, who argue that not enough efforts have been devoted to 
adjusting the consociational model to the specific circumstances of post-conflict 
societies, and to incorporating the role of external actors215 Generally, these studies 
have focused primarily on institutions, although recent studies have explored the role 
of political elites in the functioning of complex power sharing arrangements. Some of 
these studies are further explored in the third section of this chapter.216
A third line of research within the state building literature focuses on particular 
themes within the state building experience, such as inter alia the role of transitional 
justice in the outcome of state building processes,217 the role of civil society218 and the
Russell 2005; Weller and Metzger 2008.
213 Bosnia is a typical case of a complex power sharing. ‘Complex power sharing’ is referred to 
cases where power sharing “go[es] beyond one-dimensional arrangements offering ‘just’ autonomy, or 
power sharing, or minority rights bills or improved econmic development, etc. but combine a range of 
different mechanisms to address the concerns of all relevant parties” (Wolff 2009, ft. 1, drawing from 
Kettley, Sullivan and Fyfe 2001; see also Wolff 2007b; Weller and Metzger 2008). In other words, 
complex power sharing is “a practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-governance at its 
heart, but whose overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms for the 
accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies, including those recommended by advocates of 
liberal consociationalism, integration and power-dividing” (Wolff 2009, 29). Complex sharing 
arrangements are often times compounded by external intervention and the presence of external actors 
who may act as guarantors of the institutional arrangement in place. Brendan O’Leary (2005), for 
example, labels the Bosnian model as a “complex consociation”. This labelling is related to the 
presence of “international efforts to resolve national self-determination disputes; international 
involvement in the mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and implementation of peace settlements; and 
cross-border or confederal relationships ... for national minorities with their kin in other states” 
(O’Leary 2005,34; also see McGarry 2008).
214 Some of the oft-cited shortcomings include: (1) the tendency of consociational models to
institutionalize ethnic differences, hence perpetuating the sources of communal conflict. (2) The risk 
of immobilism at the institutional level. (3) And the predisposition of such models to encourage 
extremism and outbidding at the elite level as a result of the above (see for example O’Flynn and 
Russell 2005; Roeder and Rothchild 2005b; Sisk 1996; Zahar 2002).
215 For a discussion on this issue see for example Kettley, Sullivan and Fyfe 2001; O’Leary 
2005; McGarry 2008; Wolff 2007b.
216 For example Zahar 2002; Zahar 2005a; Morrow 2005. Zahar’s work draws from Stedman’s
study on the role of spoilers in peace processes (Stedman 1997).
217 See for example Thoms, Ron and Paris 2008.
218 Pouligny 2005; Belloni 2001; Pickering 2007.
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impact of the economics of war in state building.219 Neil Cooper, for example, looks 
at the impact of the dynamics associated with war economies on post-conflict peace 
building efforts; Achem Wennmann contends that post-war power structures benefit 
from the wartime economy; driving peace building resources away and working 
towards maintaining the post conflict status quo220
Studies on Post-conflict Bosnia have followed similar lines of research. I 
identify four major overarching themes.221 The first one focuses on the role of the 
international community; following similar lines as the broader literature on state 
building. Some studies have pointed to the lack of strategy and resolve on the part of 
the international community, and hence, have urged for a revitalized intervention;222 
others have argued against the pervasive, intrusive role of the international 
community, which has created mechanisms of dependence and opportunities for 
political irresponsibility, thus undermining state building in this country.223
A second overarching theme revolves around the role of Dayton institutions. 
Here the contention is made that Dayton has created too rigid of an institutional 
arrangement for inter-ethnic cooperation, and led to the “institutionalization of 
ethnicity.”224 As Florian Bieber has noted, the invasive fragmentation of power, 
including multiple ethnic guarantees granted to the three ethnic groups, has posed 
“long-term difficulties for the success of the political arrangement in Bosnia.”225 A 
third research line focuses on specific issues such as the economics of war. Timothy
219 See for example Cooper 2004; Wennmann 2005; Pugh Cooper and Goodhand 2004. These 
studies draw from Collier and Hoeffer 2004.
220 Wennmann 2005.
221 Most studies on post-conflict Bosnia touch upon one or more of these overarching themes, 
but I use this classification for simplicity purposes. This review is succint in order to set up the basis 
of my own research and theoretical framework.
222 See for example Belloni 2008; Donais 2005; Cousens and Cater 2001.
223 See for example Chandler 1999; Bose 2002; Knaus and Martin 2003. Sumantra Bose has 
called for the return of full sovereignty to the locals. “The ultimate goal of international involvement 
in post-Dayton Bosnia is (or at least should be) to assist Bosnians make a transition from being 
subjects of an international mission to build frameworks of democracy, human rights and rule of law 
to becoming active, engaged agents of their own future(s)” (Bose 2002,274).
224 Bieber 2004. As Florian Bieber has noted, “rigid institutional structures run the risk of ‘over­
institutionalizing’ ethnicity, as they tend to be concluded at the high point of interethnic conflict. As 
such they frequently enshrine political representation and participation on the basis of group 
membership, which can ‘freeze’ ethnic confrontation and transpose most political disputes into ethnic 
ones” (ibid, 15).
225 Bieber 2002, 333. See also Chandler 1999; International Crisis Group 1999; Zahar 2008. 
These authors have also noted that some of the key power sharing arrangements may not work in post­
conflict societies due to the experience of war and the lack of inter-ethnic cross-party coalitions 
(Bieber 2005; Zahar 2008). Recently, it has been argued that despite of the initial criticism of the 
peace agrement’s rigidity, Dayton instituions have turned out to be rather flexible, foremost as a result 
of the pervasive efforts of the international community (Bieber 2006b).
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Donais, for example, has focused on the political economy and economic reform of 
post-conflict Bosnia, with a special focus on the perpetuation of Bosnia’s political 
economy of conflict.226 He suggests that post-conflict Bosnia’s power structures have 
generally benefited from the status quo, especially in the first few years after the war, 
and “stand directly opposed to the types of marketization and democratization 
strategies that the international community has pursued in the post-Dayton period.”227 
A final argument is made within the literature on post-conflict Bosnia that focuses on 
the statehood problem in this country. These studies suggest that inter-ethnic 
intransigence stems from the fact that Dayton failed to assuage ethnic anxieties and 
resolve the statehood problem in Bosnia.228
Some of these studies have provided specific propositions about how external 
actors have impacted the practices of conflict regulation in post-conflict Bosnia 229 1 
explore these in the third section of this chapter where I lay out my three-tiered 
framework.
222 . Conditionality Studies
The literature on European conditionality that sprang up in the early 2000 has 
developed more sophisticated models regarding the intertwinements of both external 
and domestic dynamics; especially in reference to the two key variables of this 
research (namely the role of agency-driven factors and the two-way dynamics that 
feature in externally led processes of political reform).
The study of European conditionality (aka Europeanization literature) did not 
develop in a research vacuum, however. This literature built upon the literature on 
economic and political conditionality (i.e. first and second generation conditionality) 
that developed in the 1990s as a result of the emergence of conditioned aid in the 
1980s and 1990s. Studies on first generation conditionality relied overwhelmingly on 
rationally based approaches. Tony Killick, Ramani Gunatilaka and Ana Marr, for 
example, used the principals bargaining model, and explored the structure of rewards
226 Donais 2005; See also Pugh 2002; BojiCic-Dzelilovic and Kaldor 1999.
227 Donais 2005,14.
228 Woodward 1997; see also Bose 2002. Donais argues, “the Bosnian conflict arose from 
competing visions of stateness among the countries’ three main ethnic communities, and the Dayton 
Peace Accords can be viewed as having succeeded -  at least to this point -  in displacing this conflict 
from the military to the political realm” (Donais 2005,4).
229 See for example Chandler 1999; Cox 2001; Zahar 2002 and 2005a.
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and penalties that make it in the interest of the agent (the recipient) to act in a way 
that advances the principal’s interest, “and which punishes deviance from that 
course.”230 According to their study, “each party uses all of the resources at its 
disposal to maximize its interests, and the resulting conditional ‘deal’ is a reflection 
of this bargaining process.”231 On the whole, these models focus on one-way power 
dynamics in which power relations are described as “the interaction of two agents, 
where one successfully exercises power over the other when the latter is forced to do 
something that it would not otherwise have done.”232 This type of conditionality is 
based on a set of contextual conditions that differ from the ones operating in 
processes of European integration and state building, including the motivation of the 
actors and the scope of the changes; being rather more sensitive and controversial in 
the latter.233
As for the political conditionality (i.e. aid programmes tied to the respect of 
human rights and democratic principles such as good governance), little systematic 
research has been undertaken given its weak formulation. Some observations have 
been made, but there has been no attempt to explore the interactions between local 
and external actors systematically. Gordon Crawford’s study on political 
conditionality, for example, suggests that aid sanctions tend to fail in the majority of 
the cases as a result of their weak formulation and the strength of the states in which 
such conditionality is employed.234 James Boyce stresses that the usefulness of aid 
conditionality in post-conflict environments depends on the distribution of power in 
the recipient country, but fails to elaborate further. He merely notes, “It is indeed 
possible to use aid conditionality as a tool for peace building. Its usefulness will vary 
depending on the [power] circumstances in the recipient country.”235
Europeanization studies have also built upon the approaches on Europeanization 
that developed in the 1990s in relation to the process of European integration in 
member states. As a matter of fact, the analysis on the accession process in CEE
Killick, Gunatilaka and Marr 1998,101.
231 Collingwood 2004, 10. Similarly, Mosely, Harrigan and Toye (1995) use a rationalist
approach to describe the dynamics of World Bank conditionality as “a series of bargaining games”; as
these authors stated, the donor seeks “to influence economic policy in the manner desired by it, 
whereas the recipient resists all such attempts at influence which do not harmonize with its own 
political priorities” (Mosely, Harrigan and Toye 1995,67).
232 Collingwood 2004.
233 Stokke 1995.
234 Crawford 2001. See also Crawford 1997.
235 Boyce 2002a, 1031; see also Boyce 2002b.
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draws extensively from many of the concepts and questions that had previously 
puzzled scholars who focused on the impact of European integration on policies, 
institutions and polities of member states. Some of the key questions this literature 
addresses include: what are the domestic conditions that are more conducive to the 
transfer of EU rules, norms and beliefs? How does enlargement and conditionality 
change the identity, interests and behavior of governmental and societal actors? How 
does EU integration affect domestic policies, politics and polities and impact the 
process of institution building, policy-making and the emergence and development of 
political discourses? Furthermore, in what ways and to what extent does the EU 
affect domestic politics, policies and polities of accession countries?236 In sum, the 
main goal of these studies is to explore the impact of the process of EU accession on 
reform trajectories, paying special attention to the degree to which the mechanism of 
conditionality and European incentives interact with (and are affected by) domestic 
factors, including political actors’ preferences and interests, institutional constraints, 
political discourses, and the like.
The initial studies on EU conditionality and enlargement were based on rather 
static approaches,237 but the literature has evolved into rather sophisticated and 
complex frameworks of analysis. The key assumption is that the process of EU 
integration and the conditionality framework should not be considered as uniform 
variables but rather as instruments enjoying different meanings and effects, 
depending on the time-frame, the context, the domestic actors and sectors involved, 
the credibility of the conditionality package and how it is applied238
Three major theoretical traditions within the Europeanization literature have
See Schimmelefennig and Sedelmeier 2002; Borzel and Risse 2000. Other questions the 
Europeanization literature aims to explore within the enlargement context include the relationship 
between conditionality and compliance. How does this relationship work? Is there a strong connection 
between both variables? In other words, is there a causal and direct relationship between the 
application of conditionality and compliance? What are the conditions that affect this relationship? 
How do incentives alter ‘the calculation of domestic agents’ in the proper direction? (Checkel 2000). 
These issues are secondary to this research given the unclear formulation of constitutional reform 
within the conditionality framework but the conclusions will offer a few tentative propositions.
237 See for example Grabbe and Hughes 1998; Grabbe 2002b. Heather Grabbe for example 
argued initially that the impact of conditionality on CEE is dependent upon two sets of variables: the 
precision and certitude of EU demands, and the degree of political will and institutional capacity on 
the part of the domestic actors (i. e. whether the candidate countries are ready to take up on the 
implications and challenges of EU enlargement). In these initial studies, she contends that 
conditionality is likely to be largely effective when the political salience of the issue at hand is high, 
even if there is ample room for uncertainty regarding the policy agenda, the standards involved and the 
timing. If the political salience is low (as in social policy), on the contrary, then observance of the 
acquis communitaire is likely to be rather low and its application less strict (Grabbe 2002b, 16).
238 See Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004. See also Jacoby 2004.
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addressed the questions above,239 including the sociological institutionalism, the 
historical institutionalism and the rationalist approach (the latter being the most 
relevant approach for the purposes of this research given the focus on actors and veto 
points).240 According to the socio-institutionalist approach Europeanization leads to 
domestic change through socialization and collective learning resulting in norm 
internationalization and the development of new ideas that are conducive to domestic 
change.241 The analysis of these mechanisms are however outside of the scope of this 
research.
The second approach is represented by the historical institutionalism, which 
places the emphasis on the role of institutions and structures and its restricting effects 
upon actor’s options and preferences. According to this approach, existing 
institutions tend to be stable over time, and the changes to be expected are 
minimal.242 While this dissertation does not relate to the study of institutions and their 
effects upon actor’s choices, the institutional approach offers good insights on the 
study of institutional change within the process of EU accession. As a case in point, 
by looking into the regionalization policy and drawing from historical 
institutionalism and path dependency approaches, Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 
contend that there is no causal, clear-cut relationship between EU conditionality and 
institutional outcomes.243 Furthermore, they argue that the ambiguity surrounding EU 
conditionality in enforcing a specific regional model (which turned conditionality
239 This research does not consider the positivist approaches towards Europeanization, in which 
causal explanatory value is given to the relationship between conditionality and domestic change (See 
for example whitehead 1996; Schmitter 1996; Dimitrova and Pridham 2004). According to these 
studies, causality is thus assumed to have a direct impact on reform trajectories and little attention is 
given to the degree to which the mechanism of conditionality and Europeanization interact with (and 
are affected by) domestic factors. In addition, positivist approaches have tended to adopt a top-down 
approach whereby a hierarchical relationship between the EU and candidate countries is presumed. 
The research agenda within this approach is thus constrained to studying the outcomes of 
conditionality, without questioning or measuring its relative impact. The study of the interplay of 
intervening variables affecting conditionality is also neglected. In addition to the positive school, there 
is a body of literature that has stood on the other side of the spectrum, arguing that the impact of EU 
conditionality has only shown on discourse rather than on actual rules, structures and processes. This 
body of research, however, is mostly circumscribed to the study of EU conditionality outside the 
European accession orbit, primarily in Europe’s neighboring region (see for example Holden 2005).
240 Some authors have used various approaches conjunctively. Vachudova (2005), for example,
uses the historical institutionalism and rationalist actor-driven approaches. Her research is however
concerned with a question that is outside the research scope of this dissertation, namely the reasons 
why EU rewards and benefits were assessed and implemented differently across CEE, with a 
particular emphasis on the differences between CEE and the so-called Eastern laggards (Romania, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria).
241 Borzel and Risse 2000.
242 Heritier 2005,202.
243 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004; see also Brusis 2002.
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into a highly politicized and selective instrument) prevented the EU from having a 
more salient role in shaping institutional structures in this sector area. As a result, it is 
argued that conditionality ought to be seen as “a process which involves a tool of 
differentiated and shifting instruments” that need to be studied on a case by case 
basis.244 These authors also contend that, “on balance, the evidence suggests that path 
dependency in the form of domestic political considerations, informed by historical 
legacies, played a more salient role in regionalization than a clear causative effect of 
real or perceived EU conditionality.”245 Furthermore, even though Hughes, Sasse and 
Gordon argue that informal conditionality is generally rather prominent in shaping 
institutional outcomes as a result of the ambiguity of formal conditionality (giving 
the commission ample leeway to freely monitor and shape reform trajectories), 
institutional outcomes were in the end overwhelmingly driven by domestic factors 
stemmed from the respective transitions from communism.246 In their own words, 
“the transition was an active interface with enlargement which generated preferences 
that often overrode external incentives and pressures.”247 These findings contribute to 
establishing a new conceptual relationship between transition processes and 
enlargement, a sector area that has not been fully explored.
Finally, the rationalist tradition, the most relevant for the purposes of this 
research, adopts an actor-centered approach. This approach investigates domestic 
actors’ preferences and interests while pointing simultaneously to other political 
variables including: institutional constraints and power asymmetries; broader 
political processes such as political transitions; and variables associated with the 
process of enlargement. One of the basic claims of this approach is that actors “will 
use EU policy requirements as a resource in order to strengthen their position in the 
national political conflicts.”248 These studies are, however, based on the neglect of 
informal conditionality and domestic constraints other than the so-called adoption
244 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004, 174. Hughes, Sasse and Gordon also argue, “the 
unevenness of the acquis was reflected in a great deal of variation in the leverage of conditionality, 
and gave the commission and the CEEC governments a wide degree of flexibility” (ibid, 27) 
Similarly, Martin Brusis asserts, “the impact of the EU on regionalization processes in the accession 
countries has been diffuse and ambiguous” (Brusis 2002,554)
245 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid, 174. Similarly, the post conflict condition may be regarded as a key
transition/contextual variable that affects the process of Europeanization in such way that new 
conceptual relationships between European accession and institutional change need to be established 
in these contexts.
248 Heritier 2005,202.
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costs and the ability to form coalitions (typical of the rational choice approach).
Judith Kelley’s study on ethnic politics, for example, revolves around the issue 
of domestic receptivity.249 According to Kelley, domestic openness to external 
influence is a function of both the receptivity of individual policymakers and their 
ability to form coalitions.250 She places greater emphasis on the role of domestic 
variables, including actor’s preferences, domestic power balances and likely veto 
players. She finds that conditionality theories that solely rely on the role of incentives 
to account for domestic change to be insufficient, given their disregard of the role of 
uncertainty that is built in the process of enlargement. As she contends, “the theory 
of incentive use rests on the proposition that linking membership benefits with 
specific policies can entice domestic actors to change their behavior. However, ... 
uncertainty complicates decision-making,” forcing domestic actors to think outside 
purely rational cost-benefiting frameworks and abandon utility maximizing 
calculations. Uncertainty, as a result, tames pure rationalist accounts; it also 
influences actor’s preferences and views regarding the policy issue at hand,251 and the 
actor’s ability to form supporting coalitions.252
Wade Jacoby’s comparative study on the enlargement of the EU and NATO is 
another rationality-based study. He constructs a theoretical framework, namely the 
‘embedded rationalism,’253 to address the following question: how Western policies 
are taken up by the weak states of CEE? How do elites choose when to comply, when 
to openly resist EU demands, and when to simply agree on paper while shrinking 
them in practice?254 According to Jacoby’s model, domestic elites act rationally in the 
face of two material incentives; one is domestic (i.e. the voters), and the other one is 
external (i.e. international organizations’ resources). The basic premise of rational 
institutionalism is that elites will pursue emulation when it brings the prospect of
249 Kelley 2004a. While Heather Grabbe (2002b and 2006) adopts a top-down approach, 
focusing on how and under what circumstances conditionality may be more or less effective, Judith 
Kelley focuses on the balance of domestic power and how that affects the impact of external leverage.
250 Kelley 2004a.
251 Kelley differentiates three types of receptivity to external influence: first, policymakers 
prefer international policies and therefore external pressure is irrelevant or deemed unnecessary. 
Second, policymakers despite of being not entirely in favor of the policy, have no major reservations. 
Third, policymakers’ preferences differ greatly from external prescriptions and even benefit from the 
status quo, “even if the country as a whole stand to gain from admission from to the IOs” (Kelley 
2004a).
252 Kelley 2004b, 431.
253 Jacoby’s model (2004) draws from Putnam’s and Tsebelis’ two-level game models (Putnam 
1988; Tsebelis 1990).
254 Jacoby 2004,202-203.
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voter approval and international resources. In addition to the lure of these dual 
incentives, elite’s actions are institutionally constrained (elites are thus embedded) by 
two factors: (1) detailed normative models that are imposed upon them, and (2) 
domestic historical structures and conservative actors that restrict elite’s charted 
reform courses. The interplay of these factors (namely the type of external pressure 
and the degree of domestic constraints) results in four different types of emulation, 
ranging from pure copy to approximate emulation.
Frank Schimmelefennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier also argue that rule transfer is 
best explained according to the rationality based bargaining model. In particular, they 
argue that compliance with EU transfer depends on the credibility of conditionality 
and the domestic costs of rule adoption (the lower the costs the greatest the chances 
of adopting EU rules). However, the impact of these variables depends greatly on one 
intervening variable, namely the different types of conditionality. In their words, “In 
the context of democratic conditionality, domestic adoption costs severely limited the 
effectiveness of EU conditionality—even when it was credible and rewards were 
sizeable ... By contrast, in the context of acquis conditionality, variation in the size 
of domestic adoption costs only accounted for the speed of rule transfer but did not 
matter for its effectiveness.”255 These authors recognize the fact that the different 
models analyzed can have an accumulating impact on domestic politics and conclude 
that at best “the dominant logic underpinning EU conditionality is a bargaining 
strategy of reinforcement by reward under which the EU provides external incentives 
for a target government to comply with its conditions. However, these dominant 
features of conditionality might be superseded by other mechanisms that can also 
lead to rule transfer.”256
223 . A Critical Review: International Push in Post-Conflict, Divided Societies
While the arguments outlined above present well-informed accounts of the
interconnections between domestic and external (f)actors; they are somewhat 
deficient in the context of post-conflict Bosnia.
I identify two major shortcomings in the literature on post-conflict state building. 
Firstly, these studies have generally failed to acknowledge the impact of external
255 Schimmelefennig and Sedelmeier 2004,663.
256 Ibid, 662.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 73 10/30/09
incentives. There is no attempt to more systematically study the way in which 
European and international conditionality is working in post-conflict Bosnia. 
Secondly, there is a somewhat static understanding of the dynamics of state 
building,257 paying little attention to the processes and the interactions that occur not 
only between local and external actors but also at the domestic level within each 
ethnic group.258 Some studies have considered the different interactions in place259 
but these efforts have generally failed to look systematically at the different set of 
interactions that take place in post-conflict Bosnia; specifically the inter-ethnic, intra­
ethnic and supra-national levels.
My research aims to fill these gaps by examining a major process, and breaking 
down the analysis into the specific political interactions that take place between 
domestic and external actors; including the role of external incentives in the shaping 
of local strategies and calculations. The overall goal is to see how the interactions 
between domestic and external actors affect the overall policy outcome in the state 
building process.
With respect to the Conditionality and Europeanization literature (especially the 
actor-centered, rationalist approaches), I identify two major shortcomings. The first 
set of shortcomings is related to the reliance on rationality-based models and 
adoption costs that fail to account for situations where the status and form of the state 
is contested by ethnic groups in post-conflict societies. Jacoby, for example, works 
under the assumption that domestic actors are benefit maximizers; his rationality 
model is however based on the assumption that conditionality is applied in a
257 It is a static understanding of post-conflict Bosnia because there is no attempt to study 
systematically how both external and internal factors interact to promote practices of conflict 
regulation.
258 The power sharing literature focuses on the interactions at the intra- and inter-ethnic levels, 
but has failed to add the third level. Recent studies have considered the role of external actors (see for 
example Belloni and Deane 2005; O’Leary 2005; Wolff 2005a; McGarry 2008), but this variable has 
remained undertheorized. In sum, these studies have generally failed to consider the different elements 
that this thesis aims to explore, namely the multiple level interactions between domestic and external 
actors, and the push of external conditionality in the final outcome.
259 Michael Barnett and Cristoph Ziircher for example look at the strategic interactions of 
peacebuilders, state elites and subnational elites in state building (Barnett and Ziircher 2009). 
According to these authors, the strategic interactions of these actors shape the peace building agenda, 
leading to four different outcomes, namely cooperative peace building (when local elites accept the 
peacebuilders’ agenda), compromised peace building (when peacebuilding is the result of a negotiated 
agenda between the local and external elites), captured peacebuilding (when local elites “redirect the 
distribution of assistance so that it is fully consistent with their interests”) and conflictive peace 
building (which includes the use of coercive tools) (ibid, 25). While the effort of looking at local and 
external interactions is noteworthy, this study fails to explore the interactions at the intra-ethnic level 
featuring in deeply divided societies.
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functioning state and a relatively homogenous society. Also, though Kelley’s study 
of ethnic politics introduces the level of uncertainty associated with the EU accession 
process as an element of distortion to pure cost-benefit calculations, she does not 
look into how the existence of dysfunctional states might also affect pure cost-benefit 
rationality models. In short, the Europeanization approaches, especially the actor- 
centered ones, fail to account for how adjustment to European norms takes place in 
deeply divided societies, and in contexts where the very existence and form of the 
state is challenged by deeply ethnic divisions.260
While some studies on Europeanization have hinted at the status of the state as a 
possible intervening variable in conditionality compliance in the Western Balkans, 
this issue has been rather under theorized and referred to in a rather descriptive 
manner. An exception to this pattern is Gergana Noutcheva’s study on EU 
conditionality and sovereignty.261 She incorporates the variable of statehood into the 
analysis of conditionality compliance in the Balkans, looking into the cases of 
Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria. By exploring the impact of the EU in statehood 
structures in the Balkans, she suggests that EU conditionality may incur higher costs 
in semi-sovereign countries. As she notes, “The EU’s objective of ‘state-building’ 
has prompted the formulation of conditions that intervene in the statehood of some 
EU potential candidates against the promise of EU integration. This has changed not 
only the nature of the EU’s external influence on the semi sovereign cases but has 
also raised their costs of compliance with EU demands.”262 Notwithstanding the 
notable effort to explore the impact of conditionality in the Balkans, the language is 
generally focused on adoption costs, failing to fully account for the rather complex 
political and social establishments in deeply divided societies such as Bosnia.263 My 
research provides a more informed account on how the divisive nature in Bosnia
260 As outlined in Chapter 1, the Bosnian state enjoys questionable legitimacy at both the
societal and elite levels.
261 Noutcheva 2006.
262 Ibid, 239-240.
263 Some other works have focused on the role of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans, but 
these are rather descriptive. Maurizio Massari, for example, points to the level of cohesiveness in 
national institutions as one among various variables that affect how Western Balkan countries progress 
towards EU integration and respond to EU-generated incentives for reform (Massari 2005). He uses 
the case of Bosnia to illustrate how “the persistent struggle between forces of integration and 
separation ... and the weakness of self-sustaining central institutions have impeded BH’s efforts to 
present itself as a normal nation-state capable of promoting a clear and unified pro-European policy” 
(ibid, 262). Notwithstanding Massari’s initial attempt to explore the different reform trajectories in the 
Western Balkans, he does not theorize about the way in which the different intervening variables 
impact the resulting outcomes.
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plays out in the overall reform process.
The second set of problems associated with the conditionality literature relates to 
the bargaining dynamics of adjustment to EU standards. Europeanization studies 
draw on Robert Putnam’s two-level bargaining framework of international 
negotiations in accounting for the process of EU accession.264 Putnam’s framework265 
focuses on a game played out in two levels; specifically the domestic level, with the 
chief negotiator having to bargain with his constituency and other domestic players 
that may or may not support the negotiations; and the international one, where the 
negotiator bargains with other international negotiators who are also constrained by 
domestic games. Putnam argues that the bargaining power of the negotiator will be 
affected by the way domestic games are played out and by how much domestic 
leeway is granted for him. At the same time, the negotiator will use the progress of 
discussions at the international level to gamer further/additional support at the 
domestic level. All of these games result in a complex set of rationally-based 
propositions that are built around the notion of ‘win sets’ at the domestic level (all 
possible agreements that would give the necessary majority among the constituents). 
These games account for both the process and final outcome of the international 
agreement at stake.
Drawing from this model, Europeanization studies look at the process of 
European accession as a bargaining process that develops in two different playing 
fields; namely at the domestic one where reform-oriented actors and those who value 
the status quo squabble, and the European one where domestic and EU elites interact 
with each other. I argue that this model is too simplistic; as it does not capture the 
nuances and complexities of the multiple levels of interactions involved in deeply 
divided societies. Drawing from the conflict regulation literature (which breaks down 
the local game into two sub-level games) I propose a three-tiered framework to study 
the state building process in Bosnia in the context of EU integration. This three level 
framework examines elite interactions at the intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic and supra­
national levels. This suggests that a fruitful theoretical venue to explore is an 
examination of the propositions of the conflict regulation and plural society theories 
in reference to these interactions.
264 See for example Grabbe 2006; Kelly 2004a; Noutcheva 2006. The major difference between 
the bargaining model in use in international negotiations and the one in EU accession is the 
asymmetry of power between the domestic and the international actors.
265 Putnam 1988.
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23 . FROM THE TWO-LEVEL TO THE THREE-LEVEL FRAMEWORK: 
CONFLICT REGULATION IN POST-CONFLICT, DIVIDED SOCIETIES
This section is devoted to laying out a three-level framework to account for the EU- 
led process of state building in post-conflict, deeply divided societies such as Bosnia, 
and draws from the literature on conflict regulation and plural society theories.266 
This literature identifies two key levels of analysis in post-conflict societies; namely 
the intra- and inter-ethnic level. I incorporate a third level, i.e. the external push, and 
bring the three levels together in the study of post-conflict Bosnia. The framework 
focuses on the patterns of behavior befitting political elites in war-torn, deeply 
divided societies, and on the dynamics involved in the process of institutional 
adjustment to external norms and standards.
While conflict regulation and plural society studies have generally focused on 
the study of political stability in divided societies;267 this dissertation uses the 
dimension of conflict regulation as a proxy for accommodation/adaptation in the 
context of adjustment to external norms and policies. Adaptation to external 
standards will occur when domestic elites engage in conflict regulation and inter­
ethnic cooperation. On the contrary, entrenchment and status quo will result from 
domestic actors’ failure to engage in conciliatory behavior.268
The dimension of conflict regulation is thus used as an alternative framework to 
rationality-based approaches, and is analyzed at three different levels, including: (1) 
the inter-ethnic level, which involves the study of political dynamics that take place 
between ethnic groups. These dynamics bear a direct impact on conflict regulation 
given that all ethnic groups need to reach a compromise; (2) the intra-ethnic level, 
which looks at the dynamics of intra-ethnic political competition and its impact upon 
inter-ethnic cooperation (these two levels are mutually reinforcing); and (3) the
266 In particular, my focus is on those studies that focus on the role of political actors.
267 See for example Nordlinger 1972; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972.
268 Europeanization authors have usually referred to various possible policy outcomes in the
process of Europeanization, two of which are of relevance for the purposes of this research: 
adjustment (i.e. transformation), which involves adjustment or acceptance of the policy or standard at 
stake; and entrenchment or status quo, a situation in which domestic actors oppose or fail to 
implement the EU-induced reform. This research is specifically concerned with the dynamics involved 
in the inter-elite bargaining process that may lead to either transformation or entrenchment as a result 
of either accommodating dynamics among ethnic groups or mutual inter-ethnic intransigence.
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supra-national level or ‘third-level,’ where the interactions between domestic and 
external actors takes place with important reverberations on inter-ethnic and intra­
ethnic conflict regulation. The impact of external actors upon conflict regulation is 
indirect and may only work through the mechanisms of external influence reviewed 
in section two of this chapter; including positive and negative rewards, assistance, 
persuasion, and pressure. It is against this multi-level framework (see figure 2.1 for a 
basic sketch of conflict regulation in deeply divided societies) that the dynamics 
involved in the process of constitutional reform will be analyzed in the following 
chapters.
Figure 2.1. External Conflict Regulation in Post-conflict, Deeply Divided Societies
INTERETHNIC
DYNAMICS
CONFLICT
REGULATION
SUPRA-NATIONAL
LEVEL
INTRA-ETHNIC
COMPETITION
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23.1. The First-level: Inter-ethnic Relations in Post-conflict, Divided Settings
The analysis of elite interactions at the inter-ethnic level needs to be done in light of 
two basic considerations. The first is represented by the sources of ethnic conflict,269 
and by extension, the sources of conflict regulation in divided societies, which 
“cannot be understood without a psychology, an explanation that takes account of 
the emotional concomitants of group traits and interactions.”270 In order to learn 
more about how the psychological and social underpinnings of inter-ethnic relations 
affect conflict regulation practices, it is necessary to first look at the status of the 
different ethnic communities operating in a given society. This is related to the 
distinction that Donald Horowitz makes between advanced and backward groups 
based on the perceptions that groups have of themselves vis-a-vis the state and other 
groups in the polity.271 This categorization is pertinent in that groups may develop a 
sense of uncertainty and subordination that exaggerates the perception of insecurity, 
“producing extreme reactions to modest threats”272 and hence undermining inter­
ethnic accommodation 273 Horowitz, for example, suggests, “Backward groups have 
frequently exhibited severe anxiety about threats emanating from other groups. One 
form of this anxiety is apprehension about being dominated.”274 Under such contexts, 
“every issue can then become a survival issue,”275 especially under conditions of 
demographic and geographic insecurity.276 Following similar lines, Eric Nordlinger
26 Ethnic conflict is referred to the competition among ethnic groups for power, resources,
opportunities, status, or respect, by peaceful means (Esman 2004a and 2004b). This competition may 
turn violent under some circumstances but such situation is not discussed in this article. For a 
discussion on the root causes of ethnic conflict see Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Gurr 1995 and 2000; 
Fearon and Laitin 1996 and 2003; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Walter and Snyder 1999; Rose 2000; 
Kaufman 20001; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2003; Wolff 2007a.
270 Horowitz 1985,181-2.
271 This article uses the advanced-backward classification as based on perceptions and not in 
relation to a socioeconomic or numeric status. Though there seems to be an economic and social status 
dimension in the backward-advance classification that is not fully present in Bosnia, it is a useful 
classification when defined along the following lines: “to be backward is, first and foremost, to feel 
weak vis-a-vis advanced groups” (Horowitz 1985,167).
272 Horowitz 1985,179.
273 Horowitz claims that “the backward-advanced dichotomy is not the only possible dimension
along which conflict-producing comparisons can be made, but it is obviously the most powerful and 
widespread dimension, given the history of group interactions in Asia and Africa and the fact that 
imputed traits are the currency of intergroup comparison” (Horowitz 1985,182).
274 Horowitz 1985,175.
275 ibid, 176.
276 In reference to this, Horowitz claims, “To an outside observer, the fear of succumbing to the
superior numbers or capacities of another group and disappearing must be regarded as extreme and 
irrational. Still, these apprehensions persist, coloring group relations in many ways” (Horowitz 1985, 
179)
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claims that “anxiety [in deeply divided societies] generally inspires a tenacious 
attachment to the immediate graspable status quo as a means of relieving psychic 
insecurity; change is rejected because it represents an uncertainty which can only 
deepen existing anxieties.”277 All of these anxiety-driven concerns are generally not 
conducive to inter-ethnic conciliatory behavior.
In addition to the ‘advanced-backward’ dichotomy, there are two additional 
classifications that are prominent in the context of plural societies as described by 
Horowitz. The first one is related to the distinction between ranked and unranked 
systems, based on the coincidence or non-coincidence of ethnic groups with 
class/status differences respectively. According to Horowitz, this categorization is 
pertinent given the fact that inter-ethnic relations tend to be more unpredictable in 
unranked systems such as Bosnia. The second distinction is concerned with the locus 
of group relations; which regards ethnic politics as a function of the group size in 
relation to the state, with important consequences for inter-ethnic relations. The basic 
distinction is formulated against two ideal types, namely dispersed systems, “where 
group loyalties are parochial, and ethnic conflict is localized”278 and centralized ones 
(not in the territorial sense), such as Bosnia, where groups are large and their 
relations are constantly present at the center of state level politics. According to 
Horowitz, different tensions and demands beset each of these systems. In cases where 
groups are large and centralized, the claims of one group tend to be made at the 
expense of the others, resulting very often in inter-ethnic intransigence or non­
cooperation. This element becomes all the more critical when issues of life and death 
are discussed; running counter to patterns of inter-ethnic conciliatory behavior.
The second key notion relevant at the inter-ethnic level (which is related to the 
experience of violent conflict), is based on the assumption that patterns of political 
behavior in post-conflict, divided societies are different to those expected in divided 
but stable democracies where a strong sense of civic bond nourishes inter-group trust. 
Indeed, the experience of violent conflict between groups tends to aggravate the 
aforementioned anxieties and incorporate additional ones. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that under such circumstances anxiety driven concerns become more 
prominent (especially as a result of the recent experience of inter-ethnic violence), 
and that behavioral and rationality models that are built to describe divided societies
277 Nordlinger 1972,68.
278 Horowitz 1985,37-38.
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in stable democracies may not be valid in societies emerging from civil war where 
inter ethnic distrust is widespread. As Donald Rothchild has argued, though ethnic 
groups can be assumed to behave as utility maximizers, given the fact that “tangible 
interests” are at stake when negotiation and bargaining processes are in place,279 
“accommodations are extremely difficult to make in situations where groups fear for 
their future and thus make nonnegotiable demands that cannot be resolved through a 
process of mutual adjustment.”280 In this bargaining encounter, Rothchild suggests, 
“The interactions taking place between group representatives tend to reinforce the 
boundaries between ethnic-based interests.”281
The latter postulation is critical for disputing one of the most contentious 
notions in conflict regulation and power sharing literature; namely Lijphart’s idea 
that political elites in divided societies are prone to conciliatory behavior.282 While 
such assumption may hold true in relatively stable, Western European democracies 
(the original focus of Arend Lijphart’s theory on consociationalism), post-conflict, 
deeply divided societies have shown little evidence of such accommodating 
behavior 283 By using rationality logic in post-conflict, consociational arrangements, 
Marie-Joelle Zahar, for example, claims that post conflict societies exhibit ‘worst- 
case scenario’ characteristics in terms of necessary conditions for elite 
accommodation.284 The lack of cooperation is, to some extent, the result of a set of 
factors: (1) a lack of inter-ethnic trust; (2) the recent memories of violence (as well 
as the barbaric nature and conduct of the conflict), which turn inter-ethnic
279 Rothchild 1986,66.
280 Rothchild 1997,4.
281 Ibid.
282 Lijphart’s argument follows that in recognizing the dangers associated with engaging in 
uncooperative behaviour -  immobilism and the potential disintegration of the polity - ,  elites “make 
deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation ” 
(emphasis in text, Lijphart 1969,212). Lijphart later recognizes that accommodation works best when 
there is a previous tradition of inter-ethnic cooperation (Lijphart 1990).
283 In fact, some authors have noted that while elite cooperation is the quintessence of stability 
in divided societies and consociational democracies, the reverse, namely “the situation in which deep 
social divisions are not compensated for by elite cooperation,” make consociational democracies 
verge onto a centrifugal type, as opposed to the centripetal democracy where social cleavages do not 
reinforce each other (Andeweg 2000, 510). John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (1993) have also 
suggested that consociationalism may only be practicable in moderately rather than deeply divided 
societies. Similarly, as Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori (1983) have argued, “political 
mobilization along ethnic lines militates against moderation as political leaders discover the 
advantages of developing defensive electoral strategies that seek to maximize support within one 
segment, a ‘catch-self’ strategy” (Sani and Sartori 1983,332. Quoted from Mitchell 1995,774).
284 Zahar 2002.
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cooperation into an existential matter;285 (3) and the difficulties involved in 
mustering a sense of civic bond (which sometimes remains absent for long); 
specifically in a context where power sharing institutions promote political 
mobilization along exclusive ethnic lines, and keep inter-groups interactions to the 
minimum.
The idea that elites in divided societies are prone to accommodation behavior 
may be misleading, but this dissertation does not suggest that inter-ethnic 
accommodation is impossible in all cases. Nordlinger, for example, identifies four 
circumstances in which conflict regulation motives may develop in deeply divided 
societies, including:286 (1) an external threat or danger that submerges internal 
conflicts (a factor broadly absent in the context of Bosnia). (2). An interest in 
avoiding bloodshed and suffering within the leader’s ethnic group. (3) The desire to 
acquire or retain political power, a factor intimately dependent upon dynamics at the 
intra-ethnic level (which the second level of analysis explores). (4) The belief that 
intense conflict may undermine the economic well being of the leader’s ethnic 
group. While none of these factors relate directly to the political and economic 
circumstances in Bosnia, they suggest that conflict regulation in deeply divided 
societies may be dependent upon the dynamics found at the intra-ethnic and supra­
national levels,287 as addressed in the following sections.
232 . The Second Level: Intra-ethnic Dynamics and the Politics of Outbidding
The second level of analysis is devoted to the nature of intra-ethnic elite competition 
and its reverberations on conflict regulation at the inter-ethnic level. One of the key 
theoretical contributions of the conflict regulation literature in this area is the notion 
that conflict regulation in divided societies is the result of political dynamics at both 
the inter- and intra-ethnic levels. Nordlinger’s study represents one of the earliest 
contributions to this area of research, and offers a pioneering framework on how
Bieber for example argues, “In post-conflict societies ... the parties that will be participating 
in one government have frequently been at war with each other during the conflict, making 
cooperation particularly difficult” (Bieber 2005,93).
286 Nordlinger 1972.
287 We could thus argue that two key trigger points may affect the interest, goals and strategies 
of domestic actors: power struggles within the group members and interactions with external actors. 
This dissertation argues that the emotional underpinnings do also play a role, especially when heated 
questions are placed at the negotiation table.
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elite’s motives and political dynamics at both the intra- and inter-elite levels translate 
into conflict regulation in post-conflict, divided societies. For Nordlinger, the issue of 
political security, especially the position of political leaders within their own political 
party, represents a key variable in accounting for how conflict regulation motives 
may or may not translate into conciliatory practices at the inter-ethnic level. Though 
Nordlinger’s claims are somewhat tautological at times (especially when he explores 
the translation of elite’s motives into conflict regulation behavior), his basic 
assumption is that insecure leaders, whose position within the party may be 
challenged by either second-rank officials or when the chances of potential splits are 
high, will be far more reluctant than secure leaders to take serious risks and act upon 
their conflict regulation motives. As he points out, “leaders motivated toward conflict 
regulation are reluctant to act upon their motivations when they believe that such 
actions may result in a deep split within their conflict group,”288 which could further 
endanger and weaken their positions289
In addition to intra-party dynamics, there are other variables that need to be 
factored into situations of intra-ethnic pluralism,290 where important questions of 
authenticity become prevalent and competition leads to the ‘politics of outbidding’ 291 
The general assumption in contexts where two or more parties compete against each 
other for support in the same ethnic pool is that cross-group cooperation and inter­
ethnic accommodation is less likely.292 In other words, the more intra-segmental party 
competition, the less likely the ability of ethnic-based parties to cooperate inter 
segmentally,293 which results in the development of centrifugal dynamics in party
288 Nordlinger 1972, 66. This is a hypothesis that should be empirically tested, as the opposite 
may hold true, namely a situation in which leaders that are inclined to violent conflict behave 
moderately, fearing further splits within their party.
289 The elite’s structural predominance over non-elites is a determining factor in Nordlinger’s 
account for elite’s engagement in conciliatory behavior.
290 For example, when plural party systems develop within each ethnic group. Horowitz claims 
that even if most ethnic groups enter democratic politics represented by one party or by one group that 
has a dominant hold over the group’s support, “in many cases, however, sharp party competition later 
emerges for the adherence of group members. Usually, this is preceded by a split in the dominant 
party, though it can also take the form of entirely new parties with entirely new leaders” (Horowitz 
1985,349).
291 Ibid, 359.
292 See Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985; Gagnon 1995; Mitchell 1991 and 1995; 
Wolff 2005a. For Horowitz, the centrifugal character of the competition increases the political 
distance between groups “as to propel them toward violent outcomes, including secession” (Horowitz 
1985, 358).
293 Mitchell 1995. In reference to the situation of Northern Ireland, Stefan Wolff for example 
argues that “all political parties compete for a strictly limited pool of votes within their own political 
space ... With the dominant view being that there are too few chances to attract voters from the other
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competition.294 Paul Mitchell, for example, explains that such dynamics are related to 
the threats (or reality) of a counter-mobilization following a party’s overture to 
moderate stances, which undermines the political security of political leaders and 
hence the incentives for inter-segmental cooperation. In Mitchell’s words, “any 
moderate overtures made by one party within the segment are likely to become the 
basis for the mobilization of a rival party (if one does not already exist) that will 
vociferously denounce the betrayal of the group’s vital interest. The threat (or reality) 
of such a counter-mobilization constrains the independence of elites and directly 
promotes a centrifugal direction in party competition.”295 Philip Gagnon offers a 
somewhat similar explanation of this phenomenon. He argues that in case of potential 
threats to the group leaders’ positions and impending challenges to the status quo 
from within their own ranks, some elites may respond by provoking external conflict 
to shift the focus of the political competition to an external threat; “Part of this 
agenda-setting or discourse-shaping strategy takes the form of the struggle over 
authenticity, that is, the definition of what makes a real Serb, Croat, Aleut, etc.”296 
Further empirical evidence is needed, however, in order to better understand how 
intra-ethnic dynamics affect the outcome of inter-ethnic cooperation and vice-versa. 
Three observations are in order. Firstly, outbidding dynamics may be more 
prominent in situations where the counter-mobilization threat stems from forces that 
may have a chance at making substantial inroads in the power base of the dominant 
parties.297 Secondly, political outbidding may be caused by factors other than intra­
ethnic competition; as recent empirical studies have suggested. By looking into the 
dynamics of intra-Serb competition prior, during and after the war in former 
Yugoslavia, Nina Caspersen argues that intra- and inter-ethnic radicalization can, in 
fact, be caused by other factors such as kin-state involvement.298 Finally, the risk of 
political outbidding may not necessarily lead to destabilization, radicalization and
side, election campaigns become intra-community events and lead to increasing polarization and 
radicalization, essentially strengthening hardliners at the expense of moderates in each community. 
The lack of transfer votes thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Wolff 2005a, 52-53).
294 In other words, intra-segmental party competition may be correlated with inter-ethnic 
centrifugal dynamics.
295 Mitchell 1995,779.
296 Gagnon 1995,2. See also Gagnon 1994/1995.
297 This is the case of previously opposition parties SNSD and SBiH.
298 See Caspersen 2006. Caspersen has argued that “the dominance of the ethnic cleavage was
not an automatic result of the formation of ethnic parties in Croatia and Bosnia. The ability of the 
ethnic or nationalist parties to ensure the dominance of this cleavage and hence the marginalization of 
non-ethnic rivals depended heavily on their control of political and non-political resources as well as 
on the interplay and even cooperation between the ethnic parties” (Caspersen 2004,244).
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inter-ethnic intransigence.299 By looking at party dynamics and voting support in 
Northern Ireland, Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans and Brendan O’Leary argue that 
certain practices and institutions can provide incentives for formerly ‘hard-line’ 
ethnic parties to moderate their platforms and compete centripetally, provided “they 
can protect themselves from the charge of ‘sell-out’.”300 Other authors have 
contended that certain power sharing arrangements, especially the ones based on the 
set up of pre-election cross-ethnic coalitions, may mitigate the threat of political 
outbidding and radicalism.301
On the whole, even if the impact of intra-ethnic competition on inter-ethnic 
conflict regulation practices is unpredictable or may be subject to various influences, 
it is a factor worth considering in the analysis of inter-ethnic cooperation in divided 
societies. My research builds upon the more recent studies that suggest that political 
outbidding may not always lead to political intransigence. Rather than focusing on 
the role of institutions, however, I incorporate the role of external actors and external 
incentives in the analysis of outbidding dynamics. I argue that external actors may 
manage to undermine the impact of outbidding on inter-ethnic cooperation under 
specific circumstances. This dissertation shows that external actors may do so by 
providing key guarantees to ethnic groups and by exerting heavy external pressure.303
2 3 3 . The Supra-National Level: Interactions between External and Domestic 
Actors
The third and final level of analysis looks at interactions between external and 
domestic elites, or what this article refers to as the ‘supra-national’ level. The conflict 
regulation and consociational literature has been less prolific in exploring this area 
and there are some research gaps. Furthermore, even though recent works have
299 See Sisk 1996; Chandra 2005; Mitchell, Evans and O’Leary 2006.
300 Mitchell, Evans and O’Leary 2006, 28. They argue that this can be achieved through the 
development of a party that acts on the basis of an “ethnic tribune appeal,” with the ability to be 
intransigent on the issue of ethnic identity -  which precludes other parties from outbidding -  while 
engaging in moderating attitudes towards the distribution of resources at the power-sharing level 
(ibid).
301 See for example Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2001; O’Flynn and Russell 2005. It is
however unclear when the conditions for inter-ethnic cooperation may be in place and what specific 
contextual factors and institutions can make it possible.
303 These two factors were essential to bringing all parties to the table and to reaching an
agreement in March 2006. Section two of Chapter 6 fully discusses this issue.
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started to explore this issue,304 these studies have overlooked how and to what extent 
external incentives may have an impact on the operation and performance of power 
sharing arrangements and the success or failure of state building processes in 
consociational systems. Zahar,305 for example, suggests that we need to look at the 
role of international actors in post conflict power sharing arrangements, given that 
they have their own agendas and their policies may affect domestic elite payoffs. She 
does not, however, go into further detail over how external actors may influence 
domestic elites’ calculations and payoffs. Similarly, John McGarry notes, “outsiders 
may have resources that can be used to influence the calculations of internal parties,” 
but he does not explain how such resources may affect the final outcome.306 In 
addition to the lack of a detailed account on how the interactions between local and 
external actors play out, little effort has been undertaken by these studies to analyze 
how, and under what circumstances, external actors’ perceptions and/or 
misconceptions about the local communities may factor in the definition of their 
stratategies.
The post conflict state building literature has provided some insights on how the 
interconnections between domestic and external actors have impacted political 
dynamics at the local level. Three key claims have a special resonance for the 
purposes of this research. The first one is related to the role of external actors in 
undermining conflict regulation practices at the inter-ethnic level when extensive 
powers are vested upon them. The presence of external actors in post-conflict, 
divided societies is premised on the need to provide assurances to the parties and 
encourage them to engage in conciliatory behavior. Having said this, the lack of 
direct accountability in the hands of domestic actors has, at times, tended to 
encourage domestic elites to engage in non-conciliatory behavior when such strategy 
has served specific intra-party or intra-segmental interests, without bearing the
304 See Zahar 2002; Belloni and Deane 2005. There is an increasing interest in exploring this 
issue more thoroughly, although this body of research is still rather embryonic and lacks the basic 
premises of systematic research. Roberto Belloni and Shelley Deane’s study on the successful 
implementation of power sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and Bosnia is one of such recent 
efforts. In this work they identify “third-level games” in the implementation of power sharing 
arrangements “where internal group dynamics and external third party constraints and preferences 
shape elite decisions and the final bargain arrived at” (Belloni and Shelley 2005, 220). Although the 
study is a resourceful attempt at looking at these issues, it fails to do so systematically. The external 
variable is the least explored variable and there is not an attempt to list how all the different 
interactions affect the final bargains.
305 Zahar 2002.
306 McGarry 2008,694.
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responsibility of non-cooperation.307 Richard Caplan argues that, “the exercise of 
executive authority can have serious implications for the development of local 
political culture and institutions.”308 Indeed, as Susan Woodward argues, the 
authority of the OHR has often times resulted in an “incentive to irresponsibility.” 
She notes, “Free riding on the High Representative’s authority, a politician can 
choose intransigence ... when a decision would be unpopular with constituents or 
colleagues;” which further reduces politicians’ accountability.309 Drawing on 
Woodward’s argument, Zahar states that, while international players are supposed to 
act as “constitutional safeguards against mutual intransigence,” their presence has 
often resulted in unfavorable conditions for domestic elite’s willingness to 
cooperate.310 By looking into the powers of the HR in Bosnia, she notes, “In the 
short-term, this policy counters the paralysis of decision-making at the federal level 
in Bosnia. ... In the long-term, this undermines political capacity building by 
shifting responsibility for cooperation away from the nationalist leaders.”311 Thus, 
nationalist leaders in Bosnia will never be forced to face the consequences of 
intransigence with their constituencies if the HR intervenes every time they refuse to 
compromise. This suggests that the international community “makes cooperation less
"X 1 *7likely as there is less urgency and/or fear of the consequences of disagreement.”
The second argument suggests that processes of state building have been 
reported to be undemocratic and mistakenly based on the assumption that “the 
political process can be externally influenced through the promotion of institutional 
changes introduced at the state level,” without taking into consideration domestic
' X 1 'Xdemands. The local involvement in the state building process in Bosnia has 
certainly been quite limited. This line of argumentation implies that the undemocratic
307 See for example Caplan 2005a; Chandler 1999 and 2006a; Knaus and Martin 2003; Zahar 
2005a; Woodward 1999b and 1999c.
308 Caplan 2005a, 180.
309 Woodward 1999b, 8-9. See also Chandler 1999; Zahar 2005b.
310 Zahar 2002,17.
311 Ibid. This is related to one of Fukuyama’s key arguments about state building. As he states,
“the rhetoric of the international community stresses 'capacity building' while the reality has been 
rather a kind of 'capacity sucking out' to use Ignatieff’s (2002) memorable phrase. The international 
community ... comes so richly endowed and full of capabilities that it tends to crowd out rather than 
complement the extremely weak state capacities of the targeted countries. This means that while 
governance functions are performed, indigenous capacity does not increase, and the countries in 
question are likely to revert to their former situations once the international community loses interest 
or moves on to the next crisis area” (Fukuyama 2004,103).
312 Zahar 2002,17-18.
313 Chandler 2006a.
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and exclusive nature of state building has taken a toll on its effectiveness in terms of 
legitimacy and capacity building. As former World Bank Vice President Joseph 
Stiglitz stated, “ownership is essential for successful transformation: policies that are 
imposed from outside may be grudgingly accepted on a superficial basis, but will 
rarely be implemented as intended. ... To achieve the desired ownership and 
transformation, the process that leads to that strategy must be participatory.”314
Finally, it has also been argued that the presence of external actors has had the 
unintended consequence of creating a situation of ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ on the ground; 
irrespective of the power distribution between ethnic groups.315 This is particularly 
relevant when the external intervention touches upon statehood issues in contexts 
where the form of the state is highly contested. This situation may lead to the 
emergence of heightened suspicions amongst ‘losers’ (as a result of the perceived 
bias on the part of the external actor), and to the development of growing demands 
for ‘stronger’ power-sharing guarantees and, in turn, less cooperative behavior.316
The empirical discussion on the process of constitutional reform will shed light 
on additional issues related to the role of external actors in post-conflict Bosnia, 
including: the role of the EU incentives in the process of state building; the divisions 
within the international community (which has an impact on the overall policy 
outcome); and the specific characteristics of the process (which reflect on the broader 
process of state building in this country). The discussion will also reflect on the way 
in which external actors’ perceptions about the state building process under way may 
have an impact on their own strategies.
In sum, this chapter argues that the three-tiered framework outlined above offers a 
better understanding of post-conflict Bosnia than the approaches reviewed in the 
second section of this chapter. Rather than pointing to the role of ethnic divisions as a 
primary cause for the failure of the state building process (an argument that has often 
been brought to light by both policy makers and scholars), my analysis shows that the 
external incentives and the EU transformative power in Bosnia have been blunted by
314 Stiglitz 1998, 21. Dayton is a clear case in point. Signed as a regional agreement by the
Bosniak delegation, Serbia and Croatia in 1995, it lacked democratic credentials from the start and all 
groups worked towards undermining it during the first few years after the signing. Though locals have 
evolved into accepting Dayton as the best worst solution, the broader terms of the agreement have 
remained highly contested by all the ethnic groups in Bosnia.
3,5 Zahar 2005a.
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an ethnic power game played at the intra-ethnic level.
2.4. CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that both the state building and conditionality literatures have failed to 
capture the nuances and complexities involved in the state building process in post 
conflict Bosnia. Drawing from the conflict regulation, I propose to use a three level 
framework, where conflict regulation is analyzed at three different levels, namely the 
inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic and supra-national levels.
The practice of conflict regulation is used in this study as the dependent variable, 
as a proxy for accommodation to the norm that is defined externally. This variable is 
dependent upon the dynamics that take place at the three different levels mentioned 
above, which represent the independent variables (see figure 2.1). These variables 
enjoy both direct and indirect effects on conflict regulation.
Given that conflict regulation takes place at the domestic level, both intra- and 
inter-ethnic dynamics may have a direct impact upon conflict regulation.317 The role 
of external actors, however, may only have an indirect effect upon the dependent 
variable through interactions with domestic actors at the intra- and inter-ethnic 
levels.318 Three additional intervening variables with potential for an indirect effect 
over conflict regulation in Bosnia (through interactions with the inter- and inter­
ethnic levels) are included. These intervening variables are the non-core elite (i.e. 
religious authorities within the Bosniak and Croat communities), kin-states (Serbia 
and Croatia) and the non-elite (population). The impact of these variables is, 
however, more diffuse than the other three variables under consideration, as 
highlighted in the introduction.319
It is the purpose of this research to determine the relative weight of each of these 
variables in order to understand the broader state building process in Bosnia. In the 
context of constitutional reform, the weight of each level varied according to the
Intra-ethnic dynamics may have a direct impact on conflict regulation when a two-third 
majority in the parliament is needed for a decision to be passed (i.e. constitutional reform). A broader 
consensus within each ethnic group is thus needed in these situations.
318 In cases of control as the form of influence, external actors would have a direct effect on the 
outcome, but this research is not concerned with that model.
319 See Introduction, p. 48.
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different dynamics involved in each negotiation phase. Figure 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 -  
which are limited to the interactions between the three key variables at hand -  show 
the dynamics involved in each of the three phases of constitutional reform. In the first 
phase (figure 2.2)320 inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic variables are accountable for the 
failure of the negotiations. The role of external actors during this phase was rather 
secondary. Though the role of external actors increased towards the end of the first 
phase, dynamics at the inter- and intra-ethnic level overpowered the limited external 
engagement.
Figure 2.2. Conflict Regulation in Constitutional Reform in Bosnia: Phase I
INTRANSIGENCE CONFLICT REGULATION
EXTERNAL ACTORS
INTER ETHNIC DYNAMICS
INTRA-ETHNIC
COMPETITION
In the second phase (figure 2.3),322 the role of external actors is more prominent. 
Strong arm-twisting by external actors paves the way for inter-ethnic 
accommodation. The role of intra-ethnic dynamics is not relevant at this point as a 
result of two factors: (1) the negotiations are restricted to a limited number of 
domestic actors during this phase; (2) party leaders managed to marginalize internal 
divisions during this phase. In sum, intra-ethnic dynamics are not threatening to the 
position of party leaders, and a constitutional agreement is reached during this phase.
See chapter 5 for a discussion of the first phase o f the negotiations.
Chapter 6 analyzes the dynamics involved in the second phase o f constitutional reform.
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Figure 2.3. Conflict Regulation in Constitutional Reform in Bosnia:
Phase II
INTRANSIGENCE CONFLICT REGULATION
INTER ETHNIC DYNAMICS
INTRA-ETHNIC
COMPETITION
TERNAL ACTORS
In the final phase (figure 2.4),324 intra-ethnic dynamics acquire a prominent role. The 
package is sent to the parliament where a public discussion with all the relevant 
political actors in BiH develops. Though external actors’ engagement continues, their 
impact on intra-ethnic dynamics is negligible. Both the powerful intra-ethnic 
dynamics and the neglect of this factor in external actors’ calculations lead to the 
failure of conflict regulation.
Figure 2.4. Conflict Regulation in Constitutional Reform in Bosnia: Phase III
INTRANSIGENCE
CONFLICT REGULATION
INTER ETHNIC DYNAMICS
INTRA-ETHNIC
COMPETITION
EXTERNAL ACTORS
Chapter 7 analyzes the dynamics involved in the final phase o f constitutional reform.
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PART II
DAYTON
Part two of the dissertation (chapter 3) is concerned with the analysis of the Dayton 
Peace Accords. Chapter 3 consists of three sections. Section one explores the 
constitutional debate in Bosnia since the breakup of Yugoslavia, and is divided into 
three subsections: the first subsection is devoted to the origins of the constitutional 
debate in Bosnia following the breakup of Yugoslavia; the second subsection 
examines the key peace settlement initiatives launched during the conflict in Bosnia; 
and the last subsection analyzes the Dayton constitution. Section two o f this chapter 
analyzes the implementation of the civil and institutional aspects of Dayton and is 
also divided into three subsections coinciding with the patterns of external 
intervention in Bosnia since Dayton: from 1996 to 1997; from 1998 to 2000; and 
from 2000 to 2005, when external actors engaged in a revamped state-building 
agenda heavily influenced by the EU. Part three draws conclusions about the 
effectiveness o f Dayton in Bosnia and introduces the rationale for constitutional 
reform.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 92 10/30/09
CHAPTER 3
THE DAYTON FRAMEWORK
3.1. DAYTON AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE IN BOSNIA
3.1.1. The Constitutional Debate Before the War
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment in which the state of Yugoslavia 
collapsed under communist rule.325 It followed a two-track process, first with the 
collapse of the federal communist party in January 1990 and later with the 
progressive disintegration of the single party system in each of the republics 
throughout 1989 and 1990, which was the main integrative force in the federation. 
These processes did not take place simultaneously nor did they happen concurrently 
across the different republics composing the former Yugoslavia.
The disintegration of the federal communist party and central authority came 
about as the federal party became incapable of governing effectively. The 
discretionary policy-making powers granted to the republics during Tito’s regime 
had the effect of slowing down the process of decision-making at the federal level. 
Indeed, the Constitution of 1974 gave Yugoslav republics effective veto powers 
(decisions needed to be taken by consensus) and ‘theoretical statehood’ ,326 The state 
only retained the competences related to foreign, military and key external trade 
affairs and gave the republics the right to approve their own constitutions.327 “It 
effectively created a semi-confederative political structure” with emphasis placed on 
achieving unanimity despite prolonged and slow procedures 328 This situation led to 
ongoing policy deadlock, which became pervasive from 1987 to 1991, taking a 
dramatic turn over the period of 1989-1990 that resulted in virtual paralysis of the
For a full account on the demise of Yugoslavia see for example Cohen 1995; Woodward 
1995; Denitch 1996; Glenny 1996; Silber and Little 1996; Bennet 1995; Magas 1993; Lampe 2000; 
Ramet 2002. Also see the recent edited volume Cohen and Dragovic-Soso 2008.
326 Cohen 1995,33.
327 Vejvoda 1996.
328 Cohen 1995,33.
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state.
At the foundation of the institutional crisis at the federal level lay two mutually 
reinforcing challenges. The first challenge was the severe social unrest and a 
disruptive economic crisis that called for unified, strong federal action.329 The 
political deadlock over how to best manage and implement the appropriate economic 
and social reforms to resolve the crisis made matters worse, and led progressively to 
radical nationalisms. The second problem was related to the ongoing infighting 
between regional elites, which “skillfully utilized decentralized authority for their 
respective parochial interests.”330 The infighting took a nationalist turn over the 
reform of the federal constitution, which revolved around three major proposals: (1) 
the Serbian strategy, associated with Serbian President Slodoban Milosevic, which 
favored the creation of a renewed federation centered around Serbian prominence; 
(2) the Slovenian proposal for the creation of a federation formed of equal federation 
units with the right to secession; (3) the federal proposition, linked to the President 
of the Federal Executive Council Ante Markovic, which advocated for the 
introduction of amendments to the constitution -  mostly economic in nature -  to 
provide the federal government with the powers to constrain the influence of local 
interests and to facilitate the implementation of the necessary reforms.331 In the end, 
the federal option did not gamer enough support and the Serbian and Slovene visions 
became mutually unacceptable for each other.
The federal party system finally collapsed in January 1990 at the Extraordinary 
Congress of the League of Communists, when the Slovene delegation, having failed 
to gamer support for the creation of an ‘asymmetric confederation’, walked out of the 
congress. The Serbian delegation was in favor of proceeding with the congress 
agenda to agree on the future form of the federal state, and reallocating the votes 
accordingly, but the Croatian, Macedonian and Bosnian delegations, together with 
the army,332 voted for adjournment.333 The failure of the congress to decide on a new
329 By the end of 1980's, the country’s economy was distressed by skyrocketing inflation, high
unemployment, a huge foreign debt and food shortages, and living conditions plummeted to the level 
of the mid-1960's (Cohen 1995,45; see also Palairet 2008).
330 Cohen 1995, 33. As Cohen claims, “This situation resulted in an unusual proliferation of
authoritarian leadership networks -  sometimes referred to as ‘polycentric statism’ or a ‘pluralism of 
elites’ -  that effectively invalidated the regime” (ibid', see also Goati 1997).
331 Cohen 1995.
332 Prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the army oscillated between its support to the Yugoslav
constitutional framework and Milosevic’s project of a Yugoslavia united around Serbia’s 
predominance (see Bieber 2008). As developments progressed, the army became increasingly
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constitution reflected the incapacity of the federal government to impose any further 
reforms upon the republics, and soon after that Slovenia and Croatia prepared 
themselves for the first multiparty elections, paving the way to the collapse of the 
federal party system. The disintegration of the Yugoslav state took place effectively 
in mid-1991, as Slovenia declared independence and the federation descended into 
open warfare.
The disintegration of the single party system in the different Yugoslav republics 
occurred throughout 1989 and 1990 (in early 1990 in the case of Bosnia), prior to the 
holding of multiparty elections across the republics. The transition to a multiparty 
system was an elite-driven process334 and somewhat externally induced as it was 
triggered in part by the events taking place both at the federal level and in Eastern 
Europe. Only in the case of Croatia, where civil society demanded the legalization of 
political parties and the holding of elections in a petition to the government of the 
republic in December 1989, was the transition a by-product of both political elites 
and civil society’s active participation.335
Multiparty elections took place in April and May 1990 in Slovenia and Croatia 
respectively, and at the end of the year in Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The elections exposed the ethnification of politics. Although 
polls had shown that the population favored autonomy rather than full independence 
at the beginning of the year,336 the 1990 elections resulted in the victory of 
nationalistic parties. In Slovenia, a coalition of anticommunist and pro-independent 
opposition groups, DEMOS, attained 55 percent of the vote (although the communist 
leader Milan Kukan won the presidential election); in Croatia, HDZ’s Franjo 
Tudman won the elections with 41 percent of votes on an anticommunist,
subordinated to Serbia and Milosevic. Bieber notes, “By the time the first shots were fired, the army 
had equated protecting Serbs in Croatia with protecting supporters of Yugoslavia. That equation 
would see to the dissolution of the old JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] and its subordination to 
Serbia” (ibid, 320). Following these events, the army became a key element in the escalation of the 
conflict (ibid).
333 Woodward 1995,115.
334 Susan Woodward stated, “The demand for elections did not originate from popular pressure,
but with politicians seeking more political power over their territories and opposition intellectuals
seeking more political influence over the course of events” (Woodward 1995,117).
335 Cohen 1995.
336 Pre-election surveys in Slovenia, for example, showed that only 20 percent of the population
advocated independence outright while almost 60 percent favored autonomy within Yugoslavia 
(Cohen 1995,90). Bosnia, for its part, had the largest proportion of Yugoslav-oriented and democratic 
parties; even the parties that were ethnically oriented favored the continuation of Bosnia as a 
multiethnic entity (Cohen 1995).
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nationalistic platform;337 in Serbia and Montenegro, renamed ‘communists’ won with 
simple majorities.
Following the collapse of the federal communist system, Yugoslav Prime 
Minister Ante Markovic organized various rounds of negotiations among the 
republics in the first half of 1991 in order to resolve the constitutional crisis in 
Yugoslavia. No settlement was reached, however. Croatia and Slovenia favored the 
creation of a confederation of sovereign states, in which republics would enjoy the 
right of self-determination, but Serbia opposed this. President of the Bosnian 
Presidency Alija Izetbegovic also proposed the creation of an asymmetric federation, 
in which Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia would be closely linked to a 
loose confederation with Slovenia and Croatia. This option was also rejected by 
Milosevic,338 and by the end of June 1991 both Slovenia and Croatia had declared 
independence. In a final attempt to find a solution to the crisis, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) launched a peace conference in the Hague in 
September 1991, under the chairmanship of Lord Peter Carrington, and with the legal 
assistance of the Badinter Commission (an arbitration body set up by the EEC to 
assist in legal matters to the Peace Conference).339 The confederate solution presented 
by the London Conference in November 1991 was, however, rejected by Milosevic340 
and by the end of 1991, Yugoslavia ceased to exist as a state. In January 1992, the 
EEC recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent states and invited other 
Republics to request EEC recognition in the following months.341
The legalization of a pluralistic party system came late in Bosnia compared to 
the rest of the republics;342 but the dynamics leading to both the derailing of the
337 Woodward 1995.
338 Cohen 1995,201.
339 The Commission was presided over by Robert Badinter; it was comprised of five members,
all of them holding the presidency of Constitutional Courts within the EEC.
340 Despite the failure of the peace conference in putting forward a solution for Yugoslavia, the 
opinions of the Badinder Commission -  especially Opinions No. 2 and No. 4 -  had an enormous 
impact on how events played out later on in Bosnia (Szasz 1995). The Bardinter Commission, for 
example, recommended the need for a referendum to let citizens decide on the preferred option for the 
future status of the multiethnic country (Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 4). The commission also 
suggested that although the Bosnian Serbs had the right to choose their nationality where appropriate, 
“whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing 
frontiers at the time of independence except when the states concerned agree otherwise” (Badinter 
Commission, Opinion No. 2). In this respect, Opinion 3 suggested that the internal frontiers of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were to be considered as international frontiers 
according to international law, at the time of dissolution (Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 3).
341 Germany recognized Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991.
342 Bougarel 1996.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 96 10/30/09
democratic experiment and the outbreak of war mirrored (and were influenced by) 
the events in the rest of Yugoslavia.343 Indeed, the elections on 8 November 1990 
resulted in the victory of a three-party electoral coalition organized along the ethnic 
divide,344 winning 202 out of the 240 total seats.345 The parties of this coalition 
gained support “almost proportional to individuals’ choices of national identity in the 
1981 census:”346 the Muslim SDA, created in May 1990 on a religious-based 
platform, gained 33.8 percent of the votes; the Serbian SDS, created in July 1990, 
won 29.6 percent; and the HDZ BiH, established in August 1990 as a branch of 
Franjo Tudman’s HDZ, gained 18.3 percent.347 Two prominent cross-ethnic forces 
competed in the elections, namely the former communists (renamed the Social 
Democratic Party), and Ante Markovic’s Alliance of Yugoslav Reform Forces in 
Bosnia, but they were too weak to pose a serious challenge to the nationalist parties. 
The former communists were unpopular, given the long-standing record of 
corruption, repression and ineffective government in the midst of the economic 
crisis. Markovic’s Alliance was more popular, but it was formed relatively late and 
was “a target of much hostility by the emerging republican political forces.”348 
Markovic received only 5.4 percent of the popular vote while the reformed 
communists won 8 percent.
The coalition government was formed on 18 November 1990 but the “dividing 
of power and resources soon provoked multiple conflicts ... [leading to] a 
progressive paralysis of public institutions and services, a comprehensive 
dismantling of the state, and ... the growing criminalization of economic and 
political life.”349 As Robert Hayden stated, the three parties governed with absolute
343 See Andjelic 2003.
344 For a discussion on the results of the 1990 elections see Andjelic 2003. It is important to note 
that nationalist parties were not hostile to each other before the elections. Bieber notes that the party 
leaderships were invited to the founding congresses of each respective party (Bieber 2006a). 
Furthermore, according to Woodward, “leaders of the nationalist parties actually collaborated to 
persuade voters that their security depended on voting their national identity” (Woodward 1999c, 85).
345 Opposition parties were first granted legal status on the condition that they were not based 
on ethnicity. This ban was later declared unconstitutional.
346 Woodward 1995, 122. There were 99 Muslims (41 percent), 85 Serbs (35 percent), 49 
Croats (20 percent) and 7 ‘Yugoslavs’ in the new elected assembly, which corresponded very closely 
to the population distribution, namely 44 percent Bosniaks, 31 percent Serbs and 17 percent Croats 
(Malcolm 1996, 222-223). Voting along ethnic lines, however, was not a new phenomenon. Hayden 
argued that “every relatively free and fair election in Bosnia in the twentieth century ... [has] 
produced the same result” (Hayden 2005,235).
347 Bieber 2006a.
348 Ibid, 20.
349 Bougarel 1996,99. The Serbs were the first to undermine joint government institutions. They
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control in the local areas where they were a majority; furthermore, agreement at the 
republic level became unfeasible and the prospect of enacting a new constitution to 
replace the 1974 one became increasingly elusive.350
The first key constitutional debate in Bosnia occurred on October 14-15,1991 in 
a heated parliamentary discussion on Bosnia’s sovereignty, following both the 
secession of Croatia and Slovenia and the outbreak of war in June 1991.351 The 
discussion in the assembly revolved around a memorandum of sovereignty presented 
by SDA and HDZ whereby Bosnian officials, while in favor of remaining part of 
Yugoslavia, renounced participation in federal institutions should the representatives 
of the other republics be absent.352 Two additional, and more sensitive, provisions 
were included in the memorandum, the first one paving the way for Bosnia to reject 
any federal decision that had not been approved with the participation of the 
representatives of all of the other republics; and the second one empowering the 
Bosnian parliamentary majority to make decisions on the republic’s future status.353 
The Serbs, who had offered a competing resolution whereby Bosnian constituent 
nations could initiate a process of self-determination including secession if Croatia 
was to secede from FRY,354 rejected the memorandum and walked out of parliament. 
An hour after the Serb’s walk out, Croats and Bosniaks proclaimed the republic’s 
sovereignty without the consent of the Serb representatives (with 142 votes out of 
240), which contravened the spirit and the letter of the amendments to the 
constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced on 31 
July 1990.355 Although the Serbs demanded referring the sovereignty memorandum
first boycotted the functioning of the parliament, refusing to abide by any decision taken by the 
legislative body. They also boycotted the presidency meetings by September 1991 and formed the so- 
called Serb Autonomous regions (SAO) throughout the territory of Bosnia (Silber and Little 1996) 
pledging to secede from Bosnia.
350 Hayden 1992, 661; see also Burg and Shoup 1999. The 1974 constitution granted equality 
among the three constituent people.
351 The debate on sovereignty had been triggered by Izetbegovic’s declaration of neutrality 
between Serbia and Croatia in early October. Karadzic had rejected it on the grounds that only a 
sovereign government could do so (Malcolm 1996,228).
352 Hayden 1999.
353 Ibid.
354 Hayden 1999. It is important to note that these events were taking place after ethnic 
radicalization had occurred in other republics and provinces, such as Krajina and Kosovo, where the 
rise of Serb nationalism and widespread repression had become prevalent. These events made the 
option of remaining in Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Croatia intolerable for both Muslims and 
Croats in Bosnia (Burg 1997; Burg and Shoup 1999).
355 The amendments underscored the sovereignty and equality of the nations and nationalities in 
Bosnia, eliminating the dual sovereignty placed on both BiH’s nations and the working class (Hayden 
1999). Amendment 59 defined state sovereignty along the following lines: “The Socialist Republic of
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to the Council of the Establishment of Equality,356 which at the time had not been set 
up yet, “SDA members of parliament disputed the Serbs’ attempt to exercise this 
constitutional right.”357 The declaration of sovereignty represented the final blow to 
the Belgrade initiative heralded by Serbia’s government in the summer of 1991, 
according to which Bosnia would remain part of a new Yugoslavia, even if Croatia 
and Slovenia were to break away.
Following the declaration of sovereignty, events rapidly radicalized. The SDS 
created a National Assembly with full government competences and held a plebiscite 
in November as a precursor to the self-proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (later called Republika Srpska). The SDA and the HDZ, for their part, 
followed an ambiguous course of action from this point onwards; while favoring the 
independence of Bosnia with full territorial integrity, they also prepared for potential 
partition. The SDA, for example, the firmest advocate of a ‘civic,’ cross-ethnic 
Bosnia, had proclaimed the Muslim National Council in May 1991.358 The HDZ, for 
its part, created two Croat autonomous regions in November 1991, namely Herceg- 
Bosna and Posavina,359 and both the SDS and the HDZ started setting up their own 
armed militias in the following months. By the end of the year, the tripartite coalition 
had failed to function,360 and following the EEC’s recognition of the independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia, Izetbegovic was left with no other option than to apply for
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, the nations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina -  Muslims, Serbs and Croats and members of other nations and nationalities who live 
within it” (Amemdment 59 to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, quoted 
from Hayden 1999, 90). There was also an emphasis in granting proportional representation to all 
nations and nationalities (including others) in the major state organs and posts (Amendment 61 to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited in Hayden 1999).
356 Amendment 70 (Clause 10) of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of BiH
strengthened the equality of BiH’s nations and nationalities by introducing in the parliament a Council 
for Questions of the Establishment of Equality of the Nations and Nationalities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with equal numbers of Muslim, Serb and Croat representatives and members of other 
groups (cited in Hayden 1999, 91). The Council was given power to decide by agreement of all 
nations and nationalities on any question referred to it by at least twenty members of the parliament. 
Once approval in the Council had been guaranteed, the specific question was to go back to parliament, 
where it needed to be approved by a special procedure requiring a two-third majority of the 
parliament’s representatives (Hayden 1999).
357 Hayden 1999,93.
358 Bougarel 1996. SDA included a wide range of different personalities and movemets, from
moderate to radical nationalists. Izetbegovic however maintained a relatively moderate party line, 
arguing in favor of a multicultural Bosnia (Friedman 1996).
359 Although the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna was not officially created until the war 
was in full gear in July 1992, it was ‘unofficially’ declared on November 18, 1991 by Mate Boban. 
Boban had been appointed as the leader of the Bosnian Croats in Bosnia by Tudman in what was 
considered a coup within the Croat leadership. Stjepan Kljuic, the Croat elected member who had 
favored Bosnia’s integrity, was as a result sidelined (Woodward 1995,194).
360 Burg 1997.
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recognition and to hold a referendum of independence in February 1992.361
In an attempt to prevent instability from arising as a result of the February 29 
referendum on self-determination362 (which was followed by a declaration of 
independence on March 3), the European troika -  under the leadership of the 
Portuguese foreign Minister Jose Cutileiro -  chaired various negotiations in Lisbon 
and Brussels, in order to find a constitutional solution acceptable to all parties. On 
February 23, the EEC gathered the three key leaders, namely Izetbegovic, Karadzic 
and Boban, in Lisbon, where the Europeans managed to get an initial agreement on a 
confederation comprised of three ethnic regions with strong power devolved to the 
local level and power-sharing mechanisms in all government and administrative 
levels.363 The launch of negotiations with the three major ethnic-based parties 
signaled the EEC’s acceptance of the internal conflict in Bosnia as being ethnically 
based.364 This had a strong impact on Cutileiro’s proposed power sharing initiative, 
namely “a triune state in which the three ethnic parties divided territorial control 
among them,”365 a clear precursor to the ethnic-based solution found at Dayton.366
The initial agreement was a clear compromise by Izetbegovic, who had for long 
rejected the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines,367 but the Serbs also made 
concessions. They agreed for the first time to accept Bosnia’s secession from the 
Yugoslav federation.368 A final agreement on a three-page ‘Statement of Principles
3 Following the recognition of Croatia, the EEC had agreed to extend recognition to all the
republics that requested it before 23 December 1991 (Goodby 1996). In January 1992, the EEC 
pronounced itself in favor of holding referendums in those republics that were seeking independence 
from the Yugoslav Federation (Ibid; for a discussion of the dynamics and implications of the EU 
recognition of new states in Yugoslavia see Caplan 2005b).
362 Sixty-four percent of the population voted, including Serbs in major cities, but the 
referendum was boycotted by Serb parties. Voters almost unanimously favored independence (99.7 
percent) in a “state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, Croats and others who live in it” 
(Malcolm 1996,231).
363 The initial agreement, ‘Basic principles for a New Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,’ involved four key principles to be in force following independence, namely: (1) the 
maintenance of the Republic of BiH’s external borders; (2) the rejection for central or entity 
governments to seek secession; (3) the division of Bosnia into three territorial units; and (4) the 
guarantee that the three nations (Muslims, Croats and Serbs) as well as members of other nations 
would be able to exercise their soverignty rights through the republic of BiH and its constituted units 
(Hayden 1999,99).
364 Woodward 1995.
365 Ibid, 281.
366 Both the Cutileiro plan and the Dayton constitution are based on an ethnic understanding of 
the Bosnian conflict, but both prescribed different territorial arrangements. While the Cutileiro plan 
envisioned the cantonization of Bosnia with different districts for each ethnic group, the Dayton 
constitution put in place a two-entity based territorial arrangement, namely the Bosniak-Croat 
Federation and the Serb RS.
367 Silber and Little 1996,219.
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for a New Constitutional Arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina’ with an 
appended map369 was reached in the fifth round of negotiations on March 18 in 
Sarajevo. The so-called Cutileiro plan, following a canton-based formula 370 proposed 
the creation of separate districts for each ethnic group371 and a power-sharing 
structure at the central level,372 including “a bicameral central legislature with a 
directly elected Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Constituent Units in which 
each of the three ‘units’ would be equally represented.”373 The Cutileiro principles 
foresaw an ethnic blocking instrument in the Chamber of Constituent Units, provided 
that a four-fifths majority was required on specific important matters, which “would 
mean that if the representatives of any unit were united they could block a 
decision.”374
“Acceptance of the principles of the plan,” Woodward argues, “did not resolve 
fundamental differences of opinion about the meaning of cantonization, its 
implications for Bosnian sovereignty, and its specification in maps.”375 As a result, 
although Muslims were granted roughly the same amount of territory that they were 
offered a year later through the Vance-0wen plan,376 the deal reached in Lisbon was 
in the end rejected by both the Bosniak and Croat leadership only days after its 
approval. An additional meeting was held on March 30, in which an agreement on 
human rights was reached,377 but the Croats eventually rejected the plan while the 
war was already raging in northern Bosnia. It seems that Croats -  and Serbs too -  
appeared increasingly disinclined to support a Bosnian state when the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia became a reality.378 As for the Muslims, it is unclear why Izetbegovic 
backed out of the agreement. Some observers have suggested that the US opposed 
partition and that Izetbegovic rejected the agreement after talking with US
369 A working group was to be formed to further define the territorial units, based on the relative 
majority of each group (Hayden 1999). Amendments to the map were permitted, “only on the basis of 
economic, geographic, or other criteria” {Ibid, 100).
370 According to Malcolm (1996; see also Glenny 1996), this plan was based on an earlier 
cantonized solution presented by the Serbs in December 1991.
371 Hayden 1999.
372 Goodby 1996.
373 Szasz 1995,388.
374 Ibid, 389. In addition, the Cutileiro proposal also envisioned the creation of a special tribunal 
for at least five years, comprised of one member of each constituent unit and four international 
officials, “to decide on disputes between central authorities and a constituent unit” (Hayden 1999, 
100).
375 Woodward 1995,281.
376 Ibid.
377 Goodby 1996.
378 Hayden 1999,145.
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Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman.379 The US envoy, however, denied 
this in an interview in 1994,380 stating that Izetbegovic could have mistakenly 
believed that the US was not supportive of the Lisbon agreement and that they would 
be ready to support Izetbegovic in case of a Serb offensive in Bosnia.381
Following the failure of the EEC to find a constitutional solution for Bosnia, 
events moved fast and Bosnia descended into a full-scale war in April. The central 
government, represented by a coalition of the SDA and the HDZ, no longer held 
control over 85 percent of the territory. Its authority was openly rejected by the Serb 
Republic (proclaimed in Pale on 7 April 1992)382 and was only nominally accepted 
by the Herceg-Bosna entity declared in the summer of 1992.383 Ethnic cleansing was 
pursued by all sides as the war moved forward; key democratic institutions ceased to 
function and the state would soon crumble under open warfare.384
3.1.2. The Constitutional Debate during the War
Following the failure of the Cutileiro plan, three additional constitutional proposals 
were crafted during the war, although none of them managed to gamer the necessary 
domestic support to stop the bloodshed. As with the Cutileiro plan, all of these 
initiatives revolved around the two key major issues of contention: (1) the nature and 
status of the state, namely a constitutional framework based either on a strict 
proportionality principle -  respecting the actual numeric status of each ethnic group -  
or on a strict three-way division of the country (on a 1:1:1 basis), with positions 
being allocated on an equal basis for each constituent nation; (2) the demarcation of 
internal territorial divisions allocated for each ethnic group.
The first initiative, the Vance-Owen plan, was the byproduct of the new EEC- 
UN sponsored International Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), 
created in the summer of 1992 and co-chaired by UN envoy Cyrus Vance and EEC
379 See David Binder. “US Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Partition.” New 
York Times, 28August 1993.
380 See liljana Smajlovic. “Interview: Warren Zimmerman, my Role in Bosnia.” Vreme News 
Digest Agency No. 144,27 June 1994; see also Cohen 1995,245.
381 See Cohen 1995 quoting Owen’s declarations in 1994; see Reuters European Community 
Report, 11 March 1994, quoted from Cohen 1995, Chapter 8, Footnote 38.
382 Two days before, Serb forces initiated the siege of Sarajevo, one of the longest sieges in the 
history of modem warfare (it was officially lifted on 29 February 1996).
383 Bougarel 1996.
384 Bosnia is believed to have paid the heaviest toll in the disintegration of former Yugoslavia 
(see footnote 126 in Chapter 1).
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negotiator David Owen.385 Following intense diplomatic negotiations over the 
summer, an initial draft was presented to the UN Security Council in late October 
1992, the so-called ‘Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.’386 The initiative, however, failed to gamer domestic support as a result 
of some critical omissions, namely the specification of the number of the regions into 
which Bosnia would be divided and the territorial allocation for each ethnic group.387 
A report on the progress of negotiations was also attached to the initial draft (the 
‘Report of the Co-Chairmen on Progress in Developing a Constitution for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’), in which both Vance and Owen reflected on the fundamental 
divisions that continued to keep parties apart. In the report, both mediators noted that 
the three ethnic groups tended to present incompatible constitutional solutions, 
derailing any possible settlements at the time. While Serbs favored the division of 
Bosnia into three independent states, Bosniaks sought a unitary state organized 
around different administrative regions and Croats lay somewhere in between, 
showing wide internal discrepancies over possible solutions for the future status of 
Bosnia.388
Notwithstanding the critical differences among the three ethnic groups, a final 
settlement was presented in Geneva in January 1993. It involved three key elements: 
(1) a peace agreement to cease hostilities; (2) a map of boundary lines, which, in 
contrast to previous constitutional initiatives, offered a regional division of Bosnia 
based not only on ethnic considerations but also on other geographical, historical and 
economic factors389 (which explains why the plan was presented as a ‘regionalization'
385 The International Commission on Former Yugoslavia was inaugurated at the London 
Conference on 26-27August 1992 (replacing the former Carrington conference). The conference 
adopted a statement against the breakup of Bosnia, affirming the “respect for the integrity of the 
present frontiers” (quoted from Szasz 1995). This statement made both the creation of three 
independent states and the creation of a Muslim state carved out of the areas with Muslim majority 
unviable. Martti Ahtisaari chaired the working group on Bosnia.
386 Hayden suggests that the ‘Proposed Constitutional Structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina’
showed many similarities to the ‘Theses for a Model Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovine’, designed by two non-nationalist civil society activists Zdravko Grebo and Branislava 
Jojic (Hayden 1992,662, footnote 24).
387 Szasz 1995.
388 Goodby 1996. Indeed, Croats remained ambivalent since the Lisbon agreement. Some
agreed with the Serb vision of a cantonization of Bosnia into three ethnic units, while “others preferred 
a more unitary state with several semiautonomous administrative regions” (Cohen 1995, 252).
389 The Vance-Owen plan rejected the division of Bosnia into three regions along ethnic lines, 
considering it highly unstable and a potential precursor for the disintegration of the multiethnic 
country. The other alternative, the creation of a central state, was also rejected in the belief that Croats 
and Serbs would oppose it (Szasz 1995).
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initiative vs. the previous canton-based proposal);390 and (3) a constitutional 
framework based on ten principles (later reduced to nine), envisioning a highly 
decentralized state with minimal responsibilities391 and divided into ten provinces that 
would enjoy exclusive competences in most government functions.392 In addition to 
strong power-sharing attributes at the central level, including rotation of federal 
functions,393 ethnic groups were given constitutional recognition; all issues of ‘vital 
concern’ contained in the constitution could only be altered by consensus of the three 
groups, although the plan did not outline any veto instrument for ordinary legislation 
and judicial decisions. The plan also provided for the creation of a bicameral 
legislature, with a lower house elected on a proportional basis at the state level and an 
upper house appointed by the regional governments, and a collective presidency, 
with a powerless president and no consensus-based decision-making requirement in 
order to avoid paralysis.394 There were strong international guarantees to maintain 
Bosnia as a multiethnic and multinational country,395 including the activities of 
special organs such as the International Commission on Human Rights, four 
ombudsmen and a human rights court.396 In addition to these three documents, an 
agreement on interim measures (‘Interim Arrangements for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’) was later introduced at the end of January.
The Croats were the first to accept the plan, given the favorable territorial terms 
of the proposed map,397 but the Serbs repudiated it on the very same grounds.398 The 
Bosniaks also opposed the agreement initially -  mainly because of the military
Woodward 1995. Woodward argues that the map was heavily inspired by the proposals on 
mixed regions presented by the Bosnian delegation at the London Conference in August 1992.
391 Hayden 1999. Hayden argues that the state defined in the Vance Owen Plan was a 
protectorate with hardly any functioning capacity except for those minimal competences that are 
necessary for a state to sit in the UN and have an international personality.
392 These competences included education, police, provincial communications and airports, 
energy production, financial institutions and radio and television among others (Art.2.d of the 
constitutional agreement, cited in Hayden 1999,103).
393 Hayden 1992.
394 Szasz 1995.
395 Woodward 1999a. The ICFY recognized that “most of the provinces would have significant 
numerical minorities” (International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 1992, quoted from Goodby 
1996,512).
396 Hayden 1992,662.
397 Szasz 1995. See also Hayden 1999 for a discussion on the Vance-Owen map proposal and
the differences with the Cutileiro plan.
398 Cohen 1995. According to Cohen, the Serbs opposed to the proposed boundaries mainly
because they “required the Serbs to relinquish control over a considerable amount of the territory they 
... controlled, and it cut off the land corridor linking much of the existing Serbian zone of control to 
the Serbian republic” (ibid, 255)
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clauses it contained399 -  but finally signed the interim agreement and the revised map 
on March 25, after receiving assurances from the US that the international 
community would commit enough forces for the ceasefire.400 All in all, despite heavy 
external arm-twisting that involved numerous negotiations rounds, the Vance-Owen 
regionalization initiative came to a dead end in May 1993, when the Bosnian Serb 
National Assembly refused to accept the delineation of boundaries. Although 
Radovan Karadzic, president of RS, had initially signed the agreement under strong 
pressure from Milosevic and the FRY, final approval was made contingent upon 
ratification by the RS National Assembly. From this point on, all initiatives would be 
based on the territorial division of Bosnia along ethnic lines, moving away from the 
original Vance-Owen plan.
Following the failure of the Vance-Owen plan401 David Owen and Vance’s 
successor, Thorvald Stoltenberg, presented a revamped initiative in August 1993 that 
went back to the Lisbon notion of a tier-based cantonization of Bosnia, namely a 
confederation of three republics loosely held together.402 This initiative was more in 
accordance with the situation on the ground, with open lines of intense fighting 
between the Croats and the Muslims. Indeed, the alliance between Croats and 
Muslims was officially over at the end of October 1993. The Serb leadership gave 
unconditional support to the plan 403 given that it reflected the group’s territorial gains 
during the war, but this time the Muslims held out, even after obtaining additional 
concessions in the so-called ‘invincible’ plan (named after the British aircraft carrier 
on which the negotiations took place on September 20) 404 Although the negotiations 
that resulted in the final plan had revolved almost entirely around the demarcation of 
inter-entity boundary lines, an appendix on the ‘Constitutional Agreement of the 
Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ was added to the plan, envisioning
399 Hayden (1999) argues that the Muslims were also the big losers in terms of the territory 
allotted to them.
400 The Clinton Administration had expressed reservations about specific parts of the plan 
(Goodby 1996), especially in relation to rewarding the Serbs with their gained territory at the expense 
of the Muslims (Cohen 1995). After the rejection of the plan in May, the US declined any efforts to 
revive it (Ibid).
401 The Vance-Owen Plan was in the end rejected by the RS National Assembly and in 
referendum in RS.
402 Woodward 1995.
403 Cohen 1995. The plan, the ‘Agreement relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina’, was
presumably based on a map negotiated by both Tudman and Milossevic in June 1993 (see Paul Lewis. 
“Two Leaders Proposed Dividing Bosnia into Three Areas.” New York Times, 17 June 1993, p. 3).
404 Szasz 1995. Indeed, the map allocated merely 30 percent of the territory to Muslims, in 
contrast to the 36 percent offered at the Vance-Owen negotiations.
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the creation of a union of three entities, making the central government even more 
dysfunctional than previous constitutional initiatives. The constitutional proposal 
included: a unicameral parliament of 120 representatives (40 deputies from each 
constituent republic) where laws would be adopted by a simple majority of each 
constituent group; a collective consensus-based presidency with very restricted 
competences, whose chairmanship would rotate every four months; and a council of 
ministers, with the prime minister appointed and, possibly, removed by the office of 
the presidency, acting by consensus and “with the post rotating on an annual basis 
among the nominees of the presidents of the three republics.”405 The constitutional 
arrangements were in the end rejected along with the map406
Drawing on the heels of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the EU put forward yet 
another initiative in November 1993, the so-called EU Action Plan, advanced by the 
French and German foreign ministers, Klaus Kinkel and Alain Juppe. The initiative 
offered to lift sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro in exchange for territorial 
concessions to the Muslims (at least a third of the territory) and Croats. The Serbs 
eventually agreed to offer 33.3 percent to Muslims and 17.5 percent to Croats but 
there was no agreement on the specific adjustments to be made to the Owen- 
Stoltenberg plan and by mid-January 1994 efforts to save the ‘invincible plan’ were 
abandoned while other agreements started to unravel 407 Furthermore, the two major 
powers, the US and Russia, appeared uncommitted, and fighting ensued408
The third and final failed initiative started off with the setup of the Contact 
Group following the Serb shelling of a Sarajevo market in February 1994 that killed 
68 people. Indeed, the new diplomatic venue, formed in April 1994 by the US, 
France, Germany, the UK and Russia to replace the ICFY, launched a new round of 
consultations and presented a new settlement plan by mid-1994. This initiative was 
preceded by the US-brokered ceasefire between Croats and Bosniaks in February 
1994 and the signing of the Washington agreement in March 1994 whereby a
405 Ibid, 389-390.
406 Hayden stated that “the constitutional Agreement would have set up a quasi state ... But this 
constitutional fraud was essential, because the Serbs and Croats would have not accept inclusion in a 
real state. The Constitutional Agreement, like Vance-Owen, was an exercise in negative sovereignty, 
trying to deny the reality that there was no Bosnian state by insisting that everyone must pretend that it 
would exist” (Hayden 1999,108).
407 Szasz 1995.
408 Cohen 1995,296.
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Muslim-Croat Federation was created,409 including a ‘Proposed Constitution of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 410 The contact group initiative, presented in 
July 2004, involved the division of Bosnia into two entities, on a 51:49 basis (i.e. 51 
percent of the Bosnian territory to be assigned to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 
49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs, who at the time were in control of the 72 percent of 
the territory). No specific constitutional details were given,411 however, except for 
some provisional principles such as a draft union between the Federation and the 
Republika Srpska following on the heels of the failed ‘invincible plan’. The initial 
plan counted with the support of both Croats and Muslims, but Serbs claimed that 
“the map was ‘catastrophic’ and would prevent Bosnian Serb republic [Republika 
Srpska] from exercising self-determination, i.e. making it impossible for the Bosnian 
Serbs to maintain an independently controlled land link to Serbia.”412 In the end, 
negotiations were undermined by ongoing operations on the battlefield, including a 
Muslim offensive in November 1994 and divisions within the Contact Group, 
especially in relation to the Muslim military successes on the ground,413 which further 
contributed to derailing the negotiations by November 1994.
The agreement also supported the new auto-denomination for Muslims, namely Bosniaks 
(Woodward 1995), in order to symbolize and emphasize a non-religious sense of Bosnian unity.
410 A ‘Preliminary Agreement’ was also signed with Croatia, allowing for the creation of a 
confederation between Croatia and the newly created Federation. The Federation constitution, which 
somewhat represented a return to the Vance-Owen Plan (only this time between two ethnic groups), 
envisioned the division of the newly formed Federation into eight cantons with extensive competences 
in the areas of police, education, housing and other competences not listed under the central 
government control. The central government had exclusive authority in foreign affairs, defense, 
citizenship, economic affairs, finance and taxation (Cohen 1995) and shared control with the cantons 
over other matters such as human rights, health, and social welfare. Extensive power-sharing features 
were embedded into the federal level, including proportional representation in all executive, legislative 
and judicial institutions (at least one third of the ministerial positions would be allocated to Bosnian 
Croats) and a one-year long rotating presidency. The agreement also envisioned a bicameral 
parliament, with a lower House of Representatives comprised of 140 members elected on a 
proportional basis, and a upper House of Peoples with thirty members of each ethnic group, where 
decisions would be taken on a majority basis except for cases of vital interest, in which case decisions 
would be made on a majority basis of each constituent group (Federation Agreement, from Szasz
1995).
411 Cohen 1995.
412 Cohen 1995,314.
413 Cohen 1995. One of the key US negotiators at Dayton, James O’Brien, argued that many 
internationals favored the continuation of the offensive in the belief that Serbs could be defeated 
decisively, which delayed the international’s resolve to end the conflict (O’Brien 2004). O’Brien notes 
that Richard Holbrooke, however, was convinced that the continuation of the offensive could do more 
harm than good in the longer run. He feared the emergence of new hundreds of refugees, which would 
destabilize the region further. He also feared a scenario in which Croatian leaders became further 
empowered, at the expense of the Bosniaks, given that they were the ones doing most of the fighting. 
Furthermore, the offensive run the risk of making the agreement between Bosniaks and Croats falter. 
After all, at the time, “the Croatians and the Bosniaks were starting to fight one another” (O’Brien 
2004,100).
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The diplomatic impasse lasted several months, but the escalation of the war in 
the late spring and early summer of 1995 prompted the US to react and engage more 
actively.414 After a brief NATO air strike against Serb positions in late May in 
retaliation for the shelling of Sarajevo and UN ‘Safe Areas,’415 the Serb offensive 
intensified416 On 10 July Bosnian Serb forces captured Srebrenica, a declared safe 
area since 1993, and proceeded to kill more than seven thousands of Bosniaks in “the 
biggest single mass murder in Europe since World War II.”417 Following these 
events, the threat of the use of NATO strikes became “more real”418, and the US 
administration traveled to Europe in early August to discuss a US peace plan;419 it 
included seven key points, namely a comprehensive peace settlement, a three-way 
mutual recognition of sovereignty, the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia 
following an agreement, a peaceful return of Slavonia to Croatia, an initiative to end 
all battle operations, and a comprehensive program for economic reconstruction420 
A sustained US-sponsored NATO bombing against the Bosnian Serbs took place 
in late August, contributing to reverse further the military situation on the ground421 
By September that year, US envoy Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke managed 
to reach two partial, initial agreements with Milosevic (who became the 
spokesperson of the Bosnian Serbs),422 Tudman (as the representative of the Bosnian 
Croats)423 and Izetbegovic, paving the way for a new comprehensive peace
414 Holbrooke 1998.
415 Safe areas were declared in 1993 to be under the protection of UN peacekeeping forces, 
including Srebrenica, 2epa, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and Sarajevo.
416 After the NATO bombing, Serb forces seized more than 300 UN peacekeepers as hostages to 
negotiate a termination to the NATO bombing. Secret talks between the UN commanders in Bosnia 
and the Serb commander Ratko Mladic ensued, and the ‘human shields’ were released under unclear 
circumstances. The content of the negotiations were never fully disclosed. Serbs declared that they 
received assurances that there would not be any more NATO air strikes in Bosnia, but UN officials 
denied it (Holbrooke 1998).
417 Holbrooke 1998, 69. The International Court of Justice declared in February 2007, 12 years 
after the events, that the killings in Srebrenica constituted a genocide. Serb commander Ratko Mladic 
and RS president Radovan Karadzic were indicted by the International Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia 
following these events.
4,8 O’Brien 2004,94.
419 Goodby 1996.
420 Holbrooke 1995.
421 Croatia had managed in May and August of 2005 to expel the Serbs from Western Slavonia 
and the Krajina. The NATO bombing against the Bosnian Serbs undermined their operational 
effectiveness, and Bosniaks forces were becoming more effective (Goodby 1996).
422 Holbrooke had announced in August that he would not negotiate with Serb indictees. Within 
days, Milosevic announced that he would negotiate a peace agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs 
(O’Brien 2004) on the condition that UN sanctions were lifted (Serbia’s economy was near collapse at 
the time as a result of these sanctions). Finally, it was decided that sanctions would be suspended upon 
an agreed peace settlement and lifted when the prescribed tasks “were completed” (ibid, 99).
423 Tudman had already adopted this role during the negotiations that led to the Washington
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conference on 1 November 1995.
The final negotiations lasted 21 days, from November 1 to 21, at the Wright- 
Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and dealt with the territorial division of 
Bosnia, the renegotiation of a new Federation agreement,424 the outlining of a new 
constitutional and electoral framework for Bosnia, issues related to the military 
implementation of the agreement (including an international police mission), and the 
return of Slavonia.425 The constitutional proposal did not represent a radical departure 
from previous ones (as a matter of fact, it envisioned a united Bosnia divided into 
two entities in a 51-49 ratio, as formulated by the Contact Group plan)426 but it 
included additional constitutional devices in order to make the structure of the central 
government more functional. Furthermore, the overall peace agreement was by and 
large the most comprehensive blueprint outlined thus far 427 including one of the 
largest, most varied multinational efforts 428 Most of the dispositions in the peace 
settlement were constitutional in nature, except for some concerned with security, 
stability, police, elections and the status of the HR, which “set out transitional 
arrangements ... giving formal approval to NATO and other forces and authorities to 
carry out particular functions in the country.”429
An agreement -  the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) -  was 
finally reached on November 21, 1995,430 after intense discussions431 and the formal
Agreement.
424 The Washington agreement had been unsuccessful in implementing a real Muslim-Croat 
Federation. As Richard Holbrooke stated, “after creating the Federation on paper, the United States 
had not followed up ... we now sought to create two functioning levels of government: a central 
government ... and two regional entities, one a functioning Croat-Muslim Federation, the other the 
existing Bosnian Serb entity, but minus any claims to sovereignty” (Holbrooke 1998,241).
425 Holbrooke 1998,240.
426 The initiative thus supported the ‘cantonization’ of Bosnia along ethnic lines (this time 
between two entities) rather than a regionalization of Bosnia as envisioned in the Vance-Owen Plan.
427 It involved an agreement on twelve annexes, including on military issues; regional stability 
(arms control); the demarcation of Inter-Entity Boundary Lines; elections (providing wide 
competences to OSCE to organize the first elections in 1996); a constitutional framework; arbitration 
issues; human rights; refugees and displaced persons; the preservation of national monuments; public 
corporations; the civilian implementation of the agreement; and the setup of an international Police 
Task Force (see General Framework Agreement 1995).
428 Various international and regional organizations were involved in the implementation and 
monitoring of the key provisions of the peace plan, including inter alia NATO, the UN, the OSCE, the 
IMF, the CoE, the OHR, the European Court of Human Rights and the international community at 
large through other institutions created immediately after the signing of the agreement such as the 
Peace Implementation Council.
429 Szasz 1997,760.
430 James Goodby suggests that the Dayton agreement was possible as a result of the synergy of 
various factors, including: the creation of the Federation of BiH; the agreement to have Milosevic as 
the spokesperson of the Bosnian Serbs in the peace negotiations; an agreement in September whereby 
both Serbia and Croatia would recognize Bosnia; an agreement on the broad-scale use of NATO
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signing ceremony was held in Paris on December 14. The new constitutional 
framework for Bosnia thus emerged as an international agreement between three 
neighboring countries, namely the republic of Bosnia, the FRY and the Republic of 
Croatia, guaranteed by external powers and stripped of democratic legitimacy, given 
that the GFAP was never voted on in parliament and was never approved by 
referenda in the ethnic constituencies.
3.13. Dayton’s Annex Four: Key Provisions in the Bosnian Constitution432
The General Framework Agreement provided Bosnia with both a regional solution to 
end the conflict and a power-sharing constitutional framework (Annex four) to 
regulate ethnic relations in a highly decentralized state. Indeed, Dayton signatories 
established a loose federation (according to the 1992 boundaries recognized by 
international law), comprised of two existing entities, namely Republika Srspka and 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,433 with a separate binding arbitration 
process created for the disputed area of Brcko 434 Dayton also introduced a detailed 
system of ethnic protections and power-sharing mechanisms to guarantee Serbs, 
Croats and Bosniaks (who were recognized as constituent peoples, with special group 
rights) a say in virtually every decision made at the state level. Indeed, all decisions 
and important positions were to be agreed upon and allocated equally between the 
three constituent peoples. Although not explicitly stated in the agreement, Dayton
airpower; and an agreement within the Contact Group on the US peace plan (Goodby 1996).
431 Holbrooke 1998.
432 This review is concerned with the key institutional arrangements that are the target of the 
constitutional reform in 2005-2006.
433 Given the focus of this dissertation on the Bosnian state and state-level institutions, it will 
not expand on the structure of the entities. It will only be noted here that both entities enjoy widely 
different structures. While RS was conceived as a centralized unit, with a unicameral assembly, the 
Bosniak-Croat Federation -  the immediate model after which the Dayton constitution is built upon 
(Hayden 1999) -  is a highly decentralized federal unit, divided into 10 cantons, with strong power- 
sharing features at the executive, legislative and territorial levels. The Federation’s parliament is 
comprised of two chambers and each canton counts with its own parliament.
434 General Framework Agreement, Annex two. The arbitration tribunal set Brcko under 
international supervision in 1997. A final award in 1999 established the former Brcko municipality as 
the Br£ko District under the exclusive sovereignty of BiH and as multi-ethnic, democratic unit of local 
self-governance. It was formally inaugurated on 8 March 2000. In March 2009, the Brcko District was 
added to the Bosnian constitution, completing Dayton’s annex two. The Amendment I to the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirms Brcko as a self-governing district under the 
authority of the state -  owned jointly by both entities -  and with direct access to the Constitutional 
Court in disputes of competences between the state and the entities. The Amendment ensures that no 
party changes the status of the district (OHR 2009; Amendment I to the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2009).
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thus created a multi-ethnic democracy at the state level following the consociational 
recipe of power sharing.435 In practice, the Bosnia’s constitutional framework 
emphasized group autonomy over power sharing given the few competences 
conferred to the state436 (although the drafters of Dayton introduced several 
mechanisms in the Bosnian constitution to reverse the group emphasis to the benefit 
of the state, as we shall see below437).
One of the key power-sharing arrangements of Dayton was disposed in Article 5 
of Annex Four (hereinafter the Bosnian constitution) in relation to the structure of the 
presidency, collectively formed by three members of each constituent people,438 
namely a Bosniak and a Croat, directly elected from the Federation, and a Serb from 
RS.439 The election system was confirmed in the Election law in 2001 as a simple 
majority vote. The presidency was provided with competences over issues of foreign 
affairs and other areas as outlined by the House of Representatives and the entities, 
including the authority to appoint the chair of the council of ministers, who “shall 
nominate a Foreign Minister, a Minister for Foreign Trade, and other Ministers as 
may be appropriate.”440 The constitution also envisioned the creation of a chair of the 
presidency, but did not provide a framework for its rotation. It was later decided that
435 See Introduction for a discussion on the consociational model.
436 See Bieber 2008b; McGarry 2008. Bieber argues that the Bosnian arrangement differs from 
classical approaches to power sharing, in which group autonomy is a function of the power sharing at 
the center. In Bosnia, “Decentralization, resulting from the war, was a given, whereas some degree of 
central coordination and cooperation had to be instituted to maintain at least the resemblance of a 
country rather than two or three separate statelets” (ibid).
437 In fact, the Bosnian state has progressively gained new competences within the framework of 
the internationally led state building process, including new ministries (i.e. the Ministry of Human 
Rights and Refugees, the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Security and the Directorate for European Integration), and new agencies such as the State Border 
Service, the first security force under the authority of the state (Bieber 2006a, 58), imposed by the HR 
in 2000, and the State Investigation and Protection Agency created in May 2004
438 As Bieber notes, the creation of a co-presidency was a direct legacy of the communist and 
pre-war era. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia envisioned an 
eight-member presidency, representing six republics (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Slovenia 
and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) (Bieber 2008b). The 
Republic of BiH had in fact seven presidents, two from each constituent people and one from the 
group ‘others’ (Friedman 1996).
439 The entity-based election of the presidency has been the target of criticism. The criticism is 
based on the notion that the presidency should represent Bosnia, and not the entities (Bieber 2006a). 
Furthermore, given the ethnic specification, in practice, the members of the presidency come to 
represent their respective nations and “only secondarily their entity” (Bieber 2006a, 51). This creates a 
problem of representation. Entities are not fully mono-ethnic (especially as a result of the process of 
refugee return), which deprives a part of the population from representation in the presidency and 
forces them to rely on the representatives of their own nation from the other entity (ibid).
440 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Article 5.4. A joint secretariat was created in 
1999, which strengthened this institution (Bieber 2006a).
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the chair would rotate every 8 months and be elected among its members.441 The 
chair has remained a rather symbolic institution, with limited competences including 
signing acts arising from the activities of the presidency; accepting diplomatic 
accreditations agreed by the members of the presidency; planning the activities and 
agenda of the presidency; and representing the presidency when the participation of 
the three members is not possible 442 The chair thus cannot represent the country 
alone, except for cases in which the participation of the collective presidency is not 
possible.443
In addition to the ethnically based structure of the presidency, Dayton also 
envisioned an ethnic-based decision-making process for this institution, providing 
each member with veto powers. In effect, presidential decisions have to be taken on a 
consensus basis, except when a “dissenting member of the presidency may declare a 
presidency decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity from the territory 
from which he was elected.”444 Under such circumstance, the challenged decision 
would be referred “to the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, if the 
declaration was made by the Member from that territory; to the Bosniak Delegates of 
the House of Peoples of the Federation, if the declaration was made by the Bosniak 
Member; or to the Croat Delegates of that body, if the declaration was made by the 
Croat Member.”445 If the declaration were to be confirmed by two-thirds, the 
challenged decision would not take effect.
The council of ministers is another institution based on a strict power sharing 
approach at the state level. The council of ministers emerged as one of the weakest 
institutions at the state level, as it was regulated as part of the presidency powers.446 
The constitution included only a few clauses to regulate this institution, foremost 
assuring that at least one third of the ministers came from RS. Under the HR’s 
guidance, the first ‘Law on the Council of Ministers’ was approved in 1997. This law
441 Election Law of BiH 2001, Article 8.3; Presidency of BiH 2001.
442 Presidency of the BiH 2001, Art. 6.
443 Art. 9.1 (c) of ‘The Rules and Procedures of the BiH Presidency’ states that all members of 
the presidency are comparably responsible for representing jointly and collectively, “and acting on 
behalf of the Presiency and its positions, before the public and other domestic and international 
institutions” (Presidency of the BiH 2001, Art. 9.1 (c)).
444 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Article 5.2 (d).
445 Ibid.
446 As Bieber notes, the council of ministers operated as a coordination mechanism with little
cohesion in the first post war years; “only by the late 1990s did the council of ministers emerge as a 
fully-fledged government,” particularly under the governments of Bozidar Matic and Zlatko 
Lagumdzjia in 2001-2002 under the government of the ‘Alliance for Changes’ (Bieber 2006a, 53-54).
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created a council of ministers led by two co-chairmen, one Bosniak and one Serb, 
rotating every eight months, and a Croat vice-chair.447 It was also decided that the 
ministers would have two deputies from the other two peoples who would also rotate 
and make decisions on a consensus basis.448 The Constitutional Court ruled in 1999 
against the constitutionality of the structure of the chairmanship of the council of 
ministers449 and a new law in May 2000 provided for the creation of a chair of the 
council of ministers that would rotate every eight months (following upon the figure 
of a prime minister). The law also eliminated the rotation mechanism within the 
ministerial posts, and created three ministries, namely the Ministry of Human Rights 
and Refugees, the Ministry of Finance and Treasury and the Ministry of European 
Integration 450 Two new ministries were added in 2002 (the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Security) in the new ‘Law on the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, imposed by the HR. The ministry of European integration became a 
directorate under the authority of the chair of the council of ministers 451 The chair of 
the council of ministers was confirmed in this law, and its term was envisioned to 
coincide with the mandate of the parliamentary assembly. The decision-making 
process continued to be based on a consensus formula with the agreement of two 
members of each constituent people in case consensus was not reached.452 The 
council of ministers was significantly strenghened as a result of these changes, and 
the decision-making process streamlined453
Additional veto-based, power-sharing instruments were devised at the legislative 
level. The framework -  which is still in use today -  divides the parliament into two 
chambers, namely the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives, whose 
dual approval is required for all legislation. Additionally, both the House of Peoples 
and the House of Representatives are to select one Serb, one Bosniak, and one Croat 
to serve as its chair and deputy chairs on a rotating basis. Although both chambers 
observe the country’s division into constituent groups, the election of deputies in the 
House of Representatives is made in each entity on a proportional basis, which in 
practice means that members from the Croat and Bosniak community may be elected
447 Chandler 1999; Bieber 2006b.
448 Ibid.
449 Constitutional Court 1999.
450 Council of Europe 2001.
451 Office of the High Representative 2002d.
452 OHR 2002d, Art. 18.
453 Bieber 2006b.
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as deputies from the RS and vice versa.454 No seats are reserved for members of the 
category ‘others.’ The upper house, the House of Peoples observes the division of 
Bosnia into constituent groups; it is indeed comprised of five members of each ethnic 
community selected by their respective entity parliaments (from the House of 
Peoples in the Federation in the case of the Croat and Bosniak Members). The House 
of Peoples is also entitled to declare any decision proposed by parliament to be 
harmful to a vital interest of either constituent people by a majority of the members 
of a delegation to the House of Peoples. When the national interest is invoked, the 
decision needs to be approved by the majority of all three delegations to the House of 
Peoples, except for when the majority of another delegation objects to this. In this 
case, a joint commission of three delegates from each delegation is convened to 
decide on the issue. In the absence of an agreement within five days, the issue is sent 
to the Constitutional Court.
As for the House of Representatives, it is comprised of 42 deputies directly 
elected from the Federation and the RS on a proportional basis (28 and 14 deputies 
respectively).455 Decisions are made on a majority basis provided that they include 
one-third of the votes of the members from each entity. If meeting this requirement is 
not possible, “the chair and deputy chairs shall meet as a commission and attempt to 
obtain approval within three days of the vote.”456 If these efforts fail, decisions are 
made by a majority of those present and voting, “provided that the dissenting votes 
do not include two-thirds or more” of the deputies of either entity, which in reality 
means that there is no real mechanism to overcame a stalemate.457 This provision is 
often referred to as ‘entity voting’, and represents an additional veto layer in the 
system, given that in reality it means that merely 10 members of the RS represented 
in the House of Representatives have the power to block any decision taken at the 
state level at any given time irrespective of the nature of the legislation.
In addition to the power-sharing mechanisms at the legislative and executive
454 Bose 2002.
455 The system is based on the Sainte-Lague system, which favors parties with smaller support 
(in contrast to the commonly used d’Hondt framework which favors big parties). The rationale for the 
use of this electoral system is the weakening of the national parties (Bieber 2006a). It is difficult to 
ascertain the degree to which this formula has undermined the strength of national parties; the result 
has been a rather fragmented party system represented in the parliament {ibid). Other mechanisms 
were introduced in the draft law in 2000 and the election law in 2001 to favor political accountability, 
such as the open lists and the multimember constituencies (see Bieber 2006a for a discussion of these 
instruments).
456 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Article 4.3 (d).
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levels, Dayton also envisioned a highly decentralized state, providing ethnic groups 
with ample territorially-based autonomy. In this respect, Article 3 prescribed the 
relations between the state and the entities, outlining very specific policy 
competences for the state, including inter alia foreign policy, trade, customs, 
monetary and finance issues, refugee and immigration, and international and inter­
entity criminal law enforcement.458 Some additional competences were granted to the 
state through the annexes 5 to 8 in the areas of human rights, arbitration, refugees and 
displaced people and the preservation of national monuments 459 As for the entities, 
they were provided with “all governmental functions and powers not expressly 
assigned ... to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina”460 and with the ability to 
establish special relationships with neighboring countries and to enter into 
agreements with states and international organizations with parliamentary approval. 
In addition to the limited competences granted to the central government, the state 
lacked broad enforcement mechanisms and was made highly dependent on the 
entities for financial sustainability.
In sum, and as a result of all of these ethnic-based provisions, Dayton put in 
place an extraordinarily centripetal power-sharing system, creating an extremely 
weak, asymmetrical ‘confederation’461 with no effective central government 462 The 
only mechanism Dayton envisaged to counterbalance centripetal dynamics was 
Article 3.5 (a), which allowed for further competences to be introduced at the state 
level -  as well as the creation of new institutions as needed to carry out such 
competences. The legal architect of Dayton, James O’Brien, confirmed in a 
conference in 2005, that specific wording was included in the DPA to allow for the 
state to gain further competences without the approval of the entities 463 This option
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Article 3.
459 See General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH.
460 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Article 3.3 (a).
461 Bieber argues that BiH should be rather considered as a loose multinational federation, given 
that both the Constitution and the Constitutional Court have favored the supremacy of joint institutions 
over the entities in 1998 (see Bieber 2002).
462 As Woodward argues, in the 1990's Dayton seemed to have legalized the ongoing partition 
of the country rather than preparing the groundwork for the development of a state that has effective 
control over the territory (Woodward 1999b and 1999c). Hayden also suggested that “while Dayton 
constitution was premised on the continuation of Bosnia as a single state, its statehood was purely 
nominal” (Hayden 2005, 243). Indeed, the initial competences granted to the Bosnian state were very 
limited, and some scholars even suggested that the Bosnian state enjoyed the typical qualities of a 
quasi-state (Bose 2002; the term quasi state is coined by Jackson 1990) or a confederation (Bieber 
2002).
463 Cited in Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa 2006; see also O’Brien 2004. O’Brien recognizes, 
however, that the process of increasing competences would be slow and uncertain, “resting ultimately
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was made possible only on three different scenarios: (1) as agreed by the entities; (2) 
as related to Annexes Five through Eight to the DP A (arbitration, human rights, 
refugees and national monuments); and (3) as necessary to preserve the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality of Bosnia, in 
accordance with the division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia. 
Article 3.5 has become, eventually, a critical mechanism for the international 
community’s efforts to build the foundation of a fully functional state, allowing 
central institutions to acquire an unrestricted number of competences. This has led 
some scholars to suggest that Dayton provided “an express grant of authority to 
central institutions that is so limited as to be meaningless, and an implicit grant of 
authority that is so broad as to be unlimited.”464
32. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON: PATTERNS OF EXTERNAL 
INTERVENTION
The Dayton agreement set in motion one of the most ambitious peace-building 
missions to date, including extensive involvement and supervision in relation to the 
military, police and civil aspects of the agreement. On the military side, the GFAP 
envisioned the involvement of external forces for approximately a year. Contingent 
upon a resolution by the UN Security Council, external powers committed 60,000 
troops for a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR)465 composed of 
ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations to assist in the 
implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the 
agreement.466 On the civilian side, the agreement was wrapped around the figure of 
the HR, an international envoy entrusted with the implementation of the civilian 
aspects of the agreement,467 including the humanitarian aid effort; the rehabilitation
on strong political leadership from the international community and, more often, from Bosnians intent 
on rescuing their own country from the nationalists who brought it to destruction” (O’Brien 2004).
464 Hayden 1999,27.
465 IFOR was thus to replace UNPROFOR. IFOR was subsequently replaced by the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996, with 30,000 troops, and by the European EUFOR in December 
2004, with 7000 troops.
466 General Framework Agreement 1995, Annex la  Article 1.1.
467 The HR was given “the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement
on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement” (General Framework Agreement 1995, Annex
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of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and 
constitutional institutions; the promotion of respect for human rights; the return of 
displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections.468 The HR 
was also entrusted with the coordination of a UN International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) 469 which was integrated into the GFAP to carry out a program of assistance in 
the area of law enforcement.
Additional international forums and bodies were created in the early stages of the 
peace building operation in order to support the externally led implementation and 
policy-development process and to coordinate the work undertaken by the different 
international organization on the ground. The PIC, for example, was created at the 
Peace Implementation Conference in London on 8-9 December 1995, as a forum 
comprised of 55 countries, international organizations and agencies. It was to replace 
the ICFY -  whose activities were to be finished by January 1996 -  and was 
commissioned to manage and review the peace implementation process on a six- 
month basis 470 The London conference also designated the EU mediator for former 
Yugoslavia Carl Bildt as the HR, and created an eleven-member Steering Board, 
including the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, Russia, the 
Presidency of the EU, the EC and Turkey (as the representative of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference). The Steering Board was commissioned to serve as the 
PIC’s executive arm under the chairmanship of the HR (enjoying the authority to 
create working groups as necessary), and to provide political guidance to the HR on a 
monthly basis. In addition to these newly created institutions, the Contact Group 
continued to be heavily engaged in the implementation process, meeting on a 
monthly basis with the HR, and undertaking the preparatory work for the PIC 
Steering Board meetings. A Board of Principals was also created later on, in 2002, as 
the main coordinating body of the international community in Bosnia, under the 
chairmanship of the HR, to streamline the operations on the ground, increase the 
effectiveness of activities and avoid overlap by external efforts.471
X, Article 5).
468 General Framework Agreement, Annex 10, Art. I.
469 The IPTF was replaced by the EUPM in 2003 to “ensure the continuing professional
development of the police forces ... through mentoring, monitoring, and inspection of BiH police 
personnel and structures,” under the EC’s institution building programs (Peace Implementation 
Council 2002a).
470 Peace Implementation Conference 1995.
471 The Board of Principals is attended by the OHR, the chair, EUFOR, NATO, OSCE,
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Three broad phases can be identified in the externally led implementation of 
Dayton, despite some degree of overlap:472 (1) the first phase, from the signing of the 
GFAP to the end of 1997, centered around military implementation of the agreement, 
with most external efforts being directed towards two main goals, namely containing 
the threat of a renewed military conflict and the physical infrastructure 
reconstruction;473 (2) the second phase involved renewed attention to the civilian 
aspects of the agreement, including the strengthening of the powers of the HR and 
more focused interactions with domestic actors; (3) the third phase, which started in 
early 2000, involved a more systematic approach towards state- and institution- 
building in Bosnia and a renewed role for the EU in the country.
32.1. External Intervention and the ‘War by Other Means’ (1996-1997)
In the first phase of GFAP implementation, external efforts were overwhelmingly
focused on the military provisions of the agreement, with most activities directed
towards preventing recurrence of violence (IFOR troops were rapidly deployed along 
ceasefire lines, separating the three armies and creating a weapons-exclusion zone at 
the inter-entity boundary line). Indeed, while success was rapidly achieved in this 
area, little was accomplished in other areas, especially in reference to the civilian 
aspects of the agreement 474 As Richard Holbrooke noted, while the military, “met 
every early deadline, the civilian side ... met almost none, and fell steadily behind 
schedule;” a good amount of blame was placed on the first international envoy, HR 
Carl Bildt, but “the fault was more in the structures ... imposed on him, particularly 
the failure to give him sufficient funding or stronger backing from IFOR.”475 These 
structures failed to confront the enormous domestic challenges facing post-conflict 
Bosnia. As Elizabeth Cousens has stated, “the Dayton Agreement ... presented 
serious, if not insuperable, obstacles to peace-building, notably: an implausibly short
UNHCR, EUPM and the EC. Other organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP 
participate on a regular basis.
472 Cox 2001; Selo Sabic 2003.
473 Cox 2001.
474 Ibid.
475 Holbrooke 1998, 324. Holbrooke explains, “Carl Bildt ... had so little money and support 
that he was forced to operate without an office or telephones, and used his personal cellular telephone 
as his primary means of communication. After appeals to the European Union, he received enough 
funding to open his offices in Sarajevo, where he presided like an elegant squatter over a building 
filled with wrecked rooms, broken toilets, shattered windows, and almost no staff’ (ibid; See also 
Bildt 1998).
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timetable for national elections; a postwar constitution that privileged the leading 
mono-national parties; a settlement overly dependent on the continuing commitment 
of a narrow set of elites whose interest in either peace or broader political 
liberalization was, as it remains, debatable; and a framework for international 
engagement that excessively segregated military from civilian efforts.”476
Many of the civilian-related implementation problems thus lay both in the 
persistence of the mono-ethnic, corruption-riveted structures that had been created 
during the war477 and the continued influence of wartime leaders who managed to 
keep the wartime agenda alive in the aftermath of the conflict 478 Indeed, nationalist 
parties, which won by a landslide in the first general and municipal elections in 1996 
and 1997 (see table 3.1 and 3.2) 479 not only confronted the international community 
in its efforts to monitor and assist the implementation of the agreement, but also 
worked to undermine the very domestic institutions that Dayton signatories had 
agreed to put in place.480 Cooperation among party leaders came along only 
“grudgingly and under intense international pressure,”481 leading frequently to near­
paralysis of the state for much of the second half of the 1990's482
476 Cousens and Cater 2001,114-115.
477 In fact, the military objective of physically separating the armies tended to work against the
state-building process; as former HR’s advisor Marcus Cox noted, “with no progress to date in 
merging the three armies, the division of territory into separate military zones continue[d] to support 
illegal parallel structures” (Cox 2001,11).
478 Power in RS, especially in Eastern RS, was in the hands of wartime leaders such as Radovan
Karadzid, president of both the SDS and RS until July 1996, Momcilo Krajisnik and Biljana PlavSic 
(European Stability Initiative 1999). There were also some external missteps such as a weak police 
mandate that failed to meet the needs of the first months of the implementation process; the HR’s lack 
of enforcement capability; and NATO’s rather minimalist interpretation of its mandate and its 
opposition to assuming policing tasks (Holbrooke 1998, 324-325). As Cox argues, “In the first two 
years of the peace process, [IFOR] consistently refused to deploy its forces to prevent inter-ethnic 
violence, apprehend indicted war criminals or support the return of refugees and displaced persons” 
(Cox 2001,10).
479 The 1996 elections (as well as the 1998 and 2002 elections), held only 9 months after the
end of the conflict, resulted in the victory of the very same three nationalist parties that won the 
elections in 1990.
480 European Stability Initiative 1999; Pickel and Donais 2003. Carl Bildt stated in his memoirs
that for the political leaders, “peace was much too often just the continuation of war by other means” 
(Bildt 1998,3).
481 International Crisis Group 1998; see also Woodward 1997. As Cox argued, “so long as the
distribution of financial or material assistance was involved, the ethnic power structures were willing 
to co-operate with the international community. However, when it came to political objectives such as 
minority return or implementing the new constitutional structures, international efforts met with strong 
resistance” (Cox 2001,11).
482 Chandler 2005.
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Table 3.1.1996 Presidency Elections
Party Results
Bosniak SDA 80%
Member483 Alija Izetbegovic (730,592)
SBiH 13,6%
Haris Silajdzic (124,396)
Others 6.4%
(58,289)
Croat Member HDZ 88.7%
Kresimir Zubak (330,477)
Others 11.3%
(42,089)
Serb Member SDS 67.3%
Momcilo Krajisnik (690,646)
Democratic 30%485
Patriotic 
Block/People’s 
Alliance for Free 
Peace484
(307,461)
Others 2.7%
(28,050)
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
Table 3 2 .1996 Legislative Elections
Party Results Seats
Federation
Voters
SDA 54.2%
(725,417)
16
HDZ 25.3%
(338,440)
8
Zdruzena Lista 
(SDP and others)
7.9%
(105,918)
2
SBIH 7%
(93,816)
2
RS Voters SDS 54.5%
(578,723)
9
SDA 17.4%
(184,553)
3
Democratic Patriotic 
Block/People’s Alliance 
for Free Peace
12.8%
(136,077)
2
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
Bosnian Serbs, for example, systematically challenged the authority of central 
institutions while strengthening their own autonomous entity. As Holbrooke stated, 
“the Bosnian Serbs began to resist on almost every nonmilitary issue, while
SDP decided not to put up a candidate for the elections given the popularity of Izetbegovic.
484 This is an opposition coalition to the SDS formed by an amalgam of two minor coalitions: 
the right-wing coalition, the Demokratski patriotski blok (Democratic Patriotic Bloc); and the left- 
wing coalition People’s Alliance for Free Peace (Narodni Savez Za Slobodan Mir), including the 
SPRS (Socialist Party of RS). Mladen Ivanic was the coalition’s candidate (International Crisis Group
1996).
485 Ivanic’s support was believed to come from absentee votes of Croats and Bosniaks 
(International Crisis Group 1998).
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remaining careful to avoid provoking IFOR.”486 Although a deal was struck with the 
SDS and Milosevic in July 1996, forcing Karadzic to step down from the presidency 
of the SDS and RS on July 19, politics remained highly confrontational. Internal 
cracks started to show in 1997, however, between Pale’s hard-line leadership and a 
more moderate, Banja Luka-based officialdom, especially following the loss of 
external support from the FRY487 and a more assertive role for SFOR.488 Divisions 
were aggravated in the first half of 1997 and resulted in two events: first, the 
defection of Karadzic’s successor, President Biljana Plavsic, from the party in mid- 
1997; and second, moving the government from Pale to Banja Luka with the support 
of the international community (which for the first time offered substantive 
international aid to RS) and placing Plavsic's supporters in key positions along the 
way. As a result of the internal turmoil, the SDS floundered in 1997, and was 
defeated in parliamentary elections in November 1997. The ‘Sloga’ coalition under 
the leadership of Milorad Dodik formed a government in January 1998 with the votes 
of both Bosniaks and Croats from RS and the invaluable support of the international 
community 489 All in all, although the new government “offered a new rhetorical 
tone, promising the return of 80,000 minorities490 in its first year of office and a new 
relationship with the Bosnian state,” it remained weak and failed to deliver on its 
promises. Moreover, the Dodik government was just as resistant to the development 
of the state as the SDS 491 and substantial power was still retained by the SDS’s
486 Holbrooke 1998,338.
487 This was the result of the split between Milosevic and Pale’s leadership, and Serbia’s post­
war economic decline (European Stability Initiative 1999).
488 As the European Stability Initiative reported, the SDS monopoly over both the media and key 
economic assets was seriously damaged as a result of a joint campaign by SFOR and OHR (European 
Stability Initiative 2001).
489 International Crisis Group 1998a; European Stability Initiative 2001. The international 
community offered extraordinary budgetary support to the Sloga Government in early 1998. The 
international community also offered critical support in the 1998 presidential elections, where they 
“tried to prevent the Bosniaks from Republika Srpska from standing a candidate against the Sloga 
presidential candidate, Biljana Plavsic” (European Stability Initiative 2001,10).
490 The war displaced 2.2 million people (over a million of refugees and over a million of
internally displaced). By 1998, around 200,000 refugees and 220,000 displaced people had returned to 
their homes. Although returns to majorities went smoothly in the first few years after the war, minority 
returns (returnees in areas where they are in a minority) encountered strong local resistance by the 
parties in power (International Crisis Group 2002c). Further progress was achieved in the 2000's. In 
September 2004, UNHCR and the BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees announced that over a 
million refugees and displaced persons had returned to Bosnia by the end of July of 2004 (440,147 
former refugees and 560,326 internally displaced persons), half of which were minority returns. See 
the statistics at http://www.unhcr.org/news/pK)40921bihstats.pdf [accessed on March 30,2009],
491 European Stability Initiative 2001. Indeed, “The voting record of Sloga candidates in state 
institutions was no different to the SDS, and the government-controlled national assembly passed a 
number of unconstitutional resolutions affirming the primacy of Republika Srpska over the state.
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hardliners in key RS municipalities, where obstruction to the implementation of 
Dayton was more pervasive and critical.492
The implementation record in the Federation was not much different from that of 
the RS. As the International Crisis Group stated in 1997, “More than three and a half 
years after its creation in March 1994, the Federation remains divided into Croat- and 
Bosniak-controlled areas and all aspects of life are dominated by the two nationalist 
parties. ... Party bosses generally bypass democratic institutions, such as the 
parliament, in favor of bilateral deals.”493 Indeed, Bosnian Croats pursued a heavily 
loaded obstructionist strategy in the first few months after the end of the war by 
refusing to participate in government institutions and advocating for the creation of a 
third entity. In fact, the institutions of a separate Croat entity never ceased to 
function, especially in Mostar and in some parts of western Herzegovina.494 As for 
the Bosniaks, despite being less obstructive than the other two communities given 
their strategic interest in keeping the integrity of Bosnia, they remained split and 
divided 495 proving to be of little assistance to international efforts at implementing 
the main civilian provisions contained in Dayton. As the European Stability Initiative 
argued, SDA exhibited a greater diversity of opinion including supporters of Dayton 
as well as xenophobic elements 496 but “the central SDA leadership [was] not always 
able to control cantonal and municipal authorities, which may be as obstructive as 
those found in Croat- and Serb-controlled areas.”497
As a result -  and despite all the money poured into the country (30 percent of 
GDP in the first few years)498 — none of the civilian aspects of the agreement had 
been implemented by the end of 1997, prompting the PIC, at its meeting in Bonn in
Although minority return improved over that period, this did not correlate with the municipalities 
controlled by the Sloga parties” (ibid, 11).
492 European Stability Initiative 1999.
493 International Crisis Group 1997,5-6.
494 International Crisis Group 1997.
495 Pickel and Donais 2003. Alija Izetbegovic exerted a strong unifying influence over the party, 
but it was not sufficient to control the most xenophobic elements within the party and to prevent the 
emergence of divisions within that resulted in the creation of off-shoot parties such as Haris Silajdzic’s 
Party of BiH (SBiH) in 1997.
496 European Stability Initiative 1999.
497 Ibid, 14.
498 Bosnia has received more per capita assistance than Europe did under the Marshall Plan 
(Chesterman 2004, 244). Most of the money went to post-conflict reconstruction and refugee return 
but many resources were wasted along the way due to the incoherence of funding programs and the 
inadequacy of both entity and state level institutions to manage these funds (Chesterman 2004; see 
also International Crisis Group 2001 for an account of the political economy in Bosnia after the 
conflict).
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December 1997 to extend the mandate of the international institutions 
indefinitively,499 until compliance with the GFAP and subsequent obligations was 
achieved by the parties.500
322 . Civilian Implementation and the Bonn Powers (1998-2000)
The second phase of implementation started in December 1997 -  only a few months 
after Carlos Westendorp501 was sworn in as the second HR in Bosnia -  with a 
revamped strategy to overcome the obstruction exerted by domestic parties. In this 
context, an important development took place in 1997 with the extension and 
broadening of the HR's powers at the Sintra and Bonn PIC meetings in 1997. Indeed, 
from this point onwards, the HR was authorized to make binding decisions in relation 
to two key areas: (1) in the implementation of ‘interim measures’ when parties were 
unable to reach an agreement;502 and (2) in setting up other measures, including 
“actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from 
meetings without good cause or who are found by the HR to be in violation of legal 
commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its 
implementation.”503 In other words, the so-called Bonn powers authorized the HR 
both to remove elected representatives, public officials and party officers acting in 
violation of the DPA and to impose laws when the legislative and executive bodies
Peace Implementation Council 1996. The PIC had already extended the mandate in Paris in 
November 1996 for a ‘two-year consolidation period’.
500 Peace Implementation Council 1997b. The PIC meeting in Sintra, Porgugal, in May 1997 
had, for example, noted that “all the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are failing to live up fully 
to their obligations under the Peace Agreement, and ... this is unacceptable” (Peace Implementation 
Peace 1997a, para. 5). The Madrid PIC meeting in December 1998 recognized “the continued need for 
an international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina - both civil and military - to help build the peace” 
(Peace Implementation Council 1998a, para. 5).
501 HR Carlos Westendorp, a Spanish diplomat, had no immediate background in the region. He 
held the position of HR from June 1997 to July 1999. During his tenure, the HR powers were extended 
substantially. Although he made extensive use of these powers, with an average of four impositions 
per month (a total of 45 laws) (Knaus and Martin 2003) and the removal of 16 officials, including 
Dragan Cavic, he was a relatively low-key HR in comparison to subsequent HRs such as Wolfgang 
Petrisch and Paddy Ashdown; in fact, he was blamed for spending more time in Spain than in Bosnia 
during his tenure. Cavic was pardoned on July 1999, before the end of Westendorp’s mandate.
502 These measures were to come into force on a provisional basis, before they were passed 
formally by parliament, which would not be allowed to introduce any amendments. The HR has 
tended to become less intrusive over time (see table 4.1. in chapter 4).
503 Peace Implementation Council 1997b; As noted in the Introduction (p. 17), the HR removed 
a total of 139 individuals from 1998 to 2004, including judges, civil servants and elected officials both 
at entity or state level. He also took the decision to freeze individual bank accounts.
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failed to deliver on the legal requirements of the DP A.504 As Hays asserted, the OHR 
evolved “from being a lobbying agent for change in a war tom country to being, in 
effect, a regulatory agency.”505
Partly thanks to the new powers entrusted to the HR but also to a more assertive 
role taken by the international community (as proven by the revamped mandate given 
to SFOR in 1997), some key breakthroughs were accomplished in the area of 
institution-building, including: the law on media reform aimed at breaking the links 
between political parties and public broadcasters; a legislative reform on property 
rights for accelerating refugee returns; the creation of a Ministry for Civil Affairs and 
Communications; the imposition of a common currency (the Convertible Mark) in 
early 1998;506 the introduction of a common vehicle license plate; and the enactment 
of a common national passport, improving significantly the freedom of movement.507 
In addition to the imposition of legislation, the new strategy of the international 
community also consisted of placing intense pressure on local authorities to frame 
laws in line with both Dayton and the international community’s views of how 
institution building should develop and play out.508 As the International Crisis Group 
noted,
“Legislation in the economic sphere, designed to establish the basis for a 
sustainable recovery and a market economy, has been drawn up with 
detailed help from international advisors and consultants, and often with 
pressure on the authorities to take the path desired by the international 
community. At the cantonal and municipal levels too, strong international 
pressure has had to be applied to persuade recalcitrant leaders to fulfill 
their obligations under the DPA on such matters as establishing joint 
administrations and police forces and enabling the return of refugees and
504 Council of Europe, 2004c; The Sintra meeting also granted the HR with the powers to take 
action in relation to the suspension of “any media network or programme whose output is in persistent 
and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Peace Agreement” (Peace Implementation 
Council 1997a).
505 Hays 2004. Other voices have been more critical of the alleged undemocratic powers of the 
HR (see Knaus and Martin, 2003; Chandler 2006). The dismissal of public officials in Bosnia, for 
example, is taken without the person concerned being given a hearing. In addition, the decisions of the 
HR are final and cannot be appealed before any court (Council of Europe 2004c).
506 The Convertible Mark was pegged with the German Mark and administered by a Currency 
Board.
507 Cox 2001,13.
508 As Cox asserted, this phase was “characterized by a growing willingness of international 
actors to engage directly in local power struggles, spurred on by disillusionment with an electoral 
process that was consistently returning the wartime leadership to power” (Cox 2001,12).
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DPs; and these efforts to twist the arms of unwilling local leaders have 
tended to have only limited success.”509
In terms of the domestic landscape, general elections were held in November 
1998 (see table 3.3 and 3.4), and although nationalist parties still sustained a 
monopoly within their own ethnic segments, political pluralism became more 
significant than in previous elections. These domestic developments were also 
encouraged by the international community’s more assertive involvement and 
interference, publicly stressing support to any party committed to the implementation 
of the GFAP.510 As the International Crisis Group noted, “during 1998 it became 
obvious that OSCE was not acting as the impartial international referee envisioned 
by the DPA. Rather, it was actively involved in the international community’s efforts 
to unseat the SDA, HDZ and the Serb nationalist block, most notably the SDS and 
SRS.”511 Indeed, international actors started to openly support voting for moderate 
political forces, although the results of this strategy were mixed.
Table 33.1998 Presidency Elections
Party Results
Bosniak Member SDA Coalition 86.8%
(SDA, SBiH, others) 
Alija Izetbegovic
(511,541)
Others512 13.2% (77,819)
Croat Member HDZ 52.9%
Ante Jelavic (189,438)
SDP 31.8%
Gradimir Gojer (113,961)
NHI513 11.4%
KreSimir 2ubak (40,880)
Others514 3.9% (13,727)
Serb Member SDS-SRS RS 44.8%
Momcilo Krajisnik (314,236)
Sloga Coalition515 51.3%
2ivko Radisic (359,937)
Others516 3.9%(27,388)
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
International Crisis Group 1998a, 4-5.
510 International Crisis Group 1998a.
511 International Crisis Group 1999,45.
512 Others include: DNZ (Demokratska Narodna Zajednica) with 6.2%; BPS (The Patriot
Party/Bosanskohercegovacka Patriotska Stranka) with 5.7%; and Boss (Bosanska Stranka) with 1.3%.
513 New Croatian Initiative (NHI).
514 Others include: Boss and Rebublikanci.
515 The Sloga Coalition was formed by the Socialist Party of RS (SPRS), Biljana Plavsic’s Serb 
People’s Alliance (SNS) and Milorad Dodik’s SNSD.
516 Serbian Coalition of RS (Srpska Koalicija Republiku Srpsku)
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Table 3.4.1998 Legislative Elections
Party Results Seats
Federation
Voters
SDA Coalition 47.9% (455,668) 14
HDZ 19.7% (187,707) 6
SDP 14.5% (138,004) 4
Socijaldemokrati BiH 3% (28,740) 2
HNI 3% (28,572) 1
DNZ 2.6% (21,452) 1
RS Voters SDS 21% (162,721) 4
SDA 16.5% (128,277) 3
Sloga Coalition 27.7% (214,716) 4
SRS RS 15.3% (118,522) 2
Radical Party RS 3.9% (27,686) 1
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
One of the most straightforward external interferences involved the RS, 
following Plavsic’s defection from the SDS and the setup of a non-SDS minority 
government under Dodik's leadership in early 1998. In order to both protect Dodik’s 
unstable government and keep the SDS away from power, the international 
community campaigned intensely prior to the elections in favor of Dodik’s coalition. 
Notwithstanding the international community’s support and the warnings about the 
withdrawal of US aid, Plavsic was defeated and the elections brought the hardliners 
back to power. The international community intervened again when the new RS 
president, Nikola Poplasen from the SRS, refused to reappoint Dodik as prime 
minister despite of his parliamentary majority. The HR dismissed the elected 
president, leaving the presidency position vacant for almost two years (until new 
elections in 2000), and appointed Dodik as the caretaker prime minister,517 
supporting him despite poor economic performance and the breakdown of his 
government’s coalition.518 Although the overall aim was to preclude hardliners from 
taking over the government in RS, the legitimacy of these actions were questionable 
from a democratic standpoint, particularly in the eyes of the population.
Internal fissures also transpired in the Croat community between those in favor 
of wartime goals and those in support of a peaceful transition to a normalized 
Bosnia, although ultimately hardliners managed to remain in key party positions.
European Stability Initiative 1999,14.
518 European Stability Initiative 2001. The European Stability Initiative noted that Dodik “made 
little attempt to address Republika Srpska’s pressing economic problems, and by the end of its term 
public finances were close to collapse, with a deficit of more than DM 200 million, and pensions and 
public-sector salaries many months in arrears ... International support was not enough, however, to 
prevent Dodik losing the presidential elections” (ibid, 11).
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These divisions, which had been present since the origins of HDZ in 1990519 and 
were somehow diluted during the war’s effort, flared up at the party’s congress in 
May 1998, leading to the formation of a new party, the New Croat Initiative (HNI), 
in mid-June 1998. The rift within the HDZ was aggravated after the death of the 
Croatian minister of defense Gojko Susak in May 1998, “which left the HDZBiH 
without a figure with the authority to hold together its different strands.”520 The 
party’s hardliners managed to elect the Bosnian Federation's defense minister Ante 
Jelavic as party president (against Tudman’s wishes who was receiving intense 
pressure from the international community), defeating the moderate candidate 
favored by the Croat leader Kresimir Zubak,521 Bozo Ljubic.522
On the whole, despite the increased political pluralism and the extended powers 
granted to the HR, “significant portions of Dayton remain unimplemented” by the 
end of 1999,523 especially Annex Four. As the International Crisis Group noted in 
1999, the constitution “is unwieldy, unworkable, and bears no relation to the reality 
of Bosnian political life. The central government institutions exist largely on paper, 
and are only as powerful as the entities allow them to be.”524 Bosnia’s dependence on 
international assistance at the decision-making level had also increased. Indeed, 
although parliament had passed a number of laws since 1996, most of them had been 
either imposed by the HR or drafted by the international community.525 In sum, as 
the European Stability Initiative noted, up until 2000, “state institutions have 
functioned as theatres of nationalist politics, with the entities and parallel power
The International Crisis Group argues that there has always been “a geographical distinction 
between those Croats who lived in mixed communities with Bosniaks and Serbs, such as in central
Bosnia and Sarajevo, and in the Posavina region of northern Bosnia, and those who lived in the
ethnically compact region of western Herzegovina, where Croats formed a significant majority of the 
population. The perspective of the former was largely conditioned by the experience and necessity of 
living side beside with Bosniaks and Serbs, while the latter often had a more narrowly Croat 
perspective, which revealed itself in a more hard-line approach towards the other peoples of Bosnia” 
(International Crisis Group 1998b, 2).
520 International Crisis Group 1998b, I; see also Grandits 2007.
521 Kresimir Zubak had succeeded Mate Boban as the HDZ Croat leader, following strong
pressure by the US to have Boban step down during the negotiations of the Washington agreement. 
2ubak left the HDZ in the summer of 1998 to form a new party, NHI, which failed to displace the 
HDZ in the September 1998 elections (see table 3.3).
522 International Crisis Group 1998b, 3. The name of Dragan Covic, at the time president of the 
HDZ city committee in Mostar, had also been put forward, but his candidacy had to be removed as a 
result of allegations of pre-war Serb affiliations.
523 International Crisis Group 1999,10.
524 International Crisis Group 1999, 16. Between 1996-1998, the HR imposed eight key
national laws, including the law on citizenship, the law on the flag, the law on the state hymn and the 
law on telecommunications
525 International Crisis Group 1999.
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structures conspiring to keep the state weak and underdeveloped. The common 
institutions have been kept hostage to short-term political disputes, and have been 
unable to establish their own institutional identity.”526 As a matter of fact, no 
reconciliation had been accomplished, and “at least two of the three factions have yet 
to achieve their wartime goals.”527
3.23 . External Intervention after the 2000 Peace Implementation Council (2000- 
2005)
The New International Community's Strategy: The May Peace Implementation 
Council & Transformation from Within
Building upon the Madrid meeting in December 1998 528 the May 2000 PIC meeting 
delineated a new comprehensive strategy for the international community in Bosnia, 
following up on Dayton’s ongoing failing record529 and the acknowledgement of an 
initial reversal of the power monopoly of nationalist parties at the state and FBiH 
levels.530 It is also worth mentioning the parallel developments taking place at the 
European level, with the launch of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in
European Stability Initiative 2000,3.
527 International Crisis Group 1999,127. As Bieber noted, cooperation among parties at the time 
amounted largely to a division of power; “each party largely respected the “right” of the other 
nationalist parties to govern their respective nation, and cooperation, if required by the institutions, 
was limited to a division of access to state assets and resources” (Bieber 2001,5).
528 A more robust state-building agenda was undertaken at this meeting, under HR Westendorp, 
including a reinforced approach to strengthening state-level institutions, such as the military and the 
judiciary and ending parallel institutions. The PIC also envisioned greater emphasis in “building the 
rule of law, reinforcing the common institutions, creating a self-sustaining market economy and 
accelerating democratization”, including inter alia the creation of a professional civil service, the 
privatization of state-owned companies, the promotion of civil society (Peace Implementation Council 
1998a, para. 12).
529 The PIC meeting at the political directors level on June 1999 in Brussels expressed concern 
about the lack of progress and declared to be alarmed “by the inadequate level of functioning of the 
Common Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in particular the BiH parliament.” It also 
declared to be “seriously concerned about the lack of functioning of the institutions in the Federation. 
Security conditions must be improved without delay, and parallel institutions as well as ethnic chains 
of command within the Federation institutions must be dismantled” (Peace Implementation Council 
1999).
530 The European Stability Initiative noted that the ethnic power structures had started to fall 
apart; “Political changes in Croatia and Serbia have cut external revenues, forcing the political elites in 
Bosnia to reorient themselves towards the international community and participate in the Bosnian 
state. Although the nationalist parties continue to enjoy widespread electoral support, the post-war 
nationalist regimes, built on the ideology of ethnic cleansing and dedicated to the objective of dividing 
Bosnia, have gone” (European Stability Initiative 2001,17).
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1999 and the March 2000 presentation of the Road Map for Bosnia’s European 
integration process, building upon (and converging with) the PIC’s state-building 
strategy.531
The new strategy was based on a functionalist, maximalist interpretation of 
Article 3.5 of the Bosnian constitution, whereby new competences could be assigned 
to the state “to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, 
and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the 
division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”532 
The international community’s new approach was clearly aimed at undertaking a 
gradual transformation of Bosnia’s institutional framework from within, using 
Dayton’s mandate to expand the powers of the state at the expense of the entities. 
The May 2000 PIC meeting thus presented a revamped, comprehensive intervention 
agenda. It noted the significance of the newly launched SAP,533 and outlined a set of 
priorities “for a new accelerated phase of peace implementation”534 including 
economic reform, refugee return and the fostering and consolidating of common 
institutions. In the area of institutional reform, ‘building a credible state’ became an 
“explicit international objective.”535 In this context, the most significant areas of 
reform included: (1) the set up of independent funding for state-level institutions (the 
precursor of the value-added and integrated tax reforms), including the creation of a 
state treasury through which the donor community would channel economic
The presentation of the Road Map by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten (which 
followed a request by BiH for a feasibility study on the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
negotiations), represented the first major benchmark in Bosnia’s European bid. The Road Map 
outlined 18 concrete policy steps, including the implementation of several institution-oriented laws 
such as an election law, a civil service law, a law on State Border Service, property laws, new rules for 
the parliament, laws on judicial and prosecutorial service and legislation for foreign direct investment. 
It also included the requirement of allocating sufficient funding for the Constitutional Court of BiH 
and the implementation of the decisions ruled by the Chamber of human rights and cooperation with 
OHR in public service broadcasting. European officials did not think the list to be too demanding, 
expecting compliance within eight to nine months (Noutcheva 2006, 60). The road map was however 
only “substantially completed” in September 2002, two and a half years after.
532 European Stability Initiative 2001, 17. As a matter of fact, the European Stability Initiative 
noted that “With the breakdown of extra-constitutional power structures, debates on the design of the 
Bosnian state ... entered the political mainstream” (ibid).
533 Peace Implementation Council 2000a. The PIC reaffirmed its commitment to Bosnia’s 
integration into the EU. In the annex, the Council reminds Bosnia that the implementation of the EU’s 
road-map is a pre-condition for rapprochement to the EU and demands Bosnian authorities to act 
promptly on these and on the issues enumerated in the agenda that is included (Peace Implementation 
Council 2000b).
534 Peace Implementation Council 2000a.
535 European Stability Initiative 2001,17.
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assistance;536 (2) the creation of a unified command in the armed forces; (3) the 
creation of a body for intelligence services under democratic control; (4) the 
establishment of an effective and merit-based, professional civil service; (5) the setup 
of a first-instance state court; (6) and the setup of a single economic space through 
the creation of the appropriate regulatory bodies and structures necessary for a 
Bosnian common market. The PIC also demanded that the HR outline a plan of 
action so that the international community could both rationalize implementation 
efforts and monitor and evaluate compliance and progress by Bosnian authorities.538 
The HR was also asked to streamline the international civil presence in Bosnia in 
order to improve coordination, efficiency and ownership.
Parallel to the outline of this revamped state-building agenda, the newly 
appointed HR Wolfgang Petritsch launched a new ownership strategy, the so- 
called ‘partnership approach’, aimed at: diminishing Bosnia’s dependence on 
international assistance (paving the way for the diversion of resources towards new 
pressing commitments in places such as Kosovo);540 and preparing the transition 
from partial partnership to complete ownership in fulfillment with Bosnia’s 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.541 Meeting the ambitious goals of
Up until that point most of the state’s revenues were dependent upon transfers from the
entities.
537 Peace Implementation Council 2000a; 2000b.
538 Peace Implementation Council 2000a. The Bosnian authorities were also required to report 
to the PIC every six months on the implementation of the program included in the Declaration and 
Annex (ibid).
539 HR Petritsch held the position from August 1999 to May 2002. He had previous experience in 
the region. In 1997 he was appointed Austrian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a 
position he held until July 1999. From October 1998 to July 1999 he was appointed the EU’s Chief 
Negotiator in the Kosovo peace talks held at Rambouillet and Paris. HR Petritsch was a rather active 
HR. Although his stated goal prior to taking office as the HR was to promote domestic ownership and 
partnership, he made extensive use of the HR powers and was only able to start a program of social 
ownership in 2001. Petristch’s greatest success was refugee return. By the end of his mandate 850,000 
had returned to their homes, including 300,000 minority returnees.
540 Petritsch also stated in an interview, “When I arrived in Sarajevo, it was clear to me that the
international community’s engagement required a thorough overhaul. In 1999, the world’s focus had 
shifted from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo, and there were many other issues — outside Europe 
in particular —that occupied the attention of the principal actors of the international community” 
(Petritsch 2003,358).
541 This approach only took off in 2001 following the formation of the first non-nationalist
government in Bosnia at the state level, which encouraged greater confidence and optimism within 
international circles (this initiative was however abandoned as soon as the nationalist parties were 
back in power in 2002). The approach materialized through two different forums. The first one, 
namely the Consultative Partnership Forum, was set up on 19 July 2001 to discuss policy issues 
related to the peace implementation process with state and entity level officials, especially the council 
of ministers. The second one, namely the Civic Forum, was created with the goal of enabling citizens 
to have a greater impact in policy making. In addition, HR Petritsch also organized “regular meetings 
in which representatives of the State and the Entities try to clarify the competencies of the different
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partnership and ownership was challenging in the first weeks of Petritsch’s office in 
mid-1999, and he initiated his mandate with the dismissal of 22 officials and the 
imposition of a set of refugee-related laws, a pattern that he continued throughout his 
administration. As Petritsch stated, “During the first 11/2 years of my mandate, I 
indeed had to act as the most interventionist HR ever. Ownership is a process that 
requires a framework, and I first had to lay solid foundations to get this process going 
and create the conditions for ownership to take root. I set three priorities: 
strengthening the state institutions, which were barely functioning at the time, getting 
economic reform under way, and finally ... ensuring that the refugees and displaced 
persons could go back home. If we succeeded in these three areas, everything else 
would fall into place much more easily.”542
The first major turning point at the domestic level came with the general 
elections in 2000 (see table 3.5), which represented the first major breakthrough in 
the dissolution of the nationalist strongholds (although this held important pockets of 
power locally).543 This was partly the result of major gains by the only self-declared 
non-ethnic based party, the SDP; it was also the result of public discontent with 
nationalist parties as a result of increasing corruption and their inability to deal with 
rising unemployment and other economic ailments afflicting Bosnian society.544 The 
SDP success was, however, not sufficient for constituting a government without a 
coalition with other parties, and the SDP entered into a non-nationalist ten-party 
coalition, the so-called ‘Alliance for Changes,’ including the SBiH and smaller 
parties such as the PDP, the SNSD and Plavsic’s SNS, some of which were in 
parliamentary coalition with the SDS at the RS level.545 The coalition was brought 
together after months of negotiations, under close international scrutiny 546 Due to 
the absence of a pre-election program of its own, the Alliance adopted the Brussels
administration’” (UN Security Council 2001).
542 Petritsch 2003,361.
543 Bieber notes that this represented the biggest threat to nationalist parties; “Effective
governance, combined with power-sharing rather than resource sharing” represented a threat to the 
post-Dayton modus vivendi and sustainability of nationalist parties (Bieber 2001, 5). The result of the 
elections was, however, a disappointment for most international forces who had expected and 
estimated greater gains by pro-reform parties. As a case in point, radical forces continued to gamer the 
greatest support in RS.
544 The elections also followed key changes in neighboring Croatia and Serbia, as well as
significant external assistance to pro-Western parties in Bosnia.
545 European Stability Initiative 2001. The HR stated that the new council of ministers included, 
for the first time since the signing of Dayton, “representatives of parties that fully embrace the State of 
BiH and are reform-oriented” (Council of Europe 2001).
546 European Stability Initiative 2001.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 131 10/30/09
PIC objectives.547 The new coalition, however, entered government in difficult 
economic and institutional circumstances. The European Stability Initiative describes 
the situation as follows:
“[The Alliance for Changes] has only a year and a half to tackle Bosnia’s 
pressing economic and social crises before it must face re-election [in 
2002] 548 At the State level, administrative structures are underdeveloped, 
with no professional civil service in place. At Federation level, the 
Alliance inherits a complex and unwieldy constitutional structure in a 
state of crisis. Since 1996, Federation institutions have been developed 
according to the needs of SDA-HDZ power-sharing arrangements, and 
will need to be restructured. The HDZ continues to control a number of 
cantons, whose co-operation is needed for any serious policy programme 
to be implemented. As a result, it is difficult to see how the Alliance 
will have the capacity in its first term of office to deliver on its larger 
promises of reversing Bosnia’s economic decline. The electoral fortunes 
of its member parties are likely to depend largely on their ability to 
deliver results at the cantonal level, where much economic and social 
policy is made.”549
Table 3.5.2000 Legislative Elections
Party Seats
Federation
Voters
SDP 8
SDA 7
HDZ 5
SBIH 4
Others550 4
RS Voters SDS 6
547 Ibid, 16. The Alliance for Changes also governed in the Federation under SDP’s Prime 
Minister Alija Behman. In RS, the only thing that the international community managed to do was to 
avoid having the SDS take over the government; indeed, the US threatened to withdraw all 
international aid to RS if SDS entered the new government. The task to form a government was given 
to PDP, who had 13 percent of electoral support.
548 The election law was finally approved in August 2001, setting a four-year term for state- 
level officials. Up until this point, general elections were held every two years with OSCE assistance 
and regulations.
549 European Stability Initiative 2001,16.
550 Others include: DNZ, BPS, NHI and DSP (Democratic Pensioner’s Party/Demokratska 
Stranka Penzionera).
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PDP 2
SNSD/DSP Coalition 1
SDA 1
SBIH 1
SDP 1
Serbian People 
Alliance RS - Bilijana 
Plavsic
1
Socialist Party of the 
Republic of Srpska
1
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
In the end, the ‘Alliance for Changes’ experiment was short-lived (although 
some significant improvements were accomplished such as the approval of the 
belated election law and other important legislation for entrance in the CoE). The 
combined effects of the difficult economic situation, the relative incompetence of the 
Alliance, and the ongoing support for nationalist forces together brought the 
nationalists back to power at both the state and entity levels in the 2002 elections (see 
table 3.6. and 3.7). Their victory was not the result of a major increase of votes but 
the “general disillusionment with the political process, ... the lack of economic 
progress and a bitter pre-election campaign.”551 Furthermore, challenges to the 
Dayton framework from nationalist parties continued. As a case in point, the HDZ 
(and other minor Croat parties) created the Croat National Congress as a platform to 
protect Croat interests in October 2000, presumably in response to the change of the 
election rules by the OSCE in 2000.552 Following these elections and as a result of 
HDZ’s exclusion from the government at the entity and state levels, the National 
Congress declared Croat self-government in March 2001, and launched an inter- 
cantonal council, The international response was not delayed. On March 7, Ante 
Jelavic was removed from his position as the Croat member of the presidency and the 
SFOR took over Hercegovacka Banka, “closely linked to both HDZ and the 
financing of Croat self-government.”553
551 Bieber 2006, 101. The disillusionment of the population is reflected in the voter turnout, 
which was 54 percent in the 2002 elections (as opposed to 78 percent in the 1996 elections). The lower 
rate of voter turnout might also be the result of the frequency of elections since 1996 (Perry 2006).
552 Bieber 2001.
553 Ibid, 2.
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Table 3.6.2002 Presidency Elections
554
555
556
Party Results
Bosniak Member SDA 37.3%
Sulejman Tihic (192,661)
SBIH 34.8%
Haris Silajdzic (179,726)
SDP 17.5%
Alija Behmen (90,434)
Croat Member HDZ 61.52%
Dragan Covic (114,606)
Economic Bloc 17.4%
HDU 
Mladen Ivankovic- 
Lijanovic
(32,411)
NHI 8.8%
Mijo Anic (16,345)
Serb Member SDS 35.5%
Mirko Sarovic (180,212)
SNSD 19.9%
Nebojsa
Radmanovic
(101,119)
SRS 8.7%
Ognjen Tadic (44,262)
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
Table 3.7.2002 Legislative Elections
Party Results Seats
Federation
Voters
SDA 33.9%
(232,325)
9
HDZ554 16.6%
(114,207)
5
SBIH 17%
(116,114)
5
SDP 16.3%
(112,258)
4
Others555 9.4%
(64,737)
5
RS Voters SDS 38.3%
(172,544)
5
SNSD 25.4%
(114,591)
3
PDP 11.8%
(53,177)
2
SDA 8.2%
(37,102)
1
SBiH 4.4%
(19,976)
1
Others556 10.4%
(46,685)
2
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
The HDZ run as part of a coalition.
Others include: BOSS, DNZ, NHI and Ekonomski Blok HDU.
Others include: SRS and SPRS.
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Bringing the EU Back In: The Reform Process under Ashdown
The year 2002 marked another significant turning point in Bosnia’s political 
developments, but in a different arena. In May 2002, Lord Paddy Ashdown took 
office as both the new HR and the EU Special Representative,557 initiating a new 
phase in streamlining external efforts under the leadership of the EU.558 From this 
point onwards both the HR and the EU Special Representative operated in synergy 
and the state-building process was more clearly subordinated to the requirements and 
timeline of the EU accession process. As Ashdown stated in his inaugural speech, 
“my aim is simply ... to work with the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to put this 
country irreversibly onto the road to statehood and membership of Europe.”559 The 
October 2002 elections represented a major setback to the international community’s 
agenda, however, and the return of nationalist parties to power prompted Ashdown to 
redesign a new mission implementation plan for Bosnia.560
Ashdown’s new strategy featured two key dynamics. The first one included a
The British HR Paddy Ashdown -  the fourth HR in Bosnia -  has been one of the most 
controversial international envoys because of his extensive use of executive powers. He held office as 
HR from May 2002 to January 2006. During his tenure, a rather prominent record of imposed 
legislation was undertaken, especially in the first few years of his mandate. While Westendorp 
imposed on average four decisions per month, Ashdown started with an average of fourteen decisions 
per month (Knaus and Martin 2003). The initiation of the process of police restructuring, which was 
strongly contested by the Serb parties, was also initiated under his mandate. Prior to his role as 
international envoy in Bosnia, he was the leader of the Liberal Democrats in the UK.
558 The appointment of the EU Special Representative in 2002 was made in light of an increased 
EU presence on the ground, especially the launch of the ESDP police mission (EUPM) in 2003 that 
took over the UN. The EUSR was entrusted with two key tasks at the outset, namely (1) to “maintain 
an overview of the whole range of activities in the field of the Rule of Law and in that context provide 
advice to the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) and the Commission as necessary”; and 
(2) “to give direction, as necessary, to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner of the EU Police 
Mission” (see Council of the EU 2002). The role of the EUSR has increased significantly overtime in 
both the provision of advice to EU officials (including the EUFOR Commander) and the coordination 
of all EU actors on the ground with the goal to ensure EU consistency and coherence. The EUSR is 
also to be consulted on EU accession priorities. The first amendment to the EUSR mandate was 
undertaken in 2004, in light of the launch of the EU military operation EUFOR (Council of the EU 
2004b). The mandate has been amended four times in subsequent joint actions by the Council of the 
EU from 2005 to 2009, with a substantial increase of his competences, especially in the area of the 
rule of law and the fight against organized crime (Council of the EU 2005c). In 2006, for example, the 
Council entrusted the EUSR with a “reinforced EUSR office in the context of the closure of the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), including advice on public information aspects of the transition” 
(Council of the EU 2006). The 2007 and 2009 EUSR mandate includes the support of human rights; 
the facilitation of Bosnia’s cooperation with the ICTY; and the provision of political advice and 
facilitation in the process of constitutional reform (Council of the EU 2007b). Notwithstanding the 
overall aims to strengthen EU capacities and internal coordination, cooperation between EUPM and 
Commission officials have been poor (Grevi 2007).
559 Ashdown 2002.
560 Peace Implementation Council 2002b.
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revamped use of Bonn powers561 and a more extensive use of Article 3.5 to provide 
the state with further attributes of functionality. As Ashdown stated in his inaugural 
speech, “Dayton is the floor, not the ceiling. It is the foundation for the state we are 
trying to construct. And like all foundations, it must be built on.”562 He also wed the 
international community’s strategy to a step-by-step state-building approach rather 
than the redrawing of a completely new Dayton. As he argued early in his mandate, 
there is “only one realistic future -  to make Bosnia and Herzegovina work. ... Some 
argue that the answer lies in a single great event, a second Dayton, or something 
similar. I disagree. What we are involved in here is not an event but a process. ... 
My vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of a modem country whose state level 
institutions do only what is necessary, but do it effectively.”563
The second strategy of the newly appointed HR included a new policy approach 
towards state building based on strengthening the country’s domestic ownership and 
direct engagement of party leaders.564 This strategy was translated into the setup of 
parallel reform processes in different areas, based on the creation of joint 
commissions entrusted with the enacting of draft legislation. Indeed, over the course 
of 2003, Ashdown set in motion a number of different reform processes following 
this formula in the defense, intelligence and police areas. The commissions were 
chaired by an international expert and composed of national and international experts 
as well as members of all main political forces at state and entity level 565 The goal of 
these commissions was to sit key political forces down at the table to agree on a set 
of laws regulating new state-level institutions at the state level that would later gain 
approval of the state-level parliament. In addition to instituting a framework in which 
party leaders were to sit together under the presence of international actors, this 
initiative was aimed at infusing the decision-making process with further democratic
561 A rather prominent record of imposed legislation was undertaken in the first few years of
Ashdown’s mandate, including the Law on the Council of Ministers in December 2002 and the Law 
on the Civil Service in May 2003, whereby the state level administration became fully regulated. A 
Defense Ministry was also created in December 2003, and the HR imposed a complete restructuring of 
the court system, “closing and consolidating courts throughout both entities in order to achieve a more 
efficient and more accountable judicial system. The number of first-instance courts was reduced from 
78 to 47” (Council of Europe 2004c, para. 161). The State Prosecutor’s office was also imposed in 
August of 2002, as well as the criminal and the criminal procedure codes.
562 Ashdown 2002.
563 Ibid.
564 This strategy built upon Petritsch’s approach to the Constituent People case in 2000 and the 
set up of commissions with external presence (See section one in Chapter 4). This strategy was also in 
concordance with the EU’s emphasis on domestic ownership.
565 Council of Europe 2004c, para. 108.
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credentials. Indeed, it enabled “parliaments at all three levels to participate to some 
extent in the drafting process, since amendments could (at least theoretically) be 
tabled to the various laws put before them.”566
The initiation of these processes coincided with the presentation of the EU's 
Feasibility Study in 2003 aimed at providing an assessment of Bosnia’s progress 
towards the opening of SAA negotiations, the end goal of the SAP. The EC identified 
sixteen priority areas in which Bosnia needed to make further progress before the 
start of SAA negotiations, including forty-eight laws and the establishment of 
twenty-five new institutions in areas such as the rule of law, competition, customs, 
and taxation. Additionally, the Feasibility Study (as well as the European partnership 
released in June of 2004)567 included for the first time the restructuring of police 
forces as one of the key prerequisites for a SAA. The EU encouraged Bosnian 
authorities to “consider further restructuring and rationalizing police services in order 
to enhance efficiency and improve crime fighting capabilities.”568
The new reform strategy promoted by Ashdown seemed to generate greater 
consensus among political leaders in the first few months, but the final results were 
mixed. In fact, meeting the criteria set up by the EU became unfeasible during the 
Ashdown period. While the first three reform processes initiated in 2003 and 2004 
(namely the tax system, the defense and intelligence reforms) resulted in the adoption 
of key legislation that put down the basis of new state-level institutions by 2005, they 
faced major challenges in the area of implementation.569 Furthermore, the 
restructuring of the police forces (initiated only a few months before the 
constitutional negotiations) brought the whole state building and EU accession 
process to a stalemate.
The problem with police restructuring was tied to the imposition of a set of 
standards defined by the EU; which met with strong resistance from RS (especially
566 Ibid.
567 The Council adopted its first European Partnership with Bosnia on 14 June 2004, stating the 
short and mid-term priorities for Bosnia to move forward in the preparations towards EU integration 
(Council of the EU 2004a).
568 European Commission 2003. The PIC had already called for the establishment of a multiethnic
police in Bosnia in 1998 (Peace Implementation Council 1998b).
569 Obstruction at the implementation phase has become a recurring problem and the ultimate 
informal veto mechanism in the hands of ethnic groups. As the Foreign Policy Initiative noted, very
often the RS fails to implement state directives or to pass the appropriate legislation for the 
functioning of state level institutions and agencies (Foreign Policy Initiative 2007). In the case of the 
Federation obstruction has been frequently the result of “administrative incompetence, oversight or 
simply bad communication” (ibid, 41).
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as it related to the ability of police forces to cross inter-ethnic lines; given that this 
was considered to undermine the status of RS).571 The HR created the Police 
Restructuring Commission (PRC) in July 2004572 (including the participation of both 
international and local officials from both entities); and entrusted it with the mandate 
to propose a single police structure in Bosnia under state authority.573 The PRC held 
seven meetings from July through December,with no tangible results (in spite of the 
various concessions offered to RS officials).574 The international community 
reiterated its support for the EU’s police standards in Bosnia and in April demanded 
local authorities reach an agreement by the end of May.575 A new round of 
negotiations, organized by the OHR, took place at the end of April 2005 at Mt. 
Vlasic and in May in Konak; however again, despite further consessions and a final 
statement expressing the participants’ willingness to meet the EU criteria, 
negotiations ended in stalemate.
The approval of police reform remained an important and unmet pre-requisit 
necesary to the initialization of talks on the signing of a SAA.577 Further negotiations 
on police reform overlapped with the process of constitutional reform in 2005 and 
2006 (as we shall see in the next chapters); and established the context in which the
571 The three principles to accomplish police reform were laid out by EU officials in 2004 and 
early 2005 through various public statements and official communications with Bosnian authorities. 
These included: (1) securing exclusive state-level competencies over police (which implied 
eliminating entity control over police forces); (2) eliminating political interference from within the 
police forces; and (3) ensuring that police regions were determined on the basis of technical and 
professional criteria (See Patten 2004; Rehn 2005a). In sum, the EU envisioned the reorganization of 
police forces into 11 inter-ethnic regions and the establishment of a state-level legislative and 
budgetary authority to manage these forces.
572 Office of the High Representative 2004.
573 RS was under strong international pressure at the time. It is reasonable to assume that Serb 
parties decided to participate in the PRC in order to avoid further pressure from the international 
community (and in spite of their rejection to the EU’s principles on police reform). As a case in point, 
Bosnia’s candidacy to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (NATO’s framework for the establishment of 
good relations with non-NATO European countries and Russia) was rejected in June 2004 as a result 
of the RS’s failure to arrest war crimes indictees. Serb engagement in the PRC was nonetheless 
lukewarm (especially among RS officials); and this ultimately undermined the process as negotiations 
progressed.
574 As a case in point, the PRC’s final report envisioned ten regions where the multi-ethnic 
component was diluted to a great extent (International Crisis Group 2005).
575 In time for the Consultative Task Force meeting with the European Commission, and ahead 
of a European Commission assessment regarding the launch of negotiations on a SAA with Bosnia 
(Peace Implementation Council 2005b).
576 See International Crisis Group 2005.
577 The other condition remaining was the passage of legislation reforming the public
broadcasting system (to make it sustainable from a financial perspective and more independent). This 
reform process is discussed in chapter 5 (p. 176), as it overlaps with the process of constitutional 
reform.
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constitutional reform process unfolded.578
33. CONCLUSION
The GFAP, signed in November of 1995 to end the bloody conflict in Bosnia, set in 
motion one of the most ambitious peace- and state-building missions to date, 
including an extensive external involvement and supervision in the military, police 
and institutional aspects of the agreement. While the military and security aspects of 
the GFAP were rapidly set in place, since then the international community has 
struggled with building a functional state in the face of sturdy obstruction from the 
three major ethnic groups in Bosnia. Some key breakthroughs have occurred over the 
years with the launch of the so-called ‘Bonn Powers’, and the intertwinement of the 
state-building process with the EU accession framework, but pervasive divisions 
continued to threaten the functionality of the Bosnian state. More importantly, 
despite all the external efforts and resources poured into this country, rampant ethnic 
divisions have continued to this day; furthermore, the political debate continues to 
revolve around the same parameters as before the war. While Serbs continued to 
favor the division of Bosnia into ethic-based territories, with a highly decentralized 
central government, Bosniaks sought a centralized state organized around different 
administrative regions. Croats remained divided about the best arrangement for the 
Croats within Bosnia, with some arguing in favor of a third entity and others in 
support of a highly decentralized state with strong local autonomy.
The origins of the process of constitutional reform need to be understood in this 
context, namely the relatively poor record of the EU’s attempt to shape the state 
building process and the mega-conflict among local actors on the future form of the 
state. The process of constitutional reform thus represented a new strategic approach, 
one aimed at changing the root causes of the institutional and ethnic deficits 
inherited from Dayton. The following chapters provide an explanation for the failure 
of this strategy.
578 Police reform developments are discussed in the following chapters, as they overlap with the 
process of constitutional reform.
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PART III
BEYOND DAYTON
Part three of the dissertation is concerned with the analysis of the process of 
constitutional reform in Bosnia during the course of 2005 to 2006, looking at both 
the role of domestic and external actors and their mutual interactions in each step of 
the process.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the origins of constitutional reform and the initial 
steps. This chapter delineates the rationale behind the process o f constitutional 
reform, the format of the negotiations and the rules for the roadmap. The goal of this 
chapter is to frame the constitutional negotiations within the ongoing process o f state 
building in Bosnia.
The subsequent three chapters are devoted to the analysis of the process of 
constitutional reform, looking at three key critical junctures in the development of the 
negotiations, including the involvement of party leaders from November 2005 
onwards (chapter 5); the US takeover of the process in December 2005, paving the 
way for a final political agreement on constitutional reform in March 2006 (chapter 
6); and the transfer o f the agreement to the parliament where it was rejected in April 
2006 (chapter 7). These chapters analyze the political dynamics involved in each 
phase, looking at the role o f elite interactions at the three levels laid out in the 
theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RATIONALE AND ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
4.1. THE ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
4.1.1. The Constituent Peoples’ Case
One of the first attempts at reforming the constitutional framework in Bosnia 
occurred at the entity level through the Constitutional Court’s decision on the 
‘constituent peoples’ case.579 The case was brought by the then president, and 
Bosniak leader, Alija Izetbegovic on February 12, 1998.580 President Izetbegovic was 
effectively demanding a review of conformity in relation to certain provisions 
contained in the entities’ constitutions vis-a-vis the Dayton Constitution.581 The claim 
involved 19 provisions, and included issues relating to the official languages in 
Bosnia, the status of the Orthodox Church, the command authority of the entities’ 
presidents with respect to the armed forces, and, most notably, the position of the 
constituent peoples in the entire territory of Bosnia.582
Following numerous public hearings and discussions over a period of more than 
two years, the Constitutional Court (CC) provided four partial decisions in 2000. 
Foremost among these was the third decision, released on July 1 2000, which 
addressed the position of the constituent peoples. According to this decision, all three
579 The Constitutional Court (CC) is comprised of nine members: three international judges, 
appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights (following consultation with the 
Bosnian Presidency); four judges appointed by the House of Representatives of the Federation and 
two judges by the assembly of RS (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1985, Art.6.1.a.). The 
Court adopts its decisions by a majority of all members (Ibid, Art.6.2.b).
580 The case was first initiated by Prof. Mirko Pejanovic; Izetbegovic took on his initiative and 
submitted a legal proposal to the CC (Pejanovic 2004).
581 Annex Four of the Dayton Peace Agreement had given the entities a period of three months 
to bring their respective constitutions into conformity with the Bosnian Constitution (Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Art. 12.2).
582 Constitutional Court 2000. The entities’ constitutions failed to recognize the three ethnic 
groups as constituent peoples within their jurisdiction. Serbs were not recognized as a constituent 
people in the Federation. Similarly, Bosniaks and Croats were not recognized as constituent peoples in 
RS.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 141 10/30/09
constituent peoples were required to be given equal status and constitutional rights 
across the entire territory of Bosnia. The Court went on to declare the provisions 
related to the position of constituent peoples in each entity to be unconstitutional and 
demanded the entities proceed with the requisite constitutional amendments. This 
decision had a special resonance in Bosnian politics, as special focus was given to 
eliminating the effects of ethnic cleansing. As referenced in the CC decision, 
“Despite the territorial division of BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] by establishment of 
two entities, this territorial division cannot serve as a constitutional legitimacy for 
ethnic domination, national homogenization or the right to maintain results of ethnic 
cleansing.”583
Implementing the CC ruling was more difficult than expected. The key challenge 
lay in finding a way to revise the entities’ constitutions, with the inclusion and 
agreement of the Serbs and Croats; both of whom were strongly opposed to the 
Court’s ruling. In fact, the decision has been passed with the votes of the 
international and Bosniak judges,584 with the Croat and Serb judges585 expressing 
significant reservations. These reservations were mostly nationalistic and technical in 
nature; and were appended to the final decision. The Croat Judge Mirko Zovko, for 
example, used the agreement on the implementation of the Federation, signed in 
Dayton on 10 November 1995, to oppose the Court’s ruling. He argued that this 
agreement did not reference the Serbs as a third constituent people in the Federation, 
and therefore the CC decision ran counter to the spirit of the Dayton agreements.586 
Similarly, Serb judge Vitomir Popovic argued that the decision inherently opposed 
the nature of Bosnia as a union of two entities; “Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats are 
constituent peoples according to the Constitution of BiH at the level of the state of
Constitutional Court 2000, 36. The decision was, in fact, intended to both re-address the 
effects of ethnic cleansing and create more favorable conditions for safe returns in each entity.
584 These included two Bosniak judges: Prof. Kasim Begic, president of the CC at the time, and 
Azra Omeragic; and three international judges: Austrian Prof. Joseph Marko, French Prof. Louis 
Favoreu and Swede Dr. Hans Danelius.
585 Namely, Serb judges Prof. Vitomir Popovic and Prof. Snezana Savic; and Croat judges: Dr. 
Zvonko Miljko and Mirko Zovko.
586 Mirko Zovko stated, “the decision of the court that I voted against would have not been a 
problem if the Dayton Agreement had been established as a ‘unitary state’ ... [but] it is manifest that 
the Federation was not established by Serbs and that the Republika Srpska was not established by 
Croats and Bosniaks” (Zovko 2000, 92). According to him, full implementation of the Federation 
agreement was a precondition for a peaceful Bosnia. Croat member Zvonko Miljko also argued, “My 
fundamental dissension from the majority opinion is reflected by my belief that this constitutional 
dispute is primarily a problem of the ... organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not a problem 
within the domain of individual rights and fundamental freedoms guranteed by the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Miljko 2000,46).
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BiH,” but not at the entity levels according to the constitutions of the entities. “Any 
other approach,” he stated, “would lead to a negation of the existence of the 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH and the transformation of BiH from a 
very specific complex sui generis state to a Unitarian state which would not reflect 
what was envisaged by the DPA .”587 Though these opinions reflected a nationalist 
sentiment, they also reflected concerns relating to a potential loss of power associated 
with the amendments. Indeed, abiding by the CC decision meant changing the 
government structures of both entities and securing the representation of all 
constituent peoples in all public institutions.
As a result of this, significant resistance was encountered in both entities with 
respect to the implementation of the decision. In light of the obstructions, HR 
Petritsch formed a constitutional commission attached to each of the Entities’ 
legislative assemblies in order to reach an agreement on how to best resolve the 
issue.588 The creation of the commissions -  comprised of 16 members on a parity 
basis, including four members of each constituent people and four members 
belonging to ‘others’ -  represented a somewhat new approach in terms of resolving 
matters in Bosnia; one in which domestic actors were expected to reach compromises 
on their own with the presence and assistance of international actors.589 The 
commissions were, in fact, the first of their kind and were moderated by HR Petritsch 
and the Deputy Principal HR Donald Hays.
A set of proposals were presented to the parliaments in December 2000 and 
January 2001 in RS and the Federation, respectively, after long rounds of 
deliberations; but further negotiations appeared necessary to fine tune the most 
contending issues of the reform, namely the system for the protection of the vital 
interest and the framework for the representation of constituent peoples and ‘others’
Popovic 2000, 79. Other reservations were technical. Serb Snezana Savic, for example, 
argued that there were several formal deficiencies in the presentation of the case to the CC; such as the 
use of a non-existing BiH coat of arms (Savic 2000). According to Savic, these formal issues 
undermined the legal framework of Izetbegovic’s application as a member of the Presidency (ibid).
588 See OHR 2001. The first step included the formation of a Task Force formed by the CoE, the 
OSCE and the OHR to define the core elements of the amendments, including inter alia the definition 
and protection of the vital interest and the representation of constituent peoples and ‘others’ in public 
institutions (Neussl 2004)
589 Bieber (2004b) argues that this approach was the result of Petritsch’s focus on ‘local 
ownership’ and the relatively positive climate associated with the ‘Alliance for Changes’ government. 
But the consent of all key parties, including the nationalists, was needed for legislative approval (see 
Bieber 2004b).
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 143 10/30/09
in public institutions.590 Ethnic groups presented mutually incompatible demands. 
The Croats, as former advisor to HR Petritsch, Peter Neussl, argues, “were trying to 
achieve symmetry in form, with the establishment in the RS of a system that would 
copy the Federation structures, and, hence, lead to a complete overrepresentation.”591 
As for the Serbs, they “insisted on symmetry in substance”, aiming to uphold Serbian 
dominance in the RS to the greatest extent possible. The Bosniak parties were this 
time tom between the two positions; as Neussl noted, they were interested in both 
achieving as much as possible in the RS in terms of ‘minority people’s rights’ and 
keeping the dominant position for the largest constituent people in the Federation.592
The Mrkovica-Sarajevo Agreement was signed on March 27, 2002,593 after a lot 
of arm-twisting by the HR.594 Both SDA and HDZ, however, failed to sign the 
agreement and Serb parties expressed serious reservations.595 While the agreement 
did not reflect the best possible interpretation of the CC decision,596 it did represent 
an acceptable compromise and had significant reverberations in the overall state 
building process in Bosnia.597 For example, the agreement prescribed that all 
constituent peoples and members of the group ‘Others’ be proportionally represented 
in the entities’ governments and public institutions.598 In particular, the agreement 
envisioned a minimum representation of the constituent peoples in the government of 
both the Federation and RS, including eight ministries (out of sixteen) from the 
largest constituent people, five from the second-largest group and three from the 
smallest one. Most significantly, it stated that such proportionality should follow the 
1991 census until such time as Annex 7 [on refugee return] was fully implemented,599
590 Neussl 2004.
591 Neussl 2004,68-69.
592 Ibid.
593 Bieber argues that the two meetings held in Mrakovica and Sarajevo in January and February 
2002 represented the first meetings in which all of the main parties in Bosnia met “independently of 
international supervision” (Bieber 2004,82).
594 HR Petritsch admits that the parties found common ground “After long negotiations and 
admittedly a lot of arm-twisting by me” (Petritsch 2003, 358; see Perry 2002 for a discussion on the 
different options under consideration).
595 Bieber 2004b.
596 Serbs, for example, continued to be the dominant group in RS (see International Crisis
Group 2002b; Neussl 2004).
597 International Crisis Group 2002b. For a discussion of the implications of this constitutional 
reform see Bieber 2004b.
598 Public institutions include the ministries of the entity and cantonal governments, the cantonal 
and municipal governments, and the cantonal, district and municipal courts (see OHR 2002a and 
2002b).
599 See Office of the High Representative 2002a and 2002b. Following completion of Annex 7, 
each constituent people would have a minimum representation of 15 percent; two constituent people
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which represented a clear victory for the positions of both Croats and Bosniaks. It 
was also prescribed that the House of Peoples in the Federation and the newly created 
Council of Peoples in RS (on Vital National interest issues) would be formed on a 
parity basis so that all constituent peoples had the same number of representatives. 
These institutions were to include a number of delegates from the group ‘Others.’600 
New provisions were also included in the area of vital national interest in both 
entities, granting veto powers to all constituent peoples. Veto powers were, however, 
limited to a set of core domains, including the constitutional amendments, identity 
related matters, territorial organization, group protections, the public information 
system and the organization of public authorities, although the amendment permitted 
the extension of veto rights to other matters through parliamentary procedure.601
The Federation however failed to pass the necessary changes602 and The RS 
National Assembly chose to pass the agreement with additional technical language 
that undermined both the letter and spirit of the agreement.603 This resulted in a 
scenario in which the HR had to impose the agreement upon both entities on 19 April 
of 2002, prior to the deadline set up by the Constitution to introduce constitutional 
changes.604 Eventually, those opposed to the constitutional changes accepted the 
decision “while seeking to slow down the implementation, as had been the general 
approach towards most international reform initiatives.”605 Ultimately, although the
would have a minimum representation of 35 percent (Neussl 2004).
600 See Office of the High Representative 2002c. Some of the provisions contained in the 
amendments have not had the expected results. As a case in point, the spots reserved for ‘others’ have 
often been used for members of the constituent peoples (see Bieber 2006b), and the position of the 
Bosniak and Croat vice presidency in RS has no enjoyed real competences.
601 See OHR 2002b.
602 The House of Peoples was able to adopt the changes on 18 April 2002 thanks to the majority 
held by the members of the ‘Alliance for changes’ in this chamber. The House of Representatives 
however failed to reach a two third majority, some argue in response to the RS National Assembly’s 
approval of technical changes that undermined the agreement. SDA abstained and members of HDZ 
walked out the assembly prior to the vote (Neussl 2004).
603 Most of the technical changes introduced by the RS National Assembly on April 4 were 
aimed at weakening the ‘asymmetry’ nature of the new institutional arrangement. The Croat and 
Bosniak vice presidents in RS would not be directly elected, and the governmental representation of 
Bosniak and Croat would be limited to a 15 percent threshold (Bieber 2004b). The Council of Peoples 
(CoP) was also greatly weakened. The technical changes introduced by the RSNA, for example, 
allowed the RS president to dissolve the CoP with the approval of the vice-presidents. If the vice- 
presidents were not to concur, the president could seek approval of the RS Constitutional Court. The 
problem with this clause is that the amendments did not secure the organization of the RS CC on a 
parity basis (International Crisis Group 2002c, 19), which gave the Serbs the final word on the 
dissolution of the CoP without the consent of the other two constituent peoples (see International 
Crisis Group 2002c).
604 In fact, HR Petritsch had to intervene to change the deadline for the introduction of 
constitutional changes from 170 to 169 days (see OHR 2002f).
605 Bieber 2004b, 83.
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reform was welcomed by internationals given the success in achieving equal 
representation of individuals throughout the territory of Bosnia,606 Florian Bieber has 
noted that the proliferation of new power sharing arrangements rendered Bosnia 
“more, rather than less, complex.”607 In fact, the reform did not resolve one its 
original goals, namely resolving the tensions between individual and group rights. As 
a matter of fact, as Bieber has noted, “it actually accentuate[d] the predominance of 
group representation over individual rights.”608 The process also brought to light the 
still fundamentally antagonistic views of the different actors, and the shortcomings 
involved in a locally driven reform process.
4.12. Constitutional Debates in 2000-2004
A debate on the future of Dayton ran parallel to the entities’ constitutional reform 
process, but no action was taken at the time. The political developments that took 
place in 2000 and 2001, including the breakdown of “extra-constitutional power 
structures” and the formation of the first non-nationalist government at the state level 
in 2001, triggered a discussion on the future of the Bosnian state within both 
domestic and international circles.609 The CoE, for example, became one of the key 
advocates of the revision of the Dayton constitution; making a clear case for 
constitutional changes at the time Bosnia was accepted as a member of the CoE in 
2001. Indeed, the explanatory memorandum of the CoE’s opinion on Bosnia’s 
admission610 stated: “The Dayton Agreement was intended to set up the conditions 
for peace. Six years after their adoption one can ask oneself whether the time has not 
come to revise them in order to adapt them to the situation and in particular to 
strengthen the common institutions.”611
This opinion reflected a growing consensus within international circles that a
606 Internationals also welcomed the reform because it rendered the entities, especially RS, less 
effective vis-a-vis the state (Bieber 2004b).
607 Bieber 2006b, 21. See also Bose 2005.
608 Bieber 2004b, 84.
609 European Stability Initiative 2001,17. See for example Tomic-Malic 2000.
610 Bosnia had become special observer of the CoE in January 1994. It applied for membership 
on 10 April 1995, and the CoE committee of ministers invited the CoE parliamentary assembly to 
prepare an opinion on this request in January 1999. The opinion was presented in 2001 and 2002. 
Bosnia's admission to the CoE took place in April 2002.
611 Council of Europe 2001. Rapporteur Jaatteenmaki is referring to the situation of Bosnia at 
the time. It is important to note that the first non-nationalist government was formed in 2001. This 
event instilled strong optimism about the situation in Bosnia among internationals.
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more liberal arrangement attuned to European standards was needed in Bosnia in 
order to overcome ethnic divisions and to achieve progress in the process of 
accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions (namely NATO and the EU). The 
emergence of the first non-nationalist government in Bosnia in 2001 provided an 
incentive and served to empower this agenda at the time. In fact, the strengthening of 
the state level institutions in Bosnia, including a reform of the constitution (if 
necessary), became part of the post-admission CoE’s conditionality for Bosnia in 
2001. The CoE’s opinion on Bosnia’s admission stressed that “the state institutions 
should be strengthened at the expense of the institutions at entity level, if need be by 
a revision of the constitution.”612 The rationale behind this opinion was that if Dayton 
had created a weak state as the only possible solution to end the conflict, then the 
absence of violence six years later provided the framework for the creation of new 
institutional arrangements de-emphasizing ethnic guarantees and allowing for 
European assimilation.
Though a consensus within the international community began to grow around 
the idea of revising Dayton; no agreement was reached on the questions of how and 
when it would be appropriate to do so. The return of the nationalists to power in the 
fall of 2002 represented a significant stumbling block and served to undermine 
momentum relating to the issue of constitutional reform. There were no substantial 
initiatives until 2004. During the intervening time, HR Petritsch was succeeded by 
HR Ashdown in May 2002 (immediately after the imposition of the ‘constituent 
peoples’ decision), and the latter undertook a new state building approach based upon 
an incremental strategy. In other words, rather than devoting external efforts to 
engage in an all-encompassing, large-scale reform of Dayton, Ashdown adopted a 
strategy based on a functional, step-by-step process of institutional strengthening at 
the state level. As Ashdown put it, “Our strategy has been to follow a functional 
approach -  moving from one key sector to the next -  redressing the deficits of the
Council of Europe 2002. In another resolution relating to the monitoring of Bosnia’s 
compliance with the admission requirements, the CoE went so far as to call on the Bosnian authorities 
to engage in a constructive dialogue on constitutional reform (Council of Europe 2004a). The CoE 
stated, “The Assembly stresses that the functioning of the complex political and institutional system 
set up by the Dayton agreements requires a higher degree of mutual readiness for dialogue and 
consensus and, most importantly, a sense of common interest. While it appears that the time is not yet 
ripe for changing the existing constitutional set up -  widely acknowledged as excessively complicated 
-  the Assembly nevertheless calls on the domestic authorities and the political forces in the country to 
engage in a constructive dialogue on this issue” (Ibid).
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Dayton structure by streamlining and unifying institutions.”613 This approach was 
made possible by the discretionary use of Article 3.5 of the Bosnian constitution and 
the perceived influence of the EU; giving the international community the 
opportunity to use soft power in order to cajole domestic actors into strengthening the 
central government614 as part of the EU-required reforms.615 A single customs service 
was implemented, together with an integrated tax system, a state-level intelligence 
agency and a unified armed force under the exclusive command and control of the 
state-level government.
The fact that no concrete initiatives were launched at the local level during this 
period does not mean that political and social actors were not vocal in the 
constitutional debate. This engagement was foremost one-sided, however, and failed 
to involve the major political forces in the country constructively. SBiH, for example, 
run the 2000 elections on a platform on the elimination of the entities.616 Drazen 
Budisa, president of the Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance, also proposed in 2001 to 
transform Bosnia into a federal State of twelve or fourteen cantons, and to extend the 
institutional arrangement of the Federation to the whole country.617 Both the 
international community and officials from RS rejected these proposals.618
Various academic debates and civil society discussions on constitutional reform 
developed at this time too, foremost among Bosniak circles, especially after the 
return of the nationalists to power in 2002. Some of these debates advanced the idea 
of a federal republic, implicitly envisioning the elimination of the entities.619 These 
initiatives were however unrealistic given the lack of cross-ethnic consensus around
Ashdown 2004. Paddy Ashdown is referring to Dayton’s failure to create a functioning state. 
Indeed, according to Ashdown, the Dayton agreement represented a good framework for ending the 
war, but almost no attention was paid to creating a functioning state (see Ashdown 2007, 99). As he 
stated, “Dayton had given Bosnia peace, but in the process it had created a monster in Bosnia ... two 
entities, the Federation ... and Republika Srpska, each with their own police, health structures, 
education ministries, etc ... We could not change all of this during my mandate. But we could change 
enough of it, I believe, to create the beginnings of a light-level state structure that could qualify Bosnia 
for membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and start Bosnia on the road to Europe” (ibid, 321- 
322).
614 Indeed, the process of European integration required for Bosnia to develop as a coherent and 
functional state (see discussion in section two of this chapter).
615 Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa have argued that “This strategy sought to use the desire of 
most politicians in Bosnia’s three predominant ethnic groups to 'join Europe' as a catalyst for change 
and conflict resolution. If embedded in the twin Brussels-based Euro-Atlantic institutions of NATO 
and the EU, BiH could overcome, or at least ameliorate, some of the structural geopolitical 
disadvantages it suffered as a state” (Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa 2006,64).
616 See VukoviC 2000; Bieber 2006b.
617 Bieber 2002.
618 Ibid.
619 See for example Find 2004.
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the idea of a civic, multi-ethnic state.
4.13. Initial Steps (2004-2005)
Though there were no significant initiatives to reform the constitution between 2002 
and 2004, the debate on the revision of Dayton carried on at both the domestic and 
international levels in 2004 with some momentum towards the end of that year. The 
CoE, for example, continued to monitor the process of Bosnia’s post-accession 
requirements; which were largely centered on the need for Bosnia to strengthen state 
level institutions and to provide a better legal framework for the protection of human 
rights. In that vein, the CoE parliamentary assembly asked the Venice Commission in 
2004 to make a comprehensive assessment as to the conformity of the Bosnian 
constitution with respect to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and The European Charter of Local Self-Government. 
The Venice Commission was also asked to report on the efficiency and rationality of 
the constitutional and legal arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This opinion 
was released in March of 2005; only weeks after the beginning of the preliminary 
constitutional talks.
Parallel to the aforementioned development, various formal domestic initiatives 
on constitutional reform were put forward in 2004,621 The SDA was the first party to 
present an initiative of this nature to the parliament on March 22,2004. The proposal 
encompassed six amendments; including issues of human rights, dual citizenship and 
a redefinition of the election law in relation to the House of Peoples and the 
presidency (the initiative proposed the President be elected by a single national 
ballot).622 On March 31,2004, the HDZ proposal was presented, circumscribed to the 
adoption of a public debate on constitutional changes in order to create a more 
functioning state in line with EU requirements and standards. The last and two most 
comprehensive proposals -  equaling a radical overhaul of Dayton -  totaled 18 
amendments and were presented by the SDP on March 31 and Sept 9, 2004. These 
included, inter alia, an initiative to create a civic state, the organization of Bosnia as
620 Council of Europe 2004b.
621 Prior to these initiatives, the European Stability Initiative launched a federal proposal for
Bosnia. This initiative triggered an initial public debate on constitutional changes (see European 
Stability Initiative 2004a; European Stability Initiative 2004b).
622 This information is based on material provided to the author by Donald Hays.
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a secular state, the abolishment of the entities, the transformation of Bosnia into a 
viable state divided into regions, the strengthening of the council of ministers, and 
the introduction of indirect elections for a single president. None of these initiatives 
garnered any traction however, with the exception of the Croat initiative. Indeed, a 
public debate took place on June 15,2004 to discuss the functionality of the state but 
was quickly stymied by a Serb boycott. In effect, the parties held several aborted 
discussions on constitutional matters in 2004, but were never able to obtain the 
necessary support of the Serb parties, who failed to engage in the constitutional 
debate.623 This process was further impaired by a lack of uniformity in the approach 
taken by the parties of the federation.624
Pursuant to the failure of constitutional initiatives in the House of 
Representatives, the Bosniak and Croat party leaders Sulejman Tihic and Barisa 
Colak turned to the international community in Bosnia. The US Ambassador to BiH, 
the OSCE representative in BiH and a number of European actors in Bosnia were 
asked for assistance to initiate a process of constitutional reform. Initially, the 
international response was lukewarm. Western diplomats revealed in personal 
interviews that the OHR and the broader international community were concerned 
that this process could interfere with the ongoing restructuring of the police forces.625 
UK Ambassador to BiH Matthew Rycroft recalled, “I remembered that Paddy 
[Ashdown] did not want to be involved. I asked him why and he said because he did 
not believe that it would succeed; he was more inclined to strengthen the state 
through specific reforms in particular areas.”626 Similarly, Hays stated in a personal 
interview that Ashdown was not inclined to initiate a process of constitutional reform 
and wanted to handle the process incrementally. “The HR had no authority to 
undertake the discussions of constitutional changes. His mandate was to support the 
Dayton constitution, but not to change it.”627 Indeed, as Ashdown stated himself: “It 
has consistently been the view of the PIC and successive High Representatives, 
including me, that, provided the Parties observe Dayton ... the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina should be changed only by the prescribed procedures by the
Author’s personal interviews with party officials. Sarajevo, May-July 2007.
624 Author’s personal Interview with Donald Hays. Washington, DC, 29 July 2006.
625 ibid; Author’s interviews with Sulejman Tihic and Western diplomats. Sarajevo, May-July 
2007.
626 Author’s personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007.
627 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington D.C., 29 July 2006.
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BiH parliamentary assembly and not by the international community. In other 
words, provided Dayton is observed, the powers of the High Representative begin 
and end with the Dayton texts, and that any alteration to the constitution enshrined 
therein is a matter for the people of BiH and their elected representatives to 
consider.”628
Ultimately, it was only the Principal Deputy High Representative (DPHR), US 
Ambassador Donald Hays, who, in a private capacity,629 assisted domestic parties in 
opening a process of constitutional negotiations; with the financial assistance of 
certain European countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland and Norway. A review of 
the state budget revealing dramatic shortfalls and serious potential consequences for 
fiscal sustainability630 convinced Donald Hays that “the time for change had 
arrived.”631 “I saw a niche for us to do something ... The only thing that could save 
the Bosnians temporarily was the introduction of the VAT in 2006 to cover the 
shortfall, and that is what actually happened ... but the other thing we realized is that 
the state was only about 60 percent formed ... and that showed a huge budget 
shortfall and a huge burden for the future.”632 Two additional factors influenced 
Hays’ willingness to facilitate constitutional negotiations; namely the prospect of 
open talks on a SAA, (the implementation would eventually require a more efficient 
state), and the PIC’s decision to begin the last phase of the mandate of the OHR633 
“With that in hand, I got Paddy [Ashdown] to support the idea that I would come 
back in an NGO capacity. I was assigned to USIP [the US Institute for Peace] and I 
came back as an expert of the NGO Dayton Peace accord Project. The Norwegians, 
Swedes and Swiss also embarked upon this project”, Hays stated in a personal 
interview; “[they] agreed to fund the NGO: ‘The Dayton Project’634 to support my
628 Ashdown 2004.
629 Donald Hays was no longer the DPHR when he engaged in constitutional negotiations.
630 As a result of this review, a fiscal sustainability study was carried out and presented to the
PIC in December 2004 (Material provided to the author by Donald Hays).
631 Donald Hays. “Letter to Bosnians: Your Leaders initiated Changes.” Balkan Insight, 17 
November 2005. Donald Hays is referring to a change of Dayton.
632 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington DC, 29 July 2006.
633 Hays 2005. The termination of the OHR had been fueled by the release of rather critical 
reports on the role of the HR and on the ongoing engagement of the international community without a 
clear exit strategy (see for example Knaus and Martin 2003; Council of Europe 2004b).
634 The ‘Dayton Project: Program for Civil Dialogue in B-H’ was established in early 2005 as
an NGO platform for the constitutional negotiations, funded primarily by the Norwegian, Swede and 
Swiss governments. The activities of this project included: (1) preparing a series of constitutional and 
governmental reform proposals (based on options currently in practice in the EU); (2) developing a 
strategic plan for establishing an ongoing dialogue between civil society and government officials 
regarding constitutional changes; (3) raising international awareness through ongoing briefings on
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engagement in this purpose.”635 Bruce Hitchner, from the Boston-based NGO, The 
Dayton Project, along with members of PILPG,636 Paul Williams and Meghan 
Stewart, joined Hays in his efforts; collectively comprising the ‘secretariat’ and 
responsible for assisting the parties at the negotiation table.638 Their main task was to 
provide comparative analyses of other countries’ constitutions for background 
purposes, and to help facilitate discussions at the negotiation table.
The US and the EU were only nominally supportive of the efforts at this 
juncture, and expressed a preference not to be directly involved until further progress 
was made.639 Fears relating to how this process may influence other state building 
efforts, coupled with a lack of willingness to accept responsibility for another 
diplomatic failure, precluded the direct involvement of major international actors 
during this phase.640 The European Delegation represented the only institutional actor 
demonstrating some level of support for this initiative, although it was expressed 
nominally, and in private meetings. As a case in point, following one of the first 
constitutional meetings on July 5-6, Hays met with the Head of EC delegation in 
Bosnia, Michael Humphreys, who expressed a willingness to be further involved as 
the process moved along. “They endorsed the process and indicated that assuming 
that the SAA [talks] begins in November or December ... they would be prepared to
reform efforts in Bosnia (Dayton Project BiH, December 2005, final project report. Material in 
author’s file).
635 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays, Washington D.C., 29 July 2006. Direct and 
indirect support for the process was ultimately undertaken by various institutions, governments and 
international organizations, including the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, Tufts University, the United States Institute of Peace, The European 
Commission, the EU, and the governments of the US, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland 
(Hitchner 2005).
636 See p. 47, footnote 158.
638 Hays met Prof. Bruce Hitchner, the director of the Boston-based NGO, The Dayton Peace
Accords Project, at a conference at Tufts University in mid October 2004 (author’s personal interview 
with Donald Hays, Washington DC, 29 July 2006). Paul Williams also attended this conference. It is 
reasonable to assume that initial talks on the possibility to undertake a process of constitutional reform 
in Bosnia were conducted among the three members of the secretariat at this conference.
639 According to various sources, the State Department gave a ‘green light’ to Donald Hays to
initiate a process of constitutional reform in Bosnia in a private capacity. It was agreed that he would
take full responsibility in the event that the process resulted in failure, and that the US would be ready 
to intervene if a certain level of consensus was reached. Donald Hays was thus assigned to the US 
Institute for Peace (USIP) after the end of his mandate as DPHR in BiH, and came back to Bosnia in 
early 2005 to facilitate the process through the newly created NGO Dayton Project.
640 Some domestic actors also showed skepticism. The Director of the Directorate for European 
Integration in BiH, Osman TopCagic, asserted that Hays talked to him at the end of 2004 “on possible 
constitutional changes, how to do it, who should participate and so on ... I suggested Hays to wait 
until the Stabilization and Association Agreement was signed, hoping that its signing would create a 
better situation for constitutional changes ... but again they proceeded and I think that it went, I can 
say, surprisingly well” (author’s personal interview with Osman Topcagic. Sarajevo, 2 July 2007).
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[tie the process of European integration to constitutional changes]. They said that a 
functioning government was in fact a precondition [for European accession].”641 
Other European institutions were less enthusiastic about the initiative however, 
including the Council of the EU. Following upon Ashdown’s position on 
constitutional changes, EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana had publicly declared 
at the end of December 2004, “I do not think it would be a good idea to open Dayton 
again at this moment. Of course, if there is an agreement between the three sides on 
some arrangements or solutions [as in the case of police reform], I would not be 
against i t ... [but] I very much hope that as time goes by you will have the discipline 
and the energy to do this alone, without the need for pressure and impulse from the 
international community.”642
42. THE RATIONALE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The origins and rationale for constitutional reform in Bosnia need to be understood 
within the framework outlined in the previous chapter; namely the EU-shaped State 
building process in Bosnia and its failed record in the face of ongoing inter-ethnic 
divisions. Until the initiation of the process of constitutional reform, the international 
community had taken a functional, incremental approach towards state building. The 
goal was to strengthen state-level institutions on a case-by-case basis in order to 
make the Bosnian state more functional. This process, however, became bogged 
down by the complex institutional structure in place, and the failure of domestic 
actors to overcome ethnic divisions and engage in the reform process. The idea of 
constitutional reform represented both a response to the failed reform-related 
dynamics, and a renewed effort at amending the institutional deficiencies inherited 
from Dayton. More specifically, these deficiencies centered around: (1) a complex 
and slow decision making process; (2) a dysfunctional state, stripped of key 
competences to prepare the country for EU integration, and (3) contradictions 
contained within the constitution vis-a-vis the outline of both group and individual
641 Dayton Project, July trip report, 2005 (material in author’s file). Michael Humphreys also 
argued that tying the accession framework to the process of constitutional reform was discussed at 
some point, but that there was not enough consensus to do so at the time (author’s phone interview 
with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009).
642 Javier Solana, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 3 December 2004.
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rights.
The specific rationale for constitutional reform in Bosnia took the form of public 
statements by European officials and the CoE via the Venice Commission’s opinion 
of the Bosnian constitution.643 The justification focused on three broader areas of 
reform; namely the institutional framework, the ethno socio-political structures and 
the economy.
The first, and most salient rationale, related to the institutional deficits contained 
in the constitution. These were argued to have led to a dysfunctional state incapable 
of responding to both the needs of the Bosnian society644 and the requirements for EU 
accession.645 Two key institutional factors were identified as particularly problematic; 
the lack of key competences at the state level, and the heavy dependency of the state 
upon the cooperation of the entities. The introduction of laws with further regulatory 
functions and the externally induced transfer of competences from the entities to 
state-level institutions after Dayton provided the state with some credibility, but the 
result became an intricate institutional collage that lacked a rational and functional 
structure. Indeed, most of the institutional transfers to the state have been the result of 
compromises, resulting in “a complex system of overlapping and unclear divisions of 
responsibility and authority that allows state, entity and other institutions to coexist 
without clear hierarchy” and without the required mechanisms for cooperation among 
the different layers of authority.646
In addition to the lack of functional capabilities, another set of institutional 
contradictions and inconsistencies was identified by the Venice Commission. These 
included an underpowered government, an imprecise description of the vital national
643 As noted above, the Venice Commission Opinion (2005) was issued in response to a CoE 
request in 2004 to report on the Bosnia’s progress in compliance with the CoE’s post-accession 
requirements. Though the opinion was issued after the process of constitutional reform had been 
initiated, it became the immediate frame of reference for the negotiations.
644 A survey conducted in 2007 by UNDP indicated that more than half of the population in 
Bosnia (50.3%) believed that Dayton had not been effective (see table 1.1).
645 A European official argued in a personal interview that harmonizing the Bosnian legal 
system to European standards would likely require enacting 100 to 150 laws per week. Slovenia, for 
example, enacted, on average, 1200 laws in 2003 prior to its entry into the EU (see Anes Alic. 
“Crawling towards Europe.” Transitions Online, 22 July 2004). The BiH parliament, however, 
enacted, on average, 60 laws per year in 2002-2005 (see OHR BiH Media Round-up, December 12, 
2005). In 2007, 27 laws were merely passed at the state level, out of the 135 laws that had been 
foreseen for that period (see Topic 2008).
646 Foreign Policy Initiative 2007, 19. Keating argues that in comparison to other federal and 
complex systems, Bosnia is missing “a set of mechanisms for cooperation between the levels and for 
dealing with new issues. ... Other federations have complex mechanisms at both political and 
administrative levels to secure joint working and co-operation on common problems” (Keating 2006).
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interest veto, a vague allocation of competences between different institutions 
without the provision of subsidiary mechanisms, and a bicameral system with 
overlapping competences. In relation to the bicameral system, for example, the 
Venice Commission recommended the elimination of the House of Peoples. In 
particular, it advocated “to move the exercise of the vital interest veto to the House of 
Representatives and abolish the House of Peoples. This would streamline procedures 
and facilitate the adoption of legislation without endangering the legitimate interests 
of any people. It would also solve the problem of the discriminatory composition of 
the House of Peoples.”647 As for the collective presidency, the Venice Commission 
argued that it was redundant in relation to the executive authorities already in place. 
In the words of the Venice Commission, “At the top of the executive there is already 
one collegiate body, the council of ministers, and adding a second collegiate body 
does not seem conducive to effective decision-making. This creates a risk of 
duplication of decision-making processes and it becomes difficult to distinguish the 
powers of the council of ministers and of the presidency.”648 The Venice Commission 
thus favored the strengthening of the council of ministers, at the expense of the 
presidency, which would be instituted as a single president. Furthermore, the ethnic- 
and entity-based election of the members of the presidency was rather contentious. 
The Venice Commission summarized the institutional problem as follows:
“With such a weak [central] state Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be 
able to make much progress on the way towards European integration.
The negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the 
EU requires institutions at the State level with the necessary capacity 
and expertise to deal with the wide range of issues covered by such 
agreements. The EU will want to have a single interlocutor and 
definitely not be willing to negotiate with the two Entities separately.
BiH will need the necessary legislative powers to create the conditions 
for the conclusion of such an agreement and to implement it. And, not 
least, BiH will be expected to ensure the effective implementation of 
such an agreement within both Entities. At present, the State level is not 
able to effectively ensure compliance with the commitments of the 
country with respect to the Council of Europe and the international
647 Ibid, para. 36.
648 Venice Commission 2005, para. 38.
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community in general. With respect to the EU it is unthinkable that BiH 
can make real progress with the present constitutional arrangements. The 
EU will not countenance the kind of delay, indecision and uncertainty 
that a multiplicity of governments entails.”649
The second rationale for constitutional reform related to Dayton’s emphasis on ethnic 
guarantees. This issue was inflammatory, given the deep ethnic divisions and the 
reluctance of ethnic groups to voluntarily renounce their secured formal and informal 
safeguards.650 This argument had two major components. On the one hand, it was 
related to governmental ineffectiveness resulting from the many provisions aimed at 
protecting ethnic interests651 It was argued that the highly fragmented system in 
Bosnia had not only rendered the figure of the HR essential in holding the system 
together (which is contrary to the process of EU integration, given the emphasis on 
domestic ownership and full sovereignty) (see table 4.1), but also slowed down the 
decision-making process to the point of outright paralysis. Indeed, European officials 
have argued that harmonization with European standards requires a faster-paced law 
enactment system than the one in place 652 As the Venice Commission pointed out, 
state level institutions “are not efficient and rational but cumbersome and with too 
many possibilities of blocking the taking of any decision.”653
649 Venice Commission 2005, pa. 26. The commission recommended “a comprehensive and not a 
piecemeal transfer of responsibilities and a transfer not only of legislative powers but also of executive 
agencies and financial resources” (ibid, pa. 27).
650 At the core of this issue lay the contradictions contained in the constitution between group
and individual rights; a rather nebulous issue to handle in deeply divided societies. In the words of the 
Venice Commission, the constitution “enshrines too many prerogatives for group rights and not 
enough for individual rights enshrined in EU Charters.” In particular, the CoE identified a clear 
contradiction in the Bosnian constitution, namely “the antithesis between democracy and what some 
experts term 'ethnocracy' ... The fundamental principle legitimating state authority is protection of the 
interests of the 'constituent peoples' ... rather than of common interests. This contradiction is the main 
reason for political obstruction and, consequently, for the common institutions' ineffectiveness” 
(Council of Europe 2004d, para. 13).
651 It should be noted that this agreement was the ‘price’ for keeping the country united. 
International officials have always argued that Dayton was the only possible arrangement for keeping 
Bosnia together and ending the conflict (see for example Holbrooke 1998; see also Ashdown 2007). 
Neither partition nor a unitary state were ever considered viable options for Bosnia.
652 Author’s personal interviews with EU officials. Brussels, June 2006; Sarajevo, June-July
2007.
653 The Venice Commission noted, “there are many provisions ensuring the protection of the
interests of the constituent peoples, inter alia: the vital interest veto in the parliamentary assembly, the 
two chamber system and the collective presidency on an ethnic basis. The combined effect of these 
provisions makes effective government extremely difficult, if not impossible. Hitherto the system has 
more or less functioned due to the paramount role of the High Representative. This role is however not 
sustainable” (Venice Commission 2005, para. 29).
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Although the different veto mechanisms available to ethnic groups have been 
used rarely, especially in reference to the Vital National Interest Veto, the Venice 
Commission argued that they “entail a serious risk of blocking decision-making,”654 
especially as a result of the opportunity they present for the exercise of other informal 
veto practices. Indeed, as Florian Bieber argues, the rare usage of formal veto 
mechanisms is not an adequate measure of their effects; “the threat of the use of veto 
powers and other requirements for decision making (quora, reserved seats in 
parliament) pre-empt decisions from being taken which might be vetoed”655 (as a 
case in point, the government and the House of Peoples can be paralyzed by the non- 
attendance of ministers from one constituent people656). While the use of these 
informal veto mechanisms have been significantly decreased over the past few 
years,657 the use of these practices and/or the threat of the use of veto powers pose a 
big burden on the functionality of state level institutions, at a time when Bosnia is 
required “to adopt and implement a heavy legislative agenda” attached to the SAA.658 
One of the most problematic provisions in this area is the entity voting in the House 
of Representatives, which, in contrast to the national veto in the House of Peoples, 
fails to provide legislators with a mechanism to overcome a stalemate. This 
mechanism, in which decisions in the lower chamber required the approval of at least 
one-third of the members of each entity, provides Serb delegates a powerful tool with 
which to block decisions at the State level; thus making EU accession unfeasible.
Ibid, para. 31.
655 Bieber 2006b, 21. Bieber argues that in fact “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a key example of the 
impact of informal veto,” given the “asymmetrical” commitment among the different ethnic groups to 
the state and the functioning of state level institutions (ibid). The asymmetrical commitment to the 
state is especially relevant given the numerous blockage opportunities that ethnic groups enjoy from 
both informal and formal veto mechanisms.
656 RS representatives, for example, refused to attend most state level institutions during 1996 
and 1997, and were only persuaded to do so following strong arm-twisting by the international 
community (Foreign Policy Initiative 2007). The longest boycott happened in 2001 (from March to 
October) when HDZ representatives failed to attend the parliament to protest against the sanctions 
imposed by the OHR upon the HDZ as a result of the attempt to hold a referendum on a third entity in 
2000 (ibid).
657 Serb deputies boycotted the parliament for almost a month in the Spring of 2006, “in 
response to the failure of the council of ministers to establish a commission for investigating crimes 
allegedly carried out in Sarajevo during the war”, and Bosniaks boycotted the council of ministers to 
prevent the adoption of “amendments to a decision on the quality of liquid petroleum fuels, pushed by
the RS government” (Foreign Policy Initiative 2007, 33). The Foreign Policy Initiative argues 
however that it is difficult to have a precise measurement of informal boycotts, given that 
governmental decisions are often not taken due to the absence of a quorum (ibid).
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Table 4.1. Decisions Issued by the High Representative (1996-2009)
Year Number of
Decisions659
1996 0
1997 1
1998 29
1999 90
2000 86
2001 54
2002 153
2003 96
2004 154660
2005 91
2006 57
2007 37
2008 12
2009* 8
Total 868
Source: Author from the Office of the High Representative (www.ohr.inf): 
*As of 31 July 2009
Notwithstanding the problems associated with these ethnic safeguards, the 
international rhetoric on constitutional change focused primarily on streamlining the 
decision-making process in Bosnia, with no specific language referring to either 
entity voting, or the internal organization of Bosnia. As the Venice Commission 
stated in 2005 in reference to ethnic safeguards, “A balance has indeed to be struck 
between the need to protect the interests of all constituent peoples on the one hand 
and the need for effective government on the other.”661 A different course of action, 
such as a process revolving around the elimination of Serb safeguards, would likely 
have encountered strong resistance (especially by the Serbs) and been doomed to 
failure. In recognition of this political reality, international officials merely noted that 
entity voting “appears redundant [with] regard to the existence of the vital interest 
veto.”662 The international community however did not go so far as to expressly and
The lift o f the bans on public officials represent 30 in 2005; 20 in 2006; 2 in 2007; and 2 in
2008;
Arguments for constitutional reform were put forth at the peak of the use of the Bonn Powers 
with Paddy Ashdown. After his administration, the international community favored domestic 
ownership in order to infer a sense of political responsibility (and to respond to the criticism targeted 
against the HR’s unchecked powers). Schwarz Schilling’s mandate was based on this premise, but the 
new strategy failed to wield the expected results. The downsizing of the use o f the Bonn powers has 
however continued, as shown in table 4.1.
661 Venice Commission 2005, para. 29.
662 Venice Commission 2005, para. 34.
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publicly recommend its outright elimination. In terms of the territorial organization 
in Bosnia, the Venice Commission acknowledged the problematic division of Bosnia 
into two entities, but stated that “the option of abolishing the entities does not seem 
to be available for the foreseeable future and structural reform will have to take place 
within the [Federation].”663
Another key deficit lay in the area of human rights, especially with respect to the 
violation of international legal standards. Though the Bosnian constitution claimed to 
ensure “the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,”664 and incorporated a number of international agreements,665 certain 
constitutional provisions were purported to contravene the spirit and letter of such 
domestically recognized standards. These controversial provisions included the fact 
that members of the group ‘others’ were not eligible for election to the members of 
the presidency, contravening the European Charter on Human Rights.666 Furthermore, 
as the Venice Commission noted, “the interests of persons not belonging to the three 
constituent peoples risk being neglected or people are forced to artificially identify 
with one of the three peoples although they may for example be of mixed origin or 
belong to a different category.”667 It would appear in hindsight that the human rights 
issues could have been more easily resolved through minor changes to the 
constitution, as opposed to major reforms.
The third argument put forward by the international community related to the 
costs associated with Bosnia’s multiple layers of government.668 The World Bank
Ibid, para. 46.
664 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Art.2.1.
665 These include the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its protocols (DPA 
Annex 4, art. H.2), and other international conventions laid out in an appendix to Annex 4,
666 According to the International Crisis Group (1999, 58), the ‘others’ (national minorities that
do not define themselves as either Bosniak, Serb or Croat) constituted 8 percent of the population 
before the war. More specifically, 5.5. percent perceived of themselves as Yugoslavs and 2.4 percent 
as ‘others’ in the 1991 census. “Although both entity parliaments contain minorities, the Republika 
Srpska National Assembly is only allowed to elect Serbs to the BiH House of peoples in spite of the 
fact that only 53% of Republika Srpska’s pre-war population was Serb” (ibid, 61).
667 Venice Commission 2005, pa. 43. The protection of marginal groups became an important 
issue on the agenda of the international community, especially among European institutions. This 
issue, however, could have been easily addressed with minor amendments to the constitution.
668 BiH’s institutional and political structures are composed of three constituent peoples, two
entities, ten cantons (within the borders of the Federation), one special district (Brcko), fourteen prime 
ministers, over 180 ministers, 760 members of legislative bodies, 148 municipalities, and three official 
languages with two alphabets in a country of 4 million people (Council of Europe 2004c). 
Furthermore, each entity has its own constitution, government, a bi-cameral parliament, an army, a 
judiciary (including supreme and constitutional courts) system as well as its own education, tax and 
customs systems. Some of these redundant structures were eliminated, as a result of the reform process 
induced by the international community. As a case in point, Bosnian politicians signed an agreement
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stated that the government structure in Bosnia is “complex and expensive.”669 In its 
2006 report, it noted that although “BiH’s fiscal position has improved significantly 
since the end of the w ar,... substantial issues remain unresolved with the potential to 
seriously undermine fiscal sustainability and prospects for improving living 
standards. These issues include inefficient duplication and fragmentation of 
government functions, poor quality of government services and an inefficient 
structure of government spending. Coordination mechanisms among the state and 
the entities, crucial for setting, executing and monitoring fiscal policy, remain 
underdeveloped.”670 In fact, government spending in 2004 appeared “high and the 
composition of expenditures does not appear to be growth-enhancing.”671 These costs 
represented more than 50 percent of GDP annually at the state level (see table 4.1), 
and slightly higher at the Federation level.672
Table 42.  Government Spending, 2004 (in % of GDP)
Spending Goods & 
Services
Subsidies &
Social
Transfers
Capital Interest
Bosnia 52.6 25.7 19.7 6.0 0.7
SEE
Average673
42.8 17.1 16.9 5.0 1.7
Estonia 37.1 21.1 12.9 2.9 0.2
Ireland 32.7 14.8 12.2 3.6 1.2
Chile 22.1 - 6.6 2.1. 1.0
Source: World Bank 2006 from IMF and World Bank staff calculations.
A Fiscal study undertaken by the OHR at the end of 2004 revealed an imminent 
fiscal crisis at both the state and Federation levels, which triggered a debate among 
both international and local actors at the time. Donald Hays presented the key points
to unify military forces and create a unified Ministry of Defense in 2005.
669 See for example the World Bank 2002 and 2006.
670 World Bank 2006. This report is based on 2004 figures.
671 Ibid, 2.
672 See World Bank 2002 and 2006. Government spending on wages in 2002 was above 30 
percent in BiH and 35 percent in the Federation, much higher than in neighboring countries such as 
Macedonia (15 percent), Croatia (less than 20 percent) or Slovakia at 5 percent (see World Bank 2002, 
35). The situation in the Federation is further complicated by the fact that each canton has its own 
constitution, government and cantonal assembly and exclusive competences, for example in the fields 
of education and internal affairs.
673 Though social transfers in Bosnia were similar to the levels in neighboring countries, the World 
Bank noted that they were poorly managed; “Untargeted veterans’ benefits consume a 
disproportionate share of public resources, with outlays as a share of GDP six times larger than in 
neighboring Croatia. Social welfare and child assistance programs, by contrast, appear underfunded” 
(World Bank 2006,24).
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on ‘Fiscal Constraints in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ at the PIC Steering Board meeting 
in December 2004, where Bosnian authorities were urged to address “the nature and 
severity of the fiscal challenge facing Bosnia and Herzegovina”.674 As Hays stated, 
“The inefficiency, duplication and sheer waste embodied in the cantonal and entity 
administrations -  with their separate educational systems and police forces, invalid 
veterans and pensions’ funds, health care systems, etc. -  simply cost too much to 
maintain. The overall fixed costs at each level of government are like a dead weight 
on our state-building enterprise.675 He continued, “We can be virtually certain ... that 
the state’s share will be insufficient to provide full funding for state institutions much 
less keep pace with its growing obligations.”676
The presentation of these data increased the sense of urgency for change.677 As 
underscored by former Constitutional Court judge and former advisor to Schwarz- 
Schilling on constitutional matters Joseph Marko, “Given the state of the private 
economy which is still aid dependent instead of (foreign) investment driven, BiH 
cannot afford such an exaggerated institutional system based on the territorial 
delimitation plus ethnic divide which is, moreover, mostly ineffective to render the 
necessary public services.”678 Nevertheless, the economic argument (together with 
the ethnic-based argument) never featured high during the constitutional negotiations. 
Although both the economic and ethnic arguments seem valid from a financial and 
liberal standpoint, the maintenance of a system of institutional duplicity and ethnic 
safeguards seem to represent a necessary cost of peace in deeply divided societies.679 
Streamlining the decision making process to prepare the country for the accession
Peace implementation Council 2004.
675 The fiscal study argued that the new revenue flows, including the introduction the Single 
Account in January 2005 (which would provide the state with combined customs revenues, excise and 
sales taxes) and the Value Added Tax (VAT) in January 2006, would not satisfy “ever-increasing 
demands to fund the existing state, let alone its future growth” (Donald Hays. “Fiscal Constraints on 
State Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Talking points at PIC meeting. 2 December 2004. 
Material in author’s file).
676 Ibid. Hays also noted, “If Bosnian officials fail to address these issues in the near term (next 
eighteen months to two years), first the Federation will run up significant arrears until it can no longer 
pay its civil servants’ salaries, cover its veterans’ benefits and feed its soldiers. ... Given their 
mounting problems, the entities will be unwilling and unable to provide the funds the state needs to 
meet its financial obligations” (ibid, 3-4). This fiscal projection has in fact proven right. In May 2008, 
Federation Finance Minister Vjekoslav Bevanda announced that the Federation would face bankruptcy 
in October 2008 (see “Bosnia: The Bankruptcy Vote.” ISA Consulting. 8 May 2008). As of May 2009, 
Bosnia has secured a 1.2 pillion euro loan with the IMF to help assist the country during the crisis. The 
IMF loan has been conditioned on the agreement to cut down government expenses, especially in 
referent to social transfers to veterans.
677 Author’s interview with Donald Hays. Washington D.C. 29 July 2006.
678 Marko 2005/06.
679 See Hughes 2009.
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process seemed a more aseptic, efficient approach as opposed to stripping ethnic 
communities of highly valued group rights and positions of influence.
The presentation of this three-tiered rationale reflected a consensus within the 
international community that Bosnia could only make progress in political, economic 
and social reform, through a revision of Dayton.680 This view represented a holistic 
approach to the situation in Bosnia, in that the institutions, economy and culture were 
reinforcing one another and collectively serving to perpetuate the inherent 
problems.681 Effectively, state building, economic development, and ethnic 
reconciliation, were component parts of the same problem; a problem closely linked 
to the institutions and structure established through Dayton.
While the reform of Dayton was conceptually appropriate in light of the inherent 
institutional problems, there were numerous problems associated with the approach 
of the international community. First of all, there was a clear discrepancy between 
the holistic understanding of the political, social and institutional deficits in Bosnia 
and the proposed constitutional solution. The suggested changes, in fact, neglected to 
adequately address a largely unresolved issue in Bosnia since the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, namely the highly disputed nature of the Bosnian state and the pervasive 
lack of inter-ethnic cooperation. Could the limited constitutional changes envisioned 
be sufficient to promote long-term stability in Bosnia in the absence of a broader 
consensus framework over the future form of the state? Could a simple institutional 
reshuffle provide the right framework in Bosnia for both assuaging ethnic divisions 
and distrust and promoting inter-ethnic cooperation?682 Would constitutional changes 
be a sufficient step to overcoming the recurring problem of implementation in the 
context of the reform process?
The second problem related to the liberal connotations associated with the 
rationale for constitutional change, and in a milieu of deep inter-ethnic mistrust.
680 This school of thought gained support as international withdrawal became more likely. Two 
key factors fueled the debate surrounding the termination of the OHR. First, the developments in 
Kosovo in 1999 and other international commitments (i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq). Second, heightened 
criticism of the role of the international community in Bosnia after 2003 from Western observers who 
questioned the extensive powers of the OHR (see Chandler 1999; Knaus and Martin 2003).
681 Marsic and Marko 2007.
682 Bieber for example notes that one of the key challenges in post-conflict divided societies is 
to promote inter-ethnic cooperation through institutional design. In his words, “the key difficulty 
arises from the fact that representation is considerably easier to achieve through constitutional design 
than cooperation. While representation is a prerequisite for participation, it does not necessarily lead to 
cooperation between the representatives of the different communities. It is here that a tool to change 
both the political elites and the political choices of the population is necessary in order to alter the 
patterns of cooperation and conflict in these societies” (Bieber 2005,100-101).
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Although the rationale was far from presenting a radical overhaul of the institutional 
arrangement in place, the international community’s concept of constitutional reform 
symbolized the transformation of Dayton’s ethnic divisions into a new era of EU 
standards. At the core of this approach was the liberal notion that economic and 
social stabilization, through European integration, could bring peace dividends and, 
in turn, serve to undermine group divisions. While this concept might hold true in 
relatively homogenous societies, deeply divided societies are likely to respond 
differently to liberal ideas of social and economic integration; especially in light of 
the recent conflict. The problem with the international approach was thus directly 
tied to a divergent understanding of the Dayton framework between domestic and 
external actors. While the international community had grown increasingly frustrated 
with the complex structures and slow decision making process, believing that the 
highly ethnicized system established in Dayton was to blame for the stalemate in the 
country, domestic actors continued to be deeply divided and were not ready to move 
beyond this arrangement, especially within the most radical sectors. This mismatch 
had important reverberations in terms of the conduct of the negotiations. Would 
ethnic groups be willing to forego their rights and safeguards without first redefining 
the broader framework for ethic balance in Bosnia? Would they be ready to change 
the rules of the game, now that they have learned to control and exploit them?
Furthermore, Little emphasis was placed on incorporating the views of the 
society, largely in favor of addressing Bosnia’s institutional changes (see tables 4.3 
through 4.5). In other words, the international community failed to adequately 
consider the population, perpetuating the dysfunctional relationship between state 
and society in Bosnia.
Table 43. Opinions on the General Framework Agreement. Has Dayton worked?
(in %)
Bosniaks Serbs Croats Total
Yes 40.8 68.3 29.7 49.7
No 59.2 31.7 70.3 50.3
Source: United Nations Development Programme 2007b, 30.
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Table 4.4. Support to the Constitution of BiH, September 2005
(in %)
Question: “Some people say that the Constitution does not work? Do you agree?”
Bosniaks Serbs Croats Total
Agree 77.2 71.3 64.0 72.6
Disagree 12.9 22.1 23.7 18.8
Don’t know 8.8 3.9 7.5 6.5
Refuse to Answer 1.0 2.7 4.8 2.1
Source: Prism Research, Public Opinion Poll (n=1550). September 2005. 
Quoted from Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa 2006.
Table 4.5. Support to the Rationalization of the State, September 2005 (in %)
Question: “Do You Support the Rationalization of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a 
Less Costly State Administration at All Levels and a Decrease of the Tax Burden on Citizens 
through Fewer Levels of Government from the Current 13 to Fewer Constitutions, etc.”
Bosniaks Serbs Croats
Yes 66.7 57.3 82.7
No 13.3 18.5 8.3
Don’t Know 14.7 18.6 6.8
Refuse to Answer 5.3 5.6 2.2
Source: Prism Research, Public Opinion Poll (n=1550). September 2005. 
Quoted from Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa 2006.
The final problem related to a lack of cohesion within the international 
community. Although there was a general consensus around the need to change 
Dayton, there were strong disagreements over how to accomplish this. Two schools 
of thought emerged at the time. Most European countries, the EU and the 
EUSR/OHR (particularly the legal department within the OHR), advocated a more 
conservative approach.683 This school of thought favored an incremental approach to 
institutional change via the use of Article 3.5 of the Bosnian Constitution. The 
concern was that starting a process of constitutional reform at that time would 
negatively impact other reform process already in progress. While this group was not 
opposed to the idea of constitutional reform, they preferred to postpone initiating the 
process,684 until other reform process had been implemented. The second school of 
thought was advocated by the other European actors such as the Commission and the 
European Parliament,685 who were more inclined towards to initiating the process
Marko 2005/06.
Ibid.
The US did also advocate for a holistic approach once its involvement increased in 2005.
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without delay.686
Neglect of ethnic considerations, divisions within the international community, 
and the democratic deficit collectively, as we shall see, proved fatal to the process of 
reform.
43 . THE RULES AND FORMAT OF CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
The relevant parties agreed to a set of rules and guarantees in the early months of 
2005 that were deemed critical to garnering full participation.687 This was especially 
salient with respect to Serb parties who, up until that point, had refused to engage in 
any initiative aimed at altering the Dayton constitutional framework.688 The rules were 
agreed upon by both external and domestic actors690 and included the following:
1. The Format.
All constituents groups agreed to an initial preparatory phase in which representatives 
of the seven key parties in the parliament, including SDA, SBiH, SDP, SDS, SNSD, 
PDP, and HDZ, would be involved in a working group format. The working group 
would be assisted by an international secretariat that would consult with key
686 Marko 2005/06. In addition to these two schools, there was a third, less exposed school of 
thought. Officials from the World Bank and economists from the OHR rejected the idea of 
constitutional reform and were more inclined to pursue an incremental reform with an emphasis on 
consolidation into a single market. This school believed in undertaking a series of key reforms to make 
the state in Bosnia more functional, including the reform of the public administration (to reduce 
expenses and improve the delivery of social services), the imposition of budget constraints, and other 
minor constitutional changes (Marko 2005/2006). Given the costly framework created by Dayton, it is 
somewhat paradoxical that it was the economists arguing against an overhaul of Dayton. On the whole, 
this approach was likely too reductionist; as it was based on the idea that economic incentives and 
restraints would provide the basis for a stable political system.
687 These rules were maintained throughout the process. Some of them were altered when the 
US took over in December of 2005.
688 One may wonder however, whether Serb parties decided to engage actively in the process of
constitutional reform in order to divert attention from the process of police restructuring; especially 
given that constitutional reform offered more opportunities to influence the outcome (constitutional 
negotiations were based on the premise that solutions would not be imposed; whereas the parameters 
for police reform had already been imposed by the EU). Serb parties might have also considered that 
constructive engagement in constitutional reform might allow them to adopt a more obstructionist 
approach with respect to police reform.
690 Hays, Hitchner, and Williams visited Sarajevo in early 2005 in an effort to muster the 
necessary support for the process and to agree on the rules of engagement. They held meetings with 
inter alia the prime minister and the ministries, the presidency members, party leaders and officials 
from both entities, along with the leadership of the parliamentary assembly. They also met with 
various European ambassadors, the US ambassador, the CoE and OSCE Representatives in BiH, the 
European Delegation, and the HR.
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international actors, such as the Venice Commission, the EC and other European 
actors691 in order to facilitate discussion on constitutional solutions that would be 
compatible with EU standards.692 The secretariat was to be comprised of Donald 
Hays, representing the Dayton Project, Prof. Bruce Hitchner of the Boston-based 
Dayton Project, and Prof. Williams and Meghan Stewart of the PILPG. The main 
responsibility of the PILPG representatives was to undertake background and 
comparative analyses of the Dayton constitution and to present them to the 
negotiators.
In addition to the working group format, it was decided that party leaders would 
become involved once a certain level of consensus was achieved by the party 
representatives. In effect, no agreement was feasible until party leaders were in 
agreement. Once a constitutional agreement was approved by party leaders, it would 
then be transferred to parliament for public discussion.
2. Issues at Stake.
One of the key tenets agreed to by the parties was to limit negotiations to state-level 
institutional reform, with a focus on procedural and competency matters. This 
development intentionally excluded entity-related issues, with the exception of the 
transfer of competences from the entities to the state level. The parties agreed that the 
rationale for the negotiations would revolve around two basic precepts:694 (1) The 
Venice commission’s view of the Bosnian constitution which was adopted as the 
frame of reference for the conduct of the negotiations (particularly in relation to the 
establishment of a more effective government and the protection of human rights as 
per the European Convention of Human rights). (2) The requirements for EU
691 Following each working group meeting, it was agreed that the secretariat would meet with 
the political leaders and representatives of the international community in Bosnia to report on the 
progress (Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington D.C., 29 July 2006).
692 Hays 2005. In addition to the secretariat, the CoE also took part in the working group. Both 
Thomas Markert, one of the drafters of the Venice Commission report, and CoE Special 
Representative in BiH Tim Cartwright became the ‘silent partners’ (Author’s personal interviews with 
Meghan Stewart and Tim Cartwright); “they looked carefully at everything that was produced by the 
working group and gave us their thoughts” (Author’s personal Interview with Donald Hays. 
Washington D.C., 29 July 2006).
693 PILPG was comprised of lawyers and operators from two law firms. “Our role was to 
interpret the legal word and make it logical for negotiators. ... I then was at the table just simply 
taking notes of whatever everyone was saying ... to prepare documents for the next day” (author’s 
personal interview with Meghan Stewart. Washington D.C., August 2006).
694 Personal interviews with Donald Hays and Megan Stewart. Washington D.C., July-August 
2006.
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accession, especially in terms of the strengthening of state level institutions and the 
streamlining of the decision making process.
It was agreed that negotiations would revolve around five key articles of the 
Bosnian Constitution (mostly on election- and competence-related matters), 
including: human rights (Article 2); the division of competences between the state and 
the entities (article 3); the parliamentary assembly (Article 4); the presidency (article 
5); and the council of ministers. The issues of entity voting in the House of 
Representatives and the internal organization of Bosnia were not included as part of 
the official agenda for the negotiations (though the former was informally discussed 
at various points in the process). This was deemed critical for getting Serb parties 
involved.
3. Scope.
The negotiations would focus on amending, rather than replacing Dayton; given that 
there was no political will to undertake a more holistic approach.695 It was decided 
that the parties would be the ultimate decision makers, effectively creating a scenario 
in which pre-approval was required by the political leaders. The issue of limiting the 
involvement of both public institutions and civil society was intensely debated 
among international officials, but the precedent set by the Ashdown administration 
dictated the direction.696 According to the CoE Representative in Bosnia, Tim 
Cartwright, there was a belief among the international community that working 
through the party leaders was the only way to move forward with the reform process 
in Bosnia. This belief centered on the structure of the political system, including 
multiple layers of government, along with the strong influence and decision-making 
power held by party leaders.
4. Timeline.
Party leaders committed themselves to reaching a consensus on a constitutional 
package by November of 2005; so as to allow sufficient time for public and 
parliamentary debate, and in the interests of effecting the changes prior to the 
elections in October of 2006697 This timeline stemmed from an election law which
Hitchner 2006b.
Author’s personal interviews with Western diplomats. Sarajevo, May-July 2007.
Hitchner 2006b.
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stipulated that any change which might influence the outcome of an election had to 
be enacted a minimum of 169 days prior to the election date. An amendment to the 
election law was passed in 2005, which modified the deadline from 169 days to 130 
days. This amendment resulted in a May 4th deadline for approving any changes to 
the Constitution.
5. Guarantees.
The provision of guarantees was deemed critical in the interest of garnering the 
support of the Croats and Serbs. The guarantees provided by external actors, which 
assured that solutions would not be imposed and that the status of RS would not be 
undermined, made Serb engagement feasible.698 As Hays told the author, Serb parties 
(surprisingly) agreed to initiate a process of constitutional reform provided that the 
integrity of the entities was not challenged and that the discussions did not revolve 
around the status of RS.699 The SDS, however, failed to attend the first meeting of the 
working group, as there was some reluctance initially among certain circles within 
the party to engage in the process. Mladen Bosic stated, “We knew that it was risky 
for our party, especially in the election year ... We didn't participate at the first 
meeting, but I guess that Mr. Hays persuaded Mr. Cavic to take part, and gave him 
some guaranties that solutions would not be imposed from the outside.” As for the 
Croats, the international community decided to include a representative from the 
HNZ in the negotiations even if this party had no political representation at the state 
level; “it was believed that the Croats would never be engaged if they felt they were 
underrepresented.”700
6. Domestic ownership.
The guiding principle behind this process was complete domestic ownership. In light 
of this, the international community was limited to the provision of assistance and 
facilitation. As Hays recalled, “this became a totally new process for the international 
community. And it was totally new for the Bosnians too; you could see they were 
initially uncomfortable with the freedom they had, but they got used to it.”701 The
698 Author’s email interview with Mladen Bosic, 26 June 2007.
699 See also Hitchner 2006a.
700 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington DC, 29 July 2006.
701 Although the process was based on domestic ownership, the international community
applied enormous pressure to make the process work on a domestic level.
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process also marked a clear shift in relations between domestic and external actors. It 
was chaired, and led, for the first time by domestic actors. According to Hays, “What 
we did was the job of a secretariat, to write information, steer conversation, take 
notes, clarify issues, redistribute notes, set the agenda for the next meeting and ensure 
that the right atmosphere was created.”702 Hays’ description of the first meeting of 
party leaders in Brussels gives an indication of how these dynamics played out at the 
beginning of the process. When party leaders went to Brussels, “Rehn [EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement] briefed them on the importance of their work and on 
the key issues ... The American Ambassador to the EU was there too and also spoke. 
And then they left, and at the living room of the hotel there was a small table with 
seven seats, and there were back benches for all the advisors and a separate table for 
the secretariat. And they came in and were shocked. They expected some 
internationals. But I told them that it was their constitution and they had to decide on 
the issues. So I sat them down quickly, holding the agenda of the working group. I 
suggested they take turns for the chair, first President Tihic and then Cavic, Covic ... 
And we did that, typically starting from scratch.”703
Even when the US took over the process, domestic actors continued to steer 
developments; “At no time in the process, either in Brussels or Washington, were any 
of the political leaders compelled ... to agree to a specific set of constitutional 
reforms. Every option under discussion [was] worked out and agreed upon by the 
political leaders.”704 SDA President Sulejman Tihic stated, “If we tried to say how 
much came from each side, I would say 70 percent domestic politicians and 30 
percent the international community, and that’s because in Bosnia no negotiation can 
take place without the involvement of the international community.”705 Similarly, 
PDP leader Mladen Ivanic stressed, “the best value of this process is that we did this, 
we did it our own way and the result was a compromise with a little bit of pressure 
and some suggestions from the US.”706
7. Obligations.
All of the initial discussions with the working group were to be kept outside of the
702 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington DC, 29 July 2006.
703 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington DC, 29 July 2006.
704 Hitchner 2006c.
705 Author’s personal interview with Sulejman Tihic. Sarajevo, 4 July 2007.
706 Author’s personal interview with Mladen Ivanic. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 169 10/30/09
public domain. The working group labored the entire time without generating a 
single press release (except in relation to the last few meetings in October). This 
internal focus served to create the secure atmosphere requisite for addressing the 
delicate matters at hand. It was also agreed that “all parties would join in this process 
without politicizing [it], with the goal of presenting their political parties with the 
necessary amendments by September 2005 .”707 The parties, parting turn, committed 
themselves “to keep the parliamentary leadership fully informed at every step of the 
process so that at the appropriate time [they] could sponsor the amendments in 
parliament.”708
8. Working Method of the Working Group.
Pursuant to each session, the secretariat would prepare a working document 
reflecting the varying positions of the party representatives, along with the agreed 
upon principles. This document was then distributed to the delegates for further 
review and, in turn, approval by the political parties.709 Based upon feedback 
provided by the respective political parties after each session, the secretariat would 
return to Bosnia to initiate the next working meeting.710 Meghan Stewart’s 
description of the working group’s dynamics offers insight into this process:711
“We didn’t come with a constitution. But we had different approaches.
We first had a conversation for example on human rights and we spent 
the day; we would come with prepared working documents on the basis 
of the Venice Commission taking comparative constitutional studies in 
dealing with minority and national issues and trying to see how other 
countries had dealt with them ... Sometimes we would present different 
options, like here’s one way that a presidency is organized or here’s 
another way the council of ministers is organized, here’s another way 
that other countries do it. And then we would say here are two options, 
you don’t have to go with either or, but here are some ideas ... We then
707 Dayton Project, April trip report, 2005 (material in author’s file).
708 Ibid.
709 The proposed timeline and agenda would also be subject to review by the parties.
710 Dayton Project, May Trip Report, 2005 (material in author’s file).
711 When the US took over the process, external actors continue to steer and facilitate the
negotiations but pressure and arm-twisting became more pervasive.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 170 10/30/09
spent the day talking about human right concerns that the parties had and 
we went back to our hotel rooms and drafted something out of what they 
had said.... When there were differences of opinion we bracketed it, just 
noting that that was a point which was not settled upon. We then gave 
them the document the next day and asked what they thought about it.
We discussed it afterwards and negotiated the document. In sum, we 
tried to propel the parties to negotiate the substance of the document 
rather than sitting down and having a theoretical discussion on what the 
government should be like ... There were a number of issues where the 
parties representatives said they could not negotiate [because they did 
not have the authority to do so] so a number of issues just had to stay 
until the end.”712
9. Inclusion o f other political forces and civil society.
It was collectively decided that certain domestic and external actors, not directly 
involved in the negotiations, should be kept informed of developments. During the 
working group phase, the secretariat met, at various times, with members of the 
international community in Bosnia, party leaders, and select members of civil 
society; including moderate religious figures.713 During this phase, the members of 
the secretariat also met with the leadership of the parliament, including HDZ deputy 
Martin Raguz, SDS deputy Nikola Spiric, and SDA deputy Sefik Dzaferovic. These 
individuals “agreed to take the lead within the parliament once the consensus on the 
amendments had been reached among the parties.”714 Hays also held several meetings 
with party leaders in order to ensure that they were fully briefed and in support of the 
process.715
In parallel with the political maneuverings, it was agreed that a process of public 
education should take place throughout Bosnia.716 This educational effort failed to 
materialize in any substantive form however; resulting in an elite-driven process with
713 Such as Franciscan Provencal in Sarajevo, the Vladika from Trebinje and the Imam of Tuzla; 
all “were very open to this discussion and all agreed that it was time to undertake a common effort” 
(Dayton Project, July trip report. Material in author’s file).
714 Dayton Project, April trip report, 2005; author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. 
Washington DC, 29 July 2006.
715 Dayton Project, July trip report, 2005.
716 Dayton Project, April trip report, 2005 .
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few democratic credentials. Ultimately, the general public and civil society were 
largely excluded from the process for pragmatic reasons,717 and there were no plans 
to put the resulting agreement to a referendum for public approval. Though a 
commitment was made early in the process to conduct an outreach program under the 
framework of the Dayton Project, these activities were not undertaken in any 
meaningful way until late October and early November of 2005, when the press was 
already involved and public debate prevalent. There were vague efforts at 
involvement by other organizations as part of the societal outreach efforts. The 
OSCE and the UNDP, for example, expressed an interest in early 2005 in working 
with civil society to help create an appropriate atmosphere for reform,718 but these 
activities were never integrated into the overall process. A media campaign was 
contemplated, and an effort was made to involve NGO’s, the USIP, the Fletcher 
School, the CoE and the EU as a means to promoting forums for high-level 
discussions.719 Time constraints and pressures at the tail end of the process however, 
ran counter to the planning of such activities. Furthermore, as the US administration 
became increasingly engaged in the process towards the end of 2005, fewer actors 
were allowed to be involved, except when the final agreement reached the 
parliament.
It was within the framework of the aforementioned rules that constitutional 
negotiations were initiated in April of 2005. This was a rather low-key process that 
involved party representatives from all of the major political forces in the parliament. 
This first ‘informal’ phase lasted from April through October of 2005. Despite the 
fact that party leaders were not directly involved at this juncture, this development 
represented a major breakthrough in Bosnian politics. For the first time since the end 
of the war, all parties across the political spectrum were voluntarily and actively 
participating in the process of reforming Dayton.
717 Author’s personal interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
718 Dayton Project, April trip report, 2005.
719 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM I:
INTER-ETHIC DIVISIONS COME TO THE FORE
5.1. PHASE I: THE INVOLVEMENT OF PARTY LEADERS
5.1.1. Preliminary Talks: Proceedings of the Working Group
As outlined in Chapter 4, the process of constitutional reform started in early 2005. 
Negotiations during the first phase of the process, namely from April to November 
2005, were facilitated by Donald Hays in his capacity representing the NGO Dayton 
Project, and involved preparatory and exploratory talks among party representatives 
in a working group format.720 The working group met eight times in Sarajevo from 
April to October 2005, except for the last meeting, which took place in Washington 
DC. Discussions under this format went surprisingly well according to both external 
and domestic actors involved in the negotiations, given the exploratory nature of the 
talks, the limited range of the issues in the agenda -  which had been previously 
agreed upon, and the relatively undisturbed environment in which negotiations took 
place. As a first order of business for the first meetings (in April and May), the 
working group agreed to start with the issue of defining the national interest and the 
human rights package, aiming to reach consensus on group vs. individual rights and 
making the Bosnian constitution compatible with the European Convention of 
Human Rights.721 After the first two meetings “we were able to come up with a
720 Party representatives who participated in the negotiations included: Bosniak community 
representatives Mirsad Ceman (SDA), Beriz Belkic (SBiH) and Jozo Krizanovic (SDP); Serb 
community representatives Mladen Bosic (SDS), Zeljko Mirjanic (SNSD) and Slobodan Nagradic 
(PDP); and Croat community representatives Mile Lasic (HDZ) and Miljenko Brkic (HNZ).
721 As Meghan Stewart stated, “We started working with human rights because although it was 
not the important part it was a pretty easy way to get them talking” (author’s personal interview with 
Meghan Stewart. Washington D.C., August 2006). In the above quotation, Meghan Stewart considers 
the discussion on human rights to be peripheral for two reasons: (1) A broad political consensus had
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human rights package that would improve things for the average citizen.”722
The following meetings dealt with the remaining issues, namely the presidency 
(especially the issue of moving to a single presidency instead of a three-member 
presidency, as well as election procedures for the president and prime minister), the 
parliament and the council of ministers, especially in relation to the realignment of 
competences between the president and prime minister and the creation of new 
portfolios. “There were some ideas but not concrete agreement on the specifics,” 
Hays claimed in an interview; “We talked about the parliament and there were two 
or three possible ideas: one house of parliament, an upper house and a lower house, 
or stay the same; on the presidency, the working group was much more developed, 
strip the presidency of all the powers except for protocol and give them to the prime 
minister; but on the election procedure, we were never able to find common 
ground.”723 Following the second meeting in July, it was decided that the party 
representatives would present the progress made to party leaders to get feedback and 
buy-in to continue talks further. While not every issue received full endorsement, 
Hays remarked in a personal interview, “there was a great deal of consensus at this 
point.”
A more public debate thus opened up in early September 2005, both outside and 
within the parties, although the degree of publicity varied across parties. As HDZ 
working group member Mile Lasic recalled in a personal interview, “After four 
months, in September 2005, we went to our parties. We presented the questions [that 
were discussed in the meetings] to get a response from our parties. In my party I 
presented it to the central committee ... and we got the approval to continue our 
work. I don’t know how public the other parties went.”724 News of the negotiations 
slipped out to the broader public in early September when Richard Holbrooke 
revealed during a university lecture in Berlin on September 9 that an American NGO 
led by Donald Hays was “preparing a new Constitution.” This announcement
already been achieved in this matter; and (2) changes in the area of human rights could be approved 
separately at any point in time (in contrast, the approval of institutional changes needed to occur prior 
to the announcement of the elections in April (see p. 210, footnote 882).
722 Author’s personal Interview with Donald Hays. Washington DC, 29July 2006.
723 Ibid.
724 Author’s personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 2 July 2007.
725 Richard Holbrooke, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 10 September 2005. Holbrooke’s
announcement represented the first public statement about the process, although it was hardly a secret 
at the time. “Many people knew about it already; it was a public secret” (author’s personal interview 
with member of the Dayton Project BiH. Sarajevo, June 2007). It is unclear why Holbrooke made the
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prompted the media to misrepresent the process as a US-designed initiative despite 
repeated statements by members of the secretariat that the initiative, in fact, had 
originated from and was driven by domestic actors.
It was also around this time that developments elsewhere threatened to disturb 
the relatively quite atmosphere in which negotiations had taken place under the 
working group format. One development was related to the process of police reform, 
which reached a heated stage in mid-September 2005, following the RSNA’s 
rejection of the police package that had been previously agreed upon, and a rather 
intense public criticism by the international community of the RS for its 
obstructionist role.726 In a ‘remarkable’ press conference on September 22, the HR 
Paddy Ashdown, Head of EC Delegation Michael Humphreys, UK Ambassador to 
BiH Matthew Rycroft (at the time chair of the rotating EU presidency) and US 
Ambassador to BiH Douglas McElhaney warned the RSNA to “think again” about its 
opposition to police reform or face international isolation.727 A meeting of the 
Council of the EU followed these developments on October 3, and Bosnia was the 
only country to be excluded from the initiation of SAA negotiations.728 The level of 
confrontation was greatly diminished in early October when SDS leader Cavic 
accepted the broader terms of reform, leaving the most sensitive issues for further 
discussions in a new special commission that would meet at a later date. On October 
4, the RSNA thus passed a law committing itself to police reform respecting EU 
requirements within five years. Although the deal defused the crisis between SDS 
and external actors, internal divisions and tensions within the SDS mounted. The 
SDS member of the working group failed to attend the constitutional meetings in 
September.
announcement at the time, as he was not officially involved in the process.
726 The September agreement had been reached in a new round of negotiations called by 
Ashdown on July 26 -  following an impasse caused by the Serb rejection of the OHR-sponsored 
reform in May 2005.
727 “Transcript of the Press Conference on the Consequences of Failing to Agree on Police 
Reform,” OHR, Sarajevo, 22 September 2005, available at http://www .ohr.int/ohr- 
dept/presso/pressb/default.asp?content id=35510 [accessed on 1 December 2008].
728 At this meeting, both Croatia and Turkey were accepted for Accession talks (Council of the 
EU 2005). Serbia was also given the green light for starting SAA negotiations, authorizing the 
Commission to open negotiations “at the earliest opportunity” (Council of the EU 2005b). The 
Council conclusions on Bosnia read as follows, “The Council expressed its deep disappointment at the 
decision by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska to reject the latest proposal for police reform 
which met the EU principles, and regretted that it would not now be possible for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) to start negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the 
EU by the 10th Anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement” (ibid).
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A similar development within the Croat ranks was brewing as a result of a new 
draft law on broadcasting in May 2005 resulting from EU directives tying media 
reform to further progress towards European integration.729 The agreed public 
broadcasting law kept the previous tripartite structure, namely a central service based 
in Sarajevo and two broadcasting systems in each entity,730 much to the discontent of 
the Croat group, who had demanded the creation of a new service in Croatian for 
Croats.731 Dissatisfied with the law, the Croat delegates in the House of Peoples 
challenged the law on the basis of the Croats’ vital national interest. They demanded 
the dismantling of the FBiH’s radio and television (FTV) and the creation of a third 
Croat state-level channel so that there were three state-level services, one for each of 
the three official languages. The challenge went to the constitutional court, but on 
July 23 the constitutional body ruled against the Croats, arguing that the draft did not 
violate the interests of the Croats. Croats’ inability to use the vital national interest 
veto to protect what they considered as vital to their interests increased the level of 
frustration within this community, further fuelling their long-standing perception that 
they were being stripped of their national rights. The law was finally approved in 
parliament on 5 October 2005 with the support of both Serbs and Bosniaks 
(outvoting the Croats).732
As of May 2005, the approval of police reform and the passage of legislation reforming the 
public broadcasting system (to make it financially sustainable and more independent) were the two 
remaining EU conditions Bosnia needed to approve in order to initiate talks on the SAA agreement.
730 The three services would now be part of a single corporation with head offices in Sarajevo, 
Mostar and Banja Luka, which required entity parliaments to pass legislation on the new services 
(Mima Skrbic. “Triple Threat.” Transitions Online, 12 October 2005).
731 Croats claimed that both BiH’s and the federation’s systems failed to broadcast enough 
programs in Croatian. It is worth noting here that the three official languages in BiH, namely Croatian, 
Bosnian and Serbian are minor derivatives of the standard Serbo-Croatian (the language spoken in the 
former Yugoslavia), and closely related to each other. In fact, “Which variant individuals speak is 
often determined more by their region of origin than by their ethnic background” (ibid) . The dispute 
over the broadcasting law represents an example of the use of language for nationalist purposes.
732 The law, however, encountered important obstacles in subsequent phases, especially in the 
Federation as a result of Croat obstruction. The law was sent to the federation’s constitutional court, 
which also ruled against the Croat claim in June 2008. Passing the corresponding legislation at the 
federation level occurred in July 2008, almost three years after its adoption at the state level. Progress 
in this area, together with the agreement on police reform in April 2008, paved the way for the signing 
of the SAA in June 2008, but a new phase of harmonization and implementation is still ahead. As the 
2008 Progress Report noted, “it is now necessary to ensure that all state and entity-level legislation is 
harmonized, as well as full implementation, including the establishment of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Corporation of the Public Broadcasting Services” (European Commission 2008, 17). As 
of June 2009, however, the key coordination mechanisms are not in place, and as a former official of 
the OHR argued, “I doubt they will ever be properly implemented. While the Croat obstruction is 
pivotal ... Bosniaks and Serbs obstruct or are unwilling to implement other aspects of the reform. The 
model designed by the international community was too sophisticated” (Authors’s e-mail interview 
with former OHR official. July 2009).
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These developments triggered a heated internal debate within the HDZ, with 
hardliners increasing pressure over moderates733 and demanding the creation of a 
third entity. As a case in point, the Croat member of the presidency, Ivo Miro Jovic, 
demanded re-composing Bosnia into three levels of authority in an interview with 
Politika on September 6.734 The Mostar-based Vecerni List also published an 
interview with Jovic on September 22, in which he stated that the “one state, two 
entities, three peoples” model in Bosnia was outdated.
Notwithstanding mounting tension, these developments did not impede 
continuation of constitutional talks, and the working group met again on September 
18-21. At this meeting a general set of proposals was agreed upon, mainly on human 
rights (including a clearer definition of individual and group rights and mechanisms 
for the protection of those rights) and on the definition of the vital national interest. 
Issues related to the model of government were also discussed, including the role of 
the president and the parliament, but no specific agreement was reached on these 
issues.735 With respect to the government, although the group expressed a preference 
for the parliamentary model and a presidency that was limited to protocol issues, with 
major duties transferred to the council of ministers, there was no final consensus.736 
As for the parliament, there was general agreement to have the House of People 
focus on specific issues such as the vital national interest veto, the budget, social 
issues, treaties and the formation of government, and having the House of 
Representatives exclusively responsible for actions related to the SAA and the EU 
accession process, but no final agreement was reached either in this area. As for the 
relationship between the state and the entities, although there was recognition that 
additional authorities needed to be transferred to the state, further negotiations were 
needed to reach agreement. Finally, as a last order of business, it was decided that the 
working group would meet the next time at the premises of the US Institute for 
Peace, in Washington DC,737 where party representatives were expected to reach final
Author’s personal interviews with Western diplomats and local actors. Sarajevo, June 2007.
734 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, September 6,2005.
735 Dayton Project, April trip report.
736 Both the president and the prime minister would be elected by the parliament and the
government would be formed by the prime minister from a list of qualified candidates provided by the 
parties in parliament. The prime minister would thus become accountable to parliament and not the 
presidency.
737 The holding of this meeting was meant to send a signal of commitment from the
international community. It also showed that the US, although not directly involved, was watching the 
process very closely.
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consensus on the rest of the amendments in order to be able to send a draft agreement 
to party leaders.738 The meeting location at a US government-funded NGO was 
chosen to show the parties the support and commitment of the US.
The last meeting of the working group thus took place in Washington DC at the 
end of October, and included visits by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, the EC representative in Washington, and a close-door meeting 
with members of the US House of Representatives International Relations 
Committee.739 At this last meeting, “Mr. Belkic [who chaired the negotiations] 
presented what he thought was their agreement and told people that he was very 
pleased with how everything had gone.”740 Although not every issue received full 
endorsement at the DC meeting (see Table 5.1 and 5.2), Hays noted that a great deal 
of consensus had been reached within the working group, especially on the issue of 
human rights, general support for further transfers of power to the state (although not 
on the specific powers to be transferred), and the idea that the prime minister's 
powers should be strengthened while those of the presidency weakened to make way 
for a more efficient and faster-moving government.
Table 5.1: Areas of Consensus on the Revisions to the Bosnian Constitution (Working
Group, October 2005)
Article II Article III Article IV Article V Article VI
Human State/Entity Parliament Presidency Council of
Rights Relations Ministers
Consensus - Increased Parliament: - A four-year - A four-year
on a more competences for the - A bicameral parliament, mandate. mandate.
comprehensi state, as required with an increased number - Transfer of - Indirect election
ve list of for the process of of deputies and a new presidential of the prime
human Euro-Atlantic president. competences minister (by
rights, integration. - Same election method to the council proposal of
including - Joint competences for the House of of ministers presidency).
minority for both the state Representatives. (presidential - New
rights. and the entities (i.e. - Basic procedures for powers are competences (from
agriculture, culture, votes of confidence and substantially the presidency).
and education). no confidence. reduced742). - Delineation of
- The creation of a specific powers
mechanism for the Vital National Interest: and duties of the
transfer of - A new definition of individual
competences vital national interest.741 ministers.
Dayton Project, September trip report, 2005 (material in author’s file).
739 Donald Hays, Personal notes (material in author’s file).
740 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington D.C., 29 July 2006.
741 Article 4.11 (c) of the amended constitutional document submitted to the party leaders prior
to the Brussels meeting read that “Vital National Interest Veto may be invoked within the House of 
Peoples regarding: The rights of all three constituent people to be represented in legislative, executive, 
judicial authorities, and to have equal rights to be involved in decision-making processes; the identity
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between the state - A new review
and the entities. mechanism for the vital
national interest veto: 
direct appeal to a three- 
member panel at the CC, 
deciding by consensus.
House of Peoples:
- Vital national interest 
veto to be a House of 
Peoples exclusive 
competence at the state 
level.
- Streamlining of the 
procedures and 
competences of the 
House of Peoples (no 
consensus on how).
- Participation of both 
entities in the election of 
the delegates of the 
House of Peoples.
Minority Representation: 
Guaranteed 
representation of 
minorities in the House 
of Representatives.
Source: Author from various materials provided by Donald Hays, including the amended 
constitutional document submitted to party leaders prior to the Brussels meeting in November 2005.
Table 5.2: Areas of No Consensus on the Revisions to the Bosnian Constitution (Working
Group, October 2005)
Article HI 
State/Entity Relations
Article IV 
Parliament
Article V  
Presidency
Article VI 
Council o f 
Ministers
- Delineation of the 
powers of the state.
- Amending the 
constitution to 
incorporate the powers 
transferred to the state 
since 1995.
House of Peoples:
- Specific delineation of its 
competences.
- Election method.
Representation of 
Minorities:
- Composition of 
the presidency.
- Election method.
- Competences.
(The working group 
did not reach any 
consensus in this 
area as a result of 
the disagreements 
over the presidency 
and the parliament)
of a constituent people; territorial organization; organization of the bodies of public authority; 
education of citizens; use of languages and scripts; national symbols and flags; spiritual heritage, 
particularly the fostering and affirmation of religious and cultural identity and traditions; preservation 
of the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; public information systems; any issue deemed to be a 
Vital National Interest by 2/3 of one of the caucuses in the House of Peoples” (amended constitutional 
document submitted to party leaders prior to the Brussels meeting in November 2005. Material in 
author’s file).
742 It is unclear whether a consensus was reached on the competences of the presidency. Some 
of the agreed competences included: representation of the state; signing and promulgation of laws and 
treaties; announcement of state-level elections; appointment of ambassadors; dissolution of the 
parliament in accordance with the constitution; declaration of war and the state of emergency, 
following the approval by the parliament; and the appointment of state officials.
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- Number of seats reserved 
for ‘others.’
Source: Author from material provided by Donald Hays.
By the end of the meeting in Washington DC, there was a sense among those 
involved that negotiations could not move further without the express engagement of 
party leaders. It was thus decided that party leaders would be involved in the 
following rounds. In early November, Hays sent a letter to all party leaders (along 
with a document that included the main areas of consensus achieved until that point) 
with an invitation for a meeting to take place in Brussels on November 11-14, 2005. 
As Hays claimed, “The idea was to imbue the process ... with a sense of 
commitment and unity on the part of the international community,”743 and to unblock 
the remaining issues that eluded consensus during the working group period, 
including the role of the presidency (the first item on the agenda at the meeting in 
Brussels); the election of the member(s) of the presidency; the role of the House of 
Peoples and the House of Representatives; and the number and type of the ministerial 
portfolios to be introduced.
5.1.2. Involvement of Party Leaders
Party leaders met for the first time in Brussels on November 11 with the commitment 
to undertake the working group’s agenda.744 The involvement of party leaders in the 
EU-sponsored meeting in Brussels in November 2005, barely a year before the 
elections, set in motion a new set of dynamics, including both the presentation of 
zero-sum claims and the use of nationalist rhetoric. These new dynamics thus 
changed the spirit of the negotiations and took them in a fundamentally different 
direction than the one agreed to months earlier. As an SDP member of the working 
group, Jozo Krizanovic, asserted in a personal interview, “The atmosphere was very 
good until political parties got involved ... The emphasis started to go to issues that 
had not been discussed and were not important ... They were only speaking about
743 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays, Washington D.C., 29 July 2009.
744 The meeting was attended by Sulejman Tihic (SDA), Zlatko Lagumdzija (SDP), Safet 
Halilovic (SBiH), Dragan Cavic (SDS), Dragan Covic (HDZ), Milenko Brkic (HNZ), Milorad Dodik 
(SNSD) and Mladen Ivanic (PDP). Party members of the working group were also present at this 
meeting.
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entities.” Similarly, Hays noted that all parties started to make mutually exclusive 
claims: “the Serbs wanted to embed the existence of the entity into every clause, on 
every amendment, and the Bosniaks and the Croats wanted to eliminate the entities 
entirely.”745
These dynamics exposed the relevance of ongoing inter-ethnic distrust that had a 
deep impact on the way parties perceived their interests and how they formulated 
their claims within the bargaining framework for constitutional reform. As a matter 
of fact, all involved parties presented demands that were deeply ingrained in old 
inter-ethnic, anxiety-laden concerns reminiscent of the constitutional debate before 
and after the war (see Table 5.3). Bosniak leaders, for example, asked for the 
establishment of a majority-based government, a parliament with no entity voting 
and the abolition of the entities, which were based upon the long-pursued goal of 
creating a citizen-based state. Serb parties, to the contrary, presented a set of 
demands that were aimed at the creation of a federal state in which Serbs could not 
be outvoted in a Bosniak-dominated civic state, including a rotating collective 
presidency, maintenance of entity voting and no change to the status of RS. As for 
the Croats, although they showed a great deal of ambivalence, there were voices in 
favor of a third entity or a three-tiered structure for all levels of authority (including a 
rotating presidency and the replacement of the two-entity structure for a three-level 
decentralized state), which also arose from ethnic-based anxieties, including a fear of 
remaining an effective minority at both the state and entity levels.
Table 53. Party Positions on Constitutional Reform 
(November 2005)
Presidency & 
Council of Ministers
Form of State House of Representatives 
& House of Peoples
State/Entity
Relations
HDZ - Rotating 3-member 
presidency, directly 
elected with Bosnia 
as single electoral 
unit (as opposed to 
current entity-based 
vote).
- Decentralization 
of Bosnia into three 
(or more) entities or 
provinces.
- Current two-entity 
structure 
unacceptable.
- House of Peoples elected 
at the state level (rather 
than by each entity’s 
House of Peoples).
- No entity voting.
All
competences 
transferred to 
the state.
SDA - Single president 
from one group, 
indirectly elected.
- Prime minister and 
speaker of the House 
of Representatives
- No entities.
- Divide Bosnia 
into economic- 
based regions 
(based on EU 
standards).
- No entity voting.
- Increase competences 
and deputies in House of 
Representatives.
- House of Peoples only on 
vital national interest.
All
competences 
transferred to 
the state
Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, DC. 29 July 2006.
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from other groups.
- Council o f ministers 
as Government.
- House of Peoples elected 
at state level.
SBIH Single president, 
directly elected.
No entities. No entity voting. All
competences 
transferred to 
the state.
SDP - Single president 
with less power, 
indirectly elected.
- President and prime 
minister not from 
same group.
- Council o f ministers 
as government.
- No entities or 
cantons.
- Create regional 
communities (based 
on EU standards).
- House o f Peoples elected 
at state level.
- House o f Peoples only on 
vital national interest.
All
competences 
transferred to 
the state.
SDS* - Intact rotating 
collective presidency 
(direct, entity 
vote).746
- Willing to discuss 
mandate.
- Council o f ministers 
functional (to meet 
EU criteria) but not 
as government.
Unwilling to 
dismantle RS.
- Maintain entity voting.
- House of Representatives 
& House of Peoples to 
have same powers, but 
open to discuss reform of 
House of Peoples.
- Accept increase of 
deputies.
- House o f Peoples to 
remain elected by entities’ 
assemblies.
Open to 
discuss reform 
to meet EU 
requirements.
SNSD - Rotating collective 
presidency (direct, 
entity vote).
-  Presidency chair to 
have more powers.
- Two new ministries.
Bosnia as a federal 
state with RS a 
federal unit
- Same as SDS.
- Accepts increased 
competences of 
parliament.
Same as SD S.
PDP - Rotating collective 
presidency (direct, 
entity vote).
- Accept strengthened 
Council o f ministers 
but not as 
government.
- Two new ministries.
Unwilling to 
dismantle RS.
Same as SDS. Same as SD S.
Internat - Single president, No official - Minority representation. - Codify
ionals** with less power, 
indirectly elected.
- Strengthened 
Council o f ministers 
as government.
preference 
expressed, except 
for the creation of a 
functional state.
- House o f Peoples only on 
vital national interest.
- Narrowing of vital 
national interest.
- Entity voting redundant
- Strengthened House of 
Representatives.
- More deputies in House 
of Representatives.
competences
transferred.
- Two new 
ministries.
- Grant new 
powers for EU 
integration.
* All Serb parties had similar positions on key reform areas.
** As expressed in Venice Commission, 2005.
Source: Author from material provided to the author; personal interviews; and local media (from 
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, November 2005).
Serb parties would accept a president with two vice presidents on a 16-month rotation at the 
end of this phase.
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Notwithstanding the high tension involved in this first meeting, some consensus 
was achieved in a number of issues (see Table 5.4), including the duties and the 
selection of a president of the council of ministers and a general sense that the state 
should be provided with the means to meet EU’s pre-accession criteria. Agreement 
was also reached on the issue of the competences of the presidency, which most 
parties agreed to reduce significantly, and the focus of the House of Peoples on the 
ratification of treaties and appointments, as well as on vital national interest 
(although it was still undecided whether the House of Peoples would be the only 
authority in the country to deal with this issue). Disagreements were, however, 
pervasive in a number of issues such as the mandate of the presidency,747 the election 
of both the presidency and the House of Peoples. No agreement was reached on some 
additional issues of the government package either, except for a graded consensus 
around the creation of two new ministries.748
Table 5.4. Overview of Consensus Areas at the Meeting in Brussels (November 12-14)
Full Consensus Partial Consensus No Consensus
Article 2 
Human 
Rights
General agreement on the 
list of human rights, 
including a method of 
individual redress before 
the Constitutional Court.
Article 3 
State/Entity 
Relations
Recognition that the state 
should have the authority to 
meet the EU's pre-accession 
and post accession 
requirements and to ensure 
compliance by other levels 
of government
Article 4 
Parliament
The definition of vital 
national interest
- Quota for minorities.
- Increased number of 
deputies.
- The House of Peoples to 
serve as the sole authority 
on vital national interest
(entity assemblies to defer
Election of the House of 
Peoples (options: direct 
from the entities; indirect 
from entity parliaments; 
indirect from the House of 
Representatives).
747 Tensions around the form and competences of the presidency were also pervasive. “It was 
clear that Tihic wanted to stay president so taking powers away from his office and moving it to a 
minister was not in his interests,” (Author’s personal interview with Meghan Stewart. Washington, 
D.C., August 2006; author’s personal interviews with Donald Hays and other members of the Dayton 
Project).
748 Some party leaders expressed a preference not to touch the government structure and 
introduce an amendment to Article 3 to execute the transfer from entities to the state. “We pointed out 
to them in a second day how difficult it would be using that article to build a state competent to meet 
EU standards; they then agreed to draft an amendment that would empower the state to be the sole 
authority in relation to ... EU requirements” (author’s personal interview with Donald Hays, 
Washington D.C., 29 July 2006).
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to the House of Peoples on 
vital national interest)
Article 5 
Presidency
- Reduction of 
Competences.
- Election method.
- Competences.
- Composition of the 
presidency (single; 
collective; single with two 
vice-presidents).
- Election method (indirect 
or direct; vote in Bosnia as 
a single electoral district or 
entity based voting).
Article 6 
Council of 
Ministers
- The creation of a 
President of the Council of 
ministers.
- The duties of the PM
- The creation of two new 
ministries.
Source: Author from Hays, Hitchner, Stewart and Williams 2005; personal interviews.
Party leaders met again in Washington DC on November 19-20, right before the 
events that would take place in the US Department of State in commemoration of the 
tenth anniversary of the Dayton Accords.749 On November 19, party leaders gathered 
with members of the secretariat at the Mayflower Hotel in an effort to conciliate the 
differences. All the leaders were present, except for SDA’s President Sulejman Tihic, 
SDP President and Foreign Minister Mladen Ivanic, and HDZ President Covic, who 
was replaced by Barisa Colak at this meeting due to his inability to travel.750 During 
the Saturday session, an agreement was reached on the House of Representatives and 
government packages, “and they were able to narrow the areas of disagreement on 
the parliament and the presidency.” But on Sunday, with Tihic back in the room, 
divisions and tensions appeared to increase again.751 As Hays stated in an interview, 
“On Sunday ... there was more tension in the room. You could see that the President 
[Tihic] was unhappy that they met without him and that they seemed to be making 
progress. As a result, while I think the group moved a number of issues on the 
parliament and the presidency, there was no agreement on both issues when he was 
back in the room.”752 The meeting in Washington thus reproduced the dynamics 
involved at the meeting in Brussels, and after long hours of negotiations, the leaders
The coincidence of Dayton's tenth anniversary with the constitutional reform process was not 
fortuitous. Some circles within the US government saw the opportunity to use Dayton’s tenth 
anniversary to mark the beginning of a new era in Bosnia -  from Dayton to Brussels -  symbolizing the 
end of the US involvement in the region in favor of a more prominent role for the EU (freeing the US 
to concentrate more on other more pressing scenarios in the region and elsewhere).
750 Dragan Covic was indicted at the time on corruption charges.
751 Tensions between Tihic and Hays increased significantly at this meeting and Tihic
threatened to withdraw from negotiations (See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 22 November 2005).
752 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays, Washington D.C., 29 July 2006.
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failed to make any substantial progress on the key issues that had eluded agreement 
thus far.753
A consensus was, however, maintained around the definition of the vital national 
interest (although there was no full consensus on whether the House of Peoples 
should be the only institution dealing with it) and the Human Rights package. 
Substantial progress was also achieved on the government package, particularly on 
the structure and function of the council of ministers with a decision to have a prime 
minister who would be elected by parliament and authorized to set the agenda; to 
select the ministers from a list of candidates provided by the parties in government; 
and to make decisions on a consensus basis (or by simple majority if consensus was 
impossible, on the condition that the vote had at least one member of each constituent 
people). There was also accordance on (1) the creation of two additional ministries, 
i.e. agriculture and the second one to be decided, and (2) providing Bosnia with the 
authority to not only draft and enact legislation in accordance with EU accession 
requirements but also to enforce these decisions throughout the territory with the 
creation of coordinating mechanisms for compliance at the sub-state level. Finally, 
further negotiations would be needed in two key remaining areas: the election 
process for both the House of Representatives and the presidency and the format and 
mandate of the presidency (see Table 5.5). In addition to these initial, limited 
compromises, the external actors managed to pressure party leaders into signing a 
document in which they committed to agree to a set of amendments by March 2006.
Table 5 5 . Overview of Consensus Areas at the Meeting in Washington
(November 19-20)
Full Consensus Partial Consensus No Consensus
Article 2 
Human 
Rights
Same as Brussels.
Article 3 
State/Entity 
Relations
New state competences:
-To draft legislation and create 
institutions in accordance with the 
EU integration process (new Article 
HI. 5c).
- To create coordinating 
mechanisms with sub-state levels of 
government to ensure compliance 
with state decisions and EU 
directives.
Article 4 Definition of vital national interest The House of Peoples Same as Brussels
75 Dayton Project, November trip report, 2005 (material in author’s file).
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Parliament with exclusive 
competence on vital 
national interest at the 
state level.754
Article 5 
Presidency
The delineation of
7«<competences.
Same as Brussels.
Article 6 
Council of 
Ministers
The Government:
- Composition (the prime minister 
forms the government from a list 
provided by the parties in power)
- Government competences.
- The decision-making procedure.756
- Two new ministries (agriculture 
and one to be determined).
Prime Minister:
- Election by the parliament.
- No portfolio.
- Two deputies with portfolio.
- Prime minister duties: set the 
agenda for government; design and 
implement policies; direct the work 
of ministers.
Source: Author’s elaboration from Hays, Hitchner, Stewart and Williams 2005.
Notwithstanding the signing of this document, which was achieved through 
strong pressure by the US, inter-ethnic nationalist rhetoric and unyielding positions 
continued after both the Brussels and DC meetings. In an attempt both to bridge the 
remaining differences and reinvigorate the process after the sense of failure in 
Brussels and Washington DC, the secretariat launched a new round of informal 
meetings in early December.757 Key disagreements continued to revolve around the 
same issues, however, including first and foremost the format, mandate and election 
of the presidency. While SDA favored a single president, both Croat and Serb parties 
continued to support a president with two vice presidents on a rotating basis. There 
was also disagreement about the election of the House of Peoples and the mandate 
and election of the prime minister, although Serb parties were ready to accept both a
754 Still to be determined whether the House of Peoples is the sole authority on vital national 
interest issues.
755 The duties discussed include the same ones debated by the working group, with the addition 
of the oversight of defense policy and the appointment of Constitutional Court judges and members of 
the Central Bank Board.
756 By consensus, or by simple majority if no consensus is reached, including the agreement of 
at least one member of each constituent people. The Law on the Council of Ministers in BiH, enacted 
by the HR in December 2002 (Office of the High Representative 2002d), required the agreement of at 
least two members of each constituent people.
757 In this first round of negotiations, Hays met separately with HDZ Vice President Niko 
Lozacic, Zlatko Lagumdzija, Safet Halilovic and Milenko Brkic on December 7 to find a common 
position within the FBiH parties. He then met with RS parties on December 9.
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chair of the council of ministers and the creation of two extra ministries.758 Positions 
remained unchanged, however, and parties seemed to be driving further from 
consensus. On December 6, Tihic declared that although he had agreed not to deal 
with entity voting at the beginning of the negotiations,759 he refused to stand back 
from his demands, including the elimination of entity voting.760 The Croats also 
appeared disillusioned with the conduct of the negotiations, given the limited scope 
of the agenda; Serb parties, for their part, threatened to withdraw from the process if 
discussions continued to revolve around the status of RS. In addition to the 
immovable stances, the mood became increasingly bitter, with outside extremists 
such as Haris Silajdzic publicly denouncing the process on a rather nationalist 
platform. On November 14, for example, Haris Silajdzic stated that Bosnia did not 
need the reforms under discussion but rather a totally new constitution not built upon 
genocide and blood. Later, on December 7, in a conference sponsored by the 
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC in commemoration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Dayton Accords, he criticized the constitutional initiative as 
merely an attempt to maintain the status quo and to introduce cosmetic changes.762 
The embittered climate triggered a chain of radical inter-group accusations 
impregnated with nationalist rhetoric; by mid-December, negotiations seemed to be 
on the verge of collapse despite promises made in Washington DC.
52. ANALYSIS OF PHASE I
The dynamics outlined above illustrate that the process of constitutional reform 
during the first phase of the negotiations was highly affected (and heavily 
undermined) by domestic dynamics at both the inter- and intra-ethnic levels. In this 
context, there were two mutually reinforcing domestic dynamics prevalent during the
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 12 December 2005.
759 As a case in point, he stated in early December, “I believe that we have made a mistake at
the very beginning, mainly because we have limited topics for discussions to the presidency, council 
of ministers, parliament and the state authorities. We have not discussed the internal structure of BiH 
(Sulejman Tihic, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 6 December 2005).
760 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 12 December 2005.
761 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 14 November 2005.
762 Speech at a conference sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC in
commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Dayton (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 9 December 
2005).
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first phase of the constitutional negotiations: firstly, a pervasive inter-ethnic mistrust, 
typical in post-conflict, deeply divided societies, which tended (and has tended for 
long) to restrict and undermine the terms of the political debate during the 
constitutional negotiations; and secondly, power struggles at the intra-ethnic level 
that raised tension and resulted in confrontation between ethnic groups. In other 
words, inter-ethnic dynamics during the first stage of negotiations were affected by 
two factors: (1) the prevalence of inter-ethnic anxieties and concerns and the use of 
these concerns to set parameters for a bargaining strategy within the framework of 
constitutional reform; and (2) inter-ethnic anxieties as the foundation for intra-ethnic 
outbidding dynamics within each constituency.763
5.2.1. Inter-Ethnic Anxieties: the Limiting Parameters of the Political Debate in 
Bosnia
As noted in the empirical discussion outlined in the previous section, engagement of 
party leaders in November 2005 introduced a new set of dynamics that ran counter to 
the development of practices of conflict regulation at the inter-ethnic level within the 
framework of constitutional reform, nearly leading to the collapse of negotiations in 
December. These dynamics, namely the presentation of zero-sum claims and the use 
of inter-ethnic nationalist rhetoric, indeed exposed the prevalence of ongoing inter­
ethnic distrust in Bosnia that had a deep impact on the way parties perceived their 
interests and how they formulated their claims within the bargaining framework for 
constitutional reform.764 As a matter of fact, all involved parties presented mutually
The author argues that the use of nationalist rhetoric reflects inter-ethnic based anxieties but 
also a purposeful strategy to increase the party’s (or segment’s) own bargaining position. Irrespective 
of the reasons behind the use of inter-ethnic anxiety as a political strategy, this dissertation focuses on 
the impact of these anxieties on the parameters of the debate and the creation of a climate not 
conducive to inter-ethnic cooperation.
764 Although nationalist rhetoric in Bosnia is today generally triggered by this country’s own 
local dynamics, it is important to note that kin-state involvement from Croatia and Serbia fueled this 
rhetoric for much of the 1990s within the frameworks of the Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia. These 
dynamics started to change in the late 1990s and foremost in the 2000s, following the death of 
Croatia’s President Franjo Tudman in 1999 and Slobodan Milosevic’s resignation as President of FRY 
in 2000 (Serbia had in fact distanced itself from RS politics much earlier, as a result of Serbia’s post­
war economic decline and the international community’s forceful actions). Notwithstanding the 
change of rhetoric, Croatia’s and Serbia’s policies towards Bosnia are still today greatly influenced by 
the position of both Bosnian Croats and Serbs in this country. Furthermore, both countries have often 
times used the situation of these communities for advancing their own agendas. The government of 
Vojislav Kostunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia (2004-2008) is a clear example, especially 
following the initiation of the Kosovo status process in 2005 (See Chapter 7, p. 264). In the case of
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irreconcilable demands that were deeply ingrained in old inter-ethnic, anxiety-laden 
concerns (see Table 5.3).
Post-Davton Bosniak Positioning and Inter-Group Relations
Notwithstanding the signing of a settlement in 1995, which provided Bosnia with 
extensive regional and domestic guarantees, Bosniaks have remained attached to the 
ideal of a citizen-based state in Bosnia as the ultimate political end goal.765 Indeed, 
interviews conducted with Bosniak party officials revealed that Dayton remains an 
unsatisfactory arrangement for Bosniaks, given their status as the largest ethnic group 
in a country where all decisions and positions are made and allocated equally 
between three ethnic groups. As Hays noted in a personal interview, “Bosniaks have 
a plurality in the country and that’s why they want a citizens-based constitution; they 
want one man, one vote, because that is the only way they can have a large say in 
how the government functions; they don’t want the entities, they don’t want the 
cantons. They want to rule from the center, from Sarajevo.”766
Dayton is thus viewed as an obstacle to achieving Bosniak national 
aspirations,767 and this anxiety has evolved into a rejection of the situation on the 
ground, especially in relation to the existence of RS and the role of entity voting. 
Bosniaks have thus sought to change or alter Dayton at all costs by strengthening 
state-level institutions. In other words, as Sumantra Bose noted in 2002, they have 
become the most fervent defenders of strengthening central institutions so as to 
counterbalance their relative lack of power in a state where they represent the 
numeric majority.768 As SDA Vice President Sefik Dzaferovic declared during the 
constitutional reform process, “We have a state that has been ethnicized and 
entiticized. ... Dayton described Bosnia as it was in 1995 and established weak 
structures to end the war and the killing. Now we need to build Bosnia on a citizen’s
Croatia, the position of the Bosnian Croats has a special meaning in this country’s politics. The 
election system is based on the division of the country into eleven constituencies, including one made 
of expatriates (mostly Bosnian Croats), which total around five parliamentary seats.
765 Very similar to the model of state conveyed prior and during the war, which suggest the
limiting effect that Dayton has had on resolving the ethnic question left over from the war in BiH.
766 This represents a typical position of majority groups in divided societies; majority rule
maximizes the ethnic power of the largest group.
767 Bosniaks remain the only national group from former Yugoslavia with no nation-state or 
motherland they can aspire to join or look to for protection (see Patrick Moore. “Bosnia Herzegovina: 
can it turn over a new leaf?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 November 2005).
768 Bose 2002,258.
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basis, having in mind that Bosnia is a multiethnic state, but not endangering the 
building of the state. ... You cannot build a state on ethnic and entity basis. The
*7/COfuture should be citizens first, collective rights second.” SBiH founder Haris 
Silajdzic stated in early 2004, “The only possible solution is to abolish both entities 
simultaneously, even if that is done gradually ... The state must be organized on the 
principle of economic regions, because they have developed over hundreds of
In addition to the perceived loss of power of Bosniaks in Bosnia, both interviews 
and public statements of party leaders in the local media exposed the still-professed 
belief that Dayton was an unjust solution to the conflict based on war dynamics and 
the genocidal experience in Srebrenica.771 Bosniak ethnic anxieties have thus been 
fueled by morally grounded notions derived from the war and Srebrenica. As a case 
in point, SBiH party official Beriz Belkic stated in a personal interview, “Some 
people from RS think that Bosnia is the result of the agreement of two entities, that 
entities are older than the state ... But we think that Bosnia is an internationally 
recognized state, a state of all nations, older than the entities, which are the result of 
war and force ... we want to improve the result of war.”772 Similarly, SDA Vice 
President Sefik Dzaferovic stated, “Dayton is the reflection of ethnic cleansing; it is 
not just. We need to have a functioning citizen-state with an internal structure based 
on economic criteria.”773
This somehow represents a morally grounded understanding of the political 
debate, constraining the political parameters to a great extent. As Sociology Professor
769 Cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 24 January 2006. SDA Vice President Sefik 
Dzaferovic also declared recently, “For us, it is unacceptable any solution of internal organization of 
the country except multiethnic regions. European Commission estimated that there are five such 
regions in Bosnia specified on the basis of economical, geographical and communication criteria. We 
believe that these five regions should make internal arrangement of the country along with municipal 
and state level” (cited in “SDA against Support from RS.” Nezavisne Novine, p. 5, 13 July 2007. In 
Constitutional Changes Monitor, No. 36, 11-18 July 2007). In relation to the reconfiguration of the 
middle level, he stressed that SDA is opposed to the reconfiguration of Bosnia in only one part of the 
state (namely the Federation) (“For SDA and Party of BH Unacceptable, for Two HDZ Real 
Solution,” Dnevni Avaz, p. 10, 12 July 2007. In Constitutional Changes Monitor, No. 36, 11-18 July 
2007).
770 Haris Silajdzic, cited in Dani, 16 January 2004. Quoted from ESI 2004b, 7.
771 Hence, the belief that Dayton has failed to provide a satisfactory settlement of the ethnic 
question in Bosnia.
772 Author’s personal interview with Beriz Belkic, Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
773 Author’s personal interview with Sefik Dzaferovic, Sarajevo, 31 May 2007. The first Owen- 
Vance plan was the only settlement based on the division of Bosnia according to a mix of economic 
and ethnic criteria; the plan failed, however, to gamer consensus among the three ethnic groups during 
the war. It was rejected by the Serbs (see chapter 3 section 1).
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Ugo Vlaisavljevic stated in a personal interview, Bosniaks have tended to present a 
political platform that is based on “the heritage of bloody legitimization,” a 
sacrosanct legitimization: ”it is a sort of a religious legitimization rather than 
political. It is all about who is the victim”774 and who is the aggressor, undermining 
the dynamics of domestic accountability.775 This political discourse featured 
prominently during the constitutional reform process. As a case in point, Beriz Belkic 
asserted in a personal interview in a rather heated tone:
“The international community was using the nice approach: this is your 
country, your own constitution, you have to come up with a solution. But 
it’s also their responsibility; they forget that they created this country’s 
state. They didn’t stop the war when they could, and there was Srebrenica, 
they allowed the blockage to Sarajevo for four years and they also forced 
some solutions. Most importantly, they didn’t ask who was who during the 
war, who attacked, who defended, they said everyone is guilty, everyone 
was fighting everyone.. .”776 
All of these factors resulted in the presentation of demands during the first phase 
of the constitutional reform process that were based on the principle of a citizen- 
based state with no entities or ethnic-based structures in place. In sum, Bosnia would 
have a single president, a government with a majority-based decision-making 
process, no entity voting and the elimination of entities.777 This vision was, however, 
exact opposite of the Croat and Serb visions and failed to provide an appropriate 
climate for accommodation practices during the initial stages of the process. Indeed, 
given the ongoing mistrust among ethnic groups, the other two groups saw the 
Bosniak idea of a citizen-based state as an attempt to impose a unitary solution to the 
ethnic question inherited from the war, with the domination of one ethnic group over 
the other two. As a case in point, Cavic stated emphatically that the survival of RS 
was “a basic condition” that could not be questioned; “Everything can be changed,
774 Author’s personal interview with Ugo Vlaisavljevic. Sarajevo, 22 May 2007.
775 This mentality continues to be pervasive in today’s Bosniak politics. As a case in point, 
SBiH’s president Haris Silajdzic claimed in a speech to the managing board of the PIC in June 2007, 
“While the Dayton has ended the war and genocide, BiH remains to be a question of principle just like 
it was 12 years ago” (Bosnia Daily 1530,20 June 2007).
776 Author's interview with Beriz Belkic. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
777 SDA will evolve into more pragmatic and accommodating positions during the talks, along 
with the SDP. As an SDP official stated, “we needed to be realistic and find the best solution possible” 
(Author’s interview with Sasa Magazinovic. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007). SBiH remained radicalized 
throughout the process, as we shall see in the next chapters.
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except for the fact that three constituent peoples live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this 
must be identified in the constitutional order.” He also stated, “It seems that ... 
Bosniak parties are trying to use this as an opportunity for discussion on thorough 
change of the Dayton Agreement, which is unacceptable for representatives of parties 
from RS.”779 Similarly, PDP leader Mladen Ivanic declared in the media, “The 
problem is that one part of FBIH advocates for unitary BiH while the other part, 
namely HDZ, advocates for the third entity. Each solution is at the expense of RS.”780 
In sum, as Hays stated in a personal interview, “The main driving goal of the 
majority was thus to control, to manage, to supervise and be in charge. That’s exactly 
what the other two were worried about and that’s why there won’t be reconciliation 
and there won’t be reforms implemented, and they wont get into the EU because they 
[the three ethnic groups] are the block to their own future.”781
Post-Davton Serb Positioning and Inter-group Relations
Despite the extensive autonomous powers provided to the Serb-dominated RS by 
Dayton, Serb concerns about being outvoted by Bosniaks remain pervasive in 
political rhetoric, leading the Serb community to persist favoring the status quo or a 
federal re-arrangement in which RS remains an integral federal unit.782 As expressed 
by an SNSD member when asked about the guarantees provided for in Dayton, “We 
need RS and entity voting for our own political survival. Now for example you have 
in the parliament twenty-four Bosniak representatives, which constitutes already a 
majority. So we need to protect our rights. If we don’t have entity voting, people will 
get disappointed and we will not be able to preserve our rights. We do not want 
somebody else making a decision for us.”783
Serb political demands thus remain rooted in ethnic-based anxiety-laden 
concerns and inter-ethnic distrust, which have been aggravated by the perceived
778 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 13 November 2005.
779 Ibid.
780 Mladen Ivanic, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 14 November 2005.
781 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington D.C., 29 July 2006.
782 Hitchner 2006. It is within this context that Serb leaders have regarded the existence of RS -  
as well as the instrument of entity voting -  as key guarantors for their own political survival (Bose 
2002). This idea represented the groundwork for their demands, namely a three-tiered framework to be 
applied to all the key positions/institutions at the state level and the refusal to dispense with the ethnic- 
based guarantees provided for Serbs in Dayton.
783 Author’s interview with Gordan Milosevic. Banja Luka, 12 June 2007.
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undermining of the status of RS. Indeed, the international community-sponsored 
state-building agenda in Bosnia -  which aims to strengthen state-level institutions to 
the detriment of the powers of the entities -  has been perceived by Serb leaders as a 
concealed strategy aimed at doing away with the status of RS and putting in place a 
Bosniak-dominated state under the guise of a ‘civic’ constitution.784 As a result, Serb 
fears of being outnumbered in a Bosniak-dominated state have not only failed to 
subside since the dissolution of Yugoslavia but on the contrary have been aggravated 
by the very presence of external actors and the international community-sponsored 
state-building reform process in Bosnia, which somewhat explain the long-standing 
obstructionist approach by Serbs to the reform process at the state level.785 The latter 
has tended to revive the sense of insecurity, to increase the perceived value of the 
status quo as defined in Dayton’s institutional arrangement, and to give rise to Serb 
perceptions that the withdrawal of the international community would increase their 
domestic ownership and achieve a more leveling playing field.786
Notwithstanding the overall framework underlying Serb party mindsets, the 
constitutional reform process represented a slight turning point in their obstructionist 
attitude towards the broader reform process at the state level. Indeed, the decision by 
Serb parties to actively engage in the reform of Dayton resulted from a new 
pragmatic approach towards the international community-sponsored reform process
The perception that a state-building agenda and the survival of RS are mutually exclusive has 
been compounded by the international community's often-ambiguous positioning on the status of RS. 
As a case in point, following NATO’s summit in mid-December 2004, where RS was harshly 
criticized for failing to fully cooperate with the ICTY, Ashdown hinted at possible sanctions that could 
affect the status of RS. When asked whether such sanctions would include the abolition of RS, the 
high representative suggested that everything was possible, adding, “I must say, however, if RS would 
respect the Dayton Agreement, then I would protect its competences” (OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 
18 December 2004, Nezavsine Novine interview with Paddy Ashdown). Although days later Ashdown 
denied these statements, the controversy surrounding it -  together with the dismissal of SDS officials 
and the imposition of US sanctions -  gave way to Serb outcry and triggered heated confrontations 
between Serb parties and the international community.
785 This is not to suggest that the international community is the only factor accounting for the 
Serbs' obstructionist approach, which for long has benefited the SDS power structures in RS (see 
European Stability Initiative 1999). This is only to suggest that the international community has 
contributed to heightening ethnic anxieties as a result of the creation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ on the 
ground (see Zahar 2002 and the discussion in chapter 2, p. 88).
786 SNSD official Gordan Milosevic, advisor to SNSD leader Dodik, claimed, “The 
international community has imposed big solutions and has created a lot of frustration [in RS]; 
everybody seeks an opportunity to get rid of that solution because of that. If we reach a solution of our 
own then we’ll be able to live with it for a long time” (Author’s personal interview with Gordan 
Milosevic. Banja Luka, 12 June 2007). Serb population in RS generally support the reduction of the 
HR’s powers. In fact, the UNDP Early Warning Report in April 2006 showed that 65 percent of the 
population in Serb majority areas were in favor of reducing the powers of the HR, in contrast to 28 
percent in Bosniak majority areas and 48 percent in Croat majority areas (United Nations 
Development Programme 2006).
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based on the idea that RS would be better protected with active Serb engagement.787 
“It was indeed a departure from the previous strategy, but we realized that if we 
wanted to protect RS we had to take part in the negotiations,” said SDS high ranking 
official Mladen Bosic.788 As Hitchner stated, since the early stages of the reform 
process, Serbs showed a clear determination to marry the future of RS with that of 
Bosnia, and this had an enormous impact in the conduct of the negotiations.789
The new strategy resulted in two key developments.790 First, the Serb contingent 
became the most prepared, active and unified group in the negotiations.791 They were 
also the group putting more initiatives on the table, including some critical ones such 
as the strengthening of the chairman of the ministers along similar lines to the prime 
minister's office in RS, “which was a huge improvement.”792 The second 
development regarded the rhetoric used during the negotiations, which was 
significantly toned down from previous reform processes. Dodik, for example, 
declared in an interview to Reuters in early December 2005 that Serbs no longer 
dreamed of joining Serbia and asserted that Kosovo’s status would not influence 
developments in Bosnia unless RS was put in danger;793 in such case, he asserted, 
“Serbs could be asking for independence ... using the same argument like Albanians 
from Kosovo.”794 Similarly, Cavic stated on November 17, “We Serbs should say it
787 Author’s personal interviews with Serb officials and Western diplomats. Sarajevo, May-July 
2007.
788 Author’s email interview with Mladen Bosic, 26 June 2007. Mladen Bosic is currently SDS 
leader.
789 Hitchner 2006c. Moderate Serb figures from SDS and SNSD had already showed 
willingness to engage in a constitutional debate in early 2004, following the European Stability 
Initiative’s federal proposal for BiH. Dragan Cavic stated in January 2004, “It is completely clear that 
an RS exit from BiH would be a painful and thorny path. It is not a realistic possibility, and on that 
parth the Serbs would not have the support of the US, the EU or even Russia. Therefore we have had 
to conclude that the path to Europe for RS is through BiH” (Dragan Cavic, cited in Jutarnje Novine, 
20 January 2004. Quoted in ESI 2004b, 6). SNSD’s official Nebojsa Radmanovic stated, “There is no 
need to talk about the internal organization of BiH and it does not mean that we dont need to find 
those solutions that are functional for BiH” (Nebojsa Radmanovic’s declarations on TV, cited in ESI 
2004b, 6). These statements fell however short of compromising the status of RS. Indeed, Cavic stated 
the same day, “There is no chance that BiH will continue to exist, if RS doesn’t exist within it as an 
entity” (Dragan Cavic, cited in Oslobodenje, 20 January 2004. Quoted from ESI 2004b, 5).
790 This development laid the groundwork -  with the assistance of other factors -  for conflict 
regulation in subsequent phases.
791 Author’s personal interviews with members of the secretariat and the Dayton Project BiH. 
Sarajevo, May-June 2007.
792 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
793 See ‘Kosovo Status Without Influence on RS,’ Nezavisne Novine, p. 6, in OHR, Media 
Round-up, 3 December 2005.
794 See Ivan Lovrenovic. “Pristina on Vrbas.” Feral Tribune, p. 22-23. In OHR, Media Round­
up, 9 December 2005.
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clear: Bosnia is equally my state as it is Tihic's and Covic's.”795 Furthermore, even 
when nationalist rhetoric ran high on the Bosniak and Croat sides, Serb parties 
tended to avoid putting wartime goals such as secession on the table (except for rare 
occasions as a defensive strategy796), and merely threatened to withdraw from the 
process if the existence of RS continued to be put into question. Serb parties, thus, 
kept the level of nationalist rhetoric to a minimum.797
Notwithstanding, this new pragmatic approach by Serb parties was always 
considered to fall short of the shift required to reach a compromise on the role of 
entity voting. This helped raise the level of confrontation with the other two groups, 
and became a hurdle during negotiations.798
Post-Davton Croat Positioning and Inter-Group Relations
Croat concerns has also been marked by fear of being dominated by the Bosniaks 
ever since Dayton, especially in relation to their situation in the Federation. There are 
parallels here with Serb anxieties. As Bose stated, the Croats “share with the BiH 
Serbs a fear of becoming, in practice if not on paper, a [subordinated] national 
minority. In their view, the Serbs are more or less safe from suffering this fate 
because of the constitutionally entrenched status of Republika Srpska, but they have 
no such guarantee. Hence the exaggerated sense of injustice, and the allergic reaction 
to any move of the international community that can be remotely construed as a step 
towards a less group-based and more majoritarian federation. The dismantling of the
795 Dragan Cavic, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 17 November 2005. Following the 
constitutional agreement in March 2006, Cavic maintained this conciliatory tone. In declarations to 
Nezavisne Novine in April 2006 he stated, “The Serb people, like all other constituent peoples, have 
equal rights to govern BiH. If we make efforts to improve the functionality of the state of BiH, it does 
not mean that we destroy RS. I do not think that by weakening the institutions of BiH we are doing 
something positive for the RS, quite the opposite, this would be counterproductive and would bring 
into question, especially in international circles, whether the constitutional structure of BiH is 
hindering regional stability” (Dragan Cavic, cited in Nezavisne Novine, 7 April 2006. Quoted from 
Foreign Policy Initiative 2007,25). This declarations represent a radical departure from previous Serb 
(and SDS) rhetoric.
796 There were only a few instances in which Serb-related wartime claims were made but those 
were intertwined with the police reform process and reflected the views of SDS hardliners. RS PM 
Pero Bukejlovic, for example, pronounced himself against constitutional changes after the rejection of 
police reform and stated, “RS is created in blood, it is a treasure we mustn’t disturb” (cited in OHR, 
Media Round-up, 23 September 2005).
797 The guarantees provided at the beginning of the negotiations that the status of RS would not 
be changed may have contributed to toning down Serb rhetoric. Indeed, Serb parties could afford to be 
moderate so long as their entity and ethnic rights were not in question.
798 While Serb parties showed readiness to engage in further stages of constitutional reform, 
they never considered that such process would revolve around the status and nature of RS.
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federation and the creation of a Croat entity would represent the optimal solution, 
from this perspective.”799
In contrast to the Serb situation, however, there is a widespread belief among 
Bosnian Croats that they have no real power vested within the constitution at both the 
state and entity levels. As Hays asserted, “For the Croats, the frustration is the bad 
position in the Federation. They are usually outvoted. They have no real powers in 
the constitution and they can never use entity voting because they can never have ten 
deputies in the parliament.”800 Indeed, as HDZ 1990 official Martin Raguz stated in a 
personal interview, “In the current constitution, Croats have no real instrument to 
protect their interests. And the constitutional court cannot really protect our interests, 
as was the case with the law on public broadcasting. All Croats in the House of 
Representatives and House of Peoples were against it. All Croat judges were against 
it, but the law got approved.”801 Similarly, HDZ working group member Mile Lasic 
stated, “The current procedure in the House of Peoples [which is the main 
mechanism in the hands of Croats to defend their interests] is not powerful enough 
... because the issue will be resolved by somebody else, by the Constitutional Court, 
where you have two representatives of each people plus three internationals and 
usually decisions are made by five, a simple majority. So it’s hard to protect our 
interests through the current instruments.”802 HDZ leader Covic also stated in an 
interview in late December 2004, “The Croats in the FBiH have been completely
OA1
disempowered.” He continued, “The Federation is one of the entities which does 
not guarantee constitutional-legal equality to the Croats, therefore it is an obstacle to 
our goal.”804 In sum, Croats have developed a minority syndrome within the Muslim- 
Croat federation and are fearful of becoming a national minority without a state.805 As 
Bose notes, ever since Dayton, they view themselves as the “subordinate partner in 
an accidental marriage which is blighted by mutual suspicion.”806 They are thus 
generally interested in reinforcing ethnic-based institutions that embed them with
Bose 2002,258.
Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
Author’s personal interview with Martin Raguz. Sarajevo, 5 July 2007.
Author’s personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 2 July 2007.
Dragan Covic, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 31 December 2004.
Ibid.
Bose 2002.
Ibid, 258.
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more veto powers.807
The perceived lack of power among Croats (together with their lower total 
population, which makes them a real minority in Bosnia) has led to a great deal of 
ambivalence and misdirection within this group. Indeed, their vision of the state has 
always oscillated between two points on a continuum from moderate to radical 
nationalism.808 The moderates -  including HDZ leader Covic and other figures 
within the party such as Martin Raguz and Bozo Ljubic -  have tended to favor the 
creation of a functional state based on two basic premises; a weak central authority 
that cedes part of its powers to EU supranational institutions and the provision of 
extensive economic autonomy to the sub-state levels where the different ethnic 
groups could enjoy ample self-government in specific areas. As Martin Raguz stated, 
“we want the Europeanization of Dayton.”809 Hays also noted, “The Croats have a 
strong desire for enforcing, improving the business environment in the country. They 
are really driven by the economy. They are the businessmen of the country. And EU 
accession is an absolute. At the same time, they want to be part of the power 
calculation ... They want the state to be a set of institutions where they can lead 
government.”810
It is within this general framework that moderate Croats advocated for the 
creation of a decentralized state that is divided in different levels based on economic, 
geographic and historical criteria, although this is likely to be opposed by the Serbs. 
Barisa Colak stated in early 2004, “It is clear to us all that this organization of BiH 
cannot become functional and economically self-sustaining. Because of that, we have
807 As a case in point, HDZ official Lasic argued, “What we want is that if we keep entity 
voting, then let’s make it useful for us too and that was one of the problems. Serbs never wanted to 
give it up” (author’s personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 2 July 2007).
808 Similar to the situation before the war, with the Kljuic-Boban divide within HDZ in 1991- 
1992. As the International Crisis Group reported, the HDZBiH was initially dominated by relative 
moderates, under the leadership of Stjepan Kljuic, pursuing “a policy of participation in Bosnia's 
institutions and the maintenance of Bosnia's territorial integrity.” Shortly before the war, however, “a 
hard-line faction led by Mate Boban, a Herzegovinian, took control of the HDZBiH” with the backing 
of Zagreb (International Crisis Group 1998b, 2).
809 Author’s personal interview with Martin Raguz. Sarajevo, 5 July 2007. Raguz is referring to 
transferring the concept built in Dayton -  namely a weak central authority with strong sub-state level 
authorities -  to the EU framework. There are two major problems with this notion, however. Firstly, 
this idea is closely linked to actual EU membership, yet the EU accession process may take still many 
years. Secondly, under this framework the entities would be weakened or eliminated (Croats usually 
refer to the creation of four or five regions instead of entities). In either scenario, it is highly unlikely 
that the Serbs would renounce to RS, even if the transformation of the two-entity based structure is 
accomplished under the broader process of EU integration.
810 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
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decided to seek the transfer of responsibilities from the Federation to the state.” As 
Covic asserted, we are for “three levels of government. The middle level is the key to 
the country’s restructuring, [which should be arranged by] regions. Four or five 
regions should have a clear ethnic majority with its own legislature and executive 
offices. The regions need to be economically sustainable and balanced.”812 HDZ 
official Mile Lasic further explained, “historically and nowadays, there are two 
models that are colliding: one, a unitary state, civil, one man-one vote, a central state 
and local authorities, only one House of Representatives, etc. [or] two, 
decentralization, a federal model, and mostly a national model, which already exists. 
I think we have to find a balance between these two models so the rights of peoples 
are protected. So we need a balance of collective and individual rights. That’s the
O i l
model.” The problem with this approach is the implicit elimination of the entities, 
which would encounter strong opposition among the Serbs.814
The other Croat notion, which is put forth by more radicalized segments within 
the HDZ and some groups within the broader Croat community,815 is based on a 
three-pillar power-sharing structure that infuses all levels of authority to minimize 
the risk of being outvoted by both Bosniaks and Serbs. As Professor Mujkic argued, 
the Croat hardliner’s ultimate goal “is the elimination of RS, but given that that is 
impossible, their interest is the creation of three entities. They want to add more 
consociationalist features to the constitution.”816 This idea was prominent and present 
during negotiations, especially during the first phase, hindering the creation of a 
climate conducive to conflict regulation.817 As HDZ spokesperson Milo Relota stated, 
“We believe that the mid-level [authorities] should be composed of at least three
811 Barisa Colak, cited in Nezavisne Novine, 19 January 2004. Quoted from ESI 2004b, 18.
812 Dragan Covic, cited in an interview by Zoran Kresic, Vecemj List, 11 June 2005. Available 
at http://www.caausa.org/FPQ%20Media%20Reports/June2005/FPQ%20Media%20Report%20- 
%20June%2011 .%202005 .pdf [accessed on April 18, 2009]. HDZ official Mile Lasic also noted, 
“We’re for decentralization, for federalization with three different levels: state, local and federal units 
at the middle level, with no less than four federal units. But that has to be reached through consensus, 
with an agreement, with a compromise. The third level of power, the middle one has to reflect the 
decentralization of power: it needs to have judicial, legislative and executive powers. In that way, we 
would reduce the level of power we have here” (Author’s personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 
2 July 2007).
813 Author’s personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 2 July 2007.
814 Author’s personal interview with European official. Sarajevo, May 2007.
815 The Catholic Church, for example, has generally had an ambivalent position towards the 
creation of a third entity.
8.6 Author’s personal interview with Professor Azim Mujkic. Sarajevo, 9 May 2007.
8.7 While Serbs are not opposed to this idea, as long as it does not affect the status of RS,
Bosniaks are ardently opposed to it.
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federal units, entities or provinces.”818 Similarly, Ivo Miro Jo vie, the Croat member 
of the BiH presidency, stated in the annual summit of the Central European Initiative 
in Zagreb, “I have nothing against Serbs, but if they have Serb Republic, then we 
should have Croat and Bosniak Republics.”819 Furthermore, internal divisions within 
the Croat community also raised the level of radicalization and ambiguity, even 
among moderate figures within the party. Covic, for example, kept an ambiguous 
position during the first phase of negotiations. In mid-October, Covic stated that if 
RS survived, HDZ would not give up on a third entity.820 Only a few days later, he 
announced that he did not support another entity, but rather the creation of four or 
five multi-ethnic regions.821
The problem with the above approach, as voiced by both external and domestic 
actors, is the difficulty of satisfying such a demand without undermining the creation 
of a functional state; as established by the Venice Commission and laid out by the 
EU.822 As Hays noted, “The Croat parties are always the most difficult to find a clear 
position on the issues. Partially, because it is their party that is effectively 
underrepresented in the House of Representatives, and because they are a minority in 
terms of the population even if they are in principle coequal constituent people. So 
they had strong interest in keeping the three, three, three; everything divisible by 
three: in the government, in the presidency, etc. It is more difficult to find a modality 
that meet their needs. How can we ensure that the Croat concerns for future 
domination are addressed without undermining the demands of the Venice 
Commission?”823
Furthermore, Bosniaks are ardently opposed to the idea of a third entity.824 The
818 Milo Relota, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 6 December 2005.
819 Ivo Miro Jovic, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 14 October 2005. Similarly, he stated 
in September, “If other two people have it, why don’t we as well? ... Federation is dungeon for 
Croats.... We have no rights” (See, A. Omeragic. “SDS Threatens with New Crisis in Authorities and 
HDZ with Third Entity.” Oslobodjenje. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 29 September 2005).
820 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 13 October 2005.
821 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 26 October 2005. Materials provided to the author suggest that
Covic was asked by Hays to tone down his nationalist rhetoric (Dayton Project, September Trip 
Report; author’s personal interviews with Western Diplomats, Sarajevo, May-July 2007). The 
materials indicated that a meeting with Covic made it clear that the HDZ leader was holding the 
constitutional process hostage to his own leadership crisis within the party and using it to solidify his 
hold on the party (for an in-depth discussion on party politics see next section in this chapter).
822 As Bieber has noted, the creation of a third entity stands in contradiction to the institutional 
evolution of Bosnia since the late 1990s, namely moving “away from the ethno-territorial units and 
towards joint decision making at the state level” (Bieber 2006b, 27).
823 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington D.C., 29 July 2006.
824 As a case in point, SBiH’s leader Safet Halilovic stated in early 2004, “Changes must be
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Serbs do not oppose it in principle (so long as it does not affect the status of RS); but 
working out the details of an additional entity would inevitably cause a great deal of 
confrontation between the other two communities and the Croats. As a EUSR officer 
noted, “if you go into the details [in relation to the creation of new sub-national units] 
you need to clearly define the competences, and that would be really a fight. Also, if 
you then go to the territorial divisions, then Serbs and Croats would not be that close 
in their positions, because the Serbs do not want to give anything from RS. They 
want Bosniaks and Croats to solve that themselves within the boundaries of the 
Federation.”825
In the end, the debate over constitutional reform brought to light widespread 
vacillation within this community and their sense of misdirection over how to move 
forward. Additionally, the ongoing fighting between moderate and radical forces 
within the party -  as well as within the moderates -  led to a great deal of 
ambivalence and flip-flopping during the constitutional negotiations, especially 
during the first phase.
522 . Intra-ethnic Level: Intra-Party Power Struggles
While the presentation of zero-sum claims reflected the still-latent inter-ethnic 
mistrust in Bosnia, it also illustrated the internal struggles taking place at the intra­
party level, which contributed to the radicalization of the debate.826 As Hays stated in 
personal interviews, “it was clear that radical forces were pulling the strings at the 
very beginning of the negotiations,” when the party leaders were directly engaged.827 
While these appreciations are based on perceptions, it is worth pointing out that all 
of the leaders of the three major ethnic-based parties in Bosnia (which happened to 
be leading the governments at the state and entity levels), namely SDA’s Tihic, 
SDS’s Cavic and HDZ’s Covic, were confronted with major internal divisions at the
made, but on the basis of natural economic-functional regionalization, and not through the 
solidification of the administrative, cantonal and entity boundaries which were part of the erroneous 
construction at Dayton” (Safet Halilovic, cited in Jutamje Novine, 10/11 January 2004. Quoted from 
ESI 2004b, 6).
825 Author’s personal interview with European official. Sarajevo, May 2007.
826 See discussion on the political security of party leaders in divided societies in Chapter 2 (p. 
82-85).
827 All members of the Dayton Project reached the same conclusion (Author’s personal 
interviews with local officials of the Dayton project BiH, Sarajevo, May-June 2007). Officials of the 
NGO Dayton Project assisted the secretariat from the beginning of the process in early 2005 until the 
US became involved in mid-December.
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time of the negotiations. In fact, at least two of these parties, namely the SDA and 
the SDS, were undergoing a process of internal de-radicalization and reform 
(including de-secularization in the case of the SDA), which came with major internal 
upheavals and intense opposition from the most extreme segments within each 
party.828 Although previous reform efforts had already brought these divisions into 
the open, the process of constitutional reform pulled these parties further apart (as 
negotiations progressed), demonstrating that party leaders were not reflecting the 
majority within their own ranks (a situation that would become critical later in the 
constitutional reform process, especially once the package was brought to parliament 
for approval). Party leaders were thus facing serious challenges to their positions at 
the time.
SDS, for example, was mired in deep internal disarray resulting from the police 
reform process, which had widened the gap between the moderate nationalists under 
the leadership of SDS President Dragan Cavic and a radical nationalist wing 
prominent in Eastern RS.829 Members of the party’s General Board from Eastern RS 
remained firmly opposed to the concept of police reform supported by the EU in 
Bosnia, particularly in relation to the creation of cross-IEBL (Inter-Entity Boundary 
Line) police districts and the removal of police from entity control,830 while Cavic 
had showed a more accommodating approach. The SDS’s rejection of the Mount 
Vlasic talks -  where Cavic had agreed in early May 2005 with other domestic actors 
to move forward with police reform in the presence of EU and OHR officials -  
showed how deep the divisions within SDS were running.831 The rejection removed 
the possibility of opening SAA negotiations and a new round of police reform 
negotiations was launched in July.
Internal divisions within SDS reached a critical point in October 2005 
following the rejection of the police concept at the RS National Assembly with the 
support of RS Prime Minister Bukejlovic (who was in tune with hardliners from 
Eastern RS). The rejection caused one of the most critical crises in Bosnia, 
particularly in RS, with the international community threatening to isolate the RS
828 International Crisis Group 2003; Bougarel 2007.
829 International Crisis Group 2005.
830 International Crisis Group 2005.
831 Although the Vlasic talks did not gamer consensus on the way in which the country would
be divided into policing districts, it was believed that agreement to move forward would be enough for 
the EU to decide to open SAA negotiations with Bosnia (see Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2005)
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government if the rejection was not reversed. Following negotiations between SDS, 
SNSD and internationals behind close doors, Cavic announced the acceptance of the 
police concept, with the clear opposition of hardliners, who had been sidelined from 
these negotiations. The relations between Cavic and SDS hardliners became thus 
further strained following his decision to support the international community- 
sponsored police reform concept when only days before Bukejlovic and the RS 
National Assembly had publicly expressed its rejection. All in all, in contrast to the 
Bosniak and Croat leaders, Cavic eventually managed to both isolate Prime Minister 
Bukejlovic and prevent hardliners from outmaneuvering moderates once the 
constitutional negotiations were further advanced. This opportunity became possible 
after the PDP withdrew its support from the Bukejlovic government on November 
28832 (over the distribution of government posts and positions at state-owned 
companies),833 which opened the way for an alliance between Cavic and SNSD 
leader Dodik. Indeed, Cavic’s decision to appoint Dodik as the new RS prime 
minister on February 4 (with the support of SDA, SBiH, SDP and PDP) in a 
surprising turn of events, further precipitated the fall of hardliners within SDS in 
Banja Luka (such as RS Prime Minister Bukejlovic), giving Cavic ample room to 
engage further in the reform process.834
SDA was also undergoing a convoluted process of de-secularization with strong 
tensions between Tihic’s moderate wing and a more radical faction (most notably 
members of the Islamist movement835) that became closer to SBiH’s Haris Silajdzic 
at a later stage. Indeed, as Xavier Bougarel notes, the appointment of Sulejman Tihic 
-  who had no ties with the Islamist movement -  as the successor of Alija Izetbegovic 
in 2001 alienated members of the Islamist movement who had occupied a relatively 
central role within the party until that point. After Tihic’s appointment and in light of 
Tihic’s efforts at reform and de-secularization of the party, these forces saw their
832 The PDP was the only party whose support had allowed Prime Minister Bukejlovic to 
govern in RS in minority since February 2005.
833 The decision was based on the refusal of the SDS to appoint two PDP officials for positions 
in two state-owned companies, although electoral motives might have also been behind Ivanic’s 
decision to withdraw PDP’s support.
834 Rumors about the dismissal of Bukejlovic had been in fact prominent in early September 
when it was clear that Bukejlovic and the RSNA would vote against the European concept of police 
reform (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 6 and 7 September 2005).
835 SDA was created in 1990 by members (including Alija Izetbegovic) of a heretofore marginal 
‘Islamist movement’ associated with the Bosnian islamist organization, the ‘Young Muslims’ (see 
chapter 1, p. 43) The members of this group remained relatively key figures within the party for most 
of the 1990s under the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic (Bougarel 2007). I use the term ‘Islamist group’ 
or ‘members of the Islamist movement’ to refer to the members of this faction within SDA.
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power and influence greatly diminish.836 Divisions flared up during the constitutional 
reform process, starting at the fourth SDA congress in May 2005, when members of 
the Islamist group and other factions launched a campaign to undermine Tihic’s bid 
to reelection as party president and to elect Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija 
Izetbegovic, instead. Although the attempt failed,837 dissenting members in key 
positions within the party grew increasingly anxious about their loss of influence 
within the party and Tihic’s moderate stance on constitutional reform.838 In his 
address to the party congress, Tihic restated his resolve to make the SDA a 
multiethnic party, stripped of nationalist claims839 and accepting of European 
standards and values while respecting the particular tradition, culture and identity of 
Bosnia.840 As Tihic stated, “Besides Bosniaks we also wish to see members of other 
peoples in the party and even more strongly distance ourselves from the nationalist 
parties.”841
SBiH also showed some internal upheaval after its former leader Haris Silajdzic 
became reengaged in party politics in the fall of 2005, driving the party towards more 
radical stances. As Hays asserted in a personal interview, SBiH representatives 
started forming their position against constitutional reform around this time. Before 
Silajdzic reappeared, “they had been the most accommodating group in the 
negotiations,” especially under the leadership of SBiH representative Beriz Belkic, a 
prominent moderate figure within SBiH. But Silajdzic’s return and popularity, Hays 
argued, had a deep impact on the few moderate forces within the party. Indeed, 
“Belkic was very affected by the return of Haris. He feared to be ostracized.”842
Divisions were also rampant within the Croat HDZ, although they were mostly
836 Bougarel 2007,50.
837 In the end, Izetbegovic decided against running for the party presidency. He supported 
Tihic’s candidacy (and his Deputy Adnan Terzic) and became one of the five vice presidents of the 
party (Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2005).
838 Bougarel 2007.
839 Economist Intelligence Unit, July 2005.
840 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 27 May 2005.
841 Sulejman Tihic, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 27 May 2005.
842 Other participants in the negotiations, including a SBiH party official, agreed with these
assessments. Meghan Stewart, for example, recalls that during the negotiations with party leaders she 
noticed that Safet Halilovic “was much less independent than Belkic had been... the former engaged 
more and [Halilovic] [appeared to be] checking on a lot with Silajdzic” (author’s personal interview 
with Meghan Stewart, Washington D.C., August 2006). An official of the Dayton Project also recalls, 
“Halilovic was silent all the time. He had a very obstructionist attitude. It was obvious to all of us that 
he was receiving orders from Silajdzic to keep it that way” (author's personal interview with a local 
member of the Dayton Project BiH. Sarajevo. June, 2007).
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* ♦ 0 ^ 1  , connected to disputes over electoral lists and positions of influence. This was
especially true following Dragan Covic's removal from the BiH presidency in May
2005,844 when hardliner Miro Jovic -  a relatively minor figure within the party -  was
elected to replace Covic (with Covic's backing) as the Croat member of the
presidency. The obscure nomination process pushed aside the moderate and better
suited candidate Martin Raguz.845 Jovic was approved in the House of
Representatives with the support of only two Croat members, suggesting major
divisions within the party. In-house rifts were aggravated following the party’s ninth
convention in June 2005, where Covic -  at the time still indicted on corruption
charges -  managed to win the party's presidency against Bozo Ljubic846 in a narrow
contest mired in accusations of vote rigging.848
Divisions seemed to come to an end when Ljubic and his supporters, namely 
Martin Raguz and Ivo Andric, were expelled from the party in November 2005 
(following an initiative to remove Covic from the HDZ leadership and elect a new 
president),849 but in reality internal divisions were simply transferred from the party 
level to the public sphere, given that most expelled members kept their public
843 Although internal rifts were not new to the party, divisions became more prominent during 
the process of constitutional reform. Power struggles were already evident in 2004 between HDZ 
leader Barisa Colak and the more moderate figure Dragan Covic, at the time Croat member of the BiH 
presidency. The struggles were aggravated by the 2004 October local elections, in which HDZ lost 
some key strongholds in the federation (see Economist Intelligent Unit, January 2005). In addition to 
the traditional moderate-conservative divide within the HDZ, represented by the Covic-Colak rift and 
centered on the control of the HDZ’s Mostar city branch (traditionally the stronghold of hardliners and 
one of the most influential branches within the party), the chairman of the House of Representatives, 
Martin Raguz, a prominent moderate figure, started to gain power and popularity within the party at 
the same time, and was “considered a front-runner eventually to replace Mr Covic in the state 
presidency” (Ibid).
844 Dragan Covic had been dismissed as the Croat member of the presidency in March 2005 as a 
result of corruption charges filed against him while acting as the FBiH Finance Minister. He was, 
however, not banned from political life, which allowed him to keep the position as HDZ leader and 
run for re-election in June 2005.
845 According to the Economist Intelligent Unit (July 2005), local observers suggested that 
Covic’s support for Jovic was part of his strategy to strengthen his position within the party vis-a-vis 
other significant contenders such as Martin Raguz and outgoing HDZ leader Barisa Colak.
846 Bozo Ljubic was former vice president of HDZ; and a key moderate figure within HDZ. He
lost the presidency of HDZ at the 1998 May party convention to the more radical figure Ante Jelavic 
(see chapter 3, p. 127).
848 Covic won with 283 votes (258 votes went to Ljubic), which reflects the high degree of 
dissatisfaction within the HDZ ranks. Following the election of Covic, radical forces and other 
factions within HDZ became apprehensive about the prospect of Covic -  a moderate and a favorite of 
the internationals -  accommodating the agenda of external actors to the detriment of Croat positions at 
both the entity and state levels at a time when constitutional negotiations were taking place (author’s 
personal interviews with local and Western diplomats, Sarajevo, May-July 2007).
849 Covic did also strengthen his grip on the party by replacing non-loyal personnel in key 
ministerial positions at both the state and entity levels, starting with Federation Health Minister Tomo 
Lu£ic in July 2005, a month after the HDZ Convention (Economist Intelligent Unit, October 2005).
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positions at the House of Representatives. This proved fatal once the constitutional 
agreement reached parliament in March 2006.
Two additional factors contributed to the hardening of internal divisions within 
the HDZ. The first factor was the position of the Catholic Church, which increased 
the general tone of the nationalist rhetoric against the process of constitutional reform 
(mostly a reaction to a progressive loss of its power in Bosnia). On September 26, 
Cardinal Vinko Puljic complained in an interview that the Catholic Church was 
facing enormous obstacles in Bosnia, in reference to both regaining its lost property 
and keeping what was already in its possession. He also linked the problems of the 
Catholic Church in Bosnia with the broader situation of Croats in the multiethnic 
country, arguing that Croats had no power in Bosnia.850 Furthermore, in his address to 
the thirty-fifth session of the bishops' conference in October 2005, which coincided 
with the first meeting in Washington DC, Cardinal Puljic argued that Croats in 
Bosnia did not enjoy equal rights as a constituent people and accused the 
international community of double standards.851
The Church became increasingly vocal in its position on constitutional talks as 
negotiations became public. Indeed, during the October bishops' conference, cardinal 
Puljic presented a document, ‘Proposals of BiH bishops for the organization of 
BiH,’852 advocating for the division of Bosnia into four regions, instead of the 
entities, namely Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla.853 The Bosnian Catholic 
bishops also refused to attend the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of Dayton 
in Washington DC. As negotiations moved forward, the Church became increasingly 
critical of the process854 and supportive of Ljubic’s opposition.855 All of these 
developments had the effect of both raising the level of nationalist rhetoric and
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 26 September 2005.
851 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 28 October 2005. The Catholic Church has regarded 
Dayton as discriminatory against the Croats and the Catholic Church in Bosnia, especially in 
reference to the restitution of property, the construction of Churches, Catholic education, refugee 
return and employment opportunities (see Wettach 2007). The Catholic Church has also been 
generally rather critical of the role of the international community (Ibid).
852 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 31 October 2005.
853 Although not clearly stated, this document was implicitly advocating the creation of a third 
entity in Bosnia (three regions, plus Sarajevo as a multi-ethnic district).
854 In November, Cardinal Pujlic argued in an interview with the Croatian Ambassador to BiH 
that the new concept of constitutional reform would not protect the interests of the Croats (See OHR, 
BiH Media Round-up, 18 November 2005).
855 Cardinal Pujlic was supportive of the Ljubic candidacy at the HDZ Convention in June of 
2005 (see “Ashdown for Covic, Pack and Martens for Ljubic.” Danas. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 
2 June 2005). It is reasonable to assume that the Cardinal viewed Covic’s indictment as undermining 
of his ability to defend the Croat interest in Bosnia.
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confrontation, and reinforcing internal divisions within the HDZ. In other words, the 
Church’s critical position provided HDZ dissenters with a platform of legitimacy to
v
challenge Covic’s leadership as part of their opposition to the process of 
constitutional reform.856
Q C *7
Kin-state involvement during this phase, particularly from Croatia, also 
reinforced divisions within the Croat community.858 While Croatia publicly lobbied 
strongly for reforming the Dayton provisions,859 mostly in support of the 
constitutional reform process and of improving the position of Croats within 
Bosnia, Croatia’s meddling in HDZ BiH’s power struggles in favor of Ljubic 
contributed to aggravating the divisions. Indeed, rather than acting as a mere 
spectator of these power struggles, Croatia’s Prime Minister and HDZ leader, Ivo 
Sanader, lobbied for Ljubic to take over the HDZ leadership during the June 2005
Q/T1 V
party convention. Once Covic was elected HDZ leader, Sanader lobbied for 
Covic’s resignation, sending strong messages of support to Ljubic.862 Sanader even 
suggested that Covic was unfit for the post as a result of his indictment and invited 
him to step down.863 These developments -  together with the Catholic Church's 
support of opposition factions within HDZ BiH -  weakened Covic’s position and
These developments are further explored in Chapters 6 and 7.
857 It is worth noting that Croatia’s EU path had reached a critical juncture at this time. 
Accession negotiations had been on hold since March 2005 over the handing over of General 
Gotovina to the war crimes tribunal. The EU was, however, set to finally give a green light to Croatia 
in October of 2005, as a result of Austria’s strong lobbying efforts, conditioning the lifting of its 
opposition to Turkey’s candidacy to the opening of accession talks with Croatia. Gotovina was 
arrested shortly after in Spain in December 2005.
858 Croatian HDZ still exerts strong influence over HDZ BiH.
859 A controversy erupted, however, over Croatian President Stjepan Mesic’s address to the UN
General Assembly in September. In his address, he stated, “BiH entities, which are functioning as 
medieval feuds, are the greatest source of political and social instability in the Balkans, and BiH 
should finally be organized as a regular European state.” BiH media sources interpreted Mesic’s 
statement as a plea for the elimination of entities; this caused an immediate uproar from Serb officials, 
who accused Croatia’s president of meddling in Bosnian internal affairs. Mesic finally retracted the 
statements (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 18-21 September 2005).
860 In an address to the Croatian parliament in early November, Ivo Sanader stated that he would 
support any decision reached by the constituent peoples and advocate for Croats having equal 
constitutional rights; “Croatian Government wants BiH to be a safe and independent state, in which 
Croats will be an equal and constituent people. And we see future of BiH in the united Europe” (Ivo 
Sanader, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 10 November 2005).
861 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 2 June 2005.
862 There was official concern that Covic’s indictment would undermine Croat’s position in the
process of constitutional reform. But there were in fact strong personal differences between both 
Covic and Sanader, which could have influenced Sanader’s decision to support Ljubic. Furthermore, 
Ljubic appeared to Sanader as a more reliable partner than Covic (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 10 
June 2005), who had made clear his determination to keep Croatia’s HDZ out of BiH business. 
Covic’s decision to place Jovic as the HDZ BiH’s president had not count with HDZ Croatia’s 
knowledge for example.
863 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 11 November 2005.
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provided a vital platform of political support for Ljubic and his supporters in the 
months to come.864
5.23. Supra-national Dynamics: Limited External Intervention
Limited engagement of external actors at this stage prevented them from offsetting 
the dynamics described above. Indeed, although both the US and the EU were 
supportive of Hays’ efforts, and endorsed the process publicly, they never became 
formally involved at this stage. Despite increased engagement towards the end of 
this phase, such as US involvement in the DC meeting in November 2005, efforts 
were belated and not sufficient to counterbalance the highly charged dynamics at the 
inter- and intra-ethnic levels.
The Role of the EU
The role of the EU was in fact more prominent than that of the US during the initial 
stages of the process (most prominently during the working group period). While the 
EU was not directly and officially involved at this time, Europeans heavily 
influenced the process in its early stages.865 As seen in Chapter 4, input from Europe 
(in contrast to the US, which was limited to supporting informal talks, without 
committing officially to the process866) came through various channels, including: (1) 
financial support for Hays’ NGO from countries such as Sweden, Norway and 
Switzerland; (2) a template for the conduct of negotiations stressing local 
empowerment and domestic ownership;868 (3) sponsorship of high-ranking talks with
Serbia’s role during the first phase of negotiations was rather discreet. As a case in point, no 
comments were sent from Belgrade at the time of the Brussels negotiations. It is reasonable to assume 
that the initiation of the status process in Kosovo was keeping Serbia busy at the time. Furthermore, no 
links between the situation of RS and Kosovo were made by Serb parties during this phase; 
Paradoxically, it would be the Bosniak SBiH that made the connection between both processes 
towards the end of 2005 and early 2006, with the intent to stir tensions at the inter-ethnic level and 
undermine the process.
865 In addition, Hays was in much closer contact with the Europeans than with the US 
Ambassador. He believed in the idea of EU integration as the best path for Bosnia (author’s personal 
interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006) and worked closely with European 
representatives in Bosnia. As Michael Humphreys stated, “Hays was a rather pro-European US 
Ambassador” (author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009).
866 See chapter 4, p. 152.
868 As Hays asserted, “the procedure we were using was Euro friendly.’ In other words, ‘there
was an emphasis on local empowerment, domestic ownership, work in a working group format, etc; 
they were much more willing to accept what I would call a sloppy process, one in which the local 
solutions are not perfect but are preferable to the ones imposed from outside” (author’s personal
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party leaders under EU auspices in Brussels in November 2005; (4) and finally, the 
rationale for reform, which was outlined in the Venice Commission and EU public 
statements. Although the Venice Commission's opinion was not intended to be 
prescriptive but rather to outline shortcomings in the Bosnian constitution, it became 
a reference point and a framework around which negotiations were built.
There was also a common objective among some European actors -  more 
prominently among the European Commission and the European Parliament -  to tie, 
even if loosely, constitutional reform to EU integration in an attempt to use the 
prospect of EU accession as an inducement to party leaders to reach an agreement 
during negotiations.869 EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, for example, 
encouraged Bosnian authorities in October 2005 to work together “to streamline this 
expensive and multilayered bureaucracy,”870 declaring that Bosnia would not be able 
to join the EU with its current structure. Similarly, the European Parliament’s 
resolution in April 2005 questioned Bosnian constitutional framework as a viable 
model for a state and urged the commission “to support the country's political forces 
in finding a consensus to reform the political framework as set out in the Dayton 
agreement.”871 As Humphreys stated, the EU was trying to convey to Bosnian leaders 
“that constitutional reform would be necessary, but without specifying specific 
constitutional reform conditions.”872
At the PIC’s extraordinary session on December 14-15, the steering board also 
welcomed the recent commitment by political leaders to pursue constitutional reform 
and, together with the representatives of Bosnia, issued a communique on priority 
reforms for Bosnia, the first of which was “to modernize the Dayton constitution in 
order to increase the functionality and efficiency of BiH’s institutions and of BiH 
itself so as to create a state that puts citizens first.”873 In addition to these inputs, the 
EU was also involved in an informal way. As UK Ambassador Rycroft stated, “Hays 
would brief me every time he would come to Sarajevo. And he would brief the other 
European ambassadors, those present in the Peace Implementation Council, France, 
Germany, Italy, etc. So we were involved in a semi-formal way.”874
interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006)
869 Author’s personal interviews, European officials. S arajevo, May-July, 2007.
870 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, October 20,2005.
871 European Parliament 2005.
872 Author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009.
873 Peace Implementation Council 2005a.
874 Author's personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007.
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Notwithstanding the significance of these contributions, especially the provision 
of a rationale for reform and the public support, once negotiations entered a more 
official stage in November 2005 with the involvement of party leaders, partial EU 
engagement proved insufficient to counterbalance the highly charged dynamics 
involved in the negotiations with party leaders. As interviews with Western 
diplomats in Bosnia show, the Europeans’ goal was to see how far informal 
negotiations would go, but they failed to intensify engagement once the stakes 
increased. Supporting an informal process in which the EU had no salient liability 
represented an entirely different scenario from engaging fully in a process in which 
the outcome was uncertain and likely to disrupt other reform processes.875 As a result, 
the EU failed to build the internal consensus needed to engage fully once party 
leaders became involved.876 As a case in point, at the time of the meeting with party 
leaders in Brussels, the European Commission decided it would merely sponsor the 
meeting and restrain itself from affecting the course of negotiations. As Hays stated, 
“Although there were several guest speakers at the opening session, these officials 
did not attend the negotiations nor did they attempt to apply any pressure to the party 
leaders in their deliberations.”877 While the decision not to interfere in the course of 
the negotiations was portrayed as merely the result of the EU’s emphasis on domestic 
ownership in its policy towards Bosnia, it is reasonable to assume that in-house 
divisions around the issue of constitutional reform in Bosnia also played a role.
Indeed, divisions within the EU regarding constitutional reform in Bosnia were 
important at this stage, especially between the Council of the EU and the 
Commission. Although there was general consensus on the need for Bosnia to reform 
the Dayton constitution, there were disagreements over timing. Western diplomats 
stated that the Council, in line with Ashdown’s perspective, had strong reservations 
because of the potential impact of a constitutional reform process over the broader 
state-building agenda in Bosnia and believed that constitutional reform should be 
postponed.878 Commission officials (as well as members of the European Parliament),
875 In which case the EU would have to accept full responsibility.
876 Indeed, interviews with European officials revealed that the EU’s preference was to have 
Bosnian politicians approve a new constitution that streamlined the process of EU accession but in 
their own terms and without heavy involvement on the part of the EU (author's personal interviews 
with European officials. Sarajevo, May-June 2007).
877 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
878 Ibid\ author’s personal interviews with Western diplomats and party officials, Sarajevo, 
May-July 2007.
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however, were more optimistic about the chances of success and were willing to see 
how far the process could go as long as it remained under the direction of Hays and 
his NGO (in order to minimize the risks of failure).879 The meeting in Brussels in 
November made this disagreement patent. While both Olli Rehn and Reinhardt 
Priebe, the European Commission Director for the Western Balkans, opened the 
event with a special note on the importance of the work undertaken,880 EU Foreign 
Policy Chief Javier Solana neither attended the meeting nor sent a representative. 
This sent a clear message regarding the European Council’s position on the 
constitutional reform process in Bosnia, which followed Ashdown's concern about its 
impact on other priorities such as police reform.
The Role of the US
The US initially played a rather weak role based on a ‘wait and see’ policy. After all, 
it was Dayton's main author. The US thus limited itself to supporting the process of 
informal negotiations without further engagement. In fact, when Hays began to 
facilitate exploratory talks on constitutional issues with party representatives, he was 
given permission to engage as long as he proceeded solely as a private citizen, 
remaining the only one accountable for failure.881
In contrast to the EU, however, the US became increasingly committed as the 
stakes increased, especially towards the end of this phase of negotiations.882 As noted 
above, during the meeting in Washington DC in November 2005, which coincided 
with the tenth Dayton anniversary, the US pressured party leaders into signing a 
document committing them to agree to a set of constitutional changes that would 
both strengthen state-level institutions and define a more cost-effective state by 
March 2006.883 Indeed, on November 22, party leaders met with US Secretary of
Humphreys stated that he never thought the EU should have taken over the process fully, “I 
believed the Hays/NGO support and stimulus for a substantially (although certainly not entirely) BiH- 
motivated process was the best approach” (author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 
April 2009).
880 The US ambassador to the EU was also present and addressed the party leaders.
881 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006. This would
be possible while the process was kept secret. Once it became public in September, the stakes became 
greater and it would be more difficult for the US to separate itself from Hays initiative.
882 UK Ambassador Rycroft stated, “as we were getting closer to the Dayton anniversary the 
Americans got increasingly involved, because they wanted to make it work. And they thought they 
could use the prospect of a visit to the US as a carrot” (author’s personal interview with Matthew 
Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007).
883 The introduction of constitutional changes had to occur prior to the first week of April, in
order for the amendments to come into effect after the elections. This deadline was later extended to
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State Condoleezza Rice at the State Department, where the political agreement was 
finally signed, committing its signatories “to pursuing the policies and reforms 
necessary to become a full member of NATO and the European Union.”884 This 
document also included the idea, pushed by the US at the time, that the negotiations 
would represent the first phase of a reform process that would require further changes 
at a later stage. As the text read, “these are only first steps. We recognize that further 
reforms will be necessary to meet the European Union’s accession criteria.”885 This 
unspecified commitment to pursuing a second phase of constitutional reform in 
which other sub-state level rearrangements would be negotiated was deemed 
necessary to have Croat’s signature in the final agreed statement. Furthermore, in 
order to reassure the Croat representatives and get them on board, the Undersecretary 
for Political Affairs Nicholas Bums issued a public letter to party leaders, confirming 
that the current reform effort was only the first phase of a rolling process to reform 
government in Bosnia in which the US would be fully involved.886
53 . CONCLUSIONS
The first phase of constitutional reform was mired in highly disruptive ethnic-based 
power politics. These dynamics affected inter-group relations to the point that 
conflict regulation was impossible. During this phase, two key considerations 
affected inter-group dynamics. First, the Bosnian state had remained ‘fiercely 
contested’887 after a decade of external involvement, keeping ethnic divisions and 
anxieties alive and maintaining “all three of BiH’s communities’ defensive 
mentalities.”888 Indeed, while Serbs and Croats had remained fearful of becoming a 
minority in a state dominated by the Bosniaks, Bosniaks continued to support the 
idea of becoming the majority ethnic power under the guise of a more functional,
May 4, as a result of amendments introduced to the election law.
884 Political agreement of Bosnian leaders, Washington DC, 22 November 2005 (document in 
author’s file).
885 Ibid.
886 The letter read: “Significant progress has been made, but these are only first steps in a long­
term and multi-phased process. You have my assurances that the United States will remain fully 
committed and engaged in these efforts” (Bums 2005). The idea of a second phase was thus triggered 
initially by the US. The EU would later take over this initiative (author’s phone interview with 
Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009).
887 Bose 2002,259.
888 Ibid, 256.
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citizen-based state.889 The experience of war and the perceived bias of external actors 
further fueled these dynamics and resulted in the presentation of mutually 
incompatible demands,890 either by accentuating the minority syndrome or a 
defensive mentality (although for different reasons) or by providing ethnic groups 
with morally or wartime-grounded justifications/rhetoric for their zero-sum goals.891 
Bosniaks, for example, appealed to morally grounded, liberal arguments -  which 
have a special resonance among internationals -  to defend the righteousness of a 
citizen-based state; a solution that is ardently opposed by the other two groups. Serbs, 
for their part, tended to resist any attempt to do away with their hard-won status of 
RS. The Croats were the most ambivalent, swinging between moderate and radical 
stances out of concern for their status as a minority at both the Federation and the 
state level.
The second consideration relates to intra-party dynamics, affecting to some 
degree the radicalization of the debate. Indeed, as conflict regulation theorists 
suggests,892 insecure leaders -  namely leaders whose position is challenged at the 
intra-party level either by second-rank officials or by potential internal splits -  will 
be far more reluctant than secure leaders to take risks and to compromise in a way 
that would endanger their leadership positions.
In this context, the role of external actors was rather mixed. Although there was 
initial but uncommitted support for conducting informal negotiations -  under the 
assumption that the process would not generate any substantial progress -  the half­
hearted support of both the EU and the US proved insufficient to counterbalance the 
dynamics that led to intra-ethnic divisions and inter-ethnic intransigence. The efforts 
undertaken by external actors during this phase proved to be too little too late.
In sum, anxiety-laden concerns related to the status of groups vis-a-vis other
889 Similarly, Mostov noted during and immediately following the war, “one of the few things
which the opposing forces in ex-Yugoslavia could agree about was that nobody wanted to be a 
minority in another’s national state ... As majorities in their own states, they have proved arrogant in 
their blindness to the concerns of other ethnic and national groups; as minorities in other states, they 
have been militant in their indignation about violations or potential violations of their citizenship 
rights, and political and cultural autonomy” (Mostov 1994,21, quoted from Bose 2002,258-9 ft.5).
890 The discussion in Chapter 2 indicated that the experience of conflict challenges one of the
most contentious notions in conflict regulation and power sharing literatures, namely the idea that 
political elites in divided societies are prone to conciliatory behavior (Lijphart 1969, 211-212). See 
Chapter 2 for further discussion.
891 It also had a significant impact in shaping the parameters of the debate during constitutional 
reform, with the use of wartime nationalist rhetoric running counter to the creation of an appropriate 
climate for conflict regulation and accommodation practices.
892 Nordlinger 1972.
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groups (and vis-a-vis the international community), which is typical in divided 
societies, had a deep impact on how parties perceived their interest and other groups’ 
interests as well as how they formulated a political strategy within the bargaining 
framework for constitutional reform. Intra-party divisions further raised the level of 
confrontation within the political debate. As for the external actors, although they 
were engaged in the process, their involvement was half-hearted and failed to 
counterbalance the dynamics described above. All of these factors resulted in the 
presentation of mutually incompatible demands that thwarted the development of 
sound conflict regulation practices during the initial stages of constitutional reform.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM II: 
INTENSIFIED EXTERNAL SUPPORT
6.1. PHASE II: THE US TAKES OVER
The second critical juncture in the development of constitutional reform took place in 
mid-December, when the international community stepped up pressure on the parties. 
Two critical moments are relevant in this phase. The first one involved the decision 
of the US government to take charge of the negotiations on December 12 (with the 
official support of the UK as the Chair of the EU rotating presidency), which resulted 
in the signing of the government package. The second decisive moment took place 
after the collapse of multilateral negotiations on January 17, after which 
constitutional negotiations were held behind close doors at the US Ambassador's 
residence and other venues. It is within this context that a final agreement was 
reached in March 2006 by six out of the eight party leaders that started the 
negotiations, specifically the leaders of SDA, SDP, SDS, PDP, SNSD and HDZ.
6.1.1. The US Takes Over Formally
On December 12, US Ambassador Douglas McElhaney, announced that the US 
would be actively involved in the process of constitutional reform with the official 
support and participation of the EU.893 Thinking that Hays and his NGO could only
893 There has been much speculation about why the US decided to take over the process at the 
end of 2005. A US diplomat stated, “People thought it was worth a chance. The US [saw] the EU 
integration as the future for Bosnia ... and constitutional reform was a key piece of that. We wanted to 
see a Bosnia that was able to meet all EU criteria” (author's personal interview with US official. June 
2007). The UK Ambassador also suggested that the US government was unsatisfied with the progress 
thus far. In light of a likely scenario of collapsed negotiations, the US intervened knowing the 
potential for the negotiations to affect the region, with the Kosovo issue burning. Indeed, most 
Western diplomats agreed that the US realized that Kosovo could potentially affect its involvement in 
Bosnia; if Bosnians did not manage to get results, it would be difficult to engage at a later stage 
(author’s personal interviews with Western diplomats, Sarajevo, May-July 2007).
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take the process this far, the US considered that a full diplomatic push was needed at 
this juncture.894 Timing was also critical. The US could count on the UK -  Chair of 
the EU Presidency at the time -  as a close ally that held similar views and positions 
on Bosnia.895 With the US takeover, a new phase in the process of constitutional 
reform started, although the basic format of the process -  namely the emphasis on 
local ownership, the agreed rules for the negotiations and the scope of the agenda -  
remained unaffected at least formally. Furthermore, the members of the secretariat 
and the CoE were still involved to a great extent, and the US commenced the 
negotiations at the place where Hays had left off, rather than starting from scratch.
The first meeting under US sponsorship took place on December 15-16 on the 
premises of the Central Bank in Sarajevo, where the first deal on the ‘Council of
O Q £
Ministers Package’ was brokered. The agreement on the council of ministers 
envisioned the creation of (1) a prime minister or president of the council of ministers 
with no portfolio (instead of a chairman of the council of ministers) elected by the 
House of Representatives; (2) two deputy presidents from the other two constituent 
peoples; and (3) two new ministries, namely the ministry of agriculture and the 
ministry of science and technology.897 The agreement also envisaged a decision­
making process that was either consensus-based or, in the absence of consensus, 
ruled by a simple majority, so long as at least one minister of each constituent people 
voted in favor of the decision. A set of powers and duties entrusted to the president of 
the council of ministers and the ministries was also provided for in the agreement 
although the final package did not specifically delineate competences between the
894 From this point forward, the US Ambassador facilitated the negotiations, in conjunction with 
the UK Ambassador in his role as the Chair of the rotating EU presidency. Other European actors such 
as the Austrian Ambassador (the Chair of the EU rotating Presidency from January 2006 onwards), the 
Head of the EU Delegation Michael Humphreys and the CoE representative in BiH Tim Cartwright 
were also present during negotiations, mostly as observers. Indeed, although the negotiations had a 
joint chair held by the US and UK ambassadors (the UK Ambassador being replaced by the Austrian 
Ambassador as the co-chair in January 2006), the role of Europe was secondary to the US.
895 In fact, the UK continued to be heavily involved in 2006. The UK Ambassador told the 
author that some European countries such as France were critical of his role after stepping down as the 
EU Chair. He stated, “Once I was not holding the Chair of the EU, I decided to continue to be 
engaged. I remember that once the French Ambassador asked why I was involved if I was not 
representing the EU anymore. I told him that I was representing my own country and that he could do 
the same if this was of his interest” (author’s personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 
June 2007).
896 The Human Rights package was also finalized at this time, although it had already been 
agreed upon.
897 Constitutional Agreement on the Council of Ministers, December 2005 (document in 
author’s file).
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presidency and the council of ministers.898
Although agreement on the council of ministers came relatively swiftly, 
especially considering the level of confrontation among political leaders at the time, 
the package did not represent a fundamental change in the positions and dynamics 
that had led to the near collapse of the process only a few days earlier. In fact, 
agreement on the council of ministers was possible because it built upon the 
consensus reached in this area during the previous negotiation rounds (including the 
working group phase), but party positions remained entrenched on the remaining 
issues, namely the parliament, the presidency and the division of competences 
between the state and the entities. Furthermore, in an additional meeting on 
December 21, party positions remained unyielding after long hours of negotiations 
and external pressure.899 Mutual animosity, nationalist rhetoric and wartime demands 
continued. Covic, for example, insisted on the need to take the negotiations to the 
discussion of the regional level and to the re-drawing of maps and entity borders for 
the creation of new regions.900 Tihic, for his part, proposed the elimination of the 
House of Peoples and the president from the entities,901 an initiative that raised 
tensions with party leaders from the RS.
Two additional rounds of multilateral negotiations took place in January 2006. 
The first one on January 3-4 achieved similar results to the previous rounds,902 
although some progress was made on the issue of the presidency. Tihic appeared 
ready to compromise on a president with two vice presidents on the condition that 
this position would be elected indirectly by the House of Representatives903 (an 
initiative also supported by Covic) 904 but there was no final agreement on both the
898 Ibid.
899 Doris Pack, for example, met with Cavic and stated that Bosnia could not become a member 
of the EU with the current constitution. She added that it was up to Bosnian politicians to decide how 
to reach a satisfactory solution (See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 20 December 2005).
900 See Zoran Kresic, “Next up is drawing of maps.” Vecemji List, p. 6. In OHR, BiH Media
Round-up, 21 December 2005.
901 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 3 January 2006.
902 Ibid.
903 OHR Media Round-up 5 January 2005.
904 Indirect elections for the presidency would provide Tihic with an enormous political
advantage over SBiH Silajdzic for two reasons: (1) SDA is the most voted party in the parliament; (2) 
Tihic has broader inter-ethnic support. Silajdzic, on the contrary, would have enormous difficulty 
getting approved as president by the parliament. In the case of the Croats, the demand for an indirect 
election method was intimately associated with the assurance of having a Croat from HDZ elected as 
president. As a matter of fact, the rejection of the constitutional agreement, which envisioned an 
indirectly selected presidency, led HDZ to lose the position for president to the SDP. This 
development was also the result of the Croat split, which will be explore fully in the next chapter.
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election and rotation mechanisms; while Serb parties expressed readiness to accept a 
16-month rotation, Tihic demanded a non-rotating system in exchange for his 
compromise on the collective presidency. As for the remaining issues, namely the 
parliament and the division of competences, no agreement was reached. Although the 
parties claimed to have formed a consensus around the definition of the powers and 
competences of the House of Representatives, no agreement was possible on the 
election and the decision-making process of this institution. Agreement on the 
increased number of deputies was expected at this time, as well as agreement on 
restricting the House of People’s authority to issues related to VNI, but no progress 
was achieved on these fronts.
During these negotiation rounds, the EC, the US and some European countries 
continued to call on the parties to reach a compromise. EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement Olli Rehn welcomed the continuation of talks on January 3rd and 
reiterated the significance of implementing changes that would make the country 
ready for EU integration; “BiH and its leaders must now choose either to preserve the 
current constitution with its limitations of functioning, or to decide on constitutional 
changes which are necessary in order to make the country ready for the association 
with the EU.”905 Similarly, Head of EC Delegation Michael Humphreys restated the 
need for Bosnia to have a functional authority in preparation for joining the EU in an 
interview with Nezavisne Novine in early January, declaring, “Without progress in 
the area of reforms the EU would not financially help Bosnia.”906 EC officials also 
reminded party leaders that the negotiations held at the time represented merely the 
first stage of a more profound reform process that would start after completion of that 
first stage and that would include more direct EU involvement. Although this 
message was intended to reassure the parties and show the EU’s seriousness of 
purpose and commitment, it had the opposite effect as it indicated that more changes 
were to follow. For both the Croats and Bosniaks, this could mean that the 
negotiations under way were not that relevant in light of deeper changes to follow. It 
also triggered a shift to a more guarded approach by the Serb parties, as in later talks
Olli Rehn, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 4 January 2006.
906 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 7 January 2006. This particular statement conveys a strong 
position on the part of the Commission, amounting almost to a threat. Humphreys stated that the EU 
was trying to send the message that constitutional changes were necessary for the process of EU 
accession in order to infer a sense of responsibility on the part of domestic parties (author’s phone 
interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009).
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they refused to commit to any further reforms aimed at undermining the status of 
RS.907
Table 6.1. Party Positions on the Presidency 
(Early January 2006)
Presidency HDZ & HNZ SBiH SDA & SDP Serb Parties
Composition - Three member 
presidency as 
preferred option.
- Willing to accept 
a president with 
two vice presidents 
that rotate every 16 
months.
Single - Single as 
preferred option.
- Willing to 
accept a president 
with two vice 
presidents but no 
rotation.
- Three member 
presidency as 
preferred option.
- Willing to accept a 
president with two 
vice presidents that 
rotate every 16 
months.
Election Indirect
(direct if Bosnia is 
arranged as single 
electoral unit).
Direct Indirect (most 
preferred option 
for SDA if 
presidency is 
collective).
Direct through the 
entities.
Source: author
The parties remained stuck in their positions during the first day of talks during 
the second meeting in January, especially on the issue of the presidency. There 
appeared to be some progress during the second day of the discussions on January 
16, but no full consensus was reached on any remaining issues. Further external arm- 
twisting in the midst of heavy nationalist rhetoric908 led, however, to significant 
progress during the second day, and, as result, parties were able to present an initial 
compromise package in the early morning of January 17. The agreement included 
inter alia: (1) a four-year collective presidency (with a mid-term review by the 
parliament909) elected indirectly by the parliament, by majority vote in each of the 
ethnic caucuses of the House of Peoples and by simple majority in the House of 
Representatives; (2) the transfer of most powers from the presidency to the prime
907 Indeed, Michael Humphreys argued that the idea of a second phase was problematic for the 
Serb parties, as they were concerned about the idea of creating a unitary state (Ibid).
908 Both SBiH and SDA continued to demand the elimination of the entities, which led Serb 
parties to threaten withdrawal from the process. SBiH’s offensive against constitutional negotiations 
intensified at this time, with Silajdzic becoming increasingly involved in Bosnian politics. Although 
SBiH founder Haris Silajdzic did not hold any official position within the party at the time, he 
participated actively in the SBiH executive commission in early January (see “Support to Halilovic in 
negotiations.” Dnevni List, p. 5. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 6 January 2006).
909 If the president were to fail in the mid-term vote, he would not continue as president for the 
next two years, but rather would become vice president. The senior vice president -  the one receiving 
the greatest number of votes in the election - would take over as the sitting president. It is unclear, 
however, whether the collective presidency would be based on a rotation principle or whether each 
constituent people would hold the presidency every 8 years.
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minister; and (3) a House of Peoples elected by each constituent caucus in the House 
of Representatives from candidates sent by both entities. No agreement was possible, 
however, on amending the constitution to incorporate those powers previously 
transferred to the state.
A final deal on the whole package, including a Serb agreement to a non-rotating 
presidency, was within reach in the early morning of January 17, but negotiations 
collapsed at the last minute. As Hays recalled in an interview, “at about 8 o’clock at 
night of this last meeting in January, Serb parties demanded, as a quid pro quo for all 
their compromises, that entity voting be explicitly acknowledged in the 
agreements.”910 While SDA and SDP were willing to accept the status quo, they 
refused to recognize it explicitly and publicly.911 As a result, according to Hays, 
although “All [the Bosniaks] had to do was to say, ‘yes, we will not change the 
constitution and entity voting will remain,’ ... There was no consensus and everybody 
walked out without the agreement to meet in the future. I came back to DC and 
negotiations collapsed.”912
6.12. The Collapse of Multilateral Negotiations
Following the collapse of the negotiations in mid-January, the US decided to back off 
of multilateral negotiations and wait until party leaders worked out their differences 
bilaterally before engaging further. Yet there was some reluctance regarding bilateral 
negotiations. While both SDA and HDZ insisted on immediately resuming talks,913 
Serb parties expressed no desire to reopen the process until after the elections in 
October. Some voices within the international community also warned against the 
continuation of talks at this stage. As Hays explained in a personal interview, the 
conditions under which the negotiations were taking place had become increasingly 
risky: the election campaign was getting into full swing; Covic was significantly
910 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006. See also 
declarations by SDS’s Momcilo Novakovic in “Parties from RS ready to continue after elections” 
Oslobodjenje p. 4-5. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 18 January 2006. The Serbs believed they had 
made the greatest compromises (author’s personal interviews with international and Serb officials 
involved in the negotiations. Sarajevo and Banja Luka, May-July 2007).
911 For fear of ‘sell-out’ accusations. This is an interpretation made by Hays in a personal 
interview.
912 Hays and the members of the secretariat/Dayton Project were no longer formally involved in 
negotiations.
913 Tihic even offered a concession: he would refrain from insisting on abolishing entities as 
proof of goodwill for the resumption of talks (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 24 January 2006).
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weakened by internal divisions and Silajdzic was weakening the Bosniak side too;914 
“I advised to do a fast passage of what we had in January ... but the US wanted to go 
for everything and I was sent home.”915
Although a prevailing silence about the negotiations (as well as rumors pointing 
to failure) led some to assume that negotiations had collapsed definitively916 activity 
continued behind closed doors. As Hitchner noted in an interview to Dnevni Avaz on 
January 21, the “silence” is “indicative”; it shows that many things are happening “in 
silence” in order to prepare for a successful outcome917 Furthermore, the US and 
some European countries such as the UK continued to exert pressure both publicly 
and privately, encouraging party leaders to keep the lines of communication open and 
meet on a bilateral basis918 US Ambassador McElhaney stated on January 17 that the 
US expected negotiations to continue919 and Nicholas Bums maintained private talks 
with the leaders of SDA, SDS and SNSD to bridge gaps before the reopening of 
official talks.920
Following a few informal bilateral meetings between party leaders behind closed 
doors (supported by external actors), two further rounds of negotiation took place at
914 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006. Hays had 
envisioned a different timeline. He had planned for a final constitutional deal to be reached by 
December 2005 in order to leave enough room for discussions in the parliament and to avoid overlap 
with the electoral campaign.
915 Indeed, the option to have the constitutional package approved on a chapter-by-chapter basis 
was discussed within the international community, but, as Tim Cartwright suggested, “it was 
impossible to do so. You had to see the whole package. You needed to see how dispositions interplay 
one another. ... The interplay between the parliament and the presidency is especially vital. You need 
to see both chapters before you decide how they hang together. And the politicos had difficulty 
understanding that” (author’s interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007).
916 Halilovic, for example, claimed that negotiations were not likely to continue; Serb parties 
also continued to declare publicly that they would not go back to the negotiating table given the 
proximity of the elections (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 20 January 2006)
917 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 21 January 2006.
918 It was around this time that an agreement was formed to start the drafting of the packages
agreed thus far. The drafting team -  which had already drafted the amendments of the Human Rights 
and Council of Ministers packages -  was formed with representatives from the Council of Ministers’ 
Legislative Liaison Committee, the Election Commission, the House of Representatives Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional issues, and representatives from RS. The drafting took place in the premises 
of the CoE in BiH, with the assistance of the US legal department, with ongoing communication with 
the CoE (author’s personal interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007; OHR, BiH Media 
Round-up, 18 and 23 January 2006).
919 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 18 and 20 January 2006.
920 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 20 January 2006. It appears that the US was not willing to be
associated with failure. A few days later, US Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Bums sent 
a letter to party leaders in which he officially expressed disappointment in them for their failure to 
deliver on the promise made to the US in November and encouraged them to continue further talks. 
Bums also noted in this letter that the US would not be further involved in the process if party leaders 
failed to agree to a set of constitutional changes by April 2006 (OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 10 
February 2006).
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the US Ambassador's residence. The first round was aimed at bringing the Bosniak 
and Serb stances closer (except for SBiH, which did not participate in this new 
process despite being invited), building upon the progress reached in the preceding 
informal meetings.921 In particular, the meetings at the US Ambassador's residence 
built upon a critical meeting held in Doboj under external support between the SDA, 
the SNSD and the PDP on January 22. While the issues discussed at this encounter 
have not been fully disclosed,922 evidence gathered by the author through personal 
interviews indicate that the process of constitutional reform and the governmental 
crisis in RS were discussed in-depth, with a potential agreement on constitutional 
reform in exchange for SDA’s support for a SNSD government in RS.923 Hays, for 
example, suggested that Tihic and Dodik came up with a solution to entity voting, 
but it is unclear whether a final agreement was reached.924 Some media sources also 
indicated that a possible agreement to form a post-election coalition between SDA, 
SDP, SNSD and PDP was defined at this time.925
Which specific terms that were agreed upon and whether a definitive agreement 
was indeed achieved during this meeting, however, remain unclear. According to 
local media, further meetings between Dodik and Tihic were held after Doboj, which 
suggests that while the meeting in Doboj could have defined the broader terms of a 
potential agreement between both leaders, additional talks might have been held to 
define the small print. This conclusion is supported by media reports of further 
disagreements between both leaders a few days after the Doboj meeting. On February 
6, for example, while Tihic declared that a certain consensus had been reached with 
the Serb side,926 Serb leader Dodik insisted that agreement on rotation was still a 
prerequisite to re-launching negotiations.927
921 Meetings between the Croat HDZ and Bosniak parties SDA and SBiH also took place during 
this time, but they focused on rather general matters regarding constitutional reform (OHR, BiH 
Media Round-up, 26 January 2006). Further informal talks took place in early February.
922 Some Western officials who attended the meeting declined to reveal the substance of the 
issues discussed there (author’s personal interviews with Western diplomats, Sarajevo, May-June 
2007).
923 Hays also suggested in a personal interview that Tihic and Dodik came up with a solution to 
entity voting, but it is unclear whether this agreement was finally reached. An undisclosed source from 
RS suggested to the author that the elimination of entity voting could have followed the elections in 
October 2006, but it is unclear whether his statement was based on an agreement reached in Doboj or 
on the prospect of further negotiations to follow after the elections.
924 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays, Washington, D .C., 2006 and 2007.
925 See Zoran Kresic, “Tihic’s agreement will not happen on Sunday.” Vecernj List, p. 2. In
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 26 February 2006.
926 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 7 February 2006.
927 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 12 February 2006.
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Irrespective of whether a definite agreement was reached in Doboj or not, 
ongoing talks between Bosniak and Serb parties prepared the groundwork for a final 
agreement at the US Ambassador’s residence on February 19. The meeting resulted 
in an initial constitutional deal (the precursor of the constitutional agreement), 
pending further consensus by Croat parties928 and SBiH 929 Some of the agreed 
principles included, inter alia, a directly elected three-member presidency, based on a 
16-month rotation principle, and deprived of veto powers except for defense-related 
matters; an increase in the number of deputies to 87 in the House of Representatives 
and to 21 in the House of Peoples; and a prohibition on reversing transferred 
competences without the express approval of both the state and the entities 930 The 
agreement on direct elections for the presidency was based on the premise that an 
indirect election could prevent members of other minorities from competing for that 
post, which contravened the European convention of Human Rights.
Following the February meeting, a second round of bilateral talks began with the 
goal of bringing the remaining parties, mainly HDZ and SBiH, on board. SBiH, 
however, proved unwilling to compromise. Tihic requested to hold talks with both 
HDZ and SBiH after the meeting on February 19, but Safet Halilovic refused to 
engage in further discussions with Tihic.931 Furthermore, following additional 
exchanges between SBiH and SDA in the midst of ongoing rhetoric against the 
package,932 external actors decided to give up any efforts to bring SBiH to the 
negotiation table, believing that the package would pass without their support.933 
External efforts thus turned entirely to cajoling HDZ leader Dragan Covic in the
928 While the absence of Croat parties was never intended to be exclusionary -  it was rather an 
attempt to bridge the differences between Bosniaks and Serbs radical Croats mobilized at the time 
to criticize harshly the meeting and present it as a denial of Croats’ rights (See A. Vrebac. “Knife 
stabbed at Croats’ back.” Dnevni List, p. 2. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 21 February 2006).
929 SBiH had been invited to all previous bilateral meetings, but declined to attend.
930 Some of the clauses agreed, such as the rotation principle for the presidency and entity 
voting, still caused some contention within SDA’s ranks. As a case in point, although the SDA main 
board accepted Tihic’s package on February 25, it expressed dissatisfaction with the principle of entity 
voting, demanding Tihic to ask for its abolition within the current framework of negotiations or on a 
second phase (OHR Media Round-up, 26 February 2006).
931 S. Numanovic. “Talks on constitutional changes can not be a private deal.” Dnevni Avaz, p. 
4. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 21 February 2006.
932 SBiH rhetoric against constitutional reform continued, with additional criticism directed 
towards both Tihic and Lagumdzija. On declarations to Dnevni Avaz, Halilovic stated that 
constitutional negotiations were aimed at creating the conditions for making entities stronger and 
leading to the future separation of RS, with the connivance of both Tihic and Lagumdzija (OHR, BiH 
Media Round-up, 30 January 2006). Similarly, Haris Silajdzic kept making public statements based on 
wartime rhetoric, stating during a press conference on February 17 that constitutional negotiations 
were being used to complete ethnic cleansing (OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 18 February 2005).
933 Author’s personal interviews with Donald Hays and Western diplomats.
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belief that his support would clear the way for the Croat support needed in the 
parliament.
Although it was initially thought that a final agreement with HDZ would be 
reached within a week of the February meeting, a final compromise proved elusive. 
HDZ refused categorically to accept the maintenance of entity voting and direct 
elections for the presidency.934 In the end, although willing to postpone the discussion 
of entity voting to a second phase of constitutional reform, Covic refused 
categorically to accept an entity-based, directly elected president, fearing that the 
SDP would challenge HDZ's chances of ever holding that position. The direct 
elections for the presidency remained a deal breaker for Covic, who called for a 
rearrangement of Bosnia into a single electoral unit if the president was to be elected 
directly. Serbs, however, demanded the revision of the whole package if such an 
initiative was brought forward and the stalemate on the presidency package 
continued.935
Given the parties’ unwillingness to compromise on the issue of the presidency, 
four rounds of negotiations followed on February 21, March 1, March 11 and March 
18 (the last meeting included all party leaders except for those from SBiH). During 
the first meeting, party leaders gave the green light to two additional packages, 
namely the parliament and the delineation of competences between the state and the 
entities, but the presidency remained the only package pending for approval. The 
impasse continued at the meeting on March 1 936 when the parties decided to have the 
Venice Commission pronounce itself on the different proposals for the election of the 
presidency in BiH. Three different models were presented to the Commission: (1) the 
election method in place (i.e. a presidency with direct elections in each entity); (2) 
the election method in place, including a 16-month rotation system, with no
934 Cracks within the Croat side became increasingly obvious at this time. Expelled HDZ 
members Martin Raguz, Bozo Ljubic and Josip Merdzo started organizing a new party, namely the 
HDZ 1990, in early February with the express support of the Catholic Church and -  although not 
officially stated -  the Croatian HDZ President Ivo Sanader. Croat members such as the Chairman of 
the Presidency kept alluding to the creation of a third entity and a three-member presidency in public 
statements (See “Three Entities and Tri-partite Presidency.” Oslobodjenje, p.3. In OHR, BiH Media 
Round-up, 17 February 2006).
935 SDA was however willing to accept the indirect election (see OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 
28 February 2006).
936 All parties attended except for SBiH. Beriz Belkic confirmed in a personal interview that 
SBiH was invited but that they declined to attend and gave no notification (See A. Malagic, “will the 
agreement be signed?” In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 1 March 2006). This is the last time that SBiH 
was invited to the negotiation table.
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mentioning of any ethnic criteria for the presentation of candidates; and (3) an 
intricate indirect election through the parliament. On a draft opinion made public on 
March 8, the Venice Commission rejected the first formula, out of concern for its 
compatibility with Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention of Human Rights (it 
indeed “excludes Others as well as Bosniaks and Croats from Republika Srpska and 
Serbs from the Federation from being elected to the presidency”), and favored the 
third formula as the preferred option with the inclusion of further modifications 
mostly on procedural grounds.937 Thus, although the Venice Commission had 
expressed a preference to have an indirect single presidency in its opinion in March 
2005,938 it accepted an indirect collective presidency in the form of a single president 
with two vice presidents as a transitional solution.939
Once the Venice Commission’s opinion was published, further negotiations and 
external pressure ensued. The US Congress passed a resolution on March 13 for a 
“more functional state” in Bosnia. The resolution read that “the United States 
supports the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified, fully democratic, 
and stable state on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration [i.e. integration into the 
EU and NATO]” and encouraged domestic actors to “work together and seek 
compromises so that a first set of revisions to the Constitution can take effect before 
national elections in October 2006 ”940 The PIC also released a communique at a 
meeting in Vienna on March 15 stating that the Political Directors expressed their
937 See Venice Commission 2006a. These procedural changes were mainly related to the role of 
the House of Peoples in the election of the presidency members. In its words, “the Commission argued 
in favor of abolishing the House of Peoples. Giving it a strong role in the selection of the presidency 
cannot therefore be considered a positive step” (Venice Commission 2006a, para. 24). The Venice 
Commission thus believed that presidency candidates should be nominated by the House of 
Representatives.
938 The Venice Commission had already expressed its preference for an indirect election in the 
case of a single president; it had stated, “an indirect election of the President by the Parliamentary 
Assembly with a majority ensuring that the President enjoys wide confidence within all peoples would 
seem preferable to direct elections” (Venice Commission 2005, pa. 40).
939 The Venice Commission’s support of an indirect election for the presidency was based on 
the following assumptions: (1) Given the aim of the process of constitutional reform to reduce the 
powers of the presidency and concentrate executive powers in the council of ministers, the Venice 
commission believed that such “change will be more difficult to bring about if the presidency does 
have the legitimacy of a direct popular vote” (Venice Commission 2006a, para. 17). (2) An indirect 
election also “offers more possibilities for inter-ethnic co-operation and compromise” and entrusts a 
state-level institution, such as the parliament with further competences in line with the overall 
objective of the constitutional reform, namely the strengthening of the status and competences of the 
state {ibid, pa. 18). (3) Finally, the proposal “ensures that the representatives of the Others in the 
House of Representatives will take part in the vote and that Serbs from the Federation and Bosniaks 
and Croats from Republika Srpska are no longer disadvantaged since their representatives in the state 
parliament will be able to vote for the candidates of their choice” (Ibid, para. 24).
940 US Senate 2006.
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strong support for the constitutional reform process as “an important step towards the 
effective state government needed to meet the needs of the citizens of BiH and for 
BiH’s Euro-Atlantic integration. ... They urged the BiH parties to seize this 
opportunity to uphold their commitment to reach agreement by March by resolving 
the last remaining issue in the next week. Meeting this urgent timetable is 
essential.”941
Following the discussion of the Venice Commission’s opinion on March 17-18, 
the US summoned party leaders (except for SBiH leaders, who for the first time were 
not invited) to meet at the US Ambassador's residence on March 18 in order to 
finalize the agreement on the presidency package. The signing of the whole 
constitutional agreement took place at this meeting, and the next day President Tihic 
referred the agreement to the Venice Commission, requesting its opinion on the text. 
The Bosnian presidency referred the whole set of amendments to the Constitutional- 
Legal Affairs Commission (CLAC) in the House of Representatives on March 25. 
Party leaders signed on to the final text of the agreement on April 5 at a meeting with 
the US Ambassador, and added a few technical changes that had been forwarded by 
the council of ministers.942
6.13. Amendments to the Bosnian Constitution
The draft constitutional package included a total of four key amendments (in addition 
to the human rights package943): the division of competences between the state and 
the entities (Amendment I); the parliamentary assembly (Amendment II); the 
presidency (Amendment III); and the council of ministers (Amendment IV )944
* Amendment I: Division of Competences Between the State and the Entities. The
941 Peace Implementation Council 2006a.
942 Some of these modifications included, inter alia, an emphasis on the legislative capacity of 
both the BiH parliament and the entities’ assemblies; the confirmation that only a maximum of two 
thirds of ministers in the council of ministers could come from the FBiH; the affirmation that the 
state’s defense and security competences would be regulated by a state law (this amendment was put 
forward by the PDP); and the endorsement of the parliament’s dismissal following a failure to elect a 
president and vice presidents, in addition to the already foreseen dismissal following a failure to elect 
a council of ministers after three attempts (See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 6 April 2006).
943 The Human Rights package was, however, not submitted to presidency of the Parliamentary 
Assembly along with the rest of the amendments out of concern over the wording of the changes. 
Given the lack of urgency in relation to human right issues, this amendment was not approved on 
urgent procedure (Venice Commission 2006b; Venice Commission 2006d).
944 See Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006.
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amendments related to article 3 of the Bosnian Constitution included the following: 
(1) a list of competences that the state was entrusted with, including the codification 
of previously agreed transferred competences, most notably defense and security; (2) 
a new clause indicating a set of competences to be shared by the state and the 
entities, including taxes, the electoral process, the judicial system, agriculture, 
science and technology, ecology, local self-governance and remaining competences 
as regulated by law; (3) a clause added to Article 3.5a (which deals with the transfer 
of competences between the state and the entities) that precluded the return of 
competences that have been transferred to the state without the consent of the state 
and both entities; finally, (4) a new clause was also introduced to article 3 (as a new 
Article3.5c), which was deemed critical for providing the state with the necessary 
powers to comply with the EU accession requirements. The clause read as follows:
“State institutions are responsible for negotiating, developing, adopting and 
implementing, and the functioning of laws necessary for the fulfillment of 
European standards, as well as political and economic conditions linked with 
European integration. The State shall ensure compliance with the principles, 
priorities, and demands set forth by the European Union in the phases before and 
after accession. The State will establish the necessary bodies by law and 
undertake the necessary measures and determine the necessary procedures for the 
fulfillment of all criteria for accession and membership in the European Union, 
which also includes the necessary mechanisms of coordination and cooperation 
with authorities at lower levels.”945
Amendment II: The Parliamentary Assembly. The second amendment (related to 
Article 4 of the Bosnian constitution) included the following changes to the 
parliament:
-  The House of Representatives was provided with a more extensive list of 
powers, including inter alia the participation in the election of the president; the 
confirmation of the president of the council of ministers and the ministries; the 
adoption of constitutional amendments; the ratification of international 
agreements and the oversight of the work of the council of ministers and other
Draft Amendments to the Constituiton of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006. Article3.5c
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institutions.
- The House of Peoples was entrusted with only three powers (in line with the idea 
of eliminating this chamber): (1) to deal with issues related to VNI; (2) to adopt 
constitutional amendments; and (3) to participate in the election of the president.
- A definition of VNI was introduced, similar to the one adopted by the working 
group in October 2005.
- A new review mechanism for VNI was also introduced, similar to the one 
adopted by the working group in October, except for the creation of a special 
committee within the constitutional court to deal with VNI issues. The existing 
procedure within the constitutional court thus remained.
- An increase in the number of deputies in both chambers to both strengthen 
political pluralism and match human resources with the increased competences 
of the House of Representatives.
- In addition to the increased number of deputies, it was stipulated that three seats 
would be reserved for “Others”.
- The election of the House of Peoples delegates would occur through the House 
of Representatives and no longer through the ethnic caucuses of the entity 
parliaments.
Amendment III: The Presidency. This amendment included the following changes to 
the institution of the presidency:
- The establishment of a four-year presidency comprised of a president and two 
vice presidents (instead of a three-member presidency). It was prescribed that 
the President and Vice presidents would not come from the same constituent 
peoples. In order to avoid the election of two Bosniak members, the 
amendments stipulated that each people could only have one member. 
Additionally, the wording in this clause was very specific so as not to 
preclude, at least in print letter, the right of other minorities to be nominated 
and appointed as president or vice president.946
- The members of the presidency were to be elected indirectly in both the
946 Marko notes, however, that “The new wording that the three members must not be from the
same constituent people would allow, of course, also ‘others’ to become members of the presidency 
even if this is “in reality” not very probable if one looks into the complicated election mechanism 
which gives the ethnic caucuses in the House of Peoples the decisive role in selecting the three 
candidates from those proposed before by the two Houses” (Marko 2005/2006,9).
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House of Peoples and the House of Representatives, from members of 
parliament. The prominent role given to the House of Peoples was thus 
confirmed (the working group constitutional draft had prevented the House of 
Peoples from participating in the nomination of the presidency members), 
despite of the Venice Commission’s recommendations to have this chamber’s 
competences reduced, especially in the nomination of the members of the 
presidency.947 Indeed, each Caucus of the House of Peoples was entrusted 
with the duty to approve the nomination of each candidate by simple majority 
before sending the proposal of three candidates to the House of 
Representatives for confirmation.948
- The election of the president “by rotation or another manner” was, however, 
not prescribed in the amendments, and “shall be defined by the parliamentary 
assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”949
- A complete list of powers and duties for the president was introduced. The 
powers were very similar to those agreed upon by the members of the 
working group in October (including the ability to request for reconsideration 
of legislation, only once per law), except for the provision of additional 
powers such as the ability to convene and define the agenda for sessions of 
the council of ministers and the parliament as well as to nominate a candidate 
for president of the council of ministers upon consultation with the vice 
presidents and the parliamentary assembly. In addition, the president was also 
entrusted, with consensus of the three members, to regulate the defense policy 
and appoint judges to the CC and members of the Board of Directors of the 
Central Bank.
Amendment IV: The Council of Ministers. Amendment IV built upon the already 
agreed package of December 2005, with the introduction of minor changes, including 
some election procedures for the president of the council of ministers and his/her 
ministries and the designation of the former chair of the council of ministers as either 
president of the council of ministers or prime minister. The amendment also added
947 Venice Commission 2005.
948 The amendments did not provide a ‘dead-lock breaking mechanism’ if the House of 
Representatives refuses to confirm the proposal, a concern of the Venice Commission as expressed in 
its April opinion of the amendments (Venice Commission 2006b).
949 Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006. Amendment 3.2.f.
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the conduct of foreign affairs as one of the key competences of the council of 
ministers. Finally, “The composition, decision-making, resignation, recall, no- 
confidence vote and other matters of concern pertinent to the functioning of the 
council of ministers [as well as the competences of the ministries] shall be regulated 
by law.”950 One of the most notable changes in relation to this institution was the fact 
that the council of ministers was made no longer accountable to the president but to 
the parliamentary assembly. The competence of selecting the ministers was 
transferred from the presidency to the prime minister.
Table 6.2. Dayton and the Constitutional Amendments of March 2006
Annex Four - Dayton Constitutional Agreement (2006)
Presidency - Entity-based, direct 
election.
- Three-member rotating 
presidency.
- Indirect election.
- One president and two vice presidents 
(rotation mechanism to be decided).
- Overall reduction of powers.
Council of 
Ministers
Council o f ministers 
extremely weak, responsible 
to presidency.
Council o f ministers strengthened, 
responsible to parliament.
Parliament Two chambers with similar 
competences.
- Increased deputies in both chambers.
- House o f Representatives 
strengthened.
- House o f Peoples responsible for VNI 
issues.
State/Entity
Relations
- Limited competences for 
the state.
- Subsidiary competences 
for the entities.
- More competences granted to the state 
(including new powers for EU 
integration).
- Shared competences between the state 
and the entities.
- Devolution of powers to entities with 
consent o f the state.
Source: Author
Controversy over the constitutional agreement revolved around the value and 
worth of the amendments agreed upon. Representatives of the parties that rejected the 
agreement claimed that it was purely cosmetic, failing to address some of the key 
issues preventing the state from being fully functional. The Venice Commission, 
however, described the reform as “quite comprehensive” and as “an important step 
forward,” with a more efficient decision-making process in place.951 Similarly, 
constitutional expert Joseph Marko asserted, “Both the element of 'shared 
competencies' and the EU-integration clause have a strong 'implied power' of
950 Ibid, Amendment 4.7 .a and 4.7 .b.
951 Venice Commission 2006b, para. 2 and para. 74.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 229 10/30/09
strengthening the necessary integration processes inside Bosnia and vis-a-vis the EU. 
It is therefore the inherent power of Amendment I to enable a strong dynamic 
integration process and thereby overcome also the ethnic dividing lines.”952 
Furthermore, both members of the international community in Bosnia and domestic 
actors, including party officials and members of civil society, asserted that even if the 
agreement was not groundbreaking, it represented a first step in the right direction, as 
part of an ongoing process that would entail further negotiations. An official from the 
European delegation in Bosnia stated, “the American package was not a big change, 
but for the EU it would have been important. It would have shown political will and 
opened the door to the second phase in which the EU was planning to have a bigger 
role, the one dealing with the cantons and the entities.”953
In particular, the Venice Commission pointed out four major improvements over 
the Dayton constitution 954 namely (1) the codification of already transferred and new 
powers to the state (although the Venice Commission regards this as a temporary 
solution with the need to provide further powers in the future)955; (2) the provision of 
the necessary means for the Bosnian state to address the process of EU integration; 
(3) the reduction of the powers of the House of Peoples, virtually limited to dealing 
with VNI issues; and (4) an elected presidency that incorporates the figure of a 
president with more powers than the vice presidents. The Venice Commission gives a 
special mention to the provision of new powers to the state in relation to the process 
of European integration. In particular, the commission noted, “Article 3.5.(c) is of 
paramount importance. It gives to the state level the responsibility to negotiate with 
the European Union and to adopt and implement all measures necessary for the 
implementation of commitments to the European Union. The text is broadly drafted 
and seems to leave no gaps. It would enable the country to take full part in European 
integration and thereby rectify a fundamental shortcoming of the present 
Constitution.”956 In this respect, Bruce Hichner identified three mechanisms 
contained in the constitutional agreement whereby the power of the entities would be
952 Marko 2005/6.
953 Author’s personal interview with European official, Sarajevo, May 2007.
954 Venice Commission 2006b.
955 The Commission welcomed the list of competences granted to the state while indicating that 
it was not a long-term solution (missing competences include civil law, criminal law and labor law). 
“The Commission therefore recommends to undertake, as part of a second phase of constitutional 
reform after the elections, a systematic reflection on a coherent and stable distribution of competencies 
between both levels” (Venice Commission 2006c, para. 21).
956 Ibid.
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reduced, including the fact that (1) there would no longer be entity-based elections to 
the presidency; (2) “the entities could not recover powers ceded to the state without 
the consent of the state;” and (3) “the powers of the state were enhanced at the 
expense of the entities in matters relating to EU negotiations.”957
Some key shortcomings were also identified, however, the most significant of
Q C O
which included the definition of the VNI veto envisaged in the amendments. In 
this respect, the Venice Commission noted that the set of amendments “seems to 
enhance the status of the vital national interests veto into a kind of natural inalienable 
human right. This is entirely inconsistent with the aim of reducing the scope of this 
veto which should be considered as an exceptional institutional arrangement justified 
by the continued lack of trust among the three constituent peoples and not as a 
natural right.”959 Furthermore, Marko remarks that given that the scope of the VNI is 
not reduced but increased, “the restriction of the House of Peoples as a protection 
mechanism for VNI would not reduce its participation and equal footing in the entire 
legislative process at all.”960
In addition to these criticisms, the package was somewhat confusing on the 
divisions of competences. A high ranking official of OHR asserted the following: 
“you had a set of competences for the state, and then an open-ended
clause that said that all further competences legislated by law, which
pretty much means everything. And then you had a similar clause for the 
entities. So this could have led to confusion. Also, in the case of shared 
competences, there were things that were defined as a competence of the 
state and they were also very open with no specification; there was no 
principle of primacy in case of conflict between the state and the entities, 
which you find in many other federal constitutions.961 Also, there was not
957 Hitchner also recognizes that, “On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the
amendments did little to change the powers and complex voting systems of the three constituent 
peoples’ parties in the parliament. But given that the concept of constituent peoples is still a major 
ideological force in Bosnian politics, it was hard to devise any easy or simple options for voting 
reform that did not take this reality into account” (Hitchner 2006b).
958 The Venice Commission had recommended in March 2005 to define the scope of VNI clearly
and narrowly to avoid excessive blocking of decision-making (Venice Commission 2005; Venice 
Commission 2006b).
959 Venice Commission 2006b, para. 39.
960 Marko 2005/06,9.
961 In some countries, however, there is no primacy principle, but disputes are resolved through
a judicial review in a court with jurisdiction on constitutional matters (usually the Constitutional 
Court). In the case of the US, for example, the Supreme Court is the institution charged with the 
resolution of constitutional disputes between the states and the federal government.
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 231 10/30/09
a clear specification of the role of the state and the entities. Usually, the 
state is charged with policy designing and then federal units with the 
implementation, execution... but there wasn’t such distinction.”962 
Indeed, the Venice Commission recognized that the division of competences 
“does not allow us to have a comprehensive picture of the respective responsibilities 
of the state and the entities and that a lack of clarity may result in difficulties for its 
implementation. Nevertheless, under present political circumstances in BiH, this 
drawback seems a small price to pay for the important progress the provision makes 
possible.”963 The text contained further minor weaknesses related to some procedural 
missteps, contradictions, and discrimination dispositions regarding inclusion of the 
rights of others. All of these issues, the Venice Commission recommended, required 
minor modifications, including the removal of some clauses, further clarifications in 
certain passages and some rewording and rephrasing.964
On the whole, however, the Venice Commission and Western actors shared the 
opinion that the amendments should be approved. They thought that these minor 
errors could be easily addressed by party leaders.965 As a Western official suggested, 
from a technical point of view the package was very poor; “it contained many 
inconsistencies and many issues were not addressed, but it was the right step in the 
right direction, especially in terms of the process of EU integration. If you had the 
Venice Commission’s recommendations included in it,966 it would have been very 
good.”967 Tim Cartwright also argued, “the agreement itself contained a number of 
mechanisms which would have changed the nature of the political game, change the 
legislative dynamic, there would be more people there, you have better chance of 
legislative scrutiny.”968
In sum, as the Venice Commission concluded:
“The reform addresses the issues identified as priorities for reform by 
the Venice Commission. It grants additional powers to the state level, a
962 Author’s personal interview with OHR official. Sarajevo, June 2007.
963 Venice Commission 2006b, para. 19.
964 Other shortcomings that could be identified include the persistence of entity voting as a 
significant drawback, given its potential for blocking decisions on EU related matters, although this 
issue was not part of the negotiations.
965 Also, once the package had been agreed upon and with the introduction of the recommended 
changes, external actors thought it should be approved (author’s personal interviews with Western 
diplomats. Sarajevo, May-July 2007).
966 He is referring to the ones contained in the Venice Commission resolution (2006b).
967 Author's personal interview with Western diplomat. Sarajevo, July 2007.
968 Author's personal interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
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step which is indispensable if BiH wishes to take part in European 
integration and which brings the country closer to the situation in other 
federal Stats. The reform increases the efficiency of the state institutions 
by strengthening the council of ministers and the House of 
Representatives and reducing the role of the collective presidency and 
the House of Peoples. Some of the amendments proposed should be 
redrafted and not all proposals for reform go as far as the Venice 
Commission may have wished. In its earlier Opinion it already noted that 
constitutional reform would have to be a long-term process and that not 
everything could be done immediately since there is still a lack of trust 
among the ethnic groups. It will therefore be necessary to follow up this 
first step and carry out further reforms in the future. One part originally 
foreseen as part of the reform, the new human rights text, is in any case 
not ripe for adoption and should be postponed to the next phase of 
reform after the elections.” ... “Having made these qualifications, the 
importance of the reform, both with respect to its practical consequences 
and as a signal from BiH to Europe that the country is resolved to take 
the steps required for European integration, cannot be overestimated.”969
With respect to domestic actors, there was general support for the amendments,970 
with minor differences in the way each ethnic community assessed the value of the 
constitutional agreement. Serbs, for example, thought that the agreement was the best 
possible agreement at the time; Serbs also derived symbolic value from the 
agreement; the fact that Bosnian politicians had reached an agreement on their own 
was highly gratifying to them.971 Dragan Cavic for example stated, “Adopting this 
package would have represented the beginning of a new practice in post-conflict
969 Venice Commission 2006b, para. 99.
970 Except for the members of SBiH and HDZ 1990, who argued that the changes were too 
superficial (the next chapter fully explores the positions of these actors). Radical and independent 
forces from RS were also against the package, but with the opposite argument; radical Serbs thought 
the reform had gone too far. Independent Petar Kunic for example stated that “the amendments tried to 
centralize BiH; the principle of federalism was jeopardized” (author’s personal Interview with Petar 
Kunic. Banja Luka, 14 June 2007).
971 The rejection of the package, however, was the worst signal for the EU officials in their 
view, one that marked the initiation of one of the worst political climates in Bosnia. Serb member of 
the presidency Borislav Paravac stated, “To honest friends of BiH and to whole the public that 
supports us on our way to European integration, we issued a bad message and showed incapability to 
reach key issues for BiH future by ourselves” (“We issued bad message.” Nezavisne Novine, p. 3. In 
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 29 April 2006).
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Q77Bosnia politics. The failure of the amendments put this country back ten years.” In 
declarations to Nezavisne Novine in early April 2006, he stated, “The [constitutional] 
negotiations were very difficult, very delicate and in the end, we arrived at a 
consensus, not a painful or rotten compromise, but a credible compromise which at 
the end of the day does not destroy the character of the entities in Bosnia. The 
functionality of the institutions of the state of Bosnia has been improved and we have 
enumerated the basis for normal interaction between the state and the entities.”973 
Similarly, Ivanic stated, “The best value is that we did this, we did it our own way 
and the result was a compromise with a little bit of pressure from the US. So the best 
value was not the essence of the package, but the fact that we reached an agreement 
... that’s why the result was not perfect, not the most ideal solution but we’ll never 
be the best ideal solution to anything.”974
The Bosniaks regarded the agreement not as the best possible agreement, but as 
going in the right direction. As Tihic stated, “The result was a very good agreement, 
especially in terms of state competences, because the list of competences vested in 
the state was similar to other European countries. The council of ministers also 
provided for more functional ways of working. It would be able to work as a 
government, like in other European countries. Also, for the presidency, it was a much 
better solution to the current situation. Still there was no agreement about the 
mandate. We agreed on rotation but we envisioned that we could change it in the 
future ... It was not ideal, but it was the best solution possible at the time.”975 
Similarly, Sefik Dzaferovic stated, “The importance of the April package is not its 
content, even though the content is important. Its importance was that it was the first 
step on the way forward until we came to a normal constitution ... The April package 
did not eliminate entity voting. I didn’t like that but I didn’t want to jeopardize this 
chance to start the process and normalize our way to Europe.”976 Croats shared a 
similar opinion; although they thought that the agreement was not the best solution, 
the constitutional changes represented in their view a first step in an ongoing process
972 Author’s email interview with Dragan Cavic, January 2008.
973 Dragan Cavic, cited in Nezavisne Novine, 7 April 2006. Quoted from Foreign Policy
Initiative 2007,25.
974 He also stated, “the outcome is a very negative situation. Today we have more difficulty 
with agreeing to anything than before. There is more lack of trust than before. And I’m very 
pessimistic about any chance in the short term of something to be agreed upon” (author’s personal 
interview, Mladen Ivanic. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007).
975 Author’s personal interview with Sulejman Tihic. Sarajevo, 4 July 2007.
976 Author’s personal interview with Sefik Dzaferovic. Sarajevo, 31 May 2007.
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of constitutional reform in which further changes would be proposed in a second 
phase.977
62. ANALYSIS OF PHASE H
62.1. The Impact of the US
The success of the negotiations during this phase was largely due to the role of 
external actors, especially the US, and a facilitating domestic context. The favorable 
outcome in conflict regulation during this phase was thus the result of two key 
developments, namely the conjuncture of external pressure with favorable dynamics 
at the intra-party level.
The first development relates to the critical role the US played during the 
negotiations and the way negotiations were conducted under its leadership. Indeed, 
all of the parties involved in the negotiations deemed the participation of the US as a 
critical guarantor for reaching a compromise on constitutional reform; as with 
Dayton, the US would again be the ultimate security guarantor. As expressed in 
personal interviews, domestic actors viewed the US as the only actor capable of 
forging domestic consensus. As Hays confirmed in a personal interview, all parties 
involved conditioned their engagement on the participation of the US, “because they 
could only see the US ensuring the consensus.”978
In addition, all the domestic actors interviewed specifically pointed to the role 
played by the US Ambassador Douglas McElhany as a clear example of successful 
mediation.979 As SDS leader Cavic stated in a personal interview, “The man who 
gave the final positive energy to constitutional changes was, and there is no doubt
Author's personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 2 July 2007.
978 Author's personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
979 Douglas McElhaney, who joined the State Department in 1975, was sworn in as US
Ambassador to Bosnia on August 6, 2004. He had no background in the region but had some 
experience in international negotiations in the 1980s. From 1978 to 1982 he worked on the 
negotiations that prepared Namibia for independence. He also worked on the Middle East Peace 
Negotiations from 1987 to 1989, as Deputy Political Counselor at the US Embassy in Egypt. 
McElhaney’s more recent assignments included mostly Western Europe. From 1995 to 2000, he was 
the Political Counselor and the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.S. Mission to NATO. 
He then served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Paris (2000-2002) and as U.S. 
Consul General in Milan from 2002 to 2004 (see US Embassy, Ambassador’s biography at 
http://sarajevo.usembassy.gov/ambassador.html. Accessed on July 2007). He retired from the US 
Foreign Service in September 2007, after his assignment in Bosnia.
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about that, the US Ambassador at the time, Mr. Douglas McElhany ... Even though 
there was no final agreement at the end because of the two missing votes in the 
parliament, the role of Mr. McElhany was huge. The initiative that Mr. Hays started 
was also important, but the negotiations would have failed sooner or later if it wasn’t 
for Mr. McElhany.”980 HDZ official Lasic and additional party officials across the 
board also agreed with this assessment. Similarly, UK Ambassador Rycroft stated 
that the US Ambassador engaged in an extraordinarily vigorous mediation process 
(as opposed to the previous phase in which both the US and the EU were half­
heartedly involved), which eventually led to the agreement in March 2006; “The US 
Ambassador was quite involved, very hands on, very pushy. He would say you can't 
say this, threatening with international embarrassment, isolation, or telling them that 
if they didn’t cooperate they would tell [US Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice 
that they were not complying with the agreement they signed, etc... They were 
threatened with being portrayed as the blocking figure” [and that has important 
reverberations in Bosnian politics].981 As UK Ambassador Rycroft stated, “In Bosnia, 
we need to drive [the reform process] in order to make it work... We need to be more 
hands on,’ and that’s why the US efforts were successful.”982
In addition to McElhany’s good offices, the US also provided the framework 
within which an agreement at the inter-ethnic level was possible, namely the 
transformation of multilateral negotiations into direct, two-side negotiations behind 
closed doors. According to domestic actors, this was a key element for success. 
Tihic, for example, stated in an interview, “There were very useful proposals from 
the international community when parties were pulling apart in January.”983 
Similarly, Ivanic also asserted in an interview that the constitutional compromise was
980 Author’s e-mail interview with Dragan Cavic, January 2008. Cavic’s initial critical stand of 
US Ambassador McElhaney may have stemmed from his belief that only Donald Hays could drive the 
process and forge the necessary consensus among the party leaders (Ibid). In fact, all party leaders, 
especially Dragan Cavic, Milorad Dodik and SBiH’s Beriz Belkid, shared a high regard for Hays’ 
work. He not only knew all the leaders personally, but he was capable of exerting a strong influence 
over them (personal interviews with Western diplomats and members of the Dayton Project). In 
contrast to Hays, US Ambassador McElhaney had little background in the region and was not as 
acquainted with Bosnian politics as was Hays. This may have led party leaders such as Cavic to 
believe that the Ambassador was not suited for the process at the beginning. As Cavic stated, “I have 
to admit that at the beginning I had a wrong assumption about Mr. McElhany because it seemed to me 
that he didn’t have the necessary political experience for this kind of negotiations, but looking at it 
from this point in time I can say that he was a perfect moderator” (ibid).
981 Author’s personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007.
982 Ibid.
983 Author's personal interview with Sulejman Tihic. Sarajevo, 4 July 2007.
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reached thanks to the suggestions by the US Ambassador to establish a direct line of 
communication between party leaders.984 Indeed, a US official put forth in an 
interview that the most important value of this process was that it was a new way of 
doing things in Bosnia; “leaders realized that this was a new way; they had to reach 
consensus among themselves. They talked to each other and had to reach an 
agreement. We encouraged them, we cajoled them. We were strong but we didn’t 
impose anything.”985 Other Western diplomats such as UK Ambassador Rycroft also 
suggested that the role of the US was critical not in the sense of imposing solutions 
but in exerting the right amount of pressure to get parties to reach an agreement on 
their own, which was key to forging consensus. As a result, as Hays suggested in an 
interview, “In January we started seeing major changes in terms of solidifying the 
agreements. And then of course, once Dodik and Tihic agreed, it was over.”986
The new format of direct bilateral negotiations therefore helped trigger a 
compromise among party leaders in two ways: (1) altering the structure of the 
negotiations served to break the stalemate. It effectively created a two-tiered process 
that simplified the complex structure of the bargaining framework.987 Step one was to 
find consensus amongst the Serbo-Bosniak contingent (which mean a de facto 
marginalization of the Croats); step two involved the presentation of a preliminary 
agreement to the Croats for final approval. The establishment of a direct line of 
communication also allowed for party leaders to find mutually satisfactory solutions 
based on direct trade-offs in a relatively undisturbed environment, which suggests 
that the set-up of direct contacts at the inter-ethnic level in contexts of mutual distrust 
is key for engaging in conciliatory behavior. (2) It also gave the US ample room to 
maneuver with each party willing to find a compromise 988 protecting the negotiations 
from external disruptions, especially from the parties that did not want to take part in 
the process and/or the ones that were radically opposed to it. While this factor was
984 Author's personal interview with Mladen Ivanic. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007.
985 Author’s personal interview with Western diplomat. Banja Luka, 12 June 2007.
986 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., October 2007.
987 This strategy was reminiscent of the US diplomatic efforts prior to the signing of Dayton. As
O’Brien admitted, one of the key US objectives “was to reduce the number of voices at the table. The 
first step was the conclusion of an arrangement between Bosnia’s Croats and the Bosniaks, with full 
support from Croatia ... In the signing statement, the leaders of the parties agreed to function as a 
single delegation at all peace negotiations. This simple proposition ... reduced the number of people 
demanding seats at the table; rather than three contentious voices, only one position would be 
adopted” (O’Brien 2004,97).
988 The Austrian Ambassador, for example, was talking to the Croats, the British to the Serbs, 
and the US was talking to all of them (author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, 
D.C., October 2007).
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critical in making negotiations easier at the inter-ethnic level, the neglect of intra­
ethnic dynamics at this stage (and the failure to incorporate all forces with an interest 
in constitutional reform)989 proved fatal for the overall outcome, as the next chapter 
will show.
The second key development was related to intra-party dynamics, which also 
contributed to a successful outcome during this phase. Opposition forces within the 
Serb camp, for example, were not significant at this point, given Cavic’s success in 
keeping the hardliners at bay after the fall of the Bukejlovic government in early 
February (hardliners, however, kept key positions in the Eastern municipalities of 
RS). Cavic’s decision to appoint Dodik as the new RS PM on February 4 ,following 
a vote of confidence on January 25, further aggravated the isolation of hardliners, 
giving Cavic more room to engage in the reform process. With respect to the SDA, 
although SBiH was still clearly in opposition, Tihic managed to get the SDA behind 
the constitutional initiative, including the members of the Islamic Community.990 
While certain clauses caused some contention within SDA’s ranks, including the 
rotating presidency and the entity voting, the main board accepted Tihic’s package 
on February 25 on the condition that entity voting was abolished within the current 
framework of negotiations or in the announced second phase of constitutional 
reform.991 Furthermore, opposition to the SDA at both the entity and state levels was 
at this point very limited.992 As for the Croats, although they were the group 
undergoing major upheavals, Covic managed to place opposition forces outside the 
party, keeping his authority uncontested inside the HDZ and not facing any real 
political alternative in the Croat political scene.993
In addition to a relatively favorable intra-party situation across the board, the 
moderate terms of the agreement made it easier for party leaders to sell the
External actors gave up on the efforts to incorporate SBiH and simply neglected the 
significance of Ljubic’s opposition to the process.
990 Bougarel 2007. It will be Tihic’s rapprochement to SDP -  and the potential for a possible 
coalition with this party in the elections -  that will cause further radicalization and opposition among 
the Islamist group and other factions within SDA (author’s personal interviews with local informants. 
Sarajevo, May-July 2007; See also Bougarel 2007).
991 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 26 February 2006.
992 SBiH still represented a minor party. As for the SDP, although opinion polls showed
increasing support for this party, it was clear that the SDA and SDP were operating in close 
cooperation; some sources and media reports even indicated that both Tihic and Lagumdzija had the 
intention to run on the same ticket for the 2006 elections or form a post-election coalition.
993 At the time, there was no credible political alternative to HDZ within the Bosnian Croats that
could challenge HDZ in the elections.
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compromise within their own ranks.994 As CoE Representative Tim Cartwright 
stated, “all party leaders got away with something. It was a deal in which most 
people could find a bit of victory, and was not too threatening to the status quo.”995 
Serb parties, for example yielded on the presidency and the House of Peoples, but 
kept entity voting and an implicit recognition of the status of RS.996 In addition, they 
also obtained a stronger council of ministers with a real prime minister, which was a 
clear victory, given that Serbs would be the next group to hold that position 997 Tihic, 
on the contrary, gave up on the entity voting but he obtained part of the presidency 
deal and further competences granted to the state-level. As for the Croats, Co vie got 
a very important victory with the presidency and a promise to hold a second phase of 
constitutional reform in which the EU would be more involved. Furthermore, the 
agreement allowed for additional gains in due course, given the authority entrusted 
to the state for EU integration, “So in a way it opened doors and made it easier for 
Croats and Bosniaks to sign up to it.”998 Croats gained least, and although Co vie did 
not face opposition within his party, this situation would cause major problems in the 
next phase of the negotiations. Indeed, the exclusion of ‘opposition’ forces from the 
Croat and Bosniak communities within the bargaining framework of constitutional 
reform at this stage would eventually unravel the whole process when the package 
was finally taken to the parliament.
622 . The Role of the EU and its Member States as Minor Players
European actors adopted a secondary role in the second phase of the negotiations,999 
although their role was prominent in at least two respects. First, EU members 
continued to serve as a foundation of constitutional reform not only through the 
opinion of the Venice Commission, which operated as the frame of reference for the
994 Which is especially significant in contexts where outbidding dynamics are pronounced, as in 
the case of Bosnia.
995 Author’s personal interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
996 Serb parties also got recognition for their efforts by international actors, which was deemed 
very important, especially for Cavic.
997 As Hays stated, the Serbs (especially Dodik) were interested in having “a government that 
has power and that is able to do something.” As a case in point, Dodik stated on various occasions that 
he would never be the chair of a weak council of ministers as the one in place, but he would be willing 
to do so as the new prime minister (author's personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, 29 
July 2006).
998 Author’s personal interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
999 Some individual countries, such as the UK had, however, a rather prominent and significant 
role.
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negotiations, but also through the ongoing public endorsements by European 
officials. Indeed, the EU supported the process publicly, especially at critical 
junctures. The European Parliament, for example, passed a resolution on February 
16,2006, confirming the urgent need to make Bosnia a functional state. Additionally, 
During a trip to Bosnia in February 18, EC President Jose Manuel Barroso stressed 
the potential for Bosnia to sign an SAA by the end of the year and reiterated the EU’s 
stand on constitutional reform, with an emphasis on the three key principles for 
compliance with European integration, namely efficiency, functionality and the 
protection of human rights.
Second, in addition to the use of ‘soft power,’ the EU was also present as third- 
party observers at the different rounds of negotiations during this phase, although 
with varying degrees of engagement among the different European countries and 
institutions involved. The UK, for example, was the most actively engaged European 
actor, first as the Chair of the EU rotating presidency (there was in fact a dual chair 
of the negotiations until mid-January, namely the US and the EU) and later in a 
national capacity. As the UK Ambassador stated, when the US decided to take over 
the work of Donald Hays, “That’s when my involvement got much bigger as a 
representative of the presidency of the EU... I received an invitation of the US to be 
formally involved in the negotiations.”1000 The Austrian Ambassador also became 
involved as the new holder of the Presidency of the EU, although his participation 
was never as active as that of the British Ambassador. Some additional European 
institutions such as the European Commission and the CoE were involved before the 
breakup of multilateral negotiations, but their role was secondary. As a US official 
said, the UK was the most assertive and engaged country within the EU, although 
“the Commission and the Austrian Presidency were also very supportive of the 
process.”1001 European actors were also active on a bilateral basis. Indeed, European 
ambassadors were committed to meeting with party leaders individually. “You had 
for instance the Germans talking to the Croats, and then talking to me directly about 
those meetings. The British talking to the Serbs, of course the Americans talking to 
all of them. Yes, truly there were lots of people talking to lots of actors in order to 
stimulate the sense of inevitability.”1002
1000 Author’s personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007.
1001 Author’s personal interview with a Western diplomat. Banja Luka, 12 June 2007.
1002 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
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The EU’s divisions and ambivalence, however, showed the EU’s inability to 
effect an impact on the negotiations beyond the role of the US. The EU’s 
ambivalence stemmed from two factors. The first factor was related to Bosnia- 
specific integration-related issues, namely the overlap of constitutional reform with 
other reform processes.1003 This overlap was significant in two respects. On the one 
hand, the excruciating experience with police reform -  where the set-up of specific 
standards and the failure of compliance often threatened to paralyze the process -  
made Europeans wary about both setting new standards that could lead to a similar 
outcome and engaging actively in the negotiations. The process of police reform -  
which was intimately associated with the work of the OHR and the EUSR -  thus 
created a situation in which the application of conditionality, meant to provide 
incentives for compliance, had the unintended consequence of delaying reforms and 
blocking the broader integration process. This situation, as the Director of the 
European integration office in BiH Oman Topcagic suggested, prompted the EU to 
think in a different way about setting new conditions.1004 In fact, with European 
credibility at stake with police reform, the EU became averse to the idea of bearing 
responsibility for another reform process whose highly divisive nature ran the risk of 
following the fate of police reform.1005 On the other, there was a concern that 
constitutional negotiations would undermine the evolution of other critical reform 
processes, such as police restructuring and the signing of the SAA.1006 As SDS party 
leader Dragan Cavic noted, the EU “thought that the change of the constitution was
There were also some broader integration-related issues at play, namely the lack of a clear 
legal foundation on how to address constitutional issues in the accession criteria and acquis 
communitaire (the EU has always had a strict policy of domestic ownership in constitutional matters). 
As a European official stated, the challenge of constitutional reform, as in the case of police reform, 
was to come up with standards that did not exist in the EU (author’s personal interview with European 
official. Sarajevo, June 2007). Similarly, Michael Humphreys stated, “We just implied that at some 
state [constitutional reform] would be necessary, that Bosnia needed to be have an efficient state, that 
it was important for the country ...There were some elements that were very straightforward, those 
needed for the CoE membership, but there were other issues, the issue of efficiency, for example, that 
were more difficult to operationalize” (author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 
2009). In this respect, the issue of constitutional reform suffered from a similar ailment plaguing 
political principles contained in the Copenhagen criteria, namely unclear operationalization as a result 
of unclear legal foundations in EU law and the extensive diversity in EU practices (see Sasse 2005 for 
a discussion on the issue of minority rights). Two additional criteria made operationalization more 
challenging, namely the EU’s emphasis on principles of domestic ownership and democratic 
legitimacy in this area; and the overlap of constitutional reform with other reform processes that set a 
mixed precedent in the use of standards.
1004 Author’s personal interview with Osman TopCagic. Sarajevo, 2 July 2007.
1005 Inferred from author’s personal interviews with both domestic and external actors involved
in the negotiations.
1006 See developments on police reform in the fall of 2005 in Chapter 5, p. 201-202.
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not a priority. The commission was focused on the beginning of negotiations [for the 
signing of a SAA], and looked on the constitutional negotiation as a potential danger 
that could jeopardize the success of reforms already started.”1007
The second factor related to divisions between the EU and the US in the way 
negotiations were being conducted at the time. Although these differences did not 
affect the outcome of this phase, Europeans felt that the US had taken the wrong 
approach. They felt more comfortable with a low-key process that minimized risks in 
case of failure. As Humphreys stated, “I never fully understood why the US took 
over. It was a mistake; not the best way to proceed. Hays was putting the appropriate 
pressure. But then the US came in, and Hays was sidelined ... The Americans turned 
this into a major issue and when it failed it was a major international crisis.”1008
Europeans were also critical of the forcefulness of the US approach; they feared 
that the US would impose a solution instead of letting domestic forces reach an 
agreement on their own.1009 As Donald Hays noted, “Europeans wanted the Bosnians 
to actually do this, in their own terms, and the US was much more interested in 
having an outcome,”1010 which sometimes came to be seen as the US trying to impose 
solutions. In this respect, a European diplomat argued that the way the Americans got 
involved was not right; “It felt like this could be Dayton II but people need to feel 
this is their constitution, otherwise it would be artificial.”1011 In addition to its forceful 
approach, the US engaged in a rather exclusive third party role, allowing for little 
participation among other external actors.1012 The goal was to avoid any interference 
that could threaten to unravel the process, but this left some internationals feeling 
excluded. The HR, for example, was totally excluded until the very end.1013
European concerns over the issues described above affected the EU's
1007 Author’s e-mail interview with Dragan Cavic. January 2008.
1008 Author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009.
1009 EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn gives a speech in Sarajevo in which he says, “I 
welcome the emerging consensus among Bosnian political party leaders on the need to make changes 
to the Constitution. This is a key reform, and it is you, the people of this country and their 
representatives, who have and must have the ownership” (Rehn 2005b).
1010 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006.
1011 Author’s personal interview with Didier Chassot. Sarajevo, 1 June 2007. Other European
officials expressed a similar view (author’s personal interviews with Western diplomats. Sarajevo, 
May-July 2007).
1012 In fact, some Western diplomats believed the US was trying to pull away major external 
actors in order to avoid any interference. This worked to achieve a successful outcome during this 
phase.
1013 A Western diplomat suggested that the US did not want to involve the OHR because of this 
office’s links to the failed police reform (author’s personal interview with Western diplomat. Sarajevo, 
June 2007).
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performance during this phase. Firstly, it undercut the ability of the EU to frame the 
process of constitutional reform more clearly within the framework of EU integration 
in Bosnia, undermining the potential of its carrots and sticks. As a case in point, 
European officials in Bosnia thought in early 2005 that if negotiations progressed 
under the leadership of Hays, the EU could be ready to frame the concept of 
constitutional reform more clearly into the process of EU integration,1014 but direct 
links between the processes were never set up clearly. Indeed, although the EU used 
its soft power to elicit a sense of inevitability among domestic actors, the process of 
constitutional reform never featured as a direct condition.1015 Austria’s Ambassador, 
for example, asserted in an interview in January 2006, “The EU has never said that 
successful implementation of constitutional reforms is a pre-requisite for the 
negotiations on SAA. Efficiency, functionality, respect for human rights are three 
items that EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn has stressed recently.”1016 In 
sum, as a Western diplomat put it in a personal interview, “at one point [the EU] 
would say that constitutional reform was important but that police was the condition, 
which led people to feel that what was mandatory was police reform and that 
constitutional reform was not that important.”1017
Secondly, the EU’s ambivalence, mostly the result of its aversion to risk, also 
precluded the EU from playing a more active role as a third party during this phase. 
As Humphreys explained to the author, although he was not happy with the US 
approach, he never thought that the EU should have taken over the process; he was 
against turning the process into a major issue, fearful of the risk of failure. The major 
problem with this approach was that domestic actors perceived the EU’s ambivalence 
and aversion to risk; some felt that the EU was not fully committed, which 
undermined the final and more critical phase of the process.1018 SBiH high-ranking 
official Beriz Belkic, for example, argued, “Even though the Venice Commission 
was one of the legal authorities, they [EU] were very shy during the negotiations 
once the US took over... They were all in the shadow of the American
1014 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., October 2007.
1015 Even if the EU had tied the process of constitutional reform to the signing of an SAA, it 
might have been rejected anyway, given local politics.
1016 Cited in E. Medunjanin. “We shall consider liberalization of visas in March.” Vecernji List, 
p. 8. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 26 January 2006.
1017 Author's personal interview with Western diplomat. 12 June 2007.
1018 Author's personal interviews with party officials. Sarajevo, May-July 2007.
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Ambassador.”1019 SDA leader Sulejman Tihic stated, “We all got the letters of 
support... but they failed to be more engaged and do what they were supposed to do. 
[There was] no decisive position. I felt it was not a sincere support.”1020
6.6. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has focused on the prominent role of external actors, particularly the 
US. It argues that the second phase of constitutional reform was successful thanks to 
powerful and vigorous mediation by the US, based on a framework of direct trade­
offs in a relatively undisturbed environment. These dynamics affected inter-group 
relations in a way that conflict regulation at the inter-ethnic level was made possible 
despite the existing divisions between the EU and the US and the secondary role 
played by the EU during this phase. Intra-ethnic developments did also contribute to 
making the agreement possible, particularly the lack of serious political threats at the 
intra-party level.
Three key considerations can thus be drawn from this chapter’s discussion. First, 
the promotion of direct contacts at the inter-ethnic level in contexts of mutual distrust 
is key for engaging domestic actors in patterns of inter-ethnic cooperation and 
conflict regulation. Indeed, in Bosnia, the establishment of a direct line of 
communication between the major party leaders allowed these leaders to find a 
mutually satisfactory solution based on direct trade-offs.
The second consideration relates to the role of outbidding dynamics. Established 
works on conflict regulation1021 have argued that the threat (or reality) of counter­
mobilization to a party’s moderate overture within a specific segment runs counter to 
practices of inter-ethnic accommodation. This chapter has shown, however, that party 
leaders may be willing to engage in conflict regulation practices, irrespective of the 
dangers posed by the politics of outbidding when a set of factors at the inter-ethnic, 
intra-ethnic and supra-national levels are in place. In the context of constitutional 
reform, these factors included guarantees by external actors to the groups involved, 
favorable intra-party conditions (particularly the absence of serious challenges to the
1019 Author’s personal interview with Beriz Belkic. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
1020 Author’s personal interview with Sulejman Tihic. Sarajevo, July 4,2007.
1021 See for example Nordlinger 1972; Horowitz 1985; Gagnon 1995; Mitchell 1995.
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leader’s position) and the moderate terms of the agreement reached, which made it 
easier for party leaders to sell the compromise within their own ranks. This suggests 
that specific dynamics at the inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic and supra-national levels may 
counterbalance the effects of outbidding and provide incentives for party leaders to 
engage in conciliatory behavior.
Finally, during this phase, the role of the EU was rather secondary. Indeed, 
despite the fact that the EU enjoyed far greater sticks and carrots than the US, it 
proved hesitant to engage actively in the process. The EU also became somewhat 
critical of the US. Notwithstanding these divisions, the decisive US mediation 
overpowered the disruptive potential of in-house divisions within the international 
community.1022 These minor differences will, however, become more problematic in 
the next phase of the negotiations, when the package is put in the public domain and 
is considered by the parliament and more political groups become involved.
This suggests that divisions within the international community may be counterbalanced by a 
vigorous external actor such as the US during constitutional negotiations. The agreement reached was, 
however, too delicate given its exclusive nature, and unraveled in the phase that followed.
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CHAPTER 7
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM n i:
INTRA-ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND 
THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT
7.1. PHASE III: PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT
The third phase of constitutional reform began with the referral of the constitutional 
package to parliament on March 30, when a new set of dynamics developed. While 
external actors such as the US and EU member states increased pressure significantly 
through direct lobbying, politics at the intra-ethnic level acquired a new dimension 
that resulted in the failure of the constitutional process on April 26. Indeed, the 
package agreed upon by party leaders in March 2006 was strongly contested by 
various groups in the House of Representatives, including the Croat caucus, SBiH 
deputies and other independents such as the Serb radicals.1023 These forces comprised 
a majority in the Commission of Legal and Constitutional Affairs (CLAC), the House 
of Representatives body authorized to review the initiative and, based on a majority 
vote, to deny or approve its advancement to the House of Representatives for a 
broader public discussion.1024 The first hurdle the agreement faced upon arriving in 
parliament was thus a heated debate within the CLAC.
Signs that the agreement would overcome this first hurdle in the House of 
Representatives were not encouraging, many Western diplomats maintained in 
personal interviews. Not only was a majority of CLAC members opposed to the 
agreement, but they had no say in its content. Party leaders had requested that no
1023 The agreement needed 28 affirmative votes to pass in the parliamentary assembly 
(constitutional reform required a two-thirds majority). At the time of its transfer to parliament, it only 
counted twenty-four votes, including the votes of ten deputies from the SDA, five from SDS, three 
from SDP, three from SNSD and one from PDP. Only one of the four HDZ deputies declared to be in 
favor of the package. Other independents, such as Djedovic and Komsic were also in favor. On the 
opposition, there were four HDZ members, six deputies from SBiH, one from BOSS, and other 
independents such as Ivo Lozancic, Sead Advic, Timohir Gligoric, Petar Kunic and Mirko Blagojevic.
1024 Members of the commission may introduce amendments as deemed appropriate.
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amendments be made, given the delicate balance that held it together. It was an ‘all 
or nothing’ deal and parliamentarians felt, understandably, railroaded.
The tone of discussions at the CLAC was embittered from the start. HDZ and 
SBiH representatives refused to support the package without substantial 
modifications to key clauses.1025 Following intense public debates on April 12 and 18, 
the package was finally accepted with the support of the radical Serbs1026 and the 
opposition of SBiH’s Beriz Belkic, SDU’s Nijaz Durakovic, and former HDZ party 
members Martin Raguz and Filip Andric. The final text was approved by a majority 
at the CLAC on April 19, with four minor amendments (out of fifty-one that were 
presented) and some technical addenda. The package was forwarded to the House of 
Representatives, for a final vote before May 4, the official deadline for the October 
elections to be called.
It was at this time that frenetic lobbying began. Both external and domestic 
actors (including key European Ambassadors, EU officials such as the EU Foreign 
Policy Chief Javier Solana, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn and Head 
of EC Delegation Michael Humphreys, the OSCE and CoE representatives, US 
officials, and the High Representative) engaged in an intense campaign of 
inducements and persuasion aimed at cajoling key deputies into supporting the 
amendments. Head of EC Delegation Michael Humphreys said they used EU 
inducements and CoE post-accession obligations to persuade parliamentarians to 
support the agreement: “We told them that they needed to become an efficient 
country and to be able to meet their financial obligations. We also used the Council 
of Europe obligations, like the election of the presidency. There was also the 
argument of getting the country to work, efficient, for European accession, even if 
the condition was not explicit.”1027 Austrian Ambassador to BiH Werner Almhofer 
recalled in a personal interview, “There was a lot of calculation by all sides, about
1025 Some of the proposals brought forward included an initiative aimed at eliminating entity 
voting (supported by both HDZ and SBiH) and another aimed at eliminating the role of the 
Constitutional Court in the vital national interest process (the latter put forward by the Croat 
members).
1026 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 20 April 2006. UK Ambassador Rycroft argued that it was 
thanks to RS President Cavic that Serb radicals were finally convinced to vote in favor of the 
amendments; “Despite the fact that these deputies were not from the SDS, Cavid had this leverage as 
president of RS” (author’s personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007).
1027 Author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2007. Head of EC Delegation 
Humphreys stated, “The US then used substantial threats and invested a lot of capital” (ibid).
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which deputy will be splitting off,1028 things like that. So there was this kind of 
targeting approach. European members also participated, as well as the HR, who also 
lobbied in the parliament until the very last moment.”1029 Schwarz-Schilling 
confirmed in a personal interview that he held discussions with parliamentary 
deputies; “I talked to leaders, one to one, Ljubic, Raguz, and others... I made 
personal contact in the parliament.”1030
In the midst of this frenetic activity, parliament held a 15-hour public debate on 
the package on April 25. In addition, new proposals and initiatives were put on the 
table, further fueling the turbulent discussions. Some of them called for rescheduling 
the elections;1031 others aimed to alter the basic terms of the agreement,1032 including 
the elimination of entity voting. All these proposed changes were rejected, and 
opposition parties remained entrenched in their position. As SBiH’s Belkic stated: 
“We said, we accept the council of ministers, the parity reform, we also 
accept that the council of ministers cannot make decisions with at least 
one representative of each group. We accept two houses with House of 
Peoples deciding about vital interest. We also accept the article 13 of the 
new vital national interest veto definition, which said that any other 
question could be a vital interest and takes only 1 club to invoke it. And 
we accept a three-member presidency that is rotating and decided by 
consensus. But we thought that in the House of Representatives, they 
should articulate the interests of the citizenship. We thought we had to 
lead this move. We tried to be cooperative and were ready to leave entity 
voting but for those things that were not in the authority of the state. Of 
course, we were very unsatisfied because other questions were not 
open.”1033
1028 Rumors about the creation of a new shoot off HDZ party had been building up since 
December 2005. Expelled HDZ members Martin Raguz and Bozo Ljubic launched the platform for 
the newly created party HDZ 1990 on March 24 (for further discussion see p. 253 of this chapter).
1029 All external actors, namely the Head of EC Delegation Humphreys, the OSCE
representative, the OHR, the Council of Europe as well as Ambassadors of 12 countries (including the 
US, Austria, Canada, Hungary, France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Turkey, Croatia 
and the UK) attended parliamentary sessions on April 25th and 26* in order to lobby deputies.
1030 Author's personal interview with Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007.
1031 See M. Cubro. “Drama in Parliament.” Nezavisne Novine. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 
26 April 2006.
1032 One of these initiatives included a compromise to have a law rejected in parliament when all 
the delegates of one of the caucuses in the House of Peoples voted against it without the need to 
invoke the national interest, and hence avoiding referral to the Constitutional Court.
1033 Author’s personal interview with Beriz Belkic. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
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Similarly, Croat deputy Martin Raguz stated:
“The key reason why the agreement failed is because it was not enough 
for Bosnia in this phase for making central institutions functional, 
especially in the parliament and in the council of ministers. The 
maintenance of entity voting was unacceptable for us and it’s not 
consistent with the functions that the House of Representatives should 
play in the system. ... Also, entity voting can be used by Serbs and 
Bosniaks and they don’t need the House of People, they can preserve 
their interests in the House of Representatives. Croats cannot use this 
instrument. That’s the key reason we didn’t support the package.”1034
In the end, all the efforts undertaken to bring all the parties into agreement over the 
amendments failed. Head of EC Delegation Michael Humphreys stated, “There were 
strong efforts to get the parliament to vote in favor; we held late night meetings, 
outside and inside the parliament to persuade them, with individuals and in groups.... 
And then we also dealt separately with [SBiH's Haris] Silajdzic. But Silajdzic was 
impossible to move. I spent hours talking to Silajdzic but I could not get his position 
changed. We just didn’t manage to get his position changed.”1035 Similarly, UK 
Ambassador Rycroft stated in an interview, “We lobbied a lot, and the OHR too, but 
you could also see members of SBiH doing the job. They worked the parliament 
quite effectively.”1036 Indeed, despite heavy arm-twisting by external actors, the 
package was finally rejected at midnight on April 26, falling two votes short of the 
two-thirds majority needed for passage. Both Croat and SBiH deputies refused to 
accept what they considered ‘cosmetic changes,’ arguing that the proposed changes 
were meant to accommodate RS to the detriment of both Bosniaks and Croats; 
incidentally, Serb radicals opposed the package on the belief that it would mean the 
elimination of RS. In addition to the negative votes from SBiH, the Croat caucus in 
the House of Representatives1037 and the Serb radicals, other independent deputies
Author’s personal interview with Martin Raguz. Sarajevo, 5 July 2007).
1035 Author’s phone interview with Michael Humphreys, 15 April 2009.
1036 Author’s personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007.
1037 SBiH deputies included Beriz Belkic, Nijaz Durakovic, Mehmed Suljkanovic, Adem Huskic, 
Azra Hadziahmetovic and Senija Kapetanovic. The deputies of the Croat Caucus who voted against 
included Vinko Zoric, Martin Raguz, Ruza Sopta, Filip Andric and Ivo Lozancic.
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rejected the package. These included independent Sead Avdic, Republican Mladen 
Potocnik, SRS deputy Mirko Blagojevic, BOSS deputy Muhamed Moranjkic and 
finally a deputy from SDA, Mehmed Zilic1038, who shocked his party members two 
days before the vote by declaring he would vote against it. Negotiations thus 
collapsed and the international community took a step back.
Following the outright failure of the package, attempts were made to revive the 
process. In a letter sent to HDZ leader Dragan Covic, for example, Head of EC 
Delegation Humphreys stated, “It is clear to all that the process of constitutional 
changes must continue, not only because of the BiH’s European future, but to ensure 
that the fundamental democratic rights of citizens are fully respected and that BiH 
state functions.”1039 It was, however, unclear what direction the process would take 
after the failure in parliament. Several proposals were brought to the table, but none 
enjoyed sufficient consensus. Some voices expressed a willingness to further 
negotiate the agreement to prepare it for parliamentary approval, but Serb parties 
refused to further debate the previously agreed text.1040 SNSD instead proposed 
creating a process of constitutional reform within parliament that would start in 
March 2007 and be completed by the end of the year. According to this proposal, 
parliament would form a commission comprised of representatives from all the 
parties as well as an international representative that would be charged with drafting 
changes.1041 Other forces, however, continued demanding that the agreement be put to 
another vote in parliament without any changes. SDA's Sulejman Tihic, for example, 
traveled to the US in early May in an attempt to gamer US support for such 
initiative.1042 The trip resulted in a meeting at the US Ambassador's residence in 
Sarajevo on May 23 with all of the supporting parties (namely the SDA, SDP, HDZ,
1038 It is unclear why Zilic (a former advisor to SDA leader Sulejman Tihic) voted against the
constitutional changes. He used pure nationalist arguments in public statements following the failure 
of the constitutional changes. As he stated in a personal interview, “It is very important to understand 
is that if the April package had passed, RS would have been accepted and legalized. And Dayton was 
an unjust agreement. The Serbs would have fulfilled their war aim, because this was their goal. I 
would never do this for Bosnia” (authors’ personal interview with Mehmed Zilic. Sarajevo, June 
2007). Some analysts have suggested that Zilid’s nationalist rhetoric was purely instrumental; and that 
his opposition to the April package was based on a deal with SBiH.
i°39 “EC Delegation Head Humphreys Sends Letter to HDZ President.” Bosnia Daily 1244, May 
4,2006, p. 5.
1040 “Negotiations on Constitutional Changes Possible after the Elections: Dodik.” Bosnia Daily 
1251, May 15,2006.
1041 “Constitution May be Changed by 2008.” Bosnia Daily 1256, May 22,2006, p. 2.
1042 “USA Feels Constitutional Changes Should be Adopted.” Bosnia Daily 1251,15 May 2006.
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SNSD, SDP and SDS) to discuss options and prospects for the agreement.1043 But no 
agreement on having the package submitted again to parliament was reached.1044 
Party leaders, however, signed a joint statement reiterating their support for the 
constitutional agreement and committing to the continuation of the negotiations after 
the elections.1045 Both the intractability of opposition parties and the start of the 
electoral campaign convinced domestic actors that the best option was to resume 
talks after the October elections.
12. ANALYSIS OF PHASE POINT IH
12.1. Intra-Ethnic Dynamics
It is in the last phase of negotiations that intra-ethnic infighting and outbidding 
dynamics became more pervasive, leading to a situation in which conflict regulation 
was made impossible despite heavy external pressure. Intra-ethnic dynamics played 
differently within each of the three communities, however. As already discussed in 
Chapter 6, in contrast to the situation of Croats and Bosniaks, where intra-ethnic 
divisions led to the disruptive politics of outbidding, the reform-oriented SDS leader 
Dragan Cavic managed not only to isolate hardliners within the party1046 but also to 
prevent them from outmaneuvering moderates during the second and third phases of 
negotiations. This was achieved thanks to a carefully crafted dual strategy. The first 
part of this strategy included a partnership with the international community, 
whereby Cavic would be supported in its efforts to reform the party from within,1047
1043 “Leaders of Six Political Parties Meet in US Residence.” Bosnia Daily 1258, May 24,2006.
1044 Opposition parties continued to express their rejection to the package and Serb parties were 
unwilling to further discuss it.
1045 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, June 20, 2006. The parties met again on June 19 on the 
residence of the HR Schwarz Schilling to discuss the direction of constitutional reform. The HR 
announced that he would take a more prominent in the next phase of negotiations.
1046 HDZ’s leader Dragan Covic did this too, but the other way around. He did it at the party 
apparatus but those members kept important positions in parliament.
1047 Hays and other Western diplomats confirmed in personal interviews that the international 
community was ready to assist Cavic in his purge of the party. In fact, Cavic reached an agreement 
with Ashdown to accept the European concept of police reform while the international community 
would reverse some of the dismissals of SDS officials, especially those loyal to Cavic. Indeed, HR 
Ashdown reversed on 4 November more than 20 dismissals of SDS officials prior to the SDS 
Convention in November 2005. See OHR decisions in November 2005, available online at: 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp?m=&yr=2005 [accessed on April 20,2009].
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removing hardliners from key positions at both the party and government levels 
(although hardliners kept important pockets of influence at the municipal level in 
Eastern RS).1048 As some local officials and Western diplomats asserted in personal 
interviews, Cavic knew that SDS could only survive by gaining the confidence of the
V  t
international community and purging itself of hardliners. The goal for Cavic (and 
also for Serb parties) was thus to show the international community that RS was 
doing its homework (taking the old guard out of the picture) in order to avoid 
isolation, which would damage the party's status in the long run.
The second part of the strategy included an alliance with SNSD’s Milorad 
Dodik.1049 This alliance, which the PDP joined at a later stage, had a profound impact 
on the conduct of the negotiations, given the united Serb front presented during the 
negotiations. Indeed, as expressed by various sources, SDS, SNSD and PDP kept a 
rock-solid, unified position during the entire constitutional reform negotiation 
process,1050 in stark contrast to the other ethnic groups. As Meghan Stewart asserted 
in a personal interview, “The Serb contingent was always organized as a group; they 
actually agreed on things [and] presented a united front,1051 whereas the Bosniak 
group could not do that.”1052 Similarly, Hays stated, “The biggest problem was, of 
course, that there was a united Serb position on almost everything and there wasn’t 
even a single position on any issue among the other parties. As a matter of fact, of the 
five other parties we had six positions. Five people and six positions.”1053
While Serb parties stayed firmly united over the constitutional changes, a rather 
visceral squabble developed within the ranks of the Bosniak and Croat
1048 Although Cavic’s intent to transform the party into a moderate force with the assistance of 
the international community may have been genuine, following a different path would have likely 
resulted in the disappearance of SDS as a political party or its transformation into a pariah party (see 
Dragan Stanimirovic. “Republika Srpska: Shuffling the cards.” Transitions Online, 20 January 2006).
1049 These developments are explained in Chapter 5.
1050 This strategy consists of putting group loyalty over intra-party interests and presenting a 
united front in the face of threats to the groups’ interests (Mitchell 1991). Although such a defensive 
strategy has, according to Mitchell, the risk of “losing votes due to a less competitive and hence less 
mobilizing election” (Ibid, 81) Dodik’s position as prime minister since the early 2006 gave him 
leverage to launch a rhetorical, nationalist campaign after the failure of constitutional reform that 
counterbalanced the potential demobilizing effects associated with the group strategy adopted 
throughout the process of constitutional reform and in the run-up to the elections.
1051 It might be possible that Serb strategy in presenting a united, constructive platform on 
constitutional reform, was intertwined with the process of police reform. Serb parties might have 
considered that engaging constructively in constitutional reform would provide them further room in 
negotiating the parameters of the police reform debate.
1052 Author's personal interview with Meghan Stewart. Washington, D.C., August 2006.
1053 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C. 29 July 2009.
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communities.1054 This disagreement flared up during the last stage of the process. 
Indeed, neither the SBiH nor the Croat caucus in the House of Representatives 
supported the amendments, and built their platform for the October 2006 elections 
around their opposition to the constitutional package and the vilification of party 
leaders who supported it. The intra-ethnic fighting was thus aggravated by the 
proximity of the 2006 elections and a desire to exploit the opportunity to define 
electoral platforms along basic ‘yes’ and ‘no’ lines in relation to the constitutional 
process under way.
The last phase of the process provides evidence of the political game played by 
political actors seeking to unseat the parties in power, namely the SBiH and the 
shoot-off party HDZ 1990. As a case in point, expelled HDZ official Bozo Ljubic 
launched the platform for the newly created party HDZ 1990 on March 24, defined in 
opposition to the constitutional agreement signed merely five days prior.1055 Rumors 
about the creation of a new party had been building up since December 2005. The 
ultimate decision, however, was made on March 20, two days after the constitutional 
agreement was signed, at a meeting with HDZ deputies of the Federation and BiH 
parliaments.1056 Although HDZ 1990 was formed by some of the most prominent 
moderate figures within HDZ, such as Martin Raguz, the newly created party adopted 
a somewhat more nationalist platform. This conservative platform was clearly a 
strategy for a differentiation from Covic’s HDZ; it was also a call to the increasingly 
dissatisfied conservative sectors of the Croat community whose frustration had 
mounted as a result of Covic’s negotiated constitutional reform. At the same time, the 
deputies of the Croat caucus in the House of Representatives, namely Vinko Zoric, 
Martin Raguz, Ruza Sopta, Filip Andric and Ivo Lozancic, announced the end of the 
HDZ-Demo Christians Caucus and the creation of a new Croat caucus defined by 
opposition to the constitutional reform process. Criticism of the HDZ and its role in 
constitutional reform intensified, and Co vie was accused of betraying the interests of
1054 The Croat community was divided over electoral lists and positions of influence rather than 
long-standing ideological fights over the spiritual leadership of the community (as in the case of the 
Bosniak community).
1055 The second session of the Initiative Board of HDZ 1990 -  comprised of Ljubic, Raguz and 
Zoric -held the inaugural assembly on April 8, during which Ljubic was elected acting party 
Chairman and the rejection of the constitutional changes were reiterated (OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 
9 April 2006).
1056 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 24 March 2006. Some sources suggest that the creation of 
the new party had the support of Croatia Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (ibid, 27 March 2006; 9 April
2006), who disagreed on many fronts with Covic.
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the Croat people and of bowing to pressure from external forces because of his 
indictment.1057
The Catholic Church also played a critical role, adding fuel to the highly charged 
climate by criticizing and vilifying the agreed package as well as supporting and 
legitimizing the newly created party. Cardinal Vinko Puljic stated on March 12 in 
Citluk, “Nobody can sign something that is against me and my people in the name of 
the Croats. I expect that all those involved in the signing of the changes be 
responsible and not sign something that is detrimental to the people ... I guarantee 
that I will stand up against the changes that are detrimental to the Croats whoever 
signs them, I will call on people to fight against injustice.”1058
The Catholic Church thus fueled nationalist rhetoric and confrontation, greatly 
radicalizing the Croat position. At a Conference of Bishops on March 22, for 
example, the national Catholic Church not only rejected the package but also 
denounced it as a confirmation of ethnic cleansing and divisions in Bosnia.1059 
Conference participants denounced the undemocratic nature of the process and the 
unequal treatment for Croats. Some members of the Catholic Church, such as Puljic, 
made even more explicit appeals against the process through the use of wartime 
references (while the HDZ 1990s cultivated a more moderate nationalist platform, 
pointing to the loss of power by Croats in the new amended constitution). Right 
before the vote in parliament, Puljic accused both Americans and British of 
supporting those forces with an interest in ‘clean’ territories and expulsion.1060 In 
addition to its rhetoric, the Church became actively engaged in opposing the reform 
process. Two weeks before the vote in the parliament, a letter was sent to churches 
throughout the Federation delineating a very clear position on the so-called April 
Package, according to sources from the OHR; “It basically said that voting in favor 
of the amendments would damage the welfare of this country and the welfare of 
Croats.”1061 The Church's role in undermining the process in its last stages was
1057 In the view of Croat opposition parties, Covic’s bargaining position was always 
compromised by his criminal charges, providing external forces with a critical leverage tool to make 
him accept compromises that otherwise he would have not accepted (See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 
20 March 2006).
1058 Quoted in Ljiljana VidaCak. “Cardinal stands up against agreements on constitution.” Dnevni 
List. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 13 March 2006.
1059 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 23 March 2006.
1060 Jozo Pavkovic. “We are chased by Americans and Englishmen.” Vecernji List. In OHR, BiH 
Media Round-up, 15 April 2006.
1061 Author’s personal interview with Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007.
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prominent, and provided a raison d ’etre for the emergence of the newly created party 
HDZ 1990.
On the Bosniak side, similar developments took place with the SBiH and some 
extremist forces within the SDA. Indeed, on February 22, members of SBiH, SDU 
and BOSS announced the creation of a Patriotic Bloc (under the leadership of 
Silajdzic) to confront the ongoing constitutional process, and they accused Tihic and 
SDP's Zlatko Lagumdzjia of deceiving citizens and of joining in a coalition with SDS 
and SNSD.1062 The SDA and the SDP were vilified by the Bosniak opposition, while 
parties of the Patriotic Bloc -  as well as other forces such as the Association of 
Veterans -  strongly criticized the agreed package and the leaders that supported it. 
SBiH's Safet Halilovic, for example, stated in March that the changes agreed upon by 
party leaders “practically ensure special status for RS, as a state within a state.”1063 
Furthermore, when the final vote in parliament drew near, SBiH party officials 
engaged in frenetic lobbying against the package at the House of Representatives.
The role of religious authorities in the Bosniak political scene was more 
ambivalent than in the case of the Croat community, except towards the end of the 
process and in the run-up to the elections. On the one hand, the supreme body of the 
Islamic Community (Rijaset) passed a resolution on constitutional changes on March 
28 supporting a step-by-step approach, pushing the Patriotic Bloc to soften its 
criticism.1064 On the other hand, prominent figures within the Muslim community 
such as Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Ceric, the greatest and most influential religious 
authority among Bosnian Muslims, became increasingly supportive of Silajdzic and 
his electoral platform as negotiations progressed. In a ceremony marking the 
anniversary of the Gazy Husrev-Beg Moslem Secondary School, Mustafa Ceric 
expressed support for Silajdzic as the future head of the state so that a new 
constitution with no entities could be written.1065 While his support was rather 
ambivalent at this juncture, it solidified as negotiations progressed, even more so in 
the run up to the elections in October 2006. In the end, Tihic, who held the Bosniak 
presidency at the time, lost the post to Silajdzic in the October elections after a highly
1062 A. Maagic. “Tokic: Intensively, We Are Establishing Block of Patriotic Forces.” Dnevni 
Avaz. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 23 February 2006.
1063 Safet Halilovic, cited in OHR Media Round-up, 20 March 2006.
1064 See “The Best Cannot Come Out of Bad at Once.” Dnevni Avaz• In OHR, BiH Media 
Round-up, 29 March 2006.
1065 OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 8 January 2006. See also “BiH Will Fall Apart if Silajdzic 
Became President.” Nezavisne Novine. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 10 January 2006.
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polarized campaign that vilified him along with other supporters of the constitutional 
agreement.
122 . Supra-national Dynamics
Although external actors increased their activity significantly during this phase, they 
generally failed to counterbalance the dynamics associated with intra-ethnic 
competition. Two key factors account for the failure of external actors to provide 
incentives at the intra-ethnic level, including (1) neglect of the ethnic dimension 
throughout the constitutional reform process; and (2) a set of process-related 
shortcomings that aggravated the problems associated with intra-ethnic competition, 
namely the ambivalent role of the EU, divisions between the EU and the US, and 
process-related deficits such as time pressure and tight deadlines.
Neglect of the ethnic component
The most prominent misstep by external actors during the constitutional reform 
process was neglect of the intra-ethnic dimension and the failure to engage all of the 
significant forces with a stake in constitutional reform. As UK Ambassador Rycroft 
stated, “There is one key thing in BiH politics: you need a two thirds majority to 
change things in this country, and you need to think about how to get those two 
thirds.”1066 External actors' efforts, however, neglected this premise and miscalculated 
the actual votes needed to pass the constitutional agreement. As Hays and others 
suggested in personal interviews, the international community always thought that 
the package would pass without SBiH support, provided that Croats voted in favor; 
but the Croat vote had been severely damaged since late 2005 with the expulsion of 
key members and the nationalist campaign launched by the Catholic Church. 
Notwithstanding signs of extreme internal divisions within the Croat and Bosniak 
communities, external actors made little effort to include forces publicly opposed to 
the constitutional process (perhaps because they had initially focused on getting the 
Bosniak-Serb agreement).1067 This became a serious challenge to the progress of
1066 Author's personal interview with Matthew Rycroft. Sarajevo, 7 June 2007.
1067 The internationals gave up on the chances to get SBiH on board, as it became increasingly 
clear that they had withdrawn from the process. As Hays recollected in a personal interview, “When 
they [parties] gathered together privately after January, the party of BiH could not be convinced that 
they should join the process, and they no longer took part of it after January” (Author's personal
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negotiations. As Schwarz-Schilling said in a personal interview, “One of the deficits 
of the process was that they didn’t talk to the actors that didn’t like the April Package 
and didn’t try to bring them to the table.”1068 Domestic actors agreed. An HDZ 
official asserted in a personal interview, “The international community only lobbied 
the presidents, but party leaders didn’t have the majority within their own ranks... 
Only the Serbs had the majority in favor of the constitutional package.”1069 SNSD 
official Zeljko Mirjanic suggested that the international community erred by not 
involving key institutions such as the parliament until a very late stage; “Not all 
representatives of parties in parliament were included... One day all of their 
questions were going to be brought forward in parliament, so the parliament should 
have been involved.”1070
In sum, the international community opted for a secretive elite bargain instead of 
a public discussion and inclusive approach. As a result of this shortsighted approach, 
the political agreement reached on March 18, came with insufficient support. 
Although there were belated attempts by some European countries to bring dissenting 
voices into the agreement, they came too late and they failed. As Schwarz-Schilling 
asserted, “I made personal contact [with party representatives] in the parliament. But 
I had no possibility to influence. It was too late. They had made up their mind.”1071 In 
the end, the international community’s undemocratic approach precipitated the 
agreement's failure.
International Divisions
While bringing opposition forces into the process might have been difficult at any 
point during negotiations, additional shortcomings of external actors' efforts 
aggravated intra-ethnic discord. The first shortcoming was the division between the 
EU and the US, which undermined the credibility of external efforts in the eyes of 
domestic actors and proved fatal in the final phase of negotiations. There was doubt 
over the quality of the resulting legal product, as negotiations were being discussed 
by politicians who had little knowledge of appropriate legal wording, making
interview with Donald Hays. Washington, D.C., 29 July 2006). Indeed, following various attempts to 
bring SBiH back to the negotiation table in February, they were no longer invited in the meetings in 
March 2006.
1068 Author’s personal interview with Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007.
1069 Author’s personal interview with Mile Lasic. Mostar, 2 July 2007.
1070 Author’s personal interview with Zeljko Mirjanic. Banja Luka, 11 June 2007.
1071 Author’s personal interview with Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007.
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Europeans hesitant to have the European stamp on it; Indeed, a Western diplomat 
confirmed that the OHR got a bit nervous when negotiations became more serious 
because they had no control or say over the whole process.1072 Although unity seemed 
within reach once the agreement was on the table, party officials asserted in personal 
interviews that external actors appeared to be competing against each other 
throughout the whole process. SDS deputy Moncilo Novakovic stated that the 
international community did not have a unified position on the April Package, 
“because otherwise it would have been accepted.”1073 Even when the package was 
already on the table, domestic actors never perceived full unity; “The EU was still 
ambivalent, and domestic actors used this to play each other off.”1074
International divisions reinforced the problem of domestic accountability during 
this phase, handing domestic parties an opportunity to block the reform process (for 
intra-party purposes) without bearing responsibility for the package's failure. As a 
SBiH official critical of the party's stand on constitutional reform asserted, domestic 
actors perceived the fight within the international community “and use[d] it to 
advance their interests and goals, be it just for the advancement of their goals or 
simple to buy time and do nothing.”1075 Another SBiH official stated, “There were too 
many approaches by the international community. You had, for example, the Venice 
Commission with their opinion on constitutional matters, the European Parliament, 
the US, different institutions and organizations with different opinions. As a result, 
each political leader used what they wanted to further their arguments.”1076
This lack of domestic responsibility -  and awareness of the divisions within the 
international community -  was evident in the reactions of domestic actors only days 
after the agreement's failure in parliament. While some European voices suggested 
that the EU would apply sanctions for the failure to pass the constitutional changes, 
actors opposed to the package were skeptical about the feasibility and legitimacy of 
such actions. SBiH's Belkic, for example, declared on May 1 that the failure of the 
April Package could not possibly result in sanctions provided that other past failures 
had never brought major consequences.1077 Similarly, SBiH's Halilovic stated that if
Author's personal interview with Western diplomat. Sarajevo, July 2007.
Author’s personal interview with Moncilo Novakovic. Sarajevo, 5 June 2007.
Author’s personal interview with SBiH official, Sarajevo, July 2007.
Author's personal interview with SBiH official. Sarajevo, 2007.
Author's personal interview with SBiH official. Sarajevo. 2007.
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 1 May 2006.
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sanctions were applied, “basic principles of parliamentary democracy would be 
denied ... [including the] right to determine one’s own destiny.”1078 (Chairwoman of 
the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Southeast Europe Doris Pack 
confirmed in May that the EU would not change the standards for EU accession in 
Bosnia.1079)
The Failure ofEU Incentives: The Second Phase as Fairytale 
The EU also failed to counterbalance non-reconciliatory dynamics. In fact, although 
the EU enjoyed far greater sticks and carrots than the US, Europe proved more 
hesitant than the US in engaging fully in the process.1080 All in all, EU representatives 
became more active during the last phase of the process, once a final agreement was 
on the table. They engaged in direct lobbying and issued statements of public 
support, including officials such as EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, who up 
until that point had expressed strong reservations about constitutional reform in 
Bosnia.
Notwithstanding the EU’s more dynamic role during the final phase, domestic 
actors continued to view the EU as secondary to the US. The EU’s ambivalence 
seriously affected its credibility when it attempted to sponsor a second phase of 
constitutional reform, which was deemed decisive for appeasing the concerns of both 
Bosniak and Croat parties (as a matter of fact, HDZ leader Dragan Co vie conditioned 
Croat support for the ammendments on a commitment to a second, deeper phase of 
constitutional reform). The attempt failed, however, to entice the opposition. HR 
Schwarz-Schilling argued that they tried to do everything they could to convince the 
parties of the seriousness of their proposal. The initiative was, however, undercut by 
the EU’s inability to provide specific details. In response to demands for a clearer 
definition of what the second phase of constitutional reform would entail, Head of 
EC Delegation Michael Humphreys refused to give further information, stating that it 
was not the time to define what would come in the second phase.1081 The EU’s
1078 See H. Orahovac. “Raising Sanctions against BiH Would Deny Principles of Parliamentary
Democracy.” In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 29 April 2006. This appreciation related directly to the 
EU’s motto of domestic ownership and no interference in internal affairs, which is intimately 
associated with the process of EU accession.
1079 See Nadja Diklic. “There Would Be No Sanctions for BiH.” Dnevni Avaz, p. 5. In OHR, BiH
Media Round-up, 4 May 2006.
1080 See Chapter 6, section 2 on the role of the EU.
1081 Michael Humphreys, cited in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 26 April 2006.
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credibility on the sponsorship of a second phase was further undermined when it 
offered guarantees that were not compatible for each group.1082 While Bosniak and 
Croat parties envisioned rearrangement of Bosnia’s internal structure as a basic 
premise for a second phase of constitutional reform, Serb parties made it clear that 
the status of RS would not be questioned.1083 This allowed opposition parties to 
question and discredit the EU’s initiative. HDZ 1990 deputy Filip Andric said in 
early April that the second phase was a fairytale.1084
Process Shortcomings
Several process shortcomings also had (negative) unintended consequences on the 
overall political outcome, and especially in relation to intra-ethnic dynamics. The 
first was a failure to engage all significant social forces. The option of conducting 
constitutional reform negotiations at the highest political level, with hardly any 
involvement of public institutions and civil society, was in fact intensely discussed 
but was finally chosen on pragmatic grounds. “The answer to that,” PDP high 
ranking official Branislav Borenovic commented, is that “in Bosnia we still have 
strong leadership, strong leaders that are decision-makers. ... It is also easier to work 
with fewer politicians in this political structure.”1085 But sidelining non-political 
actors, however, created more hurdles to a successful negotiation; it not only imbued 
the process with a patent democratic deficit, but it also led to public 
misinformation,1086 which eventually paved the way for opposition parties to play the
This situation contradicts classical mediation literature. For example, Stedman states that 
offering guarantees is a critical factor in mediation activities, although when the guarantees cannot be 
delivered -  and this is how it is perceived by the parties involved -  such guarantees may diminish the 
mediator’s leverage (Stedman 1996,376).
1083 In early March, Dodik asserted, “I have nothing against the idea of having three, five, or ten 
entities within BiH itself. What is clear is that the RS’s existence is unquestionable” (OHR, BiH 
Media Round-up, 2 March 2006). Similarly, Ivanic stated, “We didn’t have any problem with opening 
the discussion on these issues on a second phase. The question is whether you are talking about the 
process or the outcome. You can open discussions but how long will it take to reach an agreement on 
these issue is a different thing” (author’s interview with Mladen Ivanic. Sarajevo, 10 July 2007).
1084 See F. Mioc. “Croats Are More Important than HDZ: I Shall Vote against Constitutions.” 
Slobododna Dalmacija. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 7 April 2006.
1085 Author’s personal interview with Branislav Borenovic. Banja Luka, 12 June 2007; see also 
Chapter 4, p. 171.
1086 Only 20 percent of respondents reported to be informed about the efforts on constitutional 
reform (United Nations Development Programme 2007a). The Early Warning Report in early 2006 
showed high levels of undecided. While around 40 percent of the population expressed some support 
for the changes, 33 percent were undecided and 10 percent were against (United Nations Development 
Programme 2006). The strongest support came from Bosniak and Croat majority areas (more than 50 
percent among Bosniaks and 48 percent in Croat majority areas). The support in Serb majority areas 
was 27 percent; almost 20 percent were against and 40 percent remained undecided (ibid).
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nationalistic card, to exploit the lack of democratic accountability and to undermine 
the legitimacy of the process.1087 Although external forces had originally envisioned 
that public education efforts would take place parallel to the negotiations and enable 
civic participation in the constitutional reform process,1088 there was a clear 
disconnect between the two efforts. Civil society activities did not fully take off until 
late October and early November 2005, when public discussions and the involvement 
of the press were in full gear.1089 Furthermore, these discussions became disconnected 
from the negotiations after the US took over from the EU as lead external facilitator. 
As CoE Representative Tim Cartwright stated, “The Dayton project and its outreach 
activities did a lot, but somehow the outreach and the negotiations were never 
brought together.”1090
Time pressure and tight deadlines also impeded conflict regulation at the 
domestic level,1091 paving the way for negotiations to be misused and distorted for 
electoral purposes. Mediating efforts of external actors in the last stages of the 
process were affected by this in three ways. First, time constraints left little room for 
maneuver once the package was brought to the parliament, a situation that does not 
bode well in circumstances where trust is in short supply and the issue at stake is of a 
win-lose (zero-sum) character. As a case in point, party officials argued in personal 
interviews that there were in fact too many critical compromises to be reached in too 
short a timeframe. Martin Raguz, a member of the newly created HDZ 1990, argued,
Sead Numanovic. “Citizens Do Not Know What Is Negotiated About.” Dnevni Avaz. In 
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 23 December 2005.
1088 Hays asserted that the education campaign had been tailored to accommodate for the fact 
that political parties in Bosnia had little experience in public relations. It was a supporting activity, to 
prevent vilification of the process in the media. In the end, however, “Domestic media created the idea 
of betrayal. ... They were condemning the process in advance when they didn’t know what it was 
about. They decided it was bad” (author’s personal interview with Sulejman Tihic. Sarajevo, 4 July
2007).
1089 The civil society/education campaign on the topic ‘constitutional changes and local 
ownership’ was launched in September 2005, although the preliminary phase involved discussions 
with key Mayors to facilitate cooperation between civil society and local politics (Dayton Project, 
final report, December 2005). It was only on October 24 when the first roundtable with civil society 
took place in Tuzla, followed by others in early December in Mostar, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Bihac 
on December 20. “The aim of the roundtables were to present to the participants the problems with the 
current constitution of BiH and inform of possible alternatives. The participants were divided into two 
working groups. Working group ‘A ’ dealt with problems of exercising of citizen’s rights due to a poor 
legal system. Working group ‘B ’ dealt with amending the constitution of BiH in such as way to make 
it compatible with the European and international instruments and how to reach an optimal solution 
for citizenry” (ibid).
1090 Author’s personal interview with Tim Cartwright. Sarajevo, 19 June 2007.
1091 The decision to hurry negotiations, however, ran counter to mediation literature analysis, 
which suggests that agreements driven by deadlines and a sense of urgency are very likely to result in 
confusion and failure (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999,693).
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“We were faced with this take-it-or-leave-it package. The US and the parties that 
negotiated the package left no room for discussion and there was no political will to 
discuss important issues such as entity voting.”1092 Second, tight deadlines put the 
international community in a position of weakness. As a Western official stated in a 
personal interview, “there is an obsession in the international community with quick 
solutions and this pushes it into a position of weakness.... They could have had this 
approved with no time constraints.”1093 Finally, time pressures impaired appropriate 
planning, as previously outlined, by obstructing efforts of institutions such as the 
CoE and the EU to establish an appropriate forum for discussions with civil society 
representatives.
73 . THE 2006 ELECTIONS
The run-up to the 2006 elections -  accompanied by the PIC’s announcement that the 
OHR would be closed on 30 June 20071094 -  was characterized by a highly 
radicalized electoral campaign, not surprisingly given the heated discussions during 
the constitutional negotiations. Indeed, the campaign was held amidst one of the 
worst political climates since the war, with nationalist rhetoric and ethnic divisions 
reaching new levels of intensity.1095 At the inter-ethnic level, the campaign featured 
highly charged language around the issue of constitutional reform and the future of 
the state. In contrast to previous electoral contests, however, the SDA and SDS were 
outflanked by the previously more moderate parties SNSD and SBiH, which 
exploited the ethnic card and took the leading role in the radicalized nationalist 
campaign.
Although nationalist rhetoric had been abundant during the constitutional 
negotiations, especially at the end of the process, it took on a new momentum after 
the failure of the package. More radical positions were adopted by the Serb and 
Bosniak parties, particularly the SNSD and SBiH (SNSD’s radicalization contrasted 
heavily with its more moderate stance during the constitutional negotiations). In
Author’s personal interview with Martin Raguz. Sarajevo, 5 July 2007.
1093 Author’s personal interview with Western diplomat. Sarajevo, June 2007.
1094 Peace Implementation Council 2006b. OHR closure was made conditional upon a review in 
early 2007.
1095 On 11 August 2006, the PIC called on the parties to “to end the inflammatory rhetoric that 
has raised tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in recent days and weeks” (PIC 2006c).
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contrast to previous electoral contests, in which the SDS was the prominent protector 
of Serb values, SNSD's Dodik emerged as the most radical defender of RS and Serb 
identity, with both the PDP and SDS following closely behind.1096 As a case in point, 
following the Montenegro referendum at the end of May, Dodik started using the 
idea of a referendum for the case of RS. Domestic and international actors were 
dismayed by his declarations, which fueled some of the most inflammatory 
exchanges between party leaders in the run up to the elections in Bosnia. In addition 
to the rhetoric, there was a shift in the Serb strategy at the state level with a return to 
the obstructionism that was in evidence prior to the constitutional reform process, 
especially during police reform efforts. On June 2, for example, Dodik declared that 
Serb parties would no longer participate in the police reform directorate (the body 
charged with implementing the reform agreed in October 2005) as full-fledged 
members but merely as observers;1097 similarly, on June 7, he declared in Novi Sad 
(the hardliner stronghold in RS), “We are clearly in favor of the European road, but 
not for the price of terminating the RS. To the theses about RS as a genocidal 
creation and the need for terminating it, our people have a response -  referendum. 
There is no political structure in RS that feels differently about this.”1098 The 
obstructionist strategy of the Serb parties would lead to Bosnia’s failure to comply 
with the EU’s deadline on September 30 for the signing of the SAA, which would 
not be signed until June 2008 due to further complications in the process of police 
reform.1099
1096 As a matter of fact, the strategic partnership between PDP, SNSD and SDS formed during 
the constitutional reform process appeared to continue through the run up-to the elections. In an 
interview granted in September, Cavic claims that the elections were of a special nature given the 
international community's announced intention of closing the OHR on July 1, 2007. He stated, “Time 
after the elections will be divided into at least two periods. In the first period, we will participate in the 
final processes before the cancellation of the Office of the High Representative. During that time, all 
political forces in the RS will have to cooperate, in other words, a ‘smart coalition’ will be needed. 
Such cooperation can logically determine the executive power. The second period will be marked by a 
greater degree of freedom and affirmation of democratic values. SDS will be ready for all solutions at 
that moment, opposition or new elections” (“OHR Should Leave As Soon as Possible” Bosnia Daily 
1345,22 September 2006, p. 7).
1097 Dodik demanded that two requests be granted, namely: “The preservation of the RS police in 
the future police structures and its financing by the RS institutions, possibly from the budget which is 
to be adopted on the BiH level.” Dodik also expected to get an extra six months to negotiate the terms 
of the police reform (see “Agreement with Serbia Will Be Signed ” Bosnia Daily, 19 September 
2006).
1098 “Dodik: if Dayton is questioned, referendum is the answer/” Bosnia Daily, 8 June 2006.
1099 The EU set up four key conditions for the signing of the SAA, namely 1) Implementation of 
police reform in compliance with the October 2005 agreement on police restructuring; 2) full co­
operation with the ICTY; 3) adoption and implementation of all necessary public broadcasting 
legislation; and 4) development of the legislative framework and administrative capacity to allow for
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Two additional developments fueled Serb rhetoric in the run-up to elections. 
First, on June 29, the CoE passed a resolution on constitutional reform in Bosnia, 
blaming, unexpectedly, RS parties for the failure of the process.1100 Second, the 
resolution also recommended that Bosnian authorities draft a new constitution by 
2010, in which entity voting would be finally eliminated. The resolution did not 
come with the support of the UK government, however; the British ambassador 
stated publicly that the resolution was more of an advisory character, adding that 
constitutional reform could only occur through consensus.1102
Following repeated references to the right of a referendum, Dodik's stance turned 
increasingly defiant. On August 16, Dodik stated, “There is no police reform without 
the RS police, and if that is a condition for breaking off SAA talks, then they can be 
broken off.”1103 Developments in Kosovo1104 also provided Serb parties -  encouraged 
by Serbia’s most conservative forces1105 -  with an additional card and an excuse to 
appeal for a referendum in RS. In early September, Dodik stated that although they 
wished to stay in Bosnia, the independence of Kosovo could “strengthen the views of 
Serbs that they too have that right ... [and that the] basic condition for the RS to 
remain within BiH is that it receives assurances that domination and radical Islam 
will not prevail in it.”1106 By the end of June, opinion polls give SNSD strong 
electoral support for the upcoming elections.
SBiH’s Silajdzic,1107 who for long had sought to take over SDA’s historic role as 
the speaker of the Bosniak community, also engaged in strong nationalist rhetoric, 
using ethnic anxieties and the process of constitutional reform to both confront
proper implementation of the SAA (European Commission 2008, 5. ft. 3). Police reform was the 
highest priority however. The signing of the SAA was only possible when parties reached an 
agreement on police restructuring in April 2008, even though such agreement failed to live up to EU 
standards.
1100 CoE Special Representative Tim Cartwright suggested that the resolution had been drafted
with strong lobbying from SBiH’s Haris Silajdzic (author’s personal interview with Tim Cartwright. 
Sarajevo, 19 June 2007).
ii°2 “Rycroft’s Statement Encouraging RS Separatists: BNP.” Bosnia Daily, 5 July 2006.
1103 “Europe Can Wait, but RS Will Have its Police.” Bosnia Daily 1318,18 August 2006, p 1.
1104 The election campaign overlapped with mediated talks on the future status of Kosovo.
1105 While Serbia acted discreetly during the process of constitutional negotiations, supporting 
the Serb stance, its involvement became most disruptive in the run-up to the elections as a result of the 
intertwinements with the Kosovo status process. The future status process had begun officially in 
Vienna on 20 February 2006. The initial conversations focused on decentralization issues but no 
progress was made in the summer of 2006 (see UN Security Council 2006). Christophe Solioz argues 
that the anticipated outcome of some sort of independence “clearly undermined the negotiations” 
(Solioz 2006,146) and radicalized the Serbian position.
n°6 “RS Referendum Inevitable.” Bosnia Daily 1332,5 September 2006, p. 1.
1107 Silajdzic was re-elected President of SBiH at the party’s convention on 20 May 2006.
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SNSD’s rhetoric and stand up as the defendant of Bosniak’s interests. In mid-June, 
for example, Silajdzic stated, “I stressed that BiH needs [a] new Constitution, based 
on principles of modem democracy, not on ethnic principles that cement results of 
ethnic cleansing, genocide and aggression.”1108 Similarly, he declared in September, 
“We defeated Milosevic and Karadzic, but, apparently, we will have to politically 
defeat Milorad Dodik, Vuk Draskovic and others who still dream of Greater Serbia in 
order to protect BiH.”1109 In reference to SBiH’s stand on constitutional reform, he 
continued to champion the creation of a civic, unitary state. As he stated a few days 
before the elections, “I'm just convinced that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be [a] 
much more comfortable and prosperous ‘house’ if it was organized differently: 
without two entrances, two kitchens, two roofs in political terms: [a] unified country 
without entities.”1110
Tensions were further aggravated by internal and regional developments 
involving Serbia and Croatia. On June 2006, Croatia’s president Ivo Sanader called 
on the international community to organize another international conference to 
change the Bosnian constitution. This statement was received with strong criticism in 
Bosnia, with both Serbs and Bosniaks denouncing it as an attack to the country’s 
sovereignty. The preparations of a renewed Special Agreement between Serbia and 
RS also raised the tension levels between Bosniak and Serb parties.1111 Although the 
agreement was carried out within the legality of the Bosnian constitutional 
framework, its signing on September 26, only five days before the elections, 
aggravated Bosniak parties, who asked the OHR to block its completion. Other 
internal events further fueled ethnic tensions. Indeed, in mid-August, an explosion 
damaged the grave of Alija Izetbegovic, and Bosniak President Tihic accused Serbs 
of reigniting ethnic tensions in reaction to developments in Kosovo and the October 
elections.1112
Developments at the intra-ethnic level also compounded problems running up to 
the elections, especially within the Bosniak community. Indeed, following the failure
E. Sarac. “Silajdzic Demands Support from US Government for New Constitution.” Dnevni 
Avaz. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 14 June 2006.
1109 “Dodik Still Dreams of Greater Serbia.” Bosnia Daily 1333,6 September 2006, p. 1.
mo “BiH with No Entities.” Bosnia Daily 1345,22 September 2006, p. 8.
1111 Tensions were eased by Serbia’s President Tadic, however. In a public statement, he said
that despite Serbia's interest in strengthening relations with the RS, it had a “strategic interest” in a 
Bosnia that was united and stable (Economist Intelligent Unit, July 2006).
1112 Economist Intelligent Unit, July 2006.
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of the constitutional package, divisions within the SDA between Tihic’s moderate 
forces and party hardliners, led by Federation Deputy Defense Minister Hasan 
Cegnic, started to mount. Indeed, Tihic’s cooperation with SDP forces during 
constitutional negotiations caused consternation among the members of the Islamist 
movement within SDA, who believed a potential coalition with the vilified SDP old 
guard, following the October elections (something Tihic had advocated within the 
party1113) would further undermine their power and influence within the party.1114 
Internal rifts within the SDA became evident in June 2006. As a case in point, on 
June 16, twenty-two SDA officials from the Municipality of Novi Grad Sarajevo left 
the party unanimously and joined the SBiH, declaring disagreement with SDA’s 
policy on constitutional reform and announcing full allegiance to Silajdzic 
instead.1115 Furthermore, the conflict between Tihic and Cegnic in relation both to 
SDA’s coalition with SNSD in RS and to Tihic’s rapprochement to SDP became 
public at the party’s main board session in Tuzla on June 17. Cegnic accused SDA of 
being partially responsible for the failure of the RS Government to cooperate with the 
ICTY and demanded the withdrawal of SDA’s support; Tihic remained unaffected, 
stating that Dodik remained the “least bad solution.”1116 Tensions mounted in the 
run-up to the elections, and hardliners launched an effort to undermine Tihic’s bid for 
the elections with the intention of overthrowing him as SDA leader through a highly 
confrontational media campaign in one of the key Bosniak newspapers, Dnevni Avaz, 
and through a rapprochement with Silajdzic.1117
In the end, Silajdzic, who for long had sought to supplant the SDA as the de 
facto speaker and spiritual leader of the Bosniak Community, partially succeeded in 
the 2006 elections. But Silajdzic’s victory should be understood in the context of
11 See OHR, BiH Media Round-up, June 19, 2006. Both Tihic and Lagumdzjia fell short of
confirming any coalition plans during the run-up to the elections. As a case in point, SDP officials 
stated at the party convention on July 8 that they would no longer be compelled to join coalitions with 
their natural partners, namely SNSD and SBiH. SDP leader Lagumdzija stated, “No one of the 
following -  SDA, SDS, HDZ, SBiH, SNSD, PDP -  would be either our coalition partner or 
opponent... just on the grounds of their names” (see Faruk Boric. “Goodbye Dodik, Goodbye 
Silajdzic -  We Are Heading Europe!” Dani p. 36-38. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 14 July 2006).
1114 Bougarel 2007.
1115 See E.S. “Former SDA Members Supporting Silajdzic.” Dnevni Avaz. In OHR, BiH Media
Round-up, 17 June 2006.
1116 E. Huremovic. “Collision of Tihic and Cegnic over Dodik and SNSD.” Dnevni Avaz, in 
OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 18 June 2006.
1117 Author’s personal interviews with local observers and Western diplomats. Sarajevo, May-
June 2007; See also Bougarel, 2007; V. Selimbegovic. “To whom would Alija’s spirit bring victory.” 
Dani, p. 18-20. In OHR, BiH Media Round-up, 19 June 2006.
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SDA's fragmentation, particularly in reference to the critical support provided by 
factions within SDA who, having been alienated by Tihic’s rapprochement with SDP 
and displeased with a decline in their privileges and influence within the party, urged 
SDA supporters to vote for Silajdzic over Tihic.1118 Silajdzic also had the support of 
key members of the Islamic Community such as Reis Effendi Ceric, who raised 
support for SBiH “among the Federation’s rural and refugee populations, which 
traditionally vote for the SDA.”1119 In the end, despite the fact that SBiH was only 
given third place among Bosniaks in opinion polls held before the elections,1120 
behind SDP and SDA, Silajdzic managed to receive more than 60 percent of the 
Bosniak vote in the presidential elections against SDA candidate Sulejman Tihic, 
who garnered 27 percent (see table 8.1). While SBiH’s votes for the presidential post 
doubled those of the SDA, the electoral results for the parliament differed 
significantly. SDA’s support stood at 25 percent and SBiH’s at 23 percent. The 2006 
elections thus turned SBiH -  which up until that point had only been a minor 
coalition partner at both entity and state levels -  into one of the leading parties at the 
state level.
The other winner of the 2006 elections was the SNSD, which won around 55 
percent of the presidential vote on a highly radicalized nationalist platform (versus 25 
percent for the SDS) and more than 45 percent at the legislative level (versus merely 
20 percent for the SDS) (see table 7.1). SDS was the big loser, with domestic 
popularity decreasing as a result of internal divisions and the party's involvement in 
some irregularities associated with the privatization of public companies. In the end, 
the SDS, who had traditionally been the strongest nationalist party in RS, lost much 
of its clout to Dodik’s SNSD, which clearly emerged as the leading party at the entity 
and state levels. At the local level, however, SDS still governed with ample margin 
(until the 2008 municipal elections). Following the resignation of its leader Dragan 
Cavic in November 2006, the SDS confirmed Mladen Bosic as President on a right- 
wing platform.1121
As for the Croat community, they continued to be in deep disarray, more so than
1118 Bougarel 2008.
1119 Economist Intelligent Unit, October 2006.
1120 See IRI survey in OHR, BiH Media Round-up, June 19,2006.
1121 SDS new leader Bosic stated, “We have concluded that we have turned towards the left after 
some time which has not been recognized by our voters and membership” (see “SDS Party Goes Right 
Center.” Bosnia Daily 1538,2 July 2007, p. 2).
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ever before as a result of the newly created HDZ 1990 and the loss of the presidential 
post to the SDP. Indeed, the SDP’s decision to place a Croat candidate for the 
presidency in the October elections put further stress on the Croat community, with 
both HDZ parties failing to gamer enough support to win the Croat presidency post 
over the SDP. Both the HDZ 1990 and the HDZ BiH split the results and failed to 
keep the presidency, which fell into the hands of a Croat SDP official, Zeljko 
Komsic.
Table 7.1. Results of Presidential Elections, October 2006
Party Results
Bosniak Member SBIH 62.8%
Haris Silajdzic (350,520)
SDA 27.5%
Sulejman Tihic (153,683)
Croat Member SDP 39.5%
Zel jko Komsic (116,062)
HDZ 26.1%
Ivo Miro Jovic (76,681)
HDZ 1990 18.2%
Bozo Ljubic (53,325)
Serb Member SNSD 53.2%
NebojSa
Radmanovic
(287,675)
SDS 24.2%
Mirko Sarovic (130,624)
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
Table 1 2 . Results of Legislative Elections, October 2006
Party Results Seats
Federation
Voters
SDA 25.5%
(217,961)
8
SBIH 23%
(196,230)
7
SDP 15.4%
(131,450)
5
HDZ 8%
(68,188)
3
HDZ 1990 6.1%
(52,095)
21122
RS Voters SNSD 46.9%
(262,203)
7
SDS 19.4%
(108,616)
3
PDP 5.1%
(28,410)
1
SBIH 4.1%
(23,257)
1
1122 Three additional seats went to three minor parties in the Federation.
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SDA 3.6%
(20,514)
1
DNS 3.5%
(19,868)
1
Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Central Election Commission
7.4. AFTER THE APRIL PACKAGE: ELUSIVE REFORM
Even though the international community’s rhetoric on constitutional changes in 
Bosnia became more unified after the failure of the April Package, divisions over 
tactics between the US and the EU not only remained but also increased significantly 
in the aftermath of the constitutional process.1123 In fact, divisions between the US 
and the EU on the constitutional approach led to two slightly different and separate 
courses following the October 2006 elections, one sponsored by the US and the other 
by the EU. It marked the end of any joint approach to seeking change in Bosnia. The 
US approach was inclusive in nature, with constitutional reform representing just one 
facet of a larger process. The US also showed a manifest interest in putting the April 
Package back on the table either in its originally agreed form or ‘adjusted’ to the new 
constellation of forces resulting from the October 2006 elections. This suggested a 
US preference for limiting constitutional negotiations to issues that prevented 
approval of the constitutional package, rather than engaging in a broader 
constitutional debate.
In contrast, the EU’s approach to constitutional reform in the aftermath of the 
April Package continued to be rather hands-off. Indeed, Europe’s preference 
remained to see Bosnian politicians approve a new constitution that streamlined the 
process of EU accession in their own terms. As a result, little was done to overtly 
support the process -  especially in light of the more hands-on US approach. The EU 
was unable to moderate domestic politicians’ use of nationalist rhetoric and could not 
get them to engage in talks in a constructive manner. The new Head of EC 
Delegation, Dimitros Kourkoulas, stressed on 4 April 2007 that the EU supported 
constitutional discussions, but was “not going to enforce constitutional changes.”1124 
The EU’s approach to constitutional issues remained step-by-step, out of concern for
1123 These developments are discussed in Sebastin 2007.
1124 “We’re Near Agreement on Police Reform.” Dnevni Avaz, p. 5, 4 April 2007. In 
Constitutional Changes Monitor no. 22,4-11 April 2006.
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the intertwinements between constitutional and other reform processes such as police 
restructuring, which continued to be on hold until a final agreement was reached in 
April 2008. Indeed, in June 2007, EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana stressed, “it is 
necessary to separate constitutional reform from police restructuring, as this would 
most likely allow for swifter overcoming of these problems ”1125 This meant a return 
to the positions of 2005.
As for the status of the April Package after its failure, the EU was inclined to 
start a broad, open-ended process from scratch rather than to reduce constitutional 
talks to the discussion of the April Package. There was the belief within European 
circles that “the US is taking the wrong approach to Bosnia’s constitutional problem, 
by trying to breathe life into a set of proposals that have no real democratic 
legitimacy.”1126 Divisions within the EU remained, however. The UK, for example, 
was more supportive of the April Package and the US approach. In general, 
Europeans accepted the broader terms of the April Package but wanted to improve it. 
As a European official stated, “We believe that it would be good to start the whole 
process of constitutional change from the beginning and in a proper way and that 
representatives of civil society and others participate in it.”1127
While different, both approaches were ill designed. In a meeting held with Dodik 
and Silajdzic in Washington DC at the end of May 2007, the Bush administration 
failed to reach a comprehensive agreement on a united police, a change in the name 
of the RS and an amended version of the April Package. Even though Dodik seemed 
to be willing to accept the reduced formula of entity voting1128 and agreed to a 
Bosnian Serb police force coming under joint control in legal and administrative 
terms,1129 “once Silajdzic realized there would be no agreement on changing the name 
of RS, they would not discuss anything else, not even the distribution of competences 
between the state and the entities.”1130 A RS government official stressed, “the 
problem with the US initiative a year after the April Package was that the 
Ambassador’s idea of compromise was to reach an agreement somewhere between 
the April Package and centralization. They are asking us to make a compromise on a
1125 “Separate Police and Constitutional Reforms.” Bosnia Daily 1531, p, 1,21 June 2007.
1126 S. Mustajbegovic and G. Katana. “Washington Summit and Reviving Bosnia’s Reforms.” 
Balkan Insight no. 84,24 May 2007.
1127 Author’s personal interview with European official. Sarajevo, May 2007.
1128 Author’s personal interview with Western diplomat. Sarajevo, June 2007.
1129 “US Wants Bosnians to End Rift for Reforms.” The Peninsula, 24 May 2007.
1130 Author's personal interview with Western diplomat. Sarajevo. July 2007.
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compromise. But if we are to find compromise, we go back to our starting position, 
Dayton, as then we can talk and reach a compromise from there.”1131 Furthermore, 
bringing negotiations down to the lowest common denominator (as with the process 
of constitutional reform) -  namely the divide between Dodik and Silajdzic -  and 
excluding key players from the political game, again sent the wrong signal to Bosnia. 
Right after the meeting between Dodik and Silajdzic in Washington DC, HDZ 1990 
published a press release criticizing the US approach towards constitutional reform as 
politically unacceptable and “not productive.”1132
Europe’s approach to untangling the deadlock over constitutional reform met 
similar fortunes. Constitutional talks initiated by Schwarz-Schilling prior to his 
departure failed to gamer enough support among domestic forces. EU proposals 
included a political agreement by which domestic actors would commit themselves to 
achieving initial results by the end of 2007 and final results by the end of 2009. The 
agreement included a willingness to commit to the following: (1) to build upon the 
negotiations started in 2005 on the basis that Bosnia remains indivisible; (2) to 
launch an open, transparent process on constitutional reform aimed at both enabling 
Bosnia’s institutions to fulfill EU integration requirements and increasing the 
functionality of the state; and (3) to establish a commission within parliament to 
manage such negotiations, which would be fully funded by the European 
Commission1133 and assisted by a series of international experts.
Despite the vagueness of Schwarz-Schilling’s proposal, political divisions along 
the ‘April Package divide’ remained. SDA and HDZ leaders did not attend the 
meeting that was called by Schwarz-Schilling,1134 while the leaders of SBiH and HDZ 
1990 greeted and welcomed the proposal. As for RS parties, they remained united in 
their acceptance of both alternatives, although they expressed a preference for 
approving the April Package as a first step. SDS MP Momcilo Novakovic stressed, 
“The parliamentary commission that is to be formed to reach amendments to the BiH 
constitution is doomed to failure from the start... Solutions ... should be reached at 
the level of political leaders.”1135 Similarly, SDA’s President Tihic suggested in a
1131 Author’s personal interview with Gordan Milosevic. Banja Luka, 12 June 2007.
1132 HDZ 1990 press release: “Against Federalization of BiH,” cited in Oslobodenje, May 30,
2007. In Constitutional Changes Monitoring, no. 30,30 May-6 June 2007.
1133 Germany committed funds to set up the commission for the first year.
1134 SDP’s President Lagumdzja left the meeting before it was called to an end.
1135 “Constitutional Changes Can Result Only Through Agreement of Political Parties.”
Oslobodenje, 25 June 2007. In Constitutional Changes Monitor, no. 33,20-27 June 2007.
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personal interview that with such an open-ended process with no specific goals laid 
out, the project would be doomed to fail. “Schilling had the wrong approach. If you 
go directly to parliament it is going to be a waste of time. You need a political 
agreement between the political leaders prior to that in which the status of the April 
Package is included.”1136 Following the same line of thought, an SDP party official 
stated, “the OHR agreement is very vague. It says we’ll engage in negotiations but 
what is the idea behind it? For parties this is great, they are buying time. They can 
say yes now, but it gives them three years and then we will see.”1137 Furthermore, the 
EU’s initiative started off on the wrong foot, as it was presented only a few days after 
US talks collapsed and only a few days before the end of the HR's term in June 2007. 
With such unfavorable timing, the process lacked credibility and was doomed to 
failure from the start. Moreover, even though the process envisaged the opening of a 
forum for discussion, the proposal did not take on board useful lessons from the April 
Package. Presenting final results right before the elections in 2010 could well keep 
negotiations hostage to electoral politics once again.
Recurring divisions and vacillation on the part of the international community 
reflected a lack of understanding of the political dynamics that led to the failure of 
constitutional reform during 2005 and 2006, including intra-party and intra-ethnic 
dynamics, international divisions,1138 time pressures, tight deadlines, electoral cycles, 
and exclusion of key stakeholders. As a result, since the April Package's failure, 
neither the US nor the EU have succeeded in gathering all parties around a basic 
framework for pushing the reform process forward. They have not offered sufficient 
assurances to parties or laid out a set of guidelines to steer and lead negotiations. 
Furthermore, by providing domestic actors with alternate courses of action to select 
according to their interests, the international community missed the chance to offer a 
credible, legitimate process, and instead gave domestic politicians a golden 
opportunity to buy time.
Since Miroslav Lajcak took over as HR in Bosnia in July 2007, there has been 
little progress on the constitutional front, except for a reinforced rhetoric in favor of
Author’s personal interview with Sulejman Tihic. Sarajevo, 4 July 2007.
1137 Author’s personal interview with Sefik Dzaferovic. Sarajevo, 31 May 2007.
1138 As a case in point, an American official suggested that the US enter into negotiations about 
constitutional reform with Dodik and Silajdzic “with absolutely no effective or important carrots or 
sticks with which to persuade them to reach any sort of compromise. Moreover, they did so with no 
real coordination with the European Union” (William Montgomery. “Gravitas.” B92, 7 June 2007).
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constitutional changes. Indeed, criticism over the EU’s conduct on constitutional 
reform in Bosnia compelled the organization to include this issue as one of the key 
SAP priorities for the next few years.1139 Bosnian authorities are simply encouraged 
to “take measures to achieve more functional and sustainable institutional structures 
and better respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including by agreeing 
and adopting changes to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 
necessary.”1140 Even if a few general guidelines are provided, along the lines of 
increasing parliament's technical resources and personnel and ensuring state/entity 
coordination, no reference is made to previous work carried out by Bosnian and 
international authorities, or to key constitutional deficiencies already identified by 
international institutions such as the Venice Commission. Furthermore, it is not clear 
what the status of constitutional reform will be within the process of EU integration, 
or whether constitutional reform will become an express condition for accession or 
simply a task that Bosnia will need to address in the following years with no specific 
timeframes.1141
In terms of the actual efforts, the HR Lajcak declared in July 2007 that 
constitutional reform would be the number one priority in the reform agenda after 
reaching an agreement on police reform that fall, but no results were achieved on 
constitutional issues by the end of his mandate in January 2009. Most of his 
resources were ultimately devoted to reaching an agreement on police reform, as a 
result of the failure to meet the deadline set by the EU in October 2007. The failure to 
meet this deadline led to another heated political crises in Bosnia, with outright 
confrontation running high not only between ethnic communities but also between 
Serb parties and the international community. Following the resignation of Prime
1139 The inclusion of constitutional reform as one of the key priority areas is based on the belief
that the Bosnian constitution “prevents swift decision-making and therefore hinders reform and the 
capacity to make progress towards the EU” (See European Commission 2007, 7). The process of 
constitutional reform has also featured in the latest EU Joint Report in November 2008, clarifying the 
EU’s position towards constitutional reform in Bosnia. It stated, “Constitutional reform is neither a 
requirement for OHR closure nor for BiH’s further journey towards the EU. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional framework must evolve to ensure effective state structures capable of delivering on EU 
integration, including the requirement to speak with one voice. The EU can support constitutional 
reform with expertise and funds, but the process must be led by BiH itself’ (See Javier Solana and Olli 
Rehn, ‘EU’s Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Way Ahead,’ Summary Note on the Joint Report, 
S367/08, Brussels, 10 November 2008, Available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/103923.pdf [accessed 
January 2009].
1140 Council of the EU 2007a, 6.
1141 The priorities are based on the expectation that “Bosnia and Herzegovina can complete them 
or take them substantially forward over the next few years” (Council of the EU 2007a, 5).
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Minister Nikola Spiric -  which brought the country to a halt -  over the set of 
measures enacted by the new HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajcak1142 to speed up the decision­
making process,1143 Bosnian parties reached an agreement on an action plan for police 
reform in November 2007, putting Bosnia back on the EU track.1144 Bosnia initialed a 
draft SAA on December 4 and signed the final SAA (and intensified dialogue with 
NATO) in June 2008, following a much delayed, watered-down agreement on police 
reform in April 20081145 that the SDA refused to support.
The SAA signing sent an important message to the international community, but 
nationalist rhetoric continued, especially during the run up to the municipal elections 
in the fall of 2008. During this period, Serb parties remained uncommitted to 
initiating a new process of constitutional reform. RSNA Speaker Igor Radojicic 
declared, for example, in mid-June 2008 that the Bosnian Constitution was not an 
obstacle for EU integration and that centralization of the state was inadvisable.1146 
Following similar lines, Dodik stated that no more transfer of competences from the 
entities to the state would take place in the future.1147 Divisions within both the Croat 
and Bosniak groups have also been prevalent, and run counter to building a political 
climate conducive to such critical negotiations less than a year and a half before the 
next general elections in 2010.
The slow implementation of the police agreement since the signing of the SAA 
in June,1148 and the lack of progress on the constitutional front have put a question 
mark on the future of the overall reform process and the sustainability of the Bosnian 
state. Although the PIC announced in July 2008 that the OHR would be terminated
HR Lajcak succeeded Schwarz Shilling in July 2007. He was in office until January 2009, 
when he announced his resignation. Upon taking the office, Lajcak stated that he would be more 
assertive in the use of his powers than his predecessor (given the failure of the latter in making 
headway in the reform process). Notwithstanding Lajcak’s more assertive manners, he resigned 
expressing great frustration and disappointment in the pace of progress.
1143 The measures included changes and amendments to the Law on the Council of Ministers, 
including some procedural and quorum related matters (see OHR 2007). The crisis was attenuated in 
December 2007 when the HR enacted the “Authentic Interpretation of the Law on Changes and 
Amendments to the Law on the Council of Ministers” in close negotiations with Serb parties (OHR 
2007b).
1144 I refer to these developments in Sebastian 2008.
1145 Following the signing of the SAA, an interim agreement was put in force on July 1 allowing
for free access to EU markets for Bosnian goods. Bosnia will also open its market to the EU gradually 
following the approval of certain legislation that falls in line with EU standards.
1146 “EU Deal Triggers First Bosnian Disputes.” Balkan Insight, 17 June 2008.
1147 He has also announced that the 50 transfers already in place will be revised.
1148 The implementation of the police agreement has indeed encountered many obstacles due to
the lack of political will. As a case in point, the coordination mechanisms are not in place as of June 
2009 (author’s interview with a Western diplomat. Sarajevo, July 2009).
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once a set of conditions were met by Bosnian authorities,1149 little progress has been 
made; and divisive politics are again on the rise. The PIC stated in November 2008, 
“After signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement on 16 June there has, 
over the last four months, been little progress in addressing reform, with ethnic and 
sub-State agendas prevailing over the European agenda. Divisive rhetoric challenging 
the sovereignty and constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the 
authority of the HR and the PIC Steering Board has been frequent, further 
undermining inter-ethnic trust and the foundations of the state.”1150
An important step was taken in November 2008 with the signing of a statement 
by Milorad Dodik, Dragan Covic and Sulejman Tihic committing to rapidly 
addressing the objectives and conditions for the transition from the OHR to the EU 
Special Representative office (the so-called Prud agreement), but the process was 
convened outside public institutions and excluded most of the key stakeholders.1151 In 
early 2009 progress on constitutional changes seemed within reach. In a meeting in 
Banja Luka in January, the three leaders issued a joint statement agreeing to divide 
Bosnia into four administrative units; however political tensions mounted after the 
meeting, partly as a result of the ambiguity inherent in the agreement but also as a 
result of intra-ethnic accussations of ‘selling out’. SBiH’s Silajdzic accused Tihic of 
instating a third Croat entity in the country and leaving RS untouched,1152 and SDS 
accused Dodik of making too many concessions. Mutual accusations between the 
three leaders also developed; specifically between Dodik and the SDA and HDZ’s
The PIC announced in a meeting in June 2008 that the phasing out of the OHR would only 
occur when Bosnia complies with a set of objectives and conditions, including: (1) acceptable and 
sustainable resolution of the issue of apportionment of property between state and other levels of 
government (this is an issue of great contention among the parties); (2) acceptable and sustainable 
resolution of defense property; (3) completion of the Brcko final award (completed in March 2009); 
(4) fiscal sustainability; and (5) entrenchment of the rule of law. In addition to the objectives, there are 
two conditions, namely the signing of the SAA, which has been fulfilled, and “a positive assessment 
of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement,” 
which requires that BiH political leaders avoid any inflammatory rhetoric (Peace Implementation 
Council 2008b).
1150 Peace Implementation Council 2008a
1151 The prud process covers issues such as negotiations on state property, the census, 
constitutional changes, and the legal status of the Brcko district (the Brcko District was finally added 
to the Bosnian constitution in March 2009, completing Dayton’s annex two). Constitutional 
negotiations revolved around the harmonization of the Bosnian constitution with the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights; the creation of new state level competences; the 
establishment of functional institutions; and a territorial reorganization of BiH.
1152 Silajdzic stated, “This agreement is about the division of the Federation ... That means that 
there will be an entity with a Croatian majority ... and we will have a Sarajevo district and the 
Bosniaks crammed into the Tuzla, 2enica and Bihac ghettoes.’’Haris Silajdzic, quoted from “BiH 
Main Parties Announce a New Decentralization Agreement.” SETimes.com, 27 January 2009.
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leaders, which in turn raised the political temperature.
Ultimately, the Prud negotiations stalled after Dodik walked out of a meeting in 
February, and indicated that the resumption of talks would only be possible when 
recognition of the right of secession for RS was made explicit.1153 Confrontation with 
the international community also mounted significantly during this period when 
Dodik announced his decision to review the transfers made to the state.1154 The crisis 
was finally defused by the newly appointed HR Valentin Inzko, and a meeting of the 
Prud process was again convened in late June at the OHR premises; however Tihic, 
understandably, refused to attend. Following a brief meeting in Dubrovnik in July, 
HR Inzko suggested that the Prud Process was dead, and that a new process of 
political dialogue with more parties would develop in the coming months.1155 This 
announcement could be related to a new US initiative on constitutional reform led by 
former US Ambassador to Bosnia Clifford Bond (building upon the failed 2005-2006 
experience), which has been defined in the past few weeks with the intention of 
producing a new agreement by the end of 2009.1156 It is uncertain at this point how 
the process will unfold and whether it will succeed (and most importantly whether it 
will be connected to the European initiatives); however, Serb parties seem at this 
point uncommitted. Furthermore, there is significant risk of constitutional 
negotiations once again being entangled in the election campaign.
As a result of these divisive and unstable dynamics in Bosnia, a new EU strategy 
to deal with the sluggishness of Bosnia’s reform process seemed to be in the making 
in the late 2008. A letter sent by EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, and 
EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana to all foreign ministers of the EU on 31 
October 2008 read, “In the light of recent political developments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is time to take a fresh look at our relations ... We are convinced that
1153 Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2009. Seemingly, the January agreement was based on 
Tihic’s concession to leave RS largely intact in exchange for recognition of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia (ibid).
1154 The emergence of new threats to Dodik’s political position in RS are likely to account for
Dodik’s mounting nationalist rhetoric and confrontation with the international community. As a case 
in point, the State Investigation and Protection Agency filed a report early this year with criminal 
charges against him. Dodik is also facing new challenges within the RS with a strengthened political 
opposition. In February, Dodik’s coalition partner, the PDP, joined the opposition at the state and 
entity levels. SDS’ leadership has also raised its criticisms of SNSD; specifically following the 
January Prud meeting. Finally, Former SDS leader Dragan Cavic has returned to politics and founded 
a new party, the Democratic Party (DP), which will compete against SNSD in the upcoming elections 
in October 2010 (see Economist Intelligence Unit March 2009).
1155 “Inzko Says BiH’s Prud Process Basically Dead.” SETimes.com, 20 July 2009
1156 Author's interview with OHR officials. Sarajevo, July 2009.
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we need a strengthened strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential candidate 
for EU membership ... We need to look again at the transition to a reinforced EU 
presence on the ground.”1157 The joint report attached to the letter noted that the 
signing of the SAA had not prevented “a deterioration of the political situation in 
BiH in recent months,” and demanded a tailor-made strategy, along with a stronger 
international engagement to further promote the reform process in Bosnia within the 
process of EU accession.1158
As of this writing, the EU has given no signs of having agreed to a new detailed 
strategy in Bosnia; except for closing the OHR at the earliest opportunity. In the 
meantime, as noted above, local tensions reached a new high in May and June of 
2009 when Dodik managed to pass a resolution in the RS National Assembly 
pledging for a review of the competences already transferred to the sate and 
instructing RS officials to oppose any further transfers. The HR Insko, backed by the 
US and the UK, responded forcefully with the Bonn powers, much to the dismay of 
EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana and some European countries, who had 
advocated strongly against their use. This new crisis has exposed once again the deep 
international divisions over the management of post conflict Bosnia and the future of 
the international mission. The PIC meeting in November will decide the future of the 
OHR, but both local and international conditions seem unprepared for such decision 
to be made; especially in an election year and in the midst of a severe econmic 
downturn.
7.5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter illustrates that the existence of multiple veto players in Bosnia, 
especially within each of the three major ethnic communities, undermined the 
process of constitutional reform in Bosnia. The problem of power fragmentation was 
thus not only prominent at the inter-ethnic level but also and most notably within 
each of the ethnic groups involved. In particular, it was the rampant divisions within 
both the Croat and Bosniak communities that eventually led to the agreement's 
failure in parliament.
1157 Solana and Rehn 2008.
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While the assistance provided by external actors proved critical in the previous 
phase by promoting a framework for inter-ethnic cooperation -  based on direct trade­
offs between an inclusive groups of parties -  external actors remained however ill- 
equipped to address other ethnic-based considerations that were most prominent in 
the third phase of negotiations. There were, in particular, three shortcomings that 
aggravated intra-ethnic infighting. The first was the democratic deficit inherent in the 
process. Indeed, the US opted for a non-transparent elite bargain framework 
mediated by political leaders that failed when the discussion was brought to 
parliament and the general public. The discussion was kept at the political-elite level 
because this was how the reform process had proceeded thus far under the Ashdown 
mandate.1159 There was a belief that the personality-driven political system in Bosnia 
-  where party leaders held final decision-making power -  called for a process in 
which party leaders would be the primary actors. The US built upon this approach, 
and made it even more exclusive at both the internal and external levels. The failure 
to engage all social and political stakeholders in the state building and reform process 
thus became a significant challenge when more political groups joined in the public 
discussions. The lack of democratic transparency also led to public disinformation 
and the manipulation by those political forces that opposed it.
The second shortcoming was lack of unity among external parties as well as EU 
ambivalence, which did little to diminish the detrimental effects of intra-ethnic 
outbidding in the final phase. Divisions between the US and the EU (and also within 
the EU) -  which were more prominent in the second phase of negotiations -  had two 
significant consequences in this phase. On the one hand, they reinforced the problem 
of domestic accountability. Indeed, domestic actors used the divisions within the 
international community to underpin their own arguments without fear of bearing 
responsibility for the failure to the reform. On the other, they undermined the stakes 
in the process; the EU’s ambivalence reduced its ability to use incentives, making 
domestic actors believe that what was important was not constitutional reform but 
police reform. Moreover, given the ambiguity of constitutional reform within the 
framework of European accession, party leaders believed failure to commit to the 
process would not bear major consequences.
The third shortcoming that prevented the parties from reaching a compromise
See chapter 4, p. 167.
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was neglect of the electoral cycle and the urge for quick fixes. Negotiations were 
misused and distorted for electoral purposes. Furthermore, tight deadlines left no 
room for a proper public discussion at both the parliamentary and public levels, a 
significant problem when the issue at stake is existential in nature and the context is 
defined by deep inter-ethnic distrust. This left the international community in a 
position of weakness, with no time to engage the parties in a proper information 
campaign about the real stakes involved in the agreement.
The result was, indeed, a return to the status quo, with no major impact on the 
SAP. SAA negotiations continued on the same basis, held hostage to the process of 
police reform. Following a highly heated electoral contest, which rewarded the forces 
that had opposed the April package, constitutional negotiations were brought to a 
stalemate with the new constellation of political forces.
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PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
8.1. A Three-Level Game in Post-Conflict Bosnia: The Failure of Constitutional 
Reform
This dissertation analyzed the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia over the 
course of 2005-2006. A significant amount of new empirical evidence has been 
accumulated and analyzed in the thesis on the basis of a rereading of key political 
texts and the information provided by the more than eighty elite interviews conducted 
by the author with the key actors involved in the process. My thesis has offered a 
new framework of analysis of post-conflict Bosnia, based on a three-level game 
played at the inter-ethnic level, between the three major ethnic groups; the intra­
ethnic level, between the parties that compete within the same ethnic group; and the 
supra-national level, between domestic and external actors. The analysis has 
indicated that the interactions of these three levels are critical for understanding the 
policy outcome of constitutional reform in Bosnia.
The process of constitutional reform was initiated in early 2005. It was in a 
context of limited progress within a step-by-step transformation from within that 
voices in favor of the reform of Dayton rose amongst both locals and international 
officials. Since the signing of the DPA in 1995, which put an end to the civil war in 
Bosnia, both the implementation of the peace agreement and the building of a 
functional state encountered strong local obstruction. In 2000, state building was 
formally linked to the process of EU accession in the belief that the EU's pull would 
encourage local actors to cooperate with each other in strengthening and 
consolidating the state. It was believed that the prospect of EU membership would 
provide enough incentives for ethnic leaders to set aside their differences and work 
together towards the common European project. Although progress was achieved in 
certain areas, this was the result of heavy external arm-twisting, and, often times,
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outright imposition by the HR. As suggested by the scholarly research, both the 
complicated institutional structure in place and the ongoing ethnic divisions around 
the form of the state impaired state building.
Pressure from the international community for the reform of Dayton increased in 
2004 and 2005, in the belief that a simpler institutional arrangement would (1) 
provide less room for ethnic and institutional blockage; and (2) give the state 
institutional capacity to comply with the EU accession process. While the idea to 
reform Dayton was not ill-conceived -  given the record of institutional deadlock in 
this country -  it was, however, plagued by a series of misconceptions and 
shortcomings that aggravated the dynamics that eventually led to its failure. Firstly, 
the focus on minor constitutional changes as a means to resolve the political deadlock 
in Bosnia overlooked the very nature of the problem, namely the ongoing and deeply 
ethnic divisions around the form and status of the state. Could a new institutional 
framework assuage ethnic distrust and eradicate ethnic power games? Could these 
changes be addressed without reconciling first the mutually incompatible positions of 
ethnic groups in Bosnia on the future form of the Bosnian state? Furthermore, could a 
new institutional framework help overcome the politics of intransigence and the 
recurring problems encountered in the implementation phase of the reform process? 
Secondly, the reform advocated for altering the national equilibrium reached and 
agreed upon in Dayton, changing, even if minimally, the balance of power between 
the three ethnic groups. This had important reverberations on the conduct of 
negotiations. Why would ethnic groups be willing to forego their rights and 
safeguards without a redefinition of the broader terms of the ethnic balance in 
Bosnia? Why would ethnic groups be ready to change the rules of the game with no 
short-term gains? The final shortcoming was related to the lack of international unity 
about this process and the absence of a wider local ownership or stake in the process. 
Although there was general consensus on the idea of making constitutional changes 
in Bosnia, there were disagreements over how and when to do it most effectively. 
Neglect of these issues proved fatal as negotiations moved forward.
The constitutional reform process unfolded in three phases. During the first 
phase of negotiations, when party leaders became involved in November 2005, two 
mutually reinforcing dynamics became prevalent in the absence of major external 
involvement. Firstly, inter-ethnic divisions became rather prominent, taking the form
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of nationalist rhetoric and the presentation of mutually incompatible demands. These 
dynamics exposed the high level of inter-ethnic confrontation, which had a deep 
impact in how parties perceived their interests, other groups’ interests and how they 
formulated a political strategy within the bargaining framework. Secondly, in 
addition to pervasive inter-ethnic divisions typical in deeply divided post-conflict 
societies, intra-ethnic power struggles also raised tensions, in line with conflict 
regulation theory.1160 As a matter of fact, all major party leaders -  namely SDA’s 
Sulejman Tihic, SDS’s Dragan Cavic and HDZ’s Dragan Co vie -  were confronted 
with serious intra-party divisions at the time of the negotiations early in the process. 
These dynamics helped radicalize positions, and negotiations were verging on 
collapse by mid-December. During the first phase, both inter- and inter-ethnic 
dynamics were thus mutually reinforcing each other, precluding conflict 
regulation.1161
The second phase started in December 2005, when direct involvement by 
external actors, especially the US, began paving the way for an agreement on 
constitutional changes among six of the eight initial parties, namely the Serb parties 
SDS, SNSD and PDP, the Bosniak parties SDA and SDP, and the Croat HDZ.1162 
Developments at the three levels -  external, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic -  
contributed to making an agreement possible during this phase. Firstly, the external 
push and arm-twisting was significant. The US provided a framework in which an 
agreement at the inter-ethnic level was possible, namely the transformation of 
multilateral negotiations into direct, two-side negotiations behind closed doors. The 
role of the EU was secondary and somewhat ambivalent, but decisive US mediation 
mitigated the disruptive potential of such ambivalence. Secondly, dynamics at the 
inter-ethnic level were also constructive in at least two respects: the establishment of 
a direct line of communication allowed for party leaders to find mutually satisfactory 
solutions based on direct trade-offs in a relatively undisturbed environment and the
See Chapter 2, p. 82-85 for a discussion on the politics of intra-ethnic competition.
1161 The level of consensus reached by party representatives during the preparatory phase begs 
the question of whether keeping party leaders outside of the negotiations would have resulted in a 
different outcome. That option was not available however; as party leaders made it clear from the 
outset that they would be the ultimate decision makers in the process of constitutional reform. 
Involving party leaders at a later stage would have likely resulted in a similar outcome, given the 
rushed deadlines and the entanglement of the process with the electoral campaign.
1162 The Bosniak SBiH withdrew from the process in early 2006, and the US did little to 
reengage it. The Croat HNZ failed to sign the final agreement but this party had no representatives in 
the BiH parliament.
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moderate terms of the agreement made it easier for party leaders to sell the 
compromise within their own ranks. Finally, politics at the intra-ethnic level were far 
less disruptive than in the previous phase. All the leaders who faced internal 
divisions during the first phase of the negotiations managed to either sideline them or 
place them outside the party, keeping their authority uncontested inside their 
respective parties. This provided party leaders with further leeway to reach a 
compromise.
The third phase of constitutional reform began with the referral of the 
constitutional package to parliament in March 2006. During this phase external actors 
increased pressure significantly through direct lobbying, but politics at the intra­
ethnic level acquired a new dimension that resulted in the failure of the constitutional 
process on April 26. Furthermore, while the constitutional agreement reached during 
the second phase was a significant breakthrough in Bosnian politics, given the record 
of institutional deadlock in this country, there were critical mistakes that proved fatal 
in the final phase of the negotiations when the package was rejected in parliament as 
a result of an intra-ethnic power game. The first and most prominent mistake was the 
exclusivity of negotiations, which aggravated the problems of intra-ethnic infighting 
and outbidding dynamics, leading to a situation in which conflict regulation was 
made impossible despite heavy external pressure. While Serb parties stayed firmly 
united over the constitutional changes, a rather more visceral squabble developed 
within the ranks of the Bosniak and Croat communities. Indeed, neither the SBiH nor 
the Croat caucus in the House of Representatives -  formally united under a party 
created in March 2006, the HDZ 1990 -  were supportive of the amendments. The 
second problem was the decision to hold negotiations during the election cycle, 
which also aggravated the problem of intra-ethnic competition. General elections 
were to be held in October 2006, and both SBiH and the HDZ 1990 built their 
electoral platform around opposition to the constitutional package and vilification of 
party leaders who supported it. The third shortcoming was the EU’s ambivalence and 
international divisions, which also ran counter to the reaching a final agreement 
among all political forces. On the one hand, international division reinforced the 
problem of domestic accountability during this phase; it provided political parties 
with the opportunity to play external actors off, and use their divisions to block the 
reform process (for intra-party purposes) without bearing direct responsibility for its
Sofia Sebastian Aparicio Page 284 10/30/09
failure. On the other, the EU’s ambivalence had a negative impact on the credibility 
of EU incentives during the final stage of negotiations, failing to gamer enough 
support for the package. The exclusion of civil society from the process was another 
harmful mistake; it not only imbued the process with a patent democratic deficit, but 
also led to public misinformation, which eventually paved the way for opposition 
parties to play the nationalistic card and undermine the legitimacy of the process. 
Finally, time pressure and hurried deadlines1163 ran counter to conflict regulation at 
the domestic level, paving the way for negotiations to be misused and distorted for 
electoral purposes. Time constraints left little room for maneuver once the package 
was brought to parliament, a situation that does not bode well in circumstances where 
trust is in short supply and the issue at stake is of a win-lose (zero-sum) character. As 
a result of all these factors, although external involvement increased significantly 
during the last phase, it generally failed to counterbalance the internal dynamics 
associated with intra-ethnic competition.
On the whole, the analysis shows that although major obstacles were prevalent at 
the inter-ethnic level, especially given incompatible agendas and pervasive inter­
ethnic anxieties, party leaders managed to reach a preliminary agreement thanks to 
the substantial external assistance and a negotiation format based on direct 
communications between party leaders. It was the rampant divisions within the Croat 
and Bosniak communities, however, which rendered the external efforts ineffective. 
In other words, while efforts of external actors proved critical in helping party leaders 
reach a constitutional agreement at the inter-ethnic level, two factors undermined 
their ability to offset other non-cooperative dynamics that eventually led to the 
agreement's failure. The first factor was neglect of the dynamics associated with 
intra-ethnic competition and failure to provide incentives at this level. The second 
factor was the unintended consequences of various dynamics associated with the 
broader conduct of constitutional negotiations, including divisions between the major 
external actors (especially between the US and the EU), bad timing, hurried 
deadlines, and the election cycle, which eventually aggravated the problem of intra- 
ethnic outbidding.
The package had to be approved prior to May 2006 for it to be in force after the October 
2006 elections.
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8.2. Contributions to Theory
In addition to bringing new information about a process that was shrouded in 
secrecy, this analysis brings a new perspective to the debates on post-conflict Bosnia, 
conflict regulation, post-conflict state building, and conditionality.
Post-Conflict Bosnia and the Three-Level Framework
My dissertation argues that the three-tiered framework provides a better 
understanding of post-conflict Bosnia than the existing approaches of conditionality 
and state building. These approaches do not adequately capture the nuance and 
complexities of post-conflict Bosnia.
Conditionality studies, for example, look at European accession as a bargaining 
process that develops in two different playing fields; namely the domestic one, where 
reform-oriented actors versus conservatives squabble, and the European one where 
domestic and EU elites interact with one another. I argue that this model is too 
simplistic. Gergana Noutcheva’s study on European conditionality in the Balkans1164 
is a clear example of how the use of conditionality approaches may lead to mistaken 
assumptions about the state building process in Bosnia. She looks at developments 
associated with the police reform in October 2005 when the RS National Assembly 
accepted the EU-sponsored reform (the RSNA had rejected it only a few days 
earlier), following an EU meeting on October 3 where Bosnia was the only Balkan 
country to be excluded from the initiation of SAA talks.1165 In explaining these 
developments Noutcheva argues that it was the EU sanctioning mechanism of 
exclusion which resulted in the alteration of the position of the political parties in 
RS.1166 While I do not argue that EU incentives and the use of sanctioning 
mechanisms were not at play in local actors’ calculations, the three-tiered framework 
I use provides a more informed understanding of these developments, and brings the
Noutcheva 2006.
1165 At this meeting, both Croatia and Turkey were accepted for Accession talks and Serbia was 
given the green light for starting SAA negotiations (see p. 175, footnote 728).
1166 Noutcheva 2006. Drawing from this, Noutcheva further concludes, “Indeed, the EU had to 
apply the sanctioning mechanism of its conditionality machine in order to get a local agreement on 
reform but it is significant that the most obstinate political camp in Bosnia is the one who made the 
difficult decision to compromise against their political beliefs and is increasingly adapting to the new 
possibilities of exercising sovereignty provided by the EU framework. With strict EU conditionality 
during the successive pre-accession stages, the compliance trend can be expected to be sustained in the 
future” (Noutcheva 2006,189).
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power games played at the intra-ethnic level to the fore. Indeed, this dissertation 
demonstrates that the SDS position towards police restructuring in October 2005 was 
intimately related to power struggles within the SDS, which reached a high in the fall 
of 2005.1167 In short, the contradictory decisions of the RS National Assembly in 
September-October reflected rampant SDS internal power struggles rather than a 
sudden readjustment of hardliner calculations, interests or costs.
Studies on state building and post-conflict Bosnia have also failed to incorporate 
systematically the three levels that I argue feature in deeply divided societies such as 
Bosnia. These studies have generally pointed to three key factors when accounting 
for the failing record of the state building process in Bosnia. The first one focuses on 
the role of the international community with the argument going in two opposing 
directions. Some studies point to the lack of strategy and resolve on the part of the 
international community, urging for a more revitalized intervention.1168 Other studies 
argue that the rather intrusive role of the international community in Bosnia has 
created mechanisms of dependence that have undermined the state building 
process.1169 The second argument within the literature on post-conflict Bosnia 
revolves around the statehood problem in Bosnia. These studies suggest that inter­
ethnic intransigence stems from the fact that Dayton failed to assuage ethnic anxieties 
and resolve the statehood problem in Bosnia.1170 The final argument underscores the 
role of institutions. These studies suggest that complex power sharing arrangement in 
Bosnia, which are based on the promotion of ethnic differences, tend to perpetuate 
the sources of communal conflict, undermining the basis of inter-ethnic
• 1171cooperation.
While these factors feature prominently in post-conflict Bosnia, my three-tiered 
framework underscores the prominence of intra-ethnic competition and the politics of 
outbidding in the state building process in this country. The issue of intra-ethnic 
competition in post-conflict Bosnia had been previously acknowledged in previous
See chapter 5, p. 201-202.
1168 See for example Belloni 2008; Donais 2005; Cousens and Cater 2001.
1169 See for example Chandler 1999.
1170 Woodward 1997; see also Bose 2002.
1171 See for example Bieber 2005. Other comparative studies include Roeder and Rothchild
2005; Noel 2005; O’Flynn and Russell 2005. Other studies on post-conflict Bosnia focus on particular 
issues such as the role of civil society (Belloni 2001) or the political economy of war (Donais 2005; 
Pugh 2002).
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studies,1172 but it has never been explored systematically in post-conflict Bosnia. 
Furthermore, I also incorporate the role of external incentives in this analysis; which 
has also been neglected in the analysis of the state building in post-conflict Bosnia. 
Indeed, there has not been an attempt in the state building and conflict regulation 
literature to study more systematically the way in which European incentives are 
working in post-conflict Bosnia and interacting with the other variables at play.
The innovative three level framework used in this research demonstrates that the 
failure of the state building and EU accession process in Bosnia is intimately related 
to the power struggles and ethnic games played within each ethnic community. It also 
shows that while international actors may prove to be prepared to promote a 
framework for inter-ethnic cooperation (as the reaching of a constitutional agreement 
illustrated) they remained generally ill-equipped to provide incentives at the intra­
ethnic level and engage all of the social and political actors involved in a state 
building reform process. Exploring how these three levels interact in other state 
building processes in post-conflict divided societies seems a fruitful avenue of 
research, especially in cases such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, to name a 
few.1173
Conflict Regulation and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation
The second contribution of this research relates to the dynamics of conflict regulation 
and inter-ethnic cooperation in deeply divided societies; especially in relation to the 
dynamics of outbidding. Classic theories on outbidding suggest that the threat (or 
reality) of a counter-mobilization to a party’s moderate overture within a specific 
segment defies practices of inter-ethnic accommodation.1174 More recent accounts on 
these dynamics have suggested, however, that political outbidding may also be 
caused by factors other than intra-ethnic competition,1175 and, most importantly, that 
the risk of political outbidding may not necessarily lead to destabilization, 
radicalization and inter-ethnic intransigence1176 (especially when certain institutional
1172 See for example Zahar 2002. Nina Caspersen explores the issue of intra-ethnic competition
in Bosnia, but during the war (Caspersen 2006).
1173 The case of Iraq is particularly significant in this respect given the contextual similarities -
Iraq is also deeply divided ethnically along three major groups -  and the experience of a process of 
constitutional reform in 2005 with strong US leadership.
1174 Nordlinger 1972; Horowitz 1985.
1175 Caspersen 2006.
1176 See Sisk 1996; Chandra 2005; Mitchell, Evans and O’Leary 2005.
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arrangements of an integrative nature are in place).1177
The analysis provided in this research builds upon the recent studies that suggest 
that political outbidding may not always lead to political intransigence. Rather than 
focusing on the role of institutions, however, I incorporate the role of external actors 
and external incentives in the analysis of outbidding dynamics. I argue that external 
actors may provide key incentives and guarantees for parties to engage in inter-ethnic 
cooperation in spite of the imminent dangers associated with the politics of 
outbidding. The process of constitutional reform is a clear example in this respect. 
Both the guarantees provided to the ethnic groups and the heavy external pressure 
levied during constitutional negotiations was essential to bringing all parties to the 
table and to reaching an agreement in March 2006. The establishment of a direct line 
of communications between the leaders, under strong external pressure, was also a 
key development. It allowed for party leaders to find mutually satisfactory solutions 
based on direct trade-offs in a relatively undisturbed environment. This suggests that 
the set up of direct contacts at the inter-ethnic level in contexts of mutual distrust is 
critical for engaging in conciliatory behavior. Two conditions need to be in place 
however. Firstly, inter-ethnic cooperation needs to be based on a framework of 
mutual, yet moderate, gains and costs. In other words, negotiations need to be 
conducted in a framework that is moderate enough so that party leaders can sell it to 
their constituencies without accusations of ‘selling-out’. Secondly, negotiations need 
to be held in a relatively undisturbed environment at the intra-party level. The 
analysis showed that intra-party divisions had the effect of creating a highly 
confrontational climate that ran counter to reaching a compromise during the first 
phase of the negotiations. It was only when these divisions were either sidelined or 
placed outside the party that a constitutional agreement was made possible during the 
second phase of the negotiations.
Post-Conflict State Building
The third contribution is related to the process of state building. I identify five key 
mistakes in the way external actors managed the process of constitutional reform in 
Bosnia, which reflect on the broader debate on state building and external 
intervention in post-conflict societies. The first mistake was related to the democratic
See for example Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2001.
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deficit inherent to the process, based upon a direct engagement with party leaders as 
the key decision makers in the reform process. My research suggests that when state 
building is not democratically grounded, external incentives do not work, especially 
when the stakes are high as is the case with constitutional reform.1178 In other words, 
state building needs to be fully transparent and inclusive, and work either towards 
making all of the actors with a stake in the process participants or towards raising 
social awareness so that accountability channels between the societal and political 
levels are not broken. The fact that the international community’s strategy is based on 
the belief that progress can only be achieved through the existing power structures 
indicates the international community’s inability to reshape local conditions and 
existing systems of governance, even when they are highly dysfunctional.
The second shortcoming is related to the propensity of external actors to interfere 
when conditions verge towards stalemate, which has long undermined conflict 
regulation practices in Bosnia. There was an initial attempt to imbue this process 
with domestic ownership, as illustrated by Donald Hays’ initial preliminary 
negotiations and the idea that local actors had to find a solution by themselves. The 
emphasis on domestic ownership was however tarnished by the readiness of the US 
to take over when the stakes became high and the risks of failure too significant. This 
factor ultimately led to a situation in which external actors became the major drivers 
of the process, further aggravating the tendency of local actors to avoid taking 
responsibility for the reform process. As Donald Hays suggested, parties were 
passive not “in the sense that they did not have strong opinions. They were passive in 
the decision making process,” waiting to be obliged to accept a package so as not to 
take political responsibility.1179 Many were indeed waiting for the internationals to 
take the lead, which was the case within Bosniak ranks (after all, the international 
community has often voiced their claims).1180 This situation has yielded a vicious 
circle of perpetual lack of local political will and inter-ethnic intransigence on the
1178 This begs the question of whether a more inclusive, democratic process could have resulted 
in a successful outcome. Keeping the lines of communication open with civil society (and keeping the 
citizens fully informed) does not necessarily translate to a positive result in a process of constitutional 
reform; but it certainly could have helped to preclude party leaders from manipulating the population 
and using constitutional change as a means of furthering intra-party agendas. Studies on constitution 
building (see Samuels 2005 and 2009) have also suggested that participatory processes tend to be 
more successful than elite-based processes; as was the case with South Africa and Uganda.
1179 Author’s personal interview with Donald Hays. Washington DC. October 2007.
1180 Ibid. All external actors that had a direct involvement in the negotiations agreed with this 
statement in personal interviews.
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one hand, and recurrent external interference on the other. As Fukuyama has noted, 
while the ultimate goal of external interventions is to build capacity, the international 
community “comes so richly endowed and full of capabilities that it tends to crowd 
out rather than complement the extremely weak state capacities.”1181
The third shortcoming relates to a failure to properly account for the ethnic 
component. External interventions have a tendency to place more emphasis on the 
provision of incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation as opposed to addressing the 
dangers of intra-ethnic competition (Dayton being a case in point). The process of 
constitutional reform was no exception. The US opted for a secretive bargaining 
process in lieu of a public discussion and, by extension, a more inclusive approach. 
This tactic, predictably, unraveled towards the end of the negotiating process. The 
choice of excluding key political forces from the bargaining table appears 
particularly striking considering the high stakes involved (after all, the goal of the 
reform process was to alter the ethnic balance agreed upon in Dayton) and also given 
the potential for outbidding as a result of the proximity of the elections. It is 
reasonable to assume that there was a clear miscalculation of the actual votes 
required for the passage of the constitutional agreement; but I argue below that other 
factors were also at play including the international community’s tendency to rush to 
a poorly planned exit strategy and a disregard for local conditions.
The predisposition for ‘quick fixes’ and the rushed deadlines (another common 
problem in external interventions),1182 was closely linked to the decision to proceed 
with the constitutional negotiations in the middle of the electoral cycle, and in spite 
of the imminent signs of intra-ethnic outbidding. The US saw constitutional 
negotiations as an opportunity to achieve two mutually reinforcing goals. Firstly, to 
obtain a timely objective in the Balkans; which was greatly needed given the rather 
unsuccessful record of the Bush administration in Iraq and the Middle East. After all, 
the Balkans was (and still is) considered one of the success stories in the record of 
US interventions in the 1990s, which could have given US officials a sense of 
overconfidence in approaching constitutional negotiations.1183 Secondly, to reach a 
long-term settlement in Bosnia, in order to both avoid any intertwinements with the 
Kosovo status negotiations (in full gear at the time), and to begin phasing out of the
1181 Fukuyama 2004,103.
1182 See for example Chesterman 2004.
1183 Some in fact viewed this process as Dayton n.
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external intervention in Bosnia so that US resources could be deployed elsewhere. 
The US strategy was thus driven by its own domestic political and strategic interests, 
rather than the process itself.1184 This suggests a policy based on preventing conflict 
and instability within Bosnia as opposed to one based upon the long-term 
sustainability of the post-conflict state building process in this country.
The final shortcoming of the process is related to the divisions within the 
international community. Though efforts at harmonizing policies in Bosnia have been 
frequent over the years, divisions over specific policies and overlapping activities on 
the ground have not only tended to undermine the leverage of the international 
community, but have also allowed domestic actors to effectively ignore external 
players at their discretion. The process of constitutional reform was no exception. 
Indeed, the lack of unity between the US and the EU contributed to making 
constitutional negotiations more challenging. In-house divisions reinforced the 
problem of domestic accountability, providing domestic actors with further 
opportunities to focus on intra-party politics, without bearing responsibility for the 
failure to deliver any substantive political outcomes. As the mediation literature has 
also suggested, though the presence of manifold actors can multiply the sources of 
leverage, there is the risk of causing further confusion as well as ‘buck passing’ and 
blame avoidance, not only amongst domestic actors, but also amongst international 
ones.1185 This suggests that state building does not work when there is no unity and 
when external divisions can be exploited to the advantage of domestic, partisan 
interests.
European Conditionality
Important conclusions can also be drawn on the broader debate on external and 
European conditionality, the final contribution of this research.
Firstly, the analysis provided in this thesis shows the real weakness of 
international conditionality when the local actors are not on board. This research also 
provides evidence about how the conditionality framework can be effectively 
undermined when the process becomes highly politicized, and local obstruction is
1184 The decision to hold post-conflict elections within six to nine months after the signing of 
Dayton was also driven by US domestic interests. It responded to the US desire to limit the 
commitment of US forces at the time (see Chesterman 2004). This decision proved to be ill conceived; 
the timing of the elections reified ethnic divisions in Bosnia (ibid).
1185 Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999.
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met with no consequences. While strong incentives were used within the process of 
constitutional reform in Bosnia, the locals rejected the process for intra-party 
purposes with hardly any consequences. This sends the wrong signals in a country 
where the political elite is prone to ‘buck-passing’ as noted above. EU efforts to 
revive the process of constitutional reform in Bosnia have thus far failed to gamer 
enough support, and there has not been enough political will to use EU incentives 
more forcefully.1186
Secondly, the analysis shows that the proposition that elites’ behavior may be 
explained according to pure rational calculations is misleading in deeply divided 
societies, where the state is strongly contested and deep inter-ethnic mistrust is 
pervasive. Drawing on conventional conditionality approaches, Heather Grabbe, for 
example, claims that conditionality is more likely to be effective when the political 
salience of the issue at hand is high;1187 even when there is ample room for 
uncertainty regarding the policy agenda, the standards involved, and the timing.1188 
The analysis provided in this thesis illustrates that the reverse appears to hold true in 
post-conflict, divided societies. Patterns of non-cooperation are found to be pervasive 
when the norm to be exported is salient and amenable to be associated with political 
questions of survival. Under these circumstances, conflict regulation and 
accommodation is more likely to be undermined; even when compliance with 
external norms is attached to a framework of positive and negative incentives. This 
suggests that deep inter-ethnic distrust and the contested nature of the state in Bosnia 
are likely to affect the interests, perceptions and strategies of the domestic actors 
involved in the state building process, as well as the dynamics associated with the 
process of adjustment to European norms. In this context, the question of survival 
(which is an existential issue) is a variable that needs to be integrated into the 
analysis of the impact of conditionality; especially when the matter at hand deals
1186 The process of police reform has showed similar dynamics of politicization, and a 
weakening EU pull. Strong arm-twisting led to an agreement, which opened Bosnia’s door to the 
signing of the SAA in June 2008, but the terms of the agreement were significantly watered down 
from the initial EU’s criteria, and left further details to be defined at a later stage.
1187 Grabbe 2002b. Europeanization literature suggests that high salience is a function of the 
norm’s significance in the domestic political agenda (asylum capacity will be high salience in those 
countries with many asylum seekers). In deeply divided societies, high salience can be defined as a 
function of how it affects the distribution of power and whether is perceived or not as a legitimate and 
desirable instrument.
1188 See for example Grabbe 2002b and 2006. Conversely, if the political salience is low (as in 
social policy), on the contrary, then observance of the acquis communitaire is likely to be rather low 
and its application less strict (Grabbe 2002b).
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with statehood issues.1189
Finally, the process of constitutional reform also brings to light the EU’s 
inability to reconcile two mutually reinforcing agendas that are present in Bosnia:1190 
firstly, to assist Bosnia with its conflict management within the framework of the 
state building process under way; secondly, to facilitate Bosnia’s progress towards 
EU accession through the use of European incentives.1191 In short, the failure of 
constitutional reform in Bosnia provides evidence for a strong claim that the EU has 
failed to use the incentives attached to the process of European accession to affect the 
domestic patterns of conflict management. On the one hand, the role of the EU as a 
third party during the process of reform was plagued by its internal divisions (as well 
as its differences with the US), which downplayed the high stakes involved in the 
process. Indeed, despite the forceful US mediation effort from late 2005, European 
ambivalence ultimately imbued the process with the perception of an impaired, half­
hearted multiparty mediation, which proved to be insufficient to counterbalance the 
powerful ethnic political dynamics involved in the failure of the package. On the 
other hand, the EU failed to use its ‘carrots’ more effectively in the promotion of 
domestic patterns of conflict management. Despite the fact that the EU had a greater 
range of ‘carrots and sticks’ than the US to potentially shape political behavior in 
Bosnia, the EU proved to be divided and hesitant in directly linking constitutional 
reform to the broader process of European integration.1192 Indeed, the process of 
constitutional reform never featured as a clearly defined benchmark or condition for 
EU accession at the time; which undermined the incentive potential attached to the 
process.
On the whole, while most of the EU-related issues described above are process- 
related and/or technical in nature (and hence amenable to being fixed by the 
implementation of better policies and greater coordination efforts on the ground), I
1189 This dissertation does not suggest that political actors in Bosnia are irrational. Rather, it 
suggests that the issue of survival distorts the pure rationality-based models that are used to explain 
compliance with EU conditionality in relatively homogenous societies.
1190 For a full discussion of this issues see Sebastian 2009.
1191 This challenge relates to a recent scholarly debate that revolves around the impact of the EU 
acting in a dual capacity, namely as a third party in conflict management and as an agent of European 
integration (See for example Diez, Stetter and Albert 2006; Noutcheva et al. 2004; Tocci 2007).
1192 Recent studies on the process of EU accession have focused prominently on the impact of 
the uncertainty built into the process of EU accession, including, inter alia, the unclear definition of 
the political criteria, the imprecise operationalization of key benchmarks and the moving-target 
problem (see for example, Grabbe 2002a; Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2004; Kelley 2004a; Jacoby 
2004).
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argue that the ethnic issue represents a much more complex issue within the EU 
integration and state building process in Bosnia. Intertwinements with statehood 
issues have tended to bring the EU accession process to a halt, and make the EU 
transformative power fail in the face of an ethnic power game. I argue that this 
problem has to do with a disregard for the local conditions, and the tendency of the 
EU project in Bosnia to create winners and losers on the ground, irrespective of the 
local balance of power in this country.1193 Serb parties, for example, have perceived 
the externally-led reform agenda in Bosnia as a direct threat to the RS’s survival;1194 
not only as a result of the intended goal of transferring competences from the entities 
to the state, but also as a result of the often ambiguous positioning of the 
international community and the EU in relation to the status of RS.1195 Though the 
EU has gradually come to the realization that undermining the status of RS is 
counterproductive to the reform process and suggested that the existence of the Serb 
entity is not incompatible with the process of EU accession, EU members have at one 
time or another continued to undermine the image of neutrality; raising inter-ethnic 
tensions and anxieties.1196 How the EU manages to resolve the contradiction between 
the provision of guarantees to the Serbs and the state building process in Bosnia will 
prove critical for both the success of conflict management efforts on the ground and 
Bosnia’s further progress towards the EU.
In sum, this research offers to a new perspective on the process of political reform in
1193 Zahar 2002; see also chapter 2. Indeed, the EU’s accession process has revolved around the 
strengthening and consolidation of the Bosnian state, which is a highly sensitive issue in Bosnia, 
where inter-ethnic mistrust is pervasive and ethnic groups hold mutually incompatible ideas about the 
form and status of the state.
1194 Following the failure of the constitutional agreement and in the midst of international efforts 
to revamp the process in 2007, Dodik stated “the mistake of the international community is that it is 
stubbornly trying to make Bosnia a country with strong central government and in that light I view the 
constant demands for the abolition of RS” (See, “Ambassadors Summon Leaders in Attempt to Restart 
Talks,” Bosnia Daily 1515,31 May 2007).
1195 Following NATO’s summit in mid-December, where hard criticism was pinned in RS for 
failing to fully cooperate with the ICTY, the then HR Paddy Ashdown hinted at possible sanctions that 
could affect the status of RS. When asked whether such sanctions would include the abolition of RS, 
the High Representative suggested that everything was possible, adding, “I must say, however, if RS 
would respect the Dayton Agreement, then I would protect its competences” (cited in OHR, BiH 
Media Round-up, 18 December 2004). Tuathail, O’Loughlin and Djipa (2006) argue that the abolition 
of RS was possible at the time as part of a greatly grey legal area. “While nominally the High 
Representative could not alter Dayton, his Bonn Powers gave him the right to impose sanctions in 
response to non-compliance. Abolition of a non-cooperative entity was, therefore, legally possible” 
(ibid, ft. 37). The existence of this legal grey area may account for Serb anxieties in relation to the 
presence of external actors in BiH.
1196 German ambassador to BiH Michael Schmunk, for example, caused an outcry within the 
Serb community in August 2007 when he declared the country should be organized as a unitary state.
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post conflict Bosnia by suggesting that the international role in state building in this 
country has been blunted by an ethnic power game played at the intra-ethnic level. 
Domestic variables, particularly intra-ethnic politics, are fundamental in accounting 
for the success or failure of state building policies in deeply divided societies. The 
role of external actors in this context should be considered merely a subsidiary 
variable; serving as a reinforcing mechanism for inter-ethnic cooperation in deeply 
divided societies when domestic conditions are ripe and as a failing one when 
external efforts are faced with intra-ethnic infighting. A more modest approach to the 
capacity of the international community to effect domestic change is thus required.
From a strategic perspective, it is possible to mitigate the influence of ethnic 
power games by supporting a process that is not constrained by rigid timelines and 
rushed deadlines, focusing on the conditions on the ground and involving a broad 
range of local actors in order to achieve sufficient dialogue and consensus building. 
The civil society at large must also be enrolled in this participatory process, so as to 
avoid political manipulation. While constitutional reform can play an important role 
in the future of Bosnia, it can only be built upon a well-balanced compromise by all 
key stakeholders; quick fixes and secretive bargaining deals will only serve to 
perpetuate the dynamics of inter-ethnic distrust and intransigence; further delaying 
the state building process and the progress towards harmonization with EU standards.
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Key Local Players/Party Officials
NAME PARTY PO SITIO N "98 DATE
Safet Halilovic SBiH Member of the negotiating 
team for constitutional reform 
(CR). Party Leader.
Three rescheduled 
appts.
No interview granted
Beriz Belkic SBiH Member of the working group 
(CR). Member of Parliament. 
Member of SBiH Presidency.
Sarajevo, 19 June 2007
Azra
Hadziahmetovic
SBiH Member of Parliament. Member 
of SBiH Presidency
Sarajevo, 5 July 2007
Damir Arnaut SBiH Legal Advisor to Haris Silajdzic Sarajevo, 19 June 2007
Zlatko Hadzidedic SBiH Advisor to Safet Halilovic Sarajevo, 20 May 2007
Sven Alkalaj SBiH Current Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
Madrid, 25 June 2008
Sulejman Tihic SDA Member of the negotiating 
team for CR. Party leader and 
Bosniak member of BiH 
Presidency.
Sarajevo, 4 July 2007
Mirsad Cemin SDA Member of working group 
(CR). Member of parliament. 
Member of SDS Presidency.
Sarajevo, 30 May 2007
Sefik Dzaferovic SDA Member of parliament. Member 
of SDA Presidency.
Sarajevo, 31 May 2007
Senad Sepic SDA Current SDA Vice President 
SDA. Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Civil Affairs
Sarajevo, 14 July 2009
Jozo Krizanovic SDP Member of working group 
(CR). Member of Parliament.
Sarajevo, 5 July 2007
Sasa Magazinovic SDP Member of the SDP Presidency Sarajevo, 19 June 2007
Davor Vuletic SDP SDP Board Member. Sarajevo, 26 June 2007
Mile Lasic HDZ Member o f working group
(CR)
Mostar, 2 July 2007
Martin Raguz HDZ1990 Member of parliament. Sarajevo, 5 July 2007
Josip Brkic HNZ BiH Amassador to Spain Madrid, 30 June 2008
Fra Ivo Markovic Franciscan Sarajevo, 31 May 2007
Zeljko Mirjanic SNSD Member of working group.
Member of the RS National 
Assemply.
Banja Luka, 11 June 
2007
Zeljka cvijanovic SNSD Advisor to RS PM. Dodik [Interviewed Cancelled]
Gordan Milosevic SNSD Advisor to RS PM Dodik Banja Luka, 12 June 
2007
Dragan Cavic SDS Member of the negotiating Email interview,
Position held at the time of the constitutional negotiations.
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team for CR. SDS President 
and RS President.
January 2008.
Mladen Bosic SDS Member of Working Group 
(CR). SDS Vice President.
Phone and email 
interview, 26 June 2007
Momcilo
Novakovic
SDS Member of parliament. Sarajevo, 5 June 2007
Mladen Ivanic PDP Member of the negotiating 
team for CR. Party leader.
Sarajevo, 10 July 2007
Branislav
Borenovic
PDP Member of the RS National 
Assembly RS. Member of PDP 
Presidency.
Banja Luka, 12 June 
2007
Mehmed 2ilic SDA/SBi
H
Member of parliament. Sarajevo, June 2007
Petar Kunic Indep. Member of parliament. Banja Luka, 14 June 
2007
Sead Avic Indep. Member of parliament. Sarajevo, June 2007
Members of the NGO ‘The Dayton Project’
NAME POSITION DATE INTERVIEW
Amb. Donald Hays Leading member of the secretariat. 
Founder Dayton Project and Ex- 
Principal Deputy HR.
Washington DC, 29 July 2006 
Washington DC, October 2007
Meghan Stewart Member of the secretariat (senior 
Officer, PILPG).
Washington DC, 31 July 2006
Prof. Bruce Hitchner Member of the secretariat 
(Director, Dayton Project, Tuft 
University, Boston).
[No interview granted]
Prof. Paul Williams Member of the secretariat 
(Director PILPG)
[Meeting cancelled]
Zoran-Matija Kulundzic Project manager, Dayton Project Sarajevo, 26 June 2007
Emir Kaknjasevic Personal Assist. Donald Hays Sarajevo, 22 May 2007
Anonymous source Dayton Project BiH Sarajevo, 6 June 2007
Maja Marjanovic Dayton Project, Outreach 
Actitvities.
Sarajevo, 16 May 2007
Ahmed Zilic Attorney & Founder Dayton 
Project BiH
Sarajevo, 30 May 2007
Anonymous source Dayton project BiH. Sarajevo, 25 June 2007
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Key International Players
NAME POSITION1199 DATE
Amb. Douglas 
McElhaney
US Ambassador to BiH No interview granted
Anonymous source US diplomat Banja Luka, 12 June 2007
Amb. Matthew Rycroft UK Ambassador to BiH Sarajevo, 7 June 2007
Michael Humphreys Head of the European 
Delegation in BiH
Phone interview, 15 April 
2009
Tim Cartwright Special Representative of the 
Secretary Geneneral, Council of 
Europe, Sarajevo office.
Sarajevo, 19 June 2007
Dr. Christian Schwarz- 
Schilling
High Representative in BiH 
(2006-2007)
Sarajevo, 10 July 2007
Lord Paddy Ashdown HR in BiH (2002-2006) [Declined interview]
Amb. Dr. Werner 
Almhofer
Ambassador, Embassy of 
Austria to BiH.
Sarajevo, 15 June 2007
Anonymous source European official in Bosnia. Sarajevo, 16 May 2007
Jose Luis Sanchez Alegre Deputy Director, Bosnia Desk, 
European Commission.
Brussels, 23 June 2006
Stefan Simosas Current Head of the Political 
Department at OHR/EUSR.
Sarajevo, 14 July 2009
Anders Hedlund Counsellor, Embassy of Sweden, 
BIH.
Sarajevo, May 2007
Didier Chassot Deputy Head of Mission, 
Embassy of Switzerland, BiH.
Sarajevo, 1 June 2007
Thomas Ruegg Country Director, Swiss 
Cooperation Office BiH, 
Embassy of Switzerland, BiH.
Sarajevo, 29 May 2007
Position held during the process of constitutional reform.
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- Other Actors and Informants-
International Actors/Informants
NAME POSITION DATE
Anonymous Source Western diplomat Sarajevo, 2 July 2007
Richard Jones Second Secretary, UK Embassy, 
BiH.
Sarajevo, 12 December 2006
Enver Ferhatovic Senior Political Advisor, Strategy 
and Planning Section, Political 
Department at OHR
Sarajevo, 15 May 2007
Prof. Joseph Marko Advisor to Schwarz-Schilling on 
constitutional reform. Former Judge 
to the BiH Constitutional Court
Sarajevo, 26 June 2007
Anonymous Source Western diplomat Sarajevo, 1 July 2007
Michael Haner Advisor, Rule of Law 
Implementation Unit, OHR
Sarajevo, 24 May 2007
Mladen Golac Political Officer, OHR Banja Luka Banja Luka, 11 June 2007
Anonymous Source European diplomat in Bosnia Sarajevo, 17 May 2007 
Sarajevo, 28 June 2007
Jasna Jelisic Political Advisor & Member of the 
Constitutional Reform Task Force 
(2007), Political Department, 
EUSR
Sarajevo, 17 May 2007
OHR Official Legal department, OHR Sarajevo, July 2009.
Konstantin Woebking Head of Economic and Political 
Sector, EU Delegation in BiH
Sarajevo, 8 December 2006
Branka Bujak National Political Officer, EUPM 
Banja Luka.
Banja Luka, 13 June 2007
Juan carlos antunez Advisor, EUFOR. Sarajevo, 2 July 1007
Sergio Valcarcel Advisor, EUFOR. Sarajevo, 2 July 2007
Kurt Bassuener Consultant & former political 
advisor, Political Department, OHR
Sarajevo, 14 December 2006 
Sarajevo, 8 June 2007
Willem Van Rossen Political Officer, Embassy of 
Netherlands, BiH.
Sarajevo, 15 June 2007
Nicholas Walton BBC correspondent in Sarajevo Sarajevo, 26 May 2007
Steve Lee Consultant, Legislative 
Strengthening Program, OSCE.
Sarajevo, June 2007
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Brussels-based Officials
NAME POSITION DATE
Axel Wallden Officer, Enlargement Directorate, European 
Commission
Brussels, 23 June 2006
Michael Aldaya Officer for BiH, Assistance Desk 
(CARDS), Enlargement Directorate, 
European Commission
Brussels, 22 June 2006
Jorge Espina Seconded Officer, Rule of law unit, 
Enlargement Directorate, European 
Commission
Brussels, 23 June 2006
Ricardo Alonso 
Criado
Administrator, DG E I Enlargement 
General Secretariat, Council of the EU
Brussels, 23 June 2006
Ignasi Guardans 
i Cambo
Member of the European Parliament, 
Permanent member of Delegation for 
Southeastern Europe, European Parliament.
Brussels, 20 June 2006
Francesco 
Bruzzese Del 
Pozzo
Principal Administrator, Police Unit 
General Secretariat, Council of the EU.
Brussels, 23 June 2006
Domestic Actors
NAME POSITION DATE
Osman
Topcagic
Director, BiH’s Directorate for European 
Integration, BiH.
Sarajevo, 2 July, 2007
Srdan
Ljubojevic
Head, Coordination unit, BiH’s 
Directorate for European Integration.
Sarajevo, 13 Decmeber, 2006
Amer
Obradovic
Advisor to Senad Pecin, Deputy Minister 
of Civil Affairs
Sarajevo, 14 July 2009
Azim Mujkic Prof. Political Science, University of 
Sarajevo
Sarajevo, 9 May 2007
Dino Abazovic Prof. Sociology, University of Sarajevo Sarajevo, 10 May 2007
Ugo
Vlaisavljevic
Prof. Philosophy, University of Sarajevo Sarajevo, 22 May 2007
Jasna Belkic Law Professor, University of Sarajevo Sarajevo, 10 May 2007
Ivan Barbalic President of ACIPS (Ass. Alumni of the 
Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgradute 
Studies).
Sarajevo, 16 May 2007
Hasel Huskic Research Associate, ACIPS Sarajevo, 16 May 2007
Miroslav
2ivanovic
Head of Library, Center for Human Rights Sarajevo, May 2007
Srecko Latal Press officer, World Bank Sarajevo, 17 May 2007
Tanja Topic Program officer, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 
Foundation, Banja Luka office.
Banja Luka, 13 June 2007
Tarik Zoimovic Portfolio Manager, UNDP BiH Sarajevo, 15 May 2007
Tarik Cerik Advisor, Aid Coordination Division, 
Directorate of European Integration, BiH
Sarajevo, December 2006 
Sarajevo, May 2007
Ermin Sarajlija East-West Management Institute, USAID 
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Appendix 2: Map of Bosnia after Dayton
Source: Office of the High Representative
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Appendix 3: Map of Ethnic Distribution in Bosnia (1991 Census)
Source: Office of the High Representative
Ethnic composition before the war in BiH (1991)
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